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Chapter 1
Overview
Macroeconomists dedicated substantial eﬀorts to clarify the puzzle of growing incomes in some
regions of the world and rising diﬀerences in standards of living across the globe. Although
the question of why economies perform diﬀerently is as old as the theory of economic thought
itself, it is only since recent times that economists integrate development patterns over the
very long-run into formal dynamic general equilibrium models. The models we present here
consider development patterns observed in advanced economies since the Industrial Revolu-
tion. The objective of this study is to shed light on the mechanics of economic development
within the frame of (dynamic) general equilibrium models. Since this requires the solution of
multi-dimensional and non-linear systems of diﬀerence or diﬀerential equations that govern
the evolution of the model economy over time (in some cases with heterogeneous agents) an-
alytical solutions are in general not obtainable. Therefore, this work relies on numerical and
computational methods at large, in order to visualize the development path of economies over
time. In the remainder of this chapter we provide a more detailed motivation of the study
and an overview of the main results.
Remarkably, both rising standards of living as well as increasing diﬀerences in standards of
living are a rather recent phenomenon. Until the nineteenth century inequality in terms of
income per capita was nearly absent. The ratio of income per capita between the richest and
the poorest regions of the world increased from a 3:1 ratio in 1820 to a 18:1 ratio in the year
2000 (Galor, 2011). Before the Industrial Revolution, the process of economic development
1
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was marked by Malthusian stagnation over the entire history of human existence. During
the Malthusian epoch increases in income per capita generated by technological progress or
through an expansion in the amount of arable land induced increases in fertility rates and
the size of the population. Since increases in income per capita were counteracted by in-
creases in the size of the population, diﬀerences in technologies were reﬂected by diﬀerences
in population sizes but not by diﬀerences in incomes per capita. As the initial stages of the
Industrial Revolution were still marked by a positive association between income per capita
and fertility, this regime has been labeled as the Post-Malthusian regime. Growth rates of
income per capita increased from averagely 0.05% per year between 1500 and 1820 to 0.5%
during 1820-1870. At the same time, the population’s growth rate increased from 0.27% per
year during 1500-1820 to 0.4% per year in 1820-1870 (Galor, 2011). In this period of the
Industrial Revolution, the production process relied on the employment of unskilled labor
at large. Further expansions of the industrial sector and technological advances, however,
changed the skill requirements in the production process and paved the way for the modern
growth regime. The increased importance of human capital formation induced parents to
devote more resources to each child and to reduce their desired level of fertility. More human
capital per child increases the productivity of the future labor force and stimulates further
technological progress, while the population growth rate is shrinking. Hence, the transition
from stagnation to growth originated by the Industrial Revolution has been accompanied by
a massive shift in demographic variables, the demographic transition. The related decline in
fertility rates was mainly the result of increasing parental expenditures for their oﬀspring’s
human capital which paved ultimately the way for sustained economic growth in per capita
terms (Galor and Weil, 2000 and Galor, 2011). According to this view diﬀerences in growth
rates and levels of income per capita is owed to diﬀerential timings in the onset of the de-
mographic transition. In addition to technological progress that - through its impact on the
demand for human capital - reverses the relationship between income and population growth
with respect to the regime of Malthusian stagnation (Galor and Weil, 2000), various expla-
nations for the demographic transition have been advanced. Increasing real wages raise the
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opportunity cost of having children, and lower fertility generates positive feedback eﬀects on
economic growth through capital accumulation (Galor and Weil, 1996). Moreover, there may
be trade-oﬀs between the quality and quantity of children in parents’ desires, that introduce
a bias against quantity due to parents’ aspirations (Mulligan, 1997), the forces of natural
selection (Galor and Moav, 2002), increased longevity (Ehrlich and Lui, 1991), or interactions
between education choices and unobservable skills of children (Becker, 1991). Finally, the
fertility decline may be associated with changing patterns in intergenerational transfers - the
so-called Caldwell hypothesis (Caldwell, 1982). At low levels of economic development, the
average family size is large as transfers ﬂow from the young to the old - the so called old-age
security hypothesis. In developed economies, family size is small as the net transfer ﬂow is
from parents to children. The idea that population dynamics are governed by the direction
of transfers has been formalized by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who assume that agents
optimally choose the amount of transfers to both parents and children, and show that two-
sided altruism generates development paths that are consistent with the Caldwell hypothesis.
In Chapter 2 we add a complementary explanation to the multi-dimensional factors re-
sponsible for the observed fertility decline, in the sense that fertility choices interact with
status-dependent preferences. In particular, we argue that habit formation generates reallo-
cation eﬀects that help explain the decline in fertility rates. Most if not all theoretical models
of fertility assume that intertemporal choices are based on standard time-separable prefer-
ences deﬁned over absolute consumption levels. However, there is now a large consensus on
the fact that preferences are status- and time-dependent in reality. A growing body of empir-
ical evidence shows that economic agents form habits, and tend to assess present satisfaction
on the basis of deviations from the standards of living enjoyed in the past (Osborn, 1988;
Fuhrer and Klein, 1998; Fuhrer, 2000; Guariglia and Rossi, 2002). In particular, we formalize
the idea that persistently low fertility rates can be induced by status-dependent preferences
because agents internalize previous standards of living into their saving motives and fertility
choices. This reasoning may be linked to the observation that low-reproduction strategies -
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i.e. intentional choices aimed at preserving the family property and status - ceased to be an
exclusive feature of the aristocracy already in the 19th century, as the same behavior grad-
ually spread across the bourgeoisie, land- owners, and other social classes (Johansson, 1987;
Haines, 1992).
In the epoch of Malthusian stagnation non-reproduceable natural resources (land) limited
the level of population and living standards from above. Apparently non renewable natural
resources are still a restriction for the evolution of income per capita although the focus has
shifted more towards the supply of energy stemming from non renewable resources. The liter-
ature on research and development based growth models treats population growth largely as
an exogenous variable and suggests within the frame of scale-invariant growth models (Jones,
1995) a positive association between the population’s growth rate and productivity growth
along the balanced growth path. In view of non-renewable resources the emergence of sus-
tained economic growth in the long run depends essentially on the rate of technical progress.
But what happens, if technological progress reduces the populations’ growth rate as discussed
above?
In Chapter 3, we therefore present a scale-invariant model of endogenous growth with en-
dogenous population growth and non-renewable natural resources. In this model parents
decide rationally about the number of children and their educational level, where the latter
is driven by the expected skilled-wage premium. Educational choices of parents for their oﬀ-
spring generate diﬀerential fertility between skilled and unskilled households, in the spirit of
Galor and Mountford (2006), and de la Croix and Doepke (2003). The skilled-wage premium
depends on the skill bias of technological progress (Acemoglu, 1998; 2002). In this fashion
directed technological progress is responsive to the skilled-unskilled labor ratio, which is in
our setting an outcome of educational investments and fertility decisions of parents for their
children. In addition, production is subject to an essential and non-renewable natural re-
source.
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By integrating the interaction between skill-biased technological change, declining population
growth and resource depletion into a theoretical framework, our paper relates to the following
empirical regularities and theoretical building blocks: In the past sixty years, the relative
supply of skilled labor has increased sharply in the U.S. as well as in other industrialized
countries. Moreover, and contrary to the predictions of a neoclassical framework with con-
cave production technologies, there has been a sharp increase in the skilled wage premium
since the 1970s. The standard explanation for this pattern is an acceleration in the skill
bias of capital-embodied technological change (Autor et al., 1998 and Hornstein et al., 2005).
Increasing demand for human capital and increasing wages can be seen as being responsible
for the decline in average fertility rates. At the same time, OECD petroleum consumption
amounted to 57% of the world petroleum consumption (U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, 2008) while per capita energy use diﬀers between the richest and the poorest group of
countries by a factor ten (Weil, 2005). Moreover, OECD petroleum consumption increased by
a factor greater than two between 1960 and 2005 (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2006). This piece of evidence points into the direction that economic development comes
along - at least during the transition - with declining fertility rates and an increasing deple-
tion of non renewable natural resources. Since skill-biased technological progress induces a
decline in fertility rates, we argue that productivity growth may dig its own grave through
the induced feed-back eﬀect on fertility rates and may generate by itself a threat on long-run
growth. We believe that this results have strong implications for economic policies aiming
at sustainable development in view of nonrenewable natural resources, since the long-run
productivity growth rate is not policy invariant anymore and dependent on the endogenous
population’s growth rate as well as the depletion rate of natural resources.
In Chapter 4 we analyze a diﬀerent link between the environment and economic develop-
ment in the sense that the transition from stagnation to growth originated by the Industrial
Revolution caused, via an immense degradation of the environment, adverse eﬀects on indi-
viduals’ health state in terms of morbidity and life expectancy. The initially adverse impact of
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economic development on individuals’ health is mirrored in the evolution of life expectancies
at birth. Average life expectancies at birth stagnated during the second phase of the Indus-
trial Revolution and started to increase only in the last four decades of the 19th century. In
cities, life expectancies at birth started even to decline and reached a level passed in the 15th
century already, although per capita output was already growing.
Bairoch (1988) documents impressively the initial increase and the subsequent decline in child
mortality rates in cities relative to rural areas during the onset of the Industrial Revolution un-
til the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. It is well documented that the gap in mortality rates
between cities and rural areas was evoked by environmental degradation and pollution. Even
in the presence, externalities of the growth process on the environment are well documented,
for example the combined health and non-health cost of outdoor air and water pollution for
China’s economy comes to around 5.8% of the GDP per year (World Bank, 2007). Chay
and Greenstone (2003) provide evidence for the impact of air pollution on infant mortality
in the U.S. during the recession period 1981-82 and conclude that a 1-percent reduction in
total suspended particulates results in a 0.35-percent decline in infant mortality at the county
level.
We will argue that economic development may be conducive for children’s survival probabili-
ties, but may also generate adverse impacts on children’s probability to survive to adulthood.
Higher child mortality reduces in turn the willingness of parents to invest in children’s educa-
tion and increases their desired level of fertility. In this context, economic inequality in terms
of agents’ relative human capital endowments induces diﬀerential fertility a la de la Croix and
Doepke (2003, 2004) meaning that less educated households tend to choose higher fertility
rates than households with higher human capital attainments. Moreover inequality triggers
agents’ exposure to environmental pollution because wealthier households live in cleaner areas.
The exposure to pollutants aﬀects again children’s probability to survive to adulthood and
the willingness of parents to invest in education. This is the key mechanism and the novelty
of our approach through which environmental conditions may impose a growth drag on the
economy. Regionally diﬀering exposures to pollutants intensify the link between inequality
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and the demographic transition, i.e. more inequality delays the fertility decline, increases the
populations’ growth rate and reduces growth. In addition, preferred levels of tax-ﬁnanced
abatement measures diﬀer between population groups with diﬀerent exposures to pollutants,
in the sense that the least aﬀected population group prefers the lowest tax rate. Thus, the
adverse eﬀect of inequality and pollution on economic growth is ampliﬁed, if the population
group that is least aﬀected decides about the level of abatement measures. Within this frame,
we are able to replicate the historical development path in accordance to empirical patterns:
ﬁrst, in early stages of economic development, there is no abatement since the marginal ben-
eﬁt of abating is low. Moreover, the preferred amount of abatement is inversely related to
agents’ exposure to pollutants, i.e. wealthier agents prefer less abatement. Second, there is
a slow take-oﬀ in terms of income per capita growth. Third, the pollution stock increases
through economic development. Fourth, the evolution of the populations’ growth rate and
the evolution of children’s regional mortality diﬀerentials is hump-shaped.
In the last two chapters, we analyzed economies that were characterized by heterogeneities
in terms of education. In the previous chapter, we showed that this inequality may be re-
sponsible for diﬀerent preferences about tax-ﬁnanced abatement measures and eventually
reinforcing the negative link between inequality and growth. Apparently, heterogeneities may
be responsible for conﬂicting interests with respect to the amount and the direction of public
expenditures. We believe that the way these conﬂicts are carried out has ﬁrst-order implica-
tions for economic eﬃciency and economic development.
In the following Chapter 5 we therefore focus on social conﬂicts among diﬀerent groups of a
society, i.e. members of the same social group are identical but diﬀer to members of another
social group. We consider an economy populated by two types of agents: capitalists and
workers. The important feature is that workers and capitalists are asymmetrically aﬀected
by changes in the tax rate. Moreover, capitalists can invest their capital abroad. Government
revenues are used to ﬁnance productive government expenditures and lump-sum transfers in
favor of workers. Tax revenues are collected by levying a unique income tax on capital and
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labor income. Thus the model captures a fundamental distributional conﬂict, namely the
struggle over market income net of taxes and transfers between capitalists and workers in
modern societies. Conﬂict over the distribution of resources (i.e. ”distributional conﬂict”) is
an unavoidable characteristic of every market economy. These conﬂicts are typically carried
out via the political process. The probably most important channel consists in the manipula-
tion of the tax and expenditure system by major interest groups in their favor. We contribute
to the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of distributional conﬂicts along three
dimensions: (i) The political mechanism, which gives rise to the equilibrium tax rates, de-
viates from the most commonly used political mechanism, i.e. the median voter principle.
More speciﬁcally, we will argue that the (relative) strength of major interest groups might
aﬀect the political outcome. The political mechanism employed in this paper, despite its
simplicity, is consistent with this observation. Moreover, the model gives rise to a richer set
of implications. Depending on the parameters of the model, the political equilibrium belongs
to one of three regimes (”dominance of capitalists”, ”dominance of workers”, ”no group dom-
inates”). A further advantage is that the political mechanism employed in this paper allows
us to distinguish between the presence and the absence of strategic interaction in the political
sphere. (ii) The analysis shows that the decentralized equilibrium is generally ineﬃcient. An
interesting result is that the decentralized tax rate can be either too high or too low. This
implies that it is not in general one group which can be held responsible for an ineﬃcient
tax rate. The distributional conﬂict gives rise to either ”weak ineﬃciency” (i.e. the tax rate
deviates from the ﬁrst-best solution but a change in the tax rate would at least hurt one
group) or ”strong ineﬃciency” (i.e. the tax rate deviates from the ﬁrst-best solution and can
be changed such that both groups would be better oﬀ). (iii) The main contribution of the
paper lies, however, in the decomposition of the overall distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency into
three components. The ﬁrst component reﬂects a fundamental time inconsistency problem,
which is due to the fact that dominant groups are in general unable to commit to a speciﬁc
policy (Acemoglu, 2003). The second component is associated with the presence of strategic
interaction in the political process. The third component results from heterogeneity among
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individuals and the resulting unavoidable conﬂict of interest. Since the underlying general
equilibrium model captures the major characteristics relevant for the analysis of distributional
conﬂicts, we employ a calibrated version of the model (using OECD data) to demonstrate the
numerical importance of distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency. The model implies a proportional
output loss of about 7%, which indicates that the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency may be
quite substantial. We also use the calibrated model to assess the relative importance of the
three components mentioned above (time inconsistency, strategic interaction, heterogeneity).
In the following two chapters, we abstract from distributional conﬂicts but allow for mobil-
ity of labor, i.e. migration, in addition to international mobility of capital and analyze the
consequences of a large integration shock on the economy. There are numerous examples
in economic history of economies that have experienced a comprehensive integration into a
larger economic entity or into the global economy. Examples comprise the ﬁrst era of glob-
alization (about 1820 until 1913) with nearly perfect capital mobility and mass migration
among Atlantic economies (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999), the uniﬁcation of South and
North Italy in 1862 (Boltho et al., 1997), the German Reuniﬁcation in 1991 (Sinn, 2002)
and the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 to include many of the East European
economies (Mora et al., 2004). What are the dynamic consequences with regard to income
and welfare of such comprehensive integration shocks for speciﬁc regions or economies? The
answer to this question appears all but trivial.
Our analysis in Chapter 6 contributes to a better understanding of the interaction between
expectations and fundamentals in models with indeterminacy. It is shown that (i) the relative
importance of expectations as a determinant of economic success depends on total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) and (ii) admissible expectations depend on fundamentals (initial conditions
and TFP) in a systematic fashion. This insight has far reaching economic implications. For
instance, it is shown that bad institutions may hinder favorable economic development be-
cause suﬃciently optimistic expectations cannot be fundamentally warranted under this side
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condition.
We argue that a careful analysis should account for capital mobility, migration, and increasing
returns to scale (IRS). The employed model features multiple equilibria (ME) as well as (local
and global) indeterminacy. We clarify the mechanics that may lead an integrating economy
to the good or to the bad equilibrium by showing how fundamentals and expectations interact
in the process of equilibrium selection. The model is then applied to replicate two striking
empirical characteristics of macroeconomic development in East Germany since 1991.
In search for an answer to our research question, international trade theory seems to be the
natural starting point. Provided that a set of neoclassical conditions (including constant
returns to scale) holds, trade liberalization induces, ﬁrst, (incomplete) specialization in goods
production according to the principle of comparative advantages and, second, international
equalization of factor rewards. Additional FMI would add no further implications. However,
the consequences of goods trade and FMI diﬀer drastically if one believes in IRS. Goods trade
then induces complete specialization in goods production, whereas factor price equalization
does not apply anymore. FMI, on the other hand, may lead to declining areas or set the stage
for prospering regions by attracting capital and labor. Interestingly, Paul Romer has recently
proposed an innovative development strategy, labeled ”charter cities”, which rests on IRS,
sound institutions and complete factor mobility (Romer, 2010).
Consequently, a careful discussion of the question raised above should take IRS and factor
mobility into account. Moreover, IRS in endogenous input factors, as is well known, may
give rise to ME. An important question, then, is how the process of equilibrium selection
works. We develop a simple one-sector model of a small open economy to study the dynamic
consequences of FMI under IRS. FMI means that both input factors get access to an outside
option, i.e. capital can be invested abroad and workers may start to emigrate. Agents (capital
owners and workers) form rational expectations about future factor rewards. The model fea-
tures ME as well as (local and global) indeterminacy. There is a multiplicity of expectations
which give rise to self-fulﬁlling prophecies. A number of non-trivial implications are obtained:
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(i) The success of economic development in response to FMI is determined by history and
expectations. (ii) The relative importance of expectations as determinant of economic success
depends on TFP. The economic reason is simply that the interdependence of decisions (across
groups) to engage in the domestic market sector increases with TFP. (iii) The model implies
that there is a multiplicity of admissible initial expectations. Admissibility means that initial
expectations must be fundamentally warranted. Initial expectations do hence interact with
fundamentals (initial conditions and TFP) in a systematic fashion. This implies that, for
instance, bad institutions (red tape and corruption), which have a detrimental impact on
TFP, may block favorable economic development because suﬃciently optimistic expectations
cannot be fundamentally warranted under this side condition.
In the previous chapter, we shed light on the relationship between capital formation and in-
terregional labor mobility and emphasized how equilibrium selection and dynamics depend
on both expectations and initial conditions in a multi-region model where increasing returns
give rise to multiple equilibria.
In the following Chapter 7 we put stronger emphasize on migration while increasing returns
to scale are absent. Immigration leads to both higher prices for non-tradable goods like hous-
ing services and higher rental rates of land. Increased housing costs may reduce welfare of
natives and trigger supply responses like residential investment. We develop a two-sector,
overlapping-generations model with land-intensive production in the non-tradable goods sec-
tor to investigate the eﬀects of interregional labor market integration. In order to capture
supply-responses for non-tradables to changes in population density, we allow for endogenous
capital formation in an integrated capital market under capital stock adjustment costs. The
goal of this research is twofold. First, we examine whether, and under which circumstances,
the relationship between interregional ﬂows of migration and physical capital is positive or
negative. Historically, there are examples for both possibilities. For instance, the ﬁrst era of
globalization in the 19th century was characterized by simultaneous capital and labor ﬂows
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from Europe to the US (e.g. O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Solimano and Watts, 2005). In
the process of European integration, labor was migrating from Southern and Eastern mem-
bers of the European Union (EU) to the UK and Western EU countries like Germany or the
UK. However, at least temporarily, capital was ﬂowing in the other direction or was accumu-
lated faster in some emigration countries. Our results suggest that integration of the labor
market into a large economy implies that emigration (immigration) goes along with decreased
(increased) capital formation when initially the capital stock was close to its pre-integration
steady state level. This may explain factor ﬂows in the ﬁrst era of globalization. However,
if the capital stock is initially low and the population density high, emigration may occur
at the same time as the capital stock accumulates. This is consistent with movements of
capital and labor in opposite directions in the EU integration process. Moreover, it ﬁts into
the German experience after the uniﬁcation in 1990, characterized by an investment boom in
East Germany and labor migration at large scale from East to West (e.g. Burda, 2006).
Second, we investigate welfare eﬀects of changes in the population density in response to labor
market integration. Our results suggest that reservations to immigration may be justiﬁed from
the perspective of the host country’s population despite the absence of wage eﬀects. Welfare
eﬀects of interregional labor market integration depends on the ownership distribution of
land. Whereas individuals without residential property will surely lose due to increased
housing costs, landowners may win from immigration. This highlights potentially substantial
distributional eﬀects of immigration which are typically neglected in the previous literature.
Our paper does also provide a candidate explanation for the widely observable phenomenon
of reverse migration, i.e. aggregate net outward migration followed by aggregate net inward
migration later on. Prominent examples comprise Ireland (between Atlantic globalization
during the 19th century and the post-WWII period), regions in East Germany between the
German reuniﬁcation in 1990 and 2012 (data available upon request) and Poland between EU
enlargement in 2004 and 2012. Standard neoclassical models which rest on constant returns
to scale cannot explain such phenomena (e.g., Braun, 1993 or Burda 2006). To explain such
non-monotonicities in the time path of a region’s population one usually employs models with
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increasing returns to scale (e.g., see Chapter 6). We show that our model setup allows for
non-monotonicies and can hence explain reverse migration in a straightforward and intuitive
manner.
Our focus on implications of migration on the dynamics of housing costs and land prices and
their consequences on capital formation and welfare is the key novelty of the paper.
In Chapter 8, we analyze endogenous intellectual property rights protection and its implica-
tions on growth and welfare within a classical North-South trade model. As trade of knowledge
intensive goods accelerated during the last decades, patent and copyright infringements have
become a problem of highest concern. Although the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) speciﬁes a minimum set of protection standards that
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have to assent to, the enforcement of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) is still a source of great international heterogeneity and
further fuels the debate about the optimal protection level of IPRs in the world.
For example, the European Commission’s IPR Enforcement Report 2009 gives account of
serious problems with IPR-enforcement in a large number of mostly developing countries.
Complaints include that injunctions or criminal sanctions are often diﬃcult to obtain and
civil procedures are lengthy and burdensome with high uncertainty of outcomes. Involved
staﬀ is insuﬃciently trained, lacks resources to eﬀectively prosecute and convict violators,
and cooperation between authorities is insuﬃcient. For some countries the report even as-
sesses a lack of political will indicated by their opposing in-depth enforcement discussions
in international fora such as the WTO or the WIPO.1 Studying the distributional eﬀects
of TRIPs, McCalman (2001) argues that the agreement involves transfers from developing
countries to developed countries due to stronger IPR protection. These transfers are primar-
ily determined by enforcement eﬀorts rather than the extension of the coverage of patent
protection. Thus, he reasons that the developing countries “will be more willing to extend
1See EU Commission (2009). A similar picture is drawn in the annual Special 301 Reports by the U.S.
Trade Representative, see Oﬃce of U.S. Trade Representative (2010).
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the coverage of patent protection as required by TRIPs, but may be less willing to devote
adequate resources to enforcement”. Further he predicted that “future North-South tensions
over intellectual property rights are likely to be centered around enforcement issues rather
than the sectoral coverage of protection oﬀered” ( McCalman, P. (2002),p. 181). The recent
debate on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) also indicates that questions on
IPR-enforcement are among the most ﬁercely discussed living causes. ACTA was worked out
in secret negotiations with the aim to harmonize international standards of IPR-enforcement.2
An agreement has been reached in April 2011 between several countries among them the U.S.
and the E.U.3 An ultimate objective of ACTA is that large emerging economies, “where IPR
could be improved will sign up to the global pact” ( EU Commission ,2008). However, the
European Parliament has voted against ACTA on July 4, 2012, thereby opposing the Euro-
pean Commission, which will now seek the legal opinion of the European Court of Justice
and approach the European Parliament to ﬁnd an agreement in the future.4
Inspired by these recent developments, this paper develops an endogenous growth framework
to study IPR-enforcement within the context of a classical North-South trade model. At
the heart of our analysis is the governments’ classical trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency and
dynamic gains extended by international externalities of IPR-protection with regard to R&D
incentives and proﬁt ﬂows.5 By choosing IPR-enforcement, the government has to trade
oﬀ welfare today - by incurring deadweight losses and R&D costs - against future welfare
resulting from a higher technological level. Without internalizing the full future beneﬁts of
innovations, an oﬃce-term motivated government may be more reluctant to bear the costs of
great innovative activity implying a substantial burden on current welfare.
As a consequence, we ﬁnd that in the decentralized equilibrium of the IPR-enforcement
game between the North and the South, the relation between the North’s equilibrium IPR-
2A comparison between ACTA and TRIPs can be found at e.g.
https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/ .
3The countries are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.S.
4See EU Commission (2012).
5The trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency and dynamic gains was ﬁrst discussed by Nordhaus(1969).
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enforcement level and its own research productivity exhibits an inverted U-shape. When the
research capacity is low, the dynamic gains of IPR-enforcement dominate and the enforcement
level increases with a higher productivity of research. However, if the research capacity is very
high, the farsighted ﬁrms’ R&D investments and the deadweight losses are very large reducing
current consumption and welfare levels. This can lead a short-sighted Northern government
to reduce IPR-enforcement in response to an even higher research productivity. As the South
does not engage in R&D, it neglects research expenditures but considers its inﬂuence on the
R&D activity in the North. Accordingly, the South’s equilibrium IPR-enforcement increases
monotonically with the North’s innovative capacity. Hence, the oﬃce-motivated government
in the North possesses higher incentives to enforce IPR than the one in the South when the
North’s R&D productivity is low, while the opposite may be the case for very high levels of
R&D productivity. Further we ﬁnd that a country’s relative market size positively aﬀects its
equilibrium IPR-enforcement level. The intuition is that a larger country’s impact on R&D
incentives is relatively higher and therefore its incentive to free-ride on the other region’s
IPR-eﬀorts are lower.
By analyzing the regions’ preferred harmonized IPR-enforcement levels at the global scale,
we seek to shed light on potential clashes of interest in international negotiation rounds. We
compare the preferred harmonized enforcement levels with those chosen in the decentralized
equilibrium and relate both to the constrained-eﬃcient solution reﬂecting the maximum wel-
fare the two governments can achieve given they are not able to escape their political-economy
constraints.
Both, the North’s and the South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement levels are higher than
their respective equilibrium choices. While the South’s preferred harmonized enforcement
level is independent of relative market sizes, the one of the North typically exhibits a declining
relationship with its relative market size. The reason is that a larger relative market size
of the North involves relatively lower proﬁt inﬂows from the South and higher deadweight
losses in the North. This contrasts with the decentralized equilibrium where the North’s
equilibrium IPR-enforcement level is positively associated with its relative market size. This
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result suggests that small innovative countries show large diﬀerences between their desired
harmonized levels supported in negotiation rounds concerning global IPR-enforcement and
their own equilibrium choices.
Further, we ﬁnd that relative to the constrained-eﬃcient solution the regions’ IPR-enforce-
ment levels in the decentralized equilibrium are too low. By contrast, the North’s desired
harmonized enforcement level is typically higher than the constrained eﬃcient one while
that of the South is lower. As a consequence, the regions’ growth rate is highest when the
harmonized IPR-enforcement level of the North is implemented. Would this rate of growth
come at the expense of welfare in the South? A numerical illustration suggests that the
South may well gain in terms of aggregate long-run welfare by adopting the North’s desired
harmonized IPR-enforcement level given a suﬃciently productive R&D sector in the North.
However, the opposite holds for low research capacities in the North.
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Abstract
We study the general equilibrium properties of two growth models with overlapping genera-
tions, habit formation and endogenous fertility. In the neoclassical model, habits modify the
economy’s growth rate and generate transitional dynamics in fertility; stationary income per
capita is associated with either increasing or decreasing population and output, depending on
the strength of habits. In the AK speciﬁcation, growing population and increasing consump-
tion per capita require that the habit coeﬃcient lie within deﬁnite boundaries; outside the
critical interval, positive growth is associated with either declining consumption due to over-
crowding, or extinction paths with declining population. In both frameworks, habits reduce
fertility: the trade-oﬀ between second-period consumption and spending for bequests prompts
agents to decrease fertility in order to make parental altruism less costly. This mechanism
suggests that status-dependent preferences may explain part of the decline in fertility rates
observed in most developed economies.
Keywords: Economic Growth, Endogenous Fertility, Habit Formation, Intergenerational Al-
truism
JEL: D91, J10, O11.
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2.1 Introduction
One of the major stylized facts that characterized the development process of industrialized
economies is the decline in fertility rates. In developed countries, the transition from rapid
population growth to low net fertility rates began with the second phase of industrialization in
the nineteenth century. Birth rates declined faster than mortality rates, yielding a substantial
reduction in net population growth - a phenomenon labelled as the demographic transition.
After World War II, net fertility rates reached exceptionally low levels, and fell short of the
’replacement threshold’ even in countries where fertility had traditionally been high - e.g.
Spain and Italy.1 In less developed countries, the fertility transition started in the mid-1960s,
and it was particularly rapid in East Asia.
In spite of institutional diﬀerences, demographic transitions regularly characterized economic
development throughout the industrialized world. The study of the causal relations behind
the fertility decline attracted the attention of several economists, and the renewed interest in
formal growth theories inspired a new body of literature that analyzes endogenous population
dynamics. Various explanations for the demographic transition have been advanced. First,
declining fertility rates may be due to technological progress that - through its impact on
the demand for human capital - reverses the relationship between income and population
growth with respect to the regime of Malthusian stagnation (Galor and Weil, 2000). Second,
increasing real wages raise the opportunity cost of having children, and lower fertility gener-
ates positive feedback eﬀects on economic growth through capital accumulation (Galor and
Weil, 1996). Third, there may be trade-oﬀs between the quality and quantity of children in
parents’ desires, that introduce a bias against quantity due to parents’ aspirations (Mulligan,
1997), the forces of natural selection (Galor and Moav, 2002), increased longevity (Ehrlich
and Lui, 1991), or interactions between education choices and unobservable skills of children
(Becker, 1991). Fourth, fertility decline may be associated with changing patterns in inter-
1Spain and Italy are nowadays among the countries with the lowest fertility rates in the world. The total
fertility rate fell from around 3 in 1960, to 1.2 in 2000, that is well below the replacement level of 2.1 (Kohler
et al. 2002).
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generational transfers - the so-called Caldwell hypothesis (Caldwell, 1982). At low levels of
economic development, the average family size is large as transfers ﬂow from the young to
the old. In developed economies, family size is small as the net transfer ﬂow is from parents
to children. The idea that population dynamics are governed by the direction of transfers
has been formalized in a recent contribution by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who assume
that agents optimally choose the amount of transfers to both parents and children, and show
that two-sided altruism generates development paths that are consistent with the Caldwell
hypothesis.
Empirical evidence and quantitative analyses suggest that each of these views has its merits,
though a monocausal explanation for (i) the low fertility rates currently observed in devel-
oped countries, and (ii) the demographic transition experienced by most Western economies,
is unlikely to hold (see Mateos-Planas, 2002; Doepke, 2005; Lagerlo¨f, 2006).2 The aim of this
paper is not to challenge previous explanations, but rather to investigate an additional mecha-
nism through which fertility choices might have been aﬀected by economic development. The
basic idea is that fertility choices interact with status-dependent preferences. In particular,
we argue that habit formation generates reallocation eﬀects that help explain the decline in
fertility rates.
Most if not all theoretical models of fertility assume that intertemporal choices are based on
standard time-separable preferences deﬁned over absolute consumption levels. However, there
is now a large consensus on the fact that preferences are status- and time-dependent in reality.
A growing body of empirical evidence shows that economic agents form habits, and tend to
assess present satisfaction on the basis of deviations from the standards of living enjoyed in the
past (Osborn, 1988; Fuhrer and Klein, 1998; Fuhrer, 2000; Guariglia and Rossi, 2002). At the
theoretical level, a recent strand of literature investigates the eﬀects of habits on economic
growth in general equilibrium models. In this framework, habit formation - also labelled
2For example, the idea that fertility declined in response to a reduction in infant mortality may be consistent
with observed dynamics in Germany and Sweden. However, in the United States and France, reduced mortality
followed fertility decline (Galor, 2005), suggesting that the contribution of observed mortality rates to the
demographic transition is limited in these cases (Mateos-Planas, 2002).
2. Habit Formation, Dynastic Altruism, and Population Dynamics 24
as ’internal habits’, or ’inward–looking preferences’ - aﬀects capital accumulation because
agents make their savings decisions by comparing current consumption with a psychological
benchmark, represented by a weighted average of own past consumption levels (Caroll et
al. 1997; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004). Quantitative applications suggest that status-
dependent preferences may explain various stylized facts - e.g. the hump-shaped time paths
that characterized the behavior of saving rates in Japan (Caroll, 2000) and Western Europe
in the post-war period (Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2008).
Recent contributions relax the traditional assumption of inﬁnitely-lived agents, and analyze
the consequences of benchmark preferences in overlapping generations models where con-
sumers optimize over ﬁnite horizons. Abel (2005) studies the eﬀects of habits and social
status on the allocation of consumption across generations when agents are selﬁsh. Alonso-
Carrera et al. (2007) extend the model of dynastic altruism of de la Croix and Michel (1999)
to include habit formation, and show that habits reduce the willingness of individuals to leave
bequests under exogenous population growth. This result hinges on a general mechanism of
reallocation in life-cycle resources that will be relevant to our conclusions. In particular, we
will formalize the idea that persistently low fertility rates can be induced by status-dependent
preferences because agents internalize previous standards of living into their saving motives
and fertility choices. This reasoning may be linked to the observation that low-reproduction
strategies - i.e. intentional choices aimed at preserving the family property and status - ceased
to be an exclusive feature of the aristocracy already in the 19th century, as the same behavior
gradually spread across the bourgeoisie, land-owners, and other social classes (Johansson,
1987; Haines, 1992).
At the formal level, our analysis may be interpreted as an extended dynastic model that
includes both habit formation and endogenous fertility. In Section 2.2, we study individual
choices in an overlapping generations economy, where the number of children provides utility
in the ﬁrst period of life, while second-period utility depends on the gap between current
and previous consumption levels. Agents are altruistic towards their descendants, and the
opportunity cost of fertility is determined by the amount of bequests that parents give to
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their children. However, due to habit formation, consumption choices are biased in favor
of second-period consumption, and agents tend to reduce the share of resources devoted to
bequests. The consequence of this consumption-bias is a reduction in fertility rates: being able
to choose the number of children, agents reduce fertility in order to make parental altruism
less costly. We investigate the implications for economic growth and population dynamics
under two technology speciﬁcations that are standard in growth theory. Section 2.3 considers
an AK model where the growth rate of aggregate output is independent of habits. In this
framework, growing population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit
coeﬃcient lie within deﬁnite boundaries. Outside the critical interval, positive growth is
associated with either declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with
declining population. Section 2.4 assumes a neoclassical technology with constant returns to
scale. Diﬀerently from the Ramsey model with habit formation and exogenous population
growth (Ryder and Heal, 1973), habits modify the economy’s growth rate. While the long-
run equilibrium features constant output per capita, the growth rate of aggregate output is
determined by the equilibrium rate of population growth - which is endogenous, and modiﬁed
by habit formation. In the long run, stationary income per capita is associated with either
increasing or decreasing population and output, depending on the strength of habits. We
also simulate the transitional dynamics, showing that a declining transitional path in fertility
rates arises, and is exclusively due to habit formation. Section 2.5 discusses the connections
between our results and previous literature, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Consumption and fertility choices
In each period, indexed by t, total population Nt consists of N
o
t old agents and N
y
t young
agents. Young agents supply one unit of work time to ﬁrms and save, whereas old agents
only earn capital income as a result of previous savings. At the end of period t, each young
agent generates nt children that will become productive workers in the subsequent period:
Nyt+1 = N
y
t nt. Total population at time t + 1 thus equals Nt+1 = N
y
t (1 + nt), and the gross
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rate of population growth is deﬁned as
Nt+1
Nt
= nt−1
(
1 + nt
1 + nt−1
)
. (2.1)
As regards individual budget constraints, we allow for the presence of intergenerational trans-
fers in the form of inter-vivos gifts, denoted by bt ≥ 0 and deﬁned in the father-to-son
direction: if bequest motives are operative, each young agent in period t receives bt units of
output and, in turn, will transfer bt+1nt units of output to his successors. The individual
budget constraints thus read
ct = wt + bt − st, (2.2)
et+1 = rt+1st − bt+1nt, (2.3)
where c is consumption when young, e is consumption when old, w is the wage rate, and r
is gross interest on previous savings received during retirement. In general, positive transfers
(bt > 0) will arise whenever the degree of dynastic altruism is suﬃciently strong to make
the bequest motive operative (Thibault, 2000) - a circumstance that can be addressed after
deriving the temporary equilibrium of the economy.3 If bequests are operative in the equilib-
rium, we have bt > 0, and the resulting equilibrium path exhibits many basic properties of
Ramsey-type equilibria in models with inﬁnitely-lived representative agent, such as dynamic
eﬃciency and policy neutrality; if bequests are not operative in the equilibrium (bt = 0),
expressions (2.2)-(2.3) reduce to the standard budget constraints of OLG models with selﬁsh
agents a` la Diamond (1965).4 In this regard, our strategy will be to study the characteristics
3The operativeness of bequests is generally linked to technological and preference parameters according
to the following logic. Since making a positive transfer to successors implies reduced capital accumulation,
agents ﬁnd it optimal only if the resulting increase in utility through the altruistic term more than compensates
for the loss in second-period capital income. Hence, bequests are operative in the equilibrium if the degree
of altruism (denoted by δ in the present paper) is suﬃciently high relative to the technological parameters
determining capital proﬁtability: see e.g. the condition derived in de la Croix and Michel (2002: p.253).
4Thibault (2000) shows that, under speciﬁcations (2.2)-(2.3), the equilibrium with operative bequests: (i)
exists only if the conditions for dynamic eﬃciency are satisﬁed; and (ii) is unique. Moreover, Thibault (2000)
shows that (iii) the equilibrium with zero bequests coincides with the Diamond (1965) equilibrium - so it can
be dynamically ineﬃcient. de la Croix and Michel (2002: sect. 5.1.4) discuss the conditions under which
the equilibrium with operative bequests coincides with the modiﬁed golden rule a` la Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
and implies policy neutrality (Ricardian Equivalence). In our analysis of the neoclassical model, we specify
numerical parameters that allow the economy to be dynamically eﬃcient in the long run: see section 2.4.2.
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of the equilibrium with bt > 0, and derive ex-post existence conditions for an optimal path
with positive bequests (see condition (2.28) below).
Private welfare for each agent alive in (t, t+ 1) equals
Wt = U (ct, et+1, nt) + δWt+1,
where U (ct, et+1, nt) represents direct utility provided by consumption levels and the number
of children, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the altruism factor, i.e. the weight put by each agent on the
welfare of each of the successors.5 Imposing the limiting condition limj→∞ δj−tWj = 0, the
dynastic utility function can be written as
W0 =
∞∑
j=0
δjU (cj , ej+1, nj) . (2.4)
Expression (2.4) is the typical objective function encountered in dynastic models, where the
degree of altruism, δ, is analogous to a discount factor imposed at time zero over future
generations’ direct utilities. As shown e.g. by de la Croix and Michel (2002: Ch.5), the as-
sumption of perfect foresight allows us to re-interpret the sequence of individual optimization
problems as a single inﬁnite-horizon problem. In order to analyze the interactions between
habit formation and fertility choices, direct utility will be speciﬁed as
U (ct, et+1, nt) = u¯ (nt) + u (ct) + βv (et+1, ct) , (2.5)
uc > 0, ucc ≤ 0, u¯n > 0, u¯nn ≤ 0,
ve > 0, vee ≤ 0, and vc < 0.
The ﬁrst element in (2.5) is a well-behaved utility function u¯ (nt) where the fertility rate
appears as a normal good. Having children provides personal satisfaction, and fertility rates
are chosen in order to maximize private beneﬁts. The way in which we model fertility choices
is thus standard in terms of preferences, but the cost of raising children is speciﬁcally linked
5In this speciﬁcation, the utility of each agent is aﬀected by the utility of each child with a ﬁxed degree
of altruism, δ. As the budget constraint is expressed in terms of per-child bequest, the interpretation is that
individual choices regarding the amount of per-child gifts, bt+1, are determined on the basis of per-child utility,
Wt+1. An equivalent interpretation is that parents care about the average utility of each child, as explained
in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
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to our assumption of dynastic altruism. A ceteris paribus increase in the number of children
implies an increased cost in terms of second-period gifts. Each agent will thus balance higher
direct utility with reduced consumption possibilities in the second period of life, in compliance
with the present-value budget constraint
bt+1nt = rt+1
[
wt + bt −
(
ct + et+1r
−1
t+1
)]
. (2.6)
As regards consumption preferences in (2.5), u (ct) is direct utility from ﬁrst-period consump-
tion, β > 0 is the individual time-preference factor, and v (et+1, ct) embodies the second
crucial assumption of our model, i.e. habit formation. More precisely, v (et+1, ct) represents
second-period utility from relative consumption: for a given benchmark level enjoyed when
young, ct, utility from consumption when old increases with direct consumption (ve > 0,
vee ≤ 0) but is lower the higher is ﬁrst-period consumption (vc < 0). In this regard we will
follow the standard speciﬁcation of subtractive habits - see (2.15) below.
Under the assumption of perfect foresight, the solution to the dynastic problem can be found
by maximizing (2.4) subject to (2.6), using the sequences of consumption levels and fertility
rates as control variables. The associated Lagrangean at time t is
Lt = U (ct, et+1, nt) + δλt+1 rt+1
nt
[
wt + bt −
(
ct +
et+1
rt+1
)]
− λtbt, (2.7)
where λ represents the dynamic multiplier attached to the individual budget constraint. The
optimality conditions of the consumer’s problem read
Lct = 0 → (uct + βvct)nt = δλt+1rt+1, (2.8)
Lnt = 0 → u¯ntn2t = δλt+1rt+1
[
wt + bt −
(
ct + et+1r
−1
t+1
)]
, (2.9)
Let+1 = 0 → βvet+1nt = δλt+1, (2.10)
Lbt = 0 → δλt+1rt+1 = λtnt. (2.11)
The crucial conditions linking consumption and fertility choices are thus summarized by
λt = uct + βvct = βvet+1rt+1, (2.12)
u¯nt = λtbt+1r
−1
t+1. (2.13)
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Expression (2.12) is the Euler condition for consumption allocation, aﬀected by the presence
of habits (vct > 0). Expression (2.13) characterizes optimal fertility choices, and asserts that
the marginal cost of bequests - discounted by the prevailing interest rate - must equal the
marginal beneﬁt from having children, u¯n. Notice that, in order to interpret bt as ’bequest’, we
should impose a non-negativity constraint bt ≥ 0 in each period. For the sake of clarity, we will
concentrate on the characteristics of interior solutions without specifying further constraints
ex-ante. Since the main results are derived while assuming speciﬁc functional forms, the
non-negativity of bequests will be addressed by checking, ex-post, under what conditions
parameters are compatible with positive gifts along the optimal path.6 Let us assume the
following speciﬁcations:
u (ct) = log ct, (2.14)
v (et+1, ct) = log (et+1 − εct) , ε > 0, (2.15)
u¯ (nt) = γn
σ
t , 0 < σ < 1, (2.16)
where γ > 0 is a weighting parameter for fertility preferences. Expression (2.15) speciﬁes habit
formation according to the ’subtractive form’ (Alonso-Carrera et al. 2007), which postulates
a precise willingness to overcome previous consumption levels: the higher is ε the stronger is
the role of habits in second-period consumption choices. Expression (2.16) assumes positive
but decreasing marginal utility from the number of children.7 As shown in the following
sections, assumptions (2.14)-(2.16) allow us to obtain closed-form solutions in the presence of
linear returns to aggregate capital, and ensure analytical tractability while studying long-run
equilibria under neoclassical technologies. We will later argue (Section 2.4.2) that logarithmic
additivity in U (ct, et+1, nt) may increase the generality of our results by ruling out ad-hoc
complementarities between consumption and fertility in individual preferences.
6We choose this strategy because the aim of the present analysis is not to study the operativeness of bequest
motives, but rather the interactions between habit formation and fertility rates in situations where bequests
are operative. Operativeness is studied in detail in de la Croix and Michel (1999; 2002) and Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2007) in related models with exogenous population growth.
7In related work, de la Croix and Michel (1999) analyze status-dependent preferences in order to study
the eﬀects of inherited tastes, which is a diﬀerent phenomenon with respect to habit formation, and reﬂects
into diﬀerent speciﬁcations of ﬁrst-period utility. See section 2.5 on this point.
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From (2.14)-(2.16), the optimality condition (2.12) implies the modiﬁed Euler equation
et+1 = ct [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)] , (2.17)
according to which, for a given interest rate, the ratio between second- and ﬁrst-period con-
sumption is higher the stronger is the degree of habit formation. As may be construed, the
bias in favor of second-period consumption generates reallocation eﬀects that modify optimal
fertility choices. Studying these interactions, and their consequences for economic develop-
ment, is the central aim of our analysis.
Since technological speciﬁcations matter for the nature of the results, we will consider two
central paradigms in growth theory, i.e. neoclassical technologies with constant returns to
scale versus constant marginal returns to aggregate capital. For the sake of exposition, we
begin by considering a simple AK model of endogenous growth.
2.3 Habits, Fertility and Endogenous Growth
This section analyzes the competitive equilibrium of a decentralized economy under laissez-
faire. Consumption and saving choices are characterized by the optimality conditions de-
scribed in Section 2.2, while the production sector is represented by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
In order to analyze situations with linear returns to aggregate capital, we consider Romer’s
(1989) speciﬁcation of learning-by-doing. There exist J identical ﬁrms, indexed by j, pro-
ducing y˜(j) units of ﬁnal good by employing k˜(j) units of capital and (j) units of labor. Each
ﬁrm’s technology is represented by
y˜(j) = (k˜(j))
μ
(
h(j)(j)
)1−μ
(2.18)
where h(j) parametrizes workers’ ability and is taken as given by every agent in the economy.
In the competitive equilibrium, factor prices thus equal marginal productivities deﬁned at
given ability levels. Since ﬁrms are of identical size, they employ identical amounts of inputs
and produce the same output level, y˜(j) = y˜. Aggregate output Y = Jy˜ equals Y = K
μL1−μ,
where K = Jk˜ is aggregate capital and L = hJ = hNy is aggregate eﬃcient labor (recall that
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labor is supplied by the young cohort only). The engine of growth is knowledge accumulation
due to learning-by-doing. Following Romer (1989), workers’ knowledge is aﬀected by an
aggregated externality: h is positively related to the capital stock per-worker, kt ≡ Kt/Nyt ,
according to the linear relation
ht = φkt = φ (Kt/N
y
t ) ,
where the constant φ > 0 represents the intensity of learning-by-doing. Substituting this
relation in the aggregate production function, we obtain Yt = AKt, where the (gross) marginal
social return from capital, A ≡ φ1−μ, is constant over time. The gross marginal private return
from capital equals the equilibrium interest factor
rt = μA < A, (2.19)
which is constant over time. Since the equilibrium wage rate reads
wt = (1− μ) (Yt/Nyt ) , (2.20)
we can substitute (2.19) and Kt+1 = N
y
t st in (2.2)-(2.3) to obtain the aggregate resource
constraint of the economy,
Kt+1 = AKt − Ct −Et. (2.21)
where Ct ≡ Nyt ct and Et = Not et represent aggregate consumption of young and old agents,
respectively. Exploiting (2.14)-(2.16), individual consumption and fertility choices imply the
following (all proofs are in the Appendix)
Lemma 1
In an interior solution, aggregate consumption of both cohorts grows at the same constant
rate
Ct+1/Ct = Et+1/Et = δμA (2.22)
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in each period t = 0, ...,∞, and the share consumed when old is higher the stronger is habit
formation:
Ct
Et
=
δμA
μAβ + ε+ εβ
. (2.23)
Expression (2.23) embodies the reallocation eﬀect induced by habit formation. A higher ε
corresponds to a stronger willingness to postpone consumption in order to overcome historical
standards of living, and results in higher shares of output consumed by old agents in each
period. Expression (2.22) is conceptually analogous to the Keynes-Ramsey rule, and suggests
that a typical balanced growth equilibrium arises in the economy, at least in terms of aggregate
variables. We use italics in order to stress that positive net growth in aggregate output is not
necessarily associated with a continuous rise in individual consumption: equilibrium fertility
rates generally diﬀer from output growth rates, so that declining per capita incomes due to
excessive birth rates - or increasing per capita incomes induced by declining population - are
not remote possibilities. This point will be addressed immediately after the necessary proof
of knife-edge balanced growth:
Lemma 2
In an interior solution, the consumption-output share of the young equals
ψ ≡ Ct
Yt
=
(1− δμ) δμA
μA (β + δ) + ε (1 + β)
(2.24)
in each period, and the economy exhibits a balanced growth path with
Kt+1/Kt = Yt+1/Yt = δμA (2.25)
in each period t = 0, ...,∞.
An important consequence of knife-edge balanced growth is that individual bequests grow at
the same rate as individual consumption. In particular, the eﬀect of habit formation is to
reduce equilibrium bequests relative to ﬁrst-period consumption. To see this formally, deﬁne
zt ≡ bt/ct, and rewrite the lifetime budget constraint (2.6) as (see Appendix)
zt+1 =
1
δ
zt +
1
δ
[
1− μ
ψ
− (μA+ ε) (1 + β)
μA
]
. (2.26)
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Since δ < 1, it follows from (2.26) that, if a steady-state zss > 0 exists, the bequest-
consumption ratio jumps at this stationary level at t = 0, and is constant thereafter. Imposing
stationarity in (2.26), we obtain
zss =
1
1− δ
[
(μA+ ε) (1 + β)
μA
− 1− μ
ψ
]
. (2.27)
Expression (2.27) implies that bequests are operative (zss > 0) only if the term in square
brackets is positive. From (2.24), this requires
1− μ
(1− δμ) δ <
μA+ ε+ β (μA+ ε)
μAδ + ε+ β (μA+ ε)
. (2.28)
Satisfying the above inequality is a necessary condition to have interior solutions to the dynas-
tic problem. We thus restrict our attention to combinations of parameters that satisfy (2.28).
Recalling that ψ depends on ε, expression (2.27) implies that an increase in the strength of
habits would reduce equilibrium bequests relative to ﬁrst-period individual consumption: in
line with the results of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), we have8
∂zss
∂ε
=
(
1
1− δ
)(
1 + β
μA
)[
1− 1
(1− δμ) δ
]
< 0. (2.29)
We now have all the elements to analyze equilibrium fertility rates. The following Propositions
show that (i) the equilibrium fertility rate is negatively related to the strength of habits, and
that (ii) positive population growth is compatible with increasing per capita incomes only if
the degree of habit formation falls within a precise range of values.
Proposition 1
Along the equilibrium path, the equilibrium fertility rate is constant: population grows at the
equilibrium rate
nss =
[
zss
δμA
γσ (μA+ ε)
] 1
σ
, (2.30)
with ∂nss/∂ε < 0 (stronger habits reduce population growth).
8Result (2.29) is in line with the ﬁndings of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007: section 3), who show that habits
make the operativeness of bequests more diﬃcult, and there is a critical level of the degree of habit formation
above which agents become selﬁsh.
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Proposition 1 and expression (2.29) imply that habit formation has intergenerational impact
along two distinct dimensions: stronger habits (i) reduce the share of expenditures devoted
to bequests, and (ii) reduce population growth. These results have an intuitive interpreta-
tion. Habits induce a bias in intertemporal choices that produces a reallocation in favor of
second-period consumption. Given the trade-oﬀ between consumption when old and resources
available for bequest, agents are made more ’egotistical’ by stronger habits - in the sense that
they will reduce fertility rates in order to make parental altruism less costly.
A peculiar feature of this model is that habit formation does not modify the growth rate
of aggregate output, while it determines fertility rates. This implies that habits modify the
dynamics of individual incomes, leaving output growth unaﬀected at the economy level. In
particular, positive growth in aggregate output is not necessarily associated with growing
population and increasing consumption per capita. As shown below, this situation arises only
if ε lies within deﬁnite boundaries.
Proposition 2
Assume that parameters are compatible with positive growth in aggregate output and positive
bequests (δμA > 1 and zss > 0). There generally exist a couple of critical levels ε
′ and ε′′,
with ε′ < ε′′, such that ε = ε′ implies nss = δμA > 1, and ε = ε′′ implies nss = 1. As a
consequence, we may have three cases:
i. (Extinction path) if ε > ε′′ population declines and per capita incomes grow faster than
aggregate output;
ii. (Overcrowding) if ε < ε′ population grows faster than aggregate output, implying declining
per capita incomes;
iii. (Non-degenerate growth) if ε′ < ε < ε′′, aggregate output, per capita incomes, and popu-
lation increase over time.
Proposition 2 directly follows from ∂nss/∂ε < 0, and draws a clear-cut distinction between
the dynamics of aggregate versus per capita variables. In case (i), habits are very strong
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Figure 2.1: Dynamics of population and individual consumption (ﬁrst period) for diﬀerent
values of ε. Parameter values are β = 0.75, γ = δ = σ = 0.5, and μ = 0.6. Non-degenerate
growth arises in all paths falling in the grey-shaded areas delimited by the critical values ε′
and ε′′.
and consumption per capita grows faster than aggregate output. The excessive willingness to
consume prompts agents to choose low fertility rates, associated with declining population,
nss < 1. In the opposite situation - case (ii) - habits are very weak and fertility rates are
too high to guarantee sustained consumption standards for future generations: the gross rate
of population growth exceeds δμA, and individual incomes decline over time. The bottom-
line is that positive growth in aggregate output is associated with a growing population and
increasing per capita incomes if and only if the coeﬃcient of habit formation falls within
deﬁnite boundaries - i.e. the case of ’non-degenerate growth’ arising when ε′ < ε < ε′′.
Numerical substitutions suggest that fertility rates are quite sensitive to the coeﬃcient of
habit formation: in the example reported in Figure 2.1, the values for ε delimiting non-
degenerate growth are ε′ = 3.24% and ε′′ = 4.89%. If the coeﬃcient of habit formation lies
outside this interval, overcrowding or extinction paths immediately arise.9 The above results
are useful in clarifying the negative impact of habits on equilibrium fertility rates. The knife-
9See Figure 2.1. For a baseline non-degenerate value of ε = 4%, gross per-period rates of growth of
aggregate output, population and consumption per capita respectively equal Yt+1/Yt = 1.2, nss = 1.11,
and ct+1/ct = 1.085. Setting ε = 6% yields an extinction path with declining population and excessive
consumption growth (nss = 0.88 and ct+1/ct = 1.36). The mirror case is obtained with ε = 2%, associated
with overcrowding (nss = 1.36 and ct+1/ct = 0.88).
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edge character of the balanced-growth path clearly hinges on the assumption of linear returns,
and a ﬁxed interest rate makes the economy’s growth rate independent of population growth.
Results change in the neoclassical model, where decreasing marginal returns to capital imply
that accumulation rates, and therefore economic growth, are crucially determined by fertility
rates. This implies that habit formation modiﬁes the economy’s growth rate both in the short
and in the long run, as shown below.
2.4 Habits, Fertility and Neoclassical Growth
The neoclassical speciﬁcation is easily obtained by ruling out learning-by-doing from the
previous model. Assuming that h is a ﬁxed constant in ﬁrms’ technologies (2.18), we can
deﬁne a constant proportionality factor H = h1−μ and rewrite aggregate output according to
the standard Cobb-Douglas form
Yt = HK
μ
t (N
y
t )
1−μ , (2.31)
where K now exhibits decreasing marginal returns. In terms of capital per-worker, kt ≡
Kt/N
y
t , the intensive-form technology reads yt = f (kt) = Hk
μ
t , and equilibrium rates of
reward equal
rt = f
′ (kt) = μHk
μ−1
t and wt = (1− μ) f (kt) . (2.32)
The aggregate constraint of the economy and the ﬁrst order conditions imply the following
dynamic relations:
ntkt+1 = f (kt)− ct − (et/nt−1) , (2.33)
et+1 = ct [βf
′ (kt+1) + ε (1 + β)] , (2.34)
λtnt = λt+1δf
′ (kt+1) , (2.35)
nσt+1 =
1
δ
nσt +
1
σγ
[(1− μ) f (kt+1) λt+1 − (1 + β)] , (2.36)
λtct = f
′ (kt+1) [f ′ (kt+1) + ε]
−1
. (2.37)
2. Habit Formation, Dynastic Altruism, and Population Dynamics 37
Expression (2.33) is the aggregate constraint of the economy in terms of capital per-worker;
equations (2.34)-(2.35) are the optimality conditions (2.17) and (2.11); expressions (2.36)-
(2.37) are derived in the Appendix and characterize the joint dynamics of shadow prices and
fertility rates along the optimal path. We begin our analysis by studying the characteristics
of the steady-state equilibrium. Subsequently, we validate the usual interpretation of the
steady-state equilibrium as the long-run equilibrium of the economy by means of a numerical
simulation that analyzes transitional dynamics (Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Steady-state analysis
Imposing steady-state conditions in system (2.33)-(2.37), and denoting by subscript ’∗’ sta-
tionary values, we obtain
n∗k∗ = f (k∗)− c∗ − (e∗/n∗) , (2.38)
e∗ = c∗ [βf ′ (k∗) + ε (1 + β)] , (2.39)
f ′ (k∗) = n∗/δ, (2.40)
nσ∗ =
1
δ
nσ∗ +
1
σγ
[(1− μ) f (k∗) λ∗ − (1 + β)] , (2.41)
c∗λ∗ = f ′ (k∗) [f ′ (k∗) + ε]
−1
. (2.42)
which is a system of ﬁve equations in ﬁve unknowns (n∗, k∗, c∗, e∗, λ∗). As shown in the
Appendix, the equilibrium condition determining the stationary fertility rate can be written
as
ga (n∗) = gb (n∗) , (2.43)
where
ga (n∗) = nσ∗ , (2.44)
gb (n∗) =
δ (1 + β)
σγ (1− δ) −
(1− μ)
σγ (1− δ) (1− μδ)
[
n∗ (δ + β) + εδ (1 + β)
n∗ + δε
]
. (2.45)
The equilibrium can be characterized by studying the properties of (2.44) and (2.45). We
will label as ’well-deﬁned’ the equilibria associated with n∗ > 0, and as ’feasible’ only those
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implying n∗ > δ. The reason for the latter restriction is that, from (2.40), a candidate
equilibrium with n∗ < δ would imply f ′ (k∗) < 1 - that is, negative net rents from capital. It
is instructive to begin with the case of non-existent habits.
Proposition 3
If habits are inactive, ε = 0, the steady-state equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 3 is described in Figure 2.2, which represents the equilibrium condition (2.43) in
the gi − n∗ plane. When ε = 0, function gb (n∗) reduces to a horizontal straight line. Since
ga (n∗) is strictly increasing and ga (0) = 0, there can be only one intersection, associated
with condition (2.43). The resulting equilibrium is well-deﬁned and feasible provided that
parameters are such that n∗ > δ (see Appendix). Introducing habit formation, ε > 0, function
gb (n∗) becomes increasing and concave: from (2.45), we have
∂gb (n∗)
∂n∗
=
εδ (1− μ)
σγ (1− μδ) (n∗ + εδ)2
> 0,
∂2gb (n∗)
∂n2∗
= − 2εδ (1− μ)
σγ (1− μδ) (n∗ + εδ)3
< 0.
In this case, the equilibrium can be characterized as follows. Two important properties of
gb (n∗) are that
∂gb (n∗)
∂ε
= − n∗ (1− μ)
γσ (1− μδ) (n∗ + εδ)2
< 0, (2.46)
lim
n∗→∞
gb (n∗)
∣∣
ε>0
= lim
ε→0
gb (n∗) . (2.47)
Expression (2.46) implies that a ceteris paribus increase in ε moves gb (n∗) south-west in
the gi − n∗ plane. Expression (2.47) follows from (2.45), and asserts that gb (n∗) is asymp-
totically horizontal and bounded from above by the value associated with inactive habits,
limε→0 gb (n∗). These results imply that, starting from the case of inactive habits, subsequent
increases in ε generate downward shifts in the gb (n∗) function for any positive fertility rate.
Since ga (n∗) is increasing and independent of habits, all intersections satisfying the equilib-
rium condition ga = gb will necessarily be associated with lower fertility rates with respect
to the case ε = 0. This result is described in the left graphs of Figure 2.2, where the highest
equilibrium fertility rate is the habit-free value, denoted as nmax.
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Figure 2.2: Long-run equilibria in the neoclassical model for diﬀerent values of ε. Diagram
(a): unique intersections ga = gb and feasible equilibria. Diagram (b): multiple intersections
ga = gb and unique feasible equilibria.
As both ga (n∗) and gb (n∗) are concave, we may have either one or multiple intersections
satisfying (2.43), depending on the constellation of parameters. However, the existence of
multiple intersections does not imply multiple equilibria, as shown in the following
Proposition 4
For any ε < 1, there may exist only one feasible steady state. This equilibrium is characterized
by an intersection in which gb (n∗) cuts ga (n∗) from above.
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The intuition behind Proposition 4 is described in graphical terms in Figure 2.2. As shown in
the Appendix, we may have two cases. When μ > (1 + δ)−1, we may only have one intersection
ga = gb, and this equilibrium is characterized by gb (n∗) cutting ga (n∗) from above. This case
is reported in Figure 2.2, Diagram (a). When μ < (1 + δ)−1, the vertical intercept of gb (n∗)
is negative, and condition ga = gb can be satisﬁed by two intersections denoted by n′ and n′′,
with n′ < n′′. This situation arises in Figure 2.2, Diagram (b), with ε = 0.15. The ’high’
intersection n′′ has the same properties as the unique equilibrium arising in Diagram (a). The
’low’ intersection n′, instead, satisﬁes the condition ga = gb with gb (n∗) cutting ga (n∗) from
below. However, the low intersection cannot be a feasible equilibrium because the feasibility
condition n′ > δ is necessarily violated (see Appendix). As a consequence, a feasible steady
state is exclusively characterized by an intersection in which gb (n∗) cuts ga (n∗) from above:
this is the only possible equilibrium in case (a), and the only feasible equilibrium, n′′, in case
(b) of Figure 2.2.
This characterization of feasible equilibria has three main implications. First, a ceteris paribus
increase in the strength of habits reduces the optimal fertility rate in any feasible steady state.
As shown in the left graphs of Figure 2.2, gb shifts downward following an increase in ε, and
the equilibrium fertility rate consequently shrinks.
Second, whenever a feasible equilibrium exists without habits, there is always a range of
positive values of ε for which feasible equilibria also exist with habit formation. In fact, if
nmax > δ, it is always possible to deﬁne a critical value of habit formation ε
δ > 0 such that
ε = εδ implies an equilibrium with n∗ = δ. This critical level can be calculated by imposing
n∗ = δ in condition (2.43) to obtain
εδ =
(1− μδ)[δ(1 + β)− δσσγ(1− δ)]− (1− μ)(δ + β)
(1− μδ)[δσσγ(1− δ)− δ(1 + β)] + (1 + β)(1− μ) . (2.48)
Given Proposition 3 and result (2.46), any value of ε exceeding εδ would generate equilibria
that violate feasibility (n∗ < δ), whereas any degree of habit formation falling within the
interval ε ∈ (0, εδ) yields feasible steady-state equilibria. This is the range of values of ε that
is relevant for studying the long-run behavior of the system. In graphical terms, the ’relevant
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region’ is represented by the grey-shaded areas in the right graphs of Figure 2.2.
Third, if parameters allow for positive population growth when habits are inactive, there
always exists a critical degree of habit formation associated with constant population, and a
subset of feasible equilibria where population declines due to the presence of habits:
Lemma 3
Provided that nmax > 1, there exists a critical value ε¯ < εδ such that ε = ε¯ implies n∗ = 1.
Hence, the set of feasible equilibria with ε > 0 includes two subsets of equilibria respectively
associated with n∗ > 1 and n∗ < 1.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is that, since δ < 1, the special case of constant population
n∗ = 1 > δ lies in the interior of the relevant region - see Figure 2.2. The consequence is that
diﬀerent degrees of habit persistence determine whether long-run population growth rates
will be positive or negative. On the one hand, this result looks similar to that found in the
AK model: strong habit persistence may imply declining population. On the other hand, the
assumption of decreasing returns to capital yields quite diﬀerent implications for the econ-
omy’s growth rate. In the stationary equilibrium of the neoclassical model, consumption and
capital per worker are constant, and aggregate output grows at the same rate as population.
Formally, since f ′ (k∗) = μHkμ−1∗ , condition (2.40) reads
k∗ =
(
μδH
n∗
) 1
1−μ
, (2.49)
and implies that Kt+1/Kt = Nt+1/Nt = Yt+1/Yt = n∗ in this equilibrium. Hence, habit
formation modiﬁes the economy’s growth rate through the fertility rate. This is an important
diﬀerence with respect to previous literature on habit formation (see Section 2.5), and also
with respect to the AKmodel of Section 2.3. The characteristics of the neoclassical equilibrium
are summarized in the following
Proposition 5
Provided that nmax > 1, we may have three cases: (i) if 0 < ε < ε¯, the steady-state equilibrium
features increasing output and population; (ii) if ε¯ < ε < εδ, the steady-state equilibrium
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features declining output and population; (iii) if ε = ε¯, the steady-state equilibrium features
constant output and population.
Proposition 5 can be interpreted as follows. Households internalize the eﬀect of habits in
their bequest and saving motives, reducing fertility in order to make parental altruism less
costly. However, in a neoclassical world, fertility determines the economy’s growth rate,
which remains strictly positive if and only if habits are relatively weak, ε < ε¯. Excessive
habit formation, ε > ε¯, induces long-run equilibria where constant per capita incomes are
associated with falling population and declining aggregate output.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
The previous Section postulates the usual interpretation of the steady-state equilibrium as
the long-run equilibrium of the economy. Two questions that still have to be addressed relate
to the dynamic stability of the stationary equilibrium, and the eﬀects of habit formation on
transitional dynamics. The starting point of the analysis is a three-by-three dynamic system
that is obtained from suitable substitutions in (2.33)-(2.37). As shown in the Appendix, the
dynamic behavior of the economy is fully determined by three equations involving the crucial
variables k, λ, and n.
kt+1 =
1
nt
[
f(kt)− f
′(kt+1)
λt(f ′(kt+1) + ε)
− βf
′(kt+1) + ε(1 + β)
λtδ(f ′(kt+1) + ε)
]
, (2.50)
λt+1 =
λtnt
δf ′(kt+1)
, (2.51)
nt+1 =
[
1
δ
nσt +
1
σγ
[(1− μ) f (kt+1) λt+1 − (1 + β)]
]1/σ
. (2.52)
From (2.50)-(2.52), the evolution of capital per capita depends on the expected interest rate,
and the dynamics of kt+1 are implicitly determined by equation (2.50) for a given set of
parameters {μ,H, γ, σ, β, δ, ε}.10 As before, it is instructive to begin with the case of inactive
10 The existence of habits (ε > 0) makes the dynamics of capital per worker dependent on the expected
interest rate, as the presence of f ′ (kt+1) in the right-hand-side of (2.50) elucidates. Hence, kt+1 is (only)
implicitly given by (2.50). In the absence of habits (ε = 0), equation (2.50) reduces to the familiar resource
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habits. In this case, it is possible to show analytically that ε = 0 implies no transition in
fertility rates.
Proposition 6
When habits are inactive, the fertility rate is constant at each point in time along the optimal
path.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is provided by the equilibrium condition for consumption
allocation (see Appendix),
Ct
Et
=
δ (rt + ε) rt+1
(rt+1 + ε) [βrt + ε (1 + β)]
. (2.53)
Expression (2.53) shows that the shares of output going to young and old agents are generally
time-varying, as they depend on capital accumulation. Setting ε = 0, however, expression
(2.53) reduces to Ct/Et = δ/β. Proposition 6 can thus be interpreted as follows: in the
presence of habits, the allocation of output among cohorts varies over time because individual
choices adjust to changing standards of living during the development process. Since the
number of children is determined by utility maximization, this mechanism characterizes both
consumption and fertility choices. Without habits, output allocation is time-invariant as no
adjustment in consumption, nor in fertility rates, is called for by changing standards of living.
In general, the presence of habits yields transitional variations in fertility rates. Given the
complexity of the dynamic system (2.50)-(2.52), this issue can only be addressed numerically
(the numerical procedure can be found in the Numerical Appendix 9.1). As a ﬁrst step, we
considered several diﬀerent constellations of parameters, and derived the respective eigenval-
ues from the Jacobian matrix. In this regard, numerical results show that system (2.50)-(2.52)
exhibits saddle-point stability for a wide range of parameter values, with one stable and two
unstable eigenvalues. As a second step, we performed a numerical simulation of the full
dynamics of the economy along the optimal path, with a special focus on the transitional
constraint
kt+1 =
1
nt
[
f(kt)− 1
λt
(
1 +
β
δ
)]
,
where kt+1 does not appear anymore in the right-hand-side.
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impact of habits on fertility decisions. In order to circumvent the disadvantages of methods
based on linearization, we used backward iteration to characterize approximate solutions to
the Euler equations (Strulik and Brunner, 2002; Heer and Maussner, 2005; see Appendix for
details). As noted above (footnote 10), the dynamics of kt+1 are implicitly determined by
equation (2.50) for a given set of parameters {μ,H, γ, σ, β, δ, ε}, and determine the respective
entries in the Jacobian matrix of the system by applying the implicit-function theorem. As a
benchmark-case, we specify the set of parameters as
μ = 0.36, H = 10, γ = 0.12, σ = 0.5, β = 0.935, δ = 0.93, ε = 0.015 ,
which implies, in light of (2.38)-(2.42), the steady-state values
c∗ = 6.24008, e∗ = 6.84885, n∗ = 1.06281, b∗ = 0.42048, k∗ = 6.0066, λ∗ = 0.15817.
The Jacobian of (2.50)-(2.52) evaluated at the steady-state, J¯∗, is equal to
J∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂kt+1
∂kt
|∗ ∂kt+1∂λt |∗
∂kt+1
∂nt
|∗
∂λt+1
∂kt
|∗ ∂λt+1∂λt |∗
∂λt+1
∂nt
|∗
∂nt+1
∂kt
|∗ ∂nt+1∂λt |∗
∂nt+1
∂nt
|∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1.075268818 76.06568876 −5.697822964
0.018122124 2.281978849 0.0528000960
11.87479223 1259.405296 0.5652977844
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and the associated eigenvalues read
ν =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2.39907513941288996
1.07526893420792736
0.44820137777951952
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
With two unstable eigenvalues (ν1, ν2 > 1) and one real stable eigenvalue (ν3 < 1), the
dynamic system (2.50)-(2.52) exhibits saddle-point stability with monotone convergence. The
results of the numerical exercises are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
We analyze the eﬀect of habits by considering three scenarios: (i) ε = 0, represented by
the solid line; (ii) ε = 1%, dashed line; and (iii) ε = 1.5%, dotted line. Looking at Figure
2.3, it becomes apparent that habits do not play an important role in very early stages of
economic development. As the economy becomes richer, parents internalize the existence
of habits in their bequest and fertility choices, and the eﬀects of habit formation become
relevant. Since agents tend to allocate more resources in favor of second-period consumption,
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Figure 2.3: Transitional dynamics of capital per capita kt, ﬁrst-period consumption ct, and
bequest-consumption ratio zt = bt/ct.
savings increase with the strength of habits, thereby fuelling capital accumulation. In order
to reduce the private cost of having children, agents choose lower fertility rates for higher
values of the habit coeﬃcient. The bequest-consumption ratio, represented by zt = bt/ct, is
declining over time when habits are active, and the long-run value is inversely related to the
degree of habit persistence. This result conﬁrms the intuition behind the reallocation eﬀects
induced by habit formation, and is in line with our previous conclusions in the AK model -
see expression (2.29) in Section 2.3.11
Figure 2.4 embodies two results. First, by virtue of the mechanism mentioned above, fertility
rates decline during the transition, i.e. net population growth rates are progressively reduced
by economic development. Second, the simulation conﬁrms Proposition 6, by which fertility
11As habits modify the consumption propensity, the reallocation eﬀect of habit formation reverberates in
each period in which agents save. The consequences for consumption levels become evident only after this
’cumulative eﬀect’ on the capital stock has become quantitatively relevant. This is why the eﬀects of habits
on consumption levels seem relatively small in the short run: in the ﬁrst two periods reported in Figure 2.3,
the growth process is in its early stages.
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Figure 2.4: Transitional dynamics of fertility rates for increasing strength of habits.
rates are constant during the transition when ε = 0. In other words, the ’demographic
transition’ depicted in Figure 2.4 is exclusively due to habit formation.
It should be stressed that the assumption of logarithmic preferences in consumption is rel-
evant for Proposition 6. If consumption preferences display an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution diﬀerent from unity, the allocation of consumption over the life-cycle is aﬀected
by interest rates, independently of the presence of habits. In this case, consumption shares are
generally time-varying in the short run, and fertility rates likely exhibit transitional dynam-
ics even without habits. Hence, the transitional eﬀects of habits on fertility would interact
with those stemming from non-logarithmic preferences. However, our long-run results should
remain valid even with other types of preferences. The reason is that the reallocation eﬀect -
i.e. the fact that habits reduce the share of resources devoted to bequests - is a general mech-
anism that does not hinge on logarithmic forms. As shown by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007)
- who assume exogenous population growth - habits make the operativeness of bequests less
likely even with generic additive preferences. Building on this mechanism, the peculiar result
of our model remains: given the possibility of modifying the fertility rate, agents are able
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to reduce the total cost of bequests by decreasing the number of children. In this respect,
notice that our assumption of logarithmic preferences may increase, rather than limit, the
generality of our conclusions. The reason is that, in both the AK and the neoclassical model
presented above, the negative long-run impact of habits arises without making ad-hoc assump-
tions of complementarity, or substitutability, between consumption and fertility in individual
preferences.
2.5 Connections with previous literature
With respect to previous literature on demographic transition, the main distinctive feature of
our analysis is given by our main result: habit formation - and, in general, status-dependent
preferences - may constitute an important part of the explanations for the decline of fertility
rates exhibited by developed economies. To our knowledge, previous studies did not address
this issue. The old-age security approach postulates that present fertility choices are driven
by the expectation that children will provide support to their parents in the future, so that
variations in equilibrium fertility rates are determined by uncertainty over future incomes
(Nishimura and Zhang, 1995), and linked to the degree of risk aversion (Sah, 1991). In the
standard framework where children provide direct utility to their parents, and the fertility
decline may be due to increased productivity from technological progress (Galor and Weil,
2000), rising real wages that increase the opportunity cost of having children (Galor and
Weil, 1996), and possible trade-oﬀs between the quality and quantity of children (Becker
1991). In this regard, we may stress that our results do not hinge on interactions between
the opportunity cost of fertility and technological development. In the present analysis, the
central element is the psychological cost of having children: low fertility rates originate in
the distorted perception of ’joy from consumption’ that old agents have in the second period
of life. Our reasoning also diﬀers from explanations based on quality-quantity trade-oﬀs. If
parents reduce the number of children in order to provide better education to each successor,
the roots of low fertility rates are to be found in parental altruism, whereas our analysis
suggests the conclusion - perhaps less pleasant, but worth considering - that the source of
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low fertility rates is parental ’egotism’ induced by habits. From a broader perspective, the
present analysis seems complementary to the related literature on Malthusian stagnation
and demographic transition - e.g. Galor and Weil (2000), Boldrin and Jones (2002). These
contributions explicitly model the rise and overlap of diﬀerent phases of development, and
characterize demographic transitions by considering the interactions between fertility, factor
availability and technology improvements. As we have emphasized the interactions between
fertility and preferences, extending the present analysis to include technological transitions
seems an interesting topic for future research.
The central role of bequests in our results suggests some similarities between our approach
and that followed by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who argue that population dynamics
are crucially governed by the direction of intergenerational transfers. Blackburn and Cipriani
(2005) assume two-sided altruism in a model that generates development paths consistent
with the Caldwell hypothesis (Caldwell, 1982): low development is associated with young-to-
old transfers and large family size, whereas high-development phases feature lower fertility
and old-to-young transfers. With respect to Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), our analysis is
diﬀerent in both aims and means. At the formal level, the models diﬀer in two important
ways. First, we rule out two-sided altruism, and focus on equilibrium paths with operative
bequests - that is, transfers are ’father-to-son’ by construction. Second, habits are not con-
sidered in Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), whereas they represent the central feature of our
analysis. At the conceptual level, our aim is diﬀerent. Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) formal-
ize the Caldwell hypothesis, and reproduce the demographic transition along these lines by
considering possible switch-overs in the direction of transfers. In this paper, we asked whether
persistently low fertility rates can also be explained by time-dependent preferences, arguing
that the stage of development aﬀects population growth because agents internalize previous
standards of living into their bequest motives and fertility choices. Our reasoning is referred
to the empirical evidence on the intertemporal behavior of consumers, and is also consistent
with less recent historical facts. In the 18th century, the aristocracy pursued low-reproduction
strategies in order to avoid the partition of the family property and maintain family status
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(Johansson, 1987). In the 19th century, similar strategies were intentionally adopted by the
bourgeoisie and land-owners, gradually spreading across other social classes (Haines, 1992).
With respect to the literature on habit formation and economic growth, we can make four
remarks. The ﬁrst comment relates to the neoclassical model. In their seminal paper, Ryder
and Heal (1973) show that habits do not modify the long-run equilibrium of the economy,
as the Ramsey model with inﬁnite horizons predicts convergence towards the usual ’modiﬁed
golden rule’. In Section 2.4, we have shown that habit formation modiﬁes the long-run
growth rate of the economy instead. The reason for our result is not the assumption of ﬁnite
lifetimes,12 but rather that of endogenous fertility: habits matter because they aﬀect the
equilibrium fertility rate, and thereby the growth rate of aggregate output in any equilibrium
with stationary income per capita. This result can be seen in parallel with that of Alvarez-
Cuadrado et al. (2004), which asserts that habit formation becomes relevant for long-run
growth when production possibilities are improved by exogenous productivity growth in the
Ramsey model.
The second remark is related to the AK framework. Carrol et al. (1997) studied the role of
habits in the standard AK model with exogenous fertility, showing that the degree of habit
formation aﬀects the long-run growth rate of the economy if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution diﬀers from unity (ibid., eqs.(17)-(19): p.345). The logarithmic case thus yields
no growth eﬀects of habits in the representative-agent framework - and this is also the case
in our OLG model of Section 2.3, where the growth rate in aggregate variables, δμA, is
independent of the degree of habit formation, ε. Specifying non-logarithmic preferences in
our AK model would re-introduce a missing link between habits and growth in aggregate
variables. However, the aim of Section 2.3 is to emphasize the peculiar role of endogenous
fertility and habit formation in determining fundamental changes in the growth rate of per
capita variables. The assumption of logarithmic preferences allows us to study the various
cases - i.e. extinction, overcrowding, and non-degenerate growth in Proposition 1 - in isolation
12If we drop the assumption of endogenous fertility, we obtain an OLG model with dynastic altruism which
yields identical predictions to the Ramsey model with inﬁnite horizons, provided that bequests are operative
in each period along the equilibrium path (see de la Croix and Michel, 2002: Chap.5).
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from transitional dynamics and elasticity-induced growth eﬀects a` la Carrol et al. (1997).
The third remark is related to models with overlapping generations. A comparable framework
is that employed by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), who study a three-period OLG model with
habit formation and inherited tastes. As we pointed out in Section 2.4.2, one of the results
of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) can be identiﬁed with the ﬁrst logical step of our reasoning:
habits tend to contrast dynastic altruism. Diﬀerently from Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) -
who assume exogenous population growth - our model features endogenous fertility, which
allows us to show that habits contrast population growth because habit formation prompts
agents to reduce the cost of parental altruism in the second period of life.
The fourth remark refers to the links between habit formation and parental-based status. In
related work, de la Croix and Michel (1999) analyze status-dependent preferences in order to
study the eﬀects of inherited tastes, assuming that the satisfaction index of a newborn agent
is higher the higher is the gap between his current consumption and the level of ’aspiration’
determined by the consumption level of the parents. In the current model, this type of
preferences would take the form U (ct, et+1, nt, ct−1) = u¯ (nt) + u (ct, ct−1) + βv (et+1), which
clearly diﬀers from (2.5). Indeed, the phenomenon of inherited tastes is diﬀerent from - and
it may be simultaneous to - that of habit formation, which refers to the comparison that each
agent makes between his own current and past consumption levels. It is possible to extend
our model to include inherited tastes, though it is diﬃcult to speculate on the consequences
without explicit modelling: while aspirations would make the existence of positive bequests
easier (Alonso-Carrera et al. 2007), the interaction between aspirations and endogenous
fertility choices is an open question that we leave for future research.
2.6 Conclusion
The recent growth literature proposes a number of explanations for (i) the low fertility rates
currently observed in developed economies, and (ii) the phenomenon known as ’demographic
transition’. Theoretical contributions considered fertility choices under old-age security mo-
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tives, or satisfaction-based approaches. In the standard framework, children provide direct
utility to their parents, and the demographic transition may be due to increased productivity
generated by technological progress, rising costs of child rearing, possible trade-oﬀs between
the quality and quantity of children, and the reversal in the direction of intergenerational
transfers. In this paper, we have argued that economic development may aﬀect population
dynamics through a diﬀerent channel, i.e. the interactions between fertility choices and habit
formation in consumption. Most theoretical models with endogenous fertility assume that
consumption choices are based on standard time-separable preferences, though a growing
body of empirical evidence suggests that preferences are status-dependent in reality. Build-
ing on this point, we have studied fertility choices and habit formation in an overlapping
generations model, assuming that the opportunity cost of having children is determined by
bequests. In this setting, habits contrast dynastic altruism through status-related eﬀects.
Our reasoning may be linked to the empirical observation that low-reproduction strategies
have historically been intentional choices aimed at preserving the family property and status
(Johansson, 1987; Haines, 1992).
A ﬁrst general result is that habits reduce population growth. The reason is that, due to
habit formation, consumption choices are biased in favor of second-period consumption, and
agents aim at reducing the loss in second-period utility induced by bequests. Being able to
choose the number of children, individuals reduce fertility in order to make parental altruism
less costly. We have studied this mechanism under two alternative technology speciﬁcations.
In the neoclassical model, habits modify the economy’s growth rate and generate transitional
dynamics in fertility that are compatible with the phenomenon of demographic transition. In
the long run, stationary income per capita is associated with either increasing or decreasing
population and output, depending on the strength of habits. In the AK speciﬁcation, growing
population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit coeﬃcient lie within
deﬁnite boundaries; outside the critical interval, positive growth is associated with either
declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with declining population.
In both frameworks, habits are responsible for the fertility decline, suggesting that status-
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dependent preferences may have played an important role in the demographic transition
observed in developed economies.
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2.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 From (2.19), condition (2.17) can be written as
et+1/ct = μAβ + ε (1 + β) . (A1)
Plugging vet+1 = (et+1 − εct)−1 in (2.10) and using (A1) to substitute et+1 yields
ctλt = μA (μA+ ε)
−1 . (A2)
Combining (A2) with (2.11) we obtain
ct+1nt = ctδμA. (A3)
Since Ct+1/Ct = nt (ct+1/ct), the above expression implies a constant growth rate of aggregate
consumption of the young, δμA. Moreover, substituting (A3) in (A1), and using Nyt+1 = ntN
o
t ,
we obtain (2.23), which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2 Deﬁne xt ≡ Kt/Ct. Dividing both sides of (2.21) by Ct+1, and
using (2.22)-(2.23) to eliminate Et, we obtain
xt+1 =
1
δμ
xt − μA (β + δ) + ε (1 + β)
(δμA)2
, (A4)
which displays a unique steady-state solution
xss =
μA (β + δ) + ε (1 + β)
(1− δμ) δμA2 . (A5)
For a given K0, the initial condition x0 is determined by the jump-variable C0. Since δμ < 1,
the steady-state is unstable, and all the trajectories starting from x0 	= xss are explosive and
non-optimal.13 Hence, variable x jumps at the steady-state level xss at time zero, and is
constant thereafter. From Lemma 1 and constraint (2.21), xt = xss at each t implies balanced
growth from time zero onwards in aggregate variables, with Kt, Yt, Ct, and Et all growing at
13Explosive trajectories can ruled out following the standard argument. If x0 < xss, capital will become
negative in ﬁnite time, violating the aggregate constraint of the economy. If x0 > xss, capital grows faster than
consumption of the young, i.e. limt→∞ (Kt+1/Kt) > δμA > δ, but this path would violate the transversality
condition limt→∞ δtKt ≤ 0.
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the constant rate δμA. Since Kt/Ct = xss, we have Yt/Ct = (AKt/Ct)
−1 = (Axss)
−1, which
implies (2.24) after substituting (A5). Q.E.D.
Derivation of (2.26) Substituting rt+1 = μA and (2.17) in (2.6) yields
bt+1 =
μA
nt
[
wt + bt − ct (μA+ ε) (1 + β)
μA
]
.
Dividing both sides by ct+1 and using (A3), we have
zt+1 =
1
δ
[
wt
ct
+ zt − (μA+ ε) (1 + β)
μA
]
. (A6)
Since wt/ct = (1− μ) (Yt/Ct), the ﬁrst term in brackets equals (1− μ)ψ−1, implying equation
(2.26) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1 From (2.16), plugging u¯nt = γσn
σ−1
t in the ﬁrst order condition
(2.13) gives λtbt+1 = γσμAn
σ−1
t . Substituting expressions (A1) and (A3) we obtain
bt+1
ct+1
=
γσ (μA+ ε)
δμA
nσt . (A7)
Since bt+1 = zssct+1 in each period, expression (A7) implies (2.30). Since ∂zss/∂ε < 0, it
follows from (2.30) that ∂nss/∂ε < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Since the growth rate of aggregate output Yt+1/Yt = δμA is
independent of habit formation, the non-ambiguous sign of the derivative ∂nss/∂ε < 0 implies
that there generally exist a couple of critical levels ε′ and ε′′, with ε′ < ε′′, such that ε = ε′
implies nss = δμA > 1, and ε = ε
′′ implies nss = 1. For reasonable parameter values, both ε′
and ε′′ are strictly positive, implying cases (i), (ii) and (iii) - see Figure 1. Q.E.D.
Derivation of (2.36)-(2.37) Equation (2.37) is obtained as follows. Substituting vet+1 =
(et+1 − εct)−1 in (2.10) we obtain βnt = δλt+1 (et+1 − εct). Substituting δλt+1 = λtntr−1t+1
from (2.11) we thus have βrt+1 = λt (et+1 − εct). Substituting et+1 = ct [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)]
from (2.17) we obtain
β
ct [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)]− εct =
λt
rt+1
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which reduces to (2.37) after rearranging terms and substituting rt+1 = f
′ (kt+1). Equation
(2.36) is obtained as follows. From (2.34) it follows that
ct +
et+1
rt+1
= ct +
ct [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)]
rt+1
= ct (1 + β)
(
rt+1 + ε
rt+1
)
(A8)
Substituting (A8) in (2.6) we obtain
bt+1 =
rt+1
nt
(wt + bt)− ct (1 + β)
(
rt+1 + ε
nt
)
. (A9)
Now rewrite condition (2.35) as
bt+1 =
unt
λt
rt+1 and bt =
unt−1
λt−1
rt, (A10)
and combine (A10) with (A9) to get
unt = λt
1
nt
(
wt +
unt−1
λt−1
rt
)
− λtct (1 + β) 1
nt
(
rt+1 + ε
rt+1
)
. (A11)
Substituting (2.37) in (A11) yields
untnt = λtwt + unt−1
λt
λt−1
rt − (1 + β) , (A12)
and, substituting λt
λt−1 rt =
nt−1
δ
, we obtain
untnt = unt−1nt−1
1
δ
+ λtwt − (1 + β) .
Substituting wt = (1− μ) f (kt) and untnt = σγnσt we obtain expression (2.36).
Derivation of (2.44)-(2.45) Using (2.39) to substitute e∗ in (2.38), and using (2.42) to
substitute c∗ in the resulting expression, we have
n∗k∗ = f (k∗)−
(
1
λ∗
)
f ′ (k∗)
f ′ (k∗) + ε
[
n∗ + βf ′ (k∗) + ε (1 + β)
n∗
]
. (A13)
Since f ′ (k∗) = μHkμ−1∗ , condition (2.40) implies f
′ (k∗) = n∗/δ and k∗ =
(
μHδ
n∗
) 1
1−μ
. Substi-
tuting these results in (A13) and solving for λ we obtain
λ∗ =
n∗ + n∗ (β/δ) + ε (1 + β)
n∗ + εδ
[
H
(
μHδ
n∗
) μ
1−μ
− n∗
(
μHδ
n∗
) 1
1−μ
]−1
. (A14)
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From (2.41) we have
nσ∗ =
(
δ
1− δ
)
1
σγ
[(1 + β)− (1− μ) f (k∗) λ∗] ,
where we can substitute (A14) and f (k∗) = H
(
μHδ
n∗
) μ
1−μ
to obtain
nσ∗ =
δ (1 + β)
σγ (1− δ) −
(1− μ)
σγ (1− δ) (1− μδ)
[
n∗ (δ + β) + εδ (1 + β)
n∗ + δε
]
. (A15)
Deﬁning ga (n∗) = nσ∗ and g
b (n∗) as the right hand side of (A15), this equilibrium condition
can be re-written as ga (n∗) = gb (n∗).
Proof of Proposition 3 Expression (2.45) implies
lim
ε→0
gb (n∗) =
δ (1 + β)
σγ (1− δ) −
(1− μ) (δ + β)
σγ (1− δ) (1− μδ) , (A16)
As ε → 0, gb (n∗) becomes independent of n∗, and reduces to a horizontal line in the gi − n∗
plane. Since 0 < σ < 1, the function ga (n∗) = nσ∗ is strictly increasing in the g
i − n∗ plane,
and satisﬁes ga (0) = 0. This implies that only one value n∗ > 0 may satisfy the equilibrium
condition ga = gb (see Figure 2.2). Imposing (2.43) we obtain
n∗ =
{
1
σγ (1− δ)
[
δ (1 + β)− (1− μ) (δ + β)
(1− μδ)
]}1/σ
. (A17)
The term in square brackets implies that there exists a unique well-deﬁned equilibrium when
parameters satisfy
δ (1 + β)
δ + β
>
1− μ
1− μδ . (A18)
When (A18) is violated, there is no well-deﬁned equilibrium, since the right hand side of
(A16) is negative. The unique equilibrium is feasible if and only if the right hand side of
(A17) is greater than δ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that, when ε > 0, the existence of an equilibrium is
linked to the case of inactive habits: in order to have an equilibrium it is necessary that (A18)
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is satisﬁed.14 As regards the characteristics of candidate equilibria, the reasoning is as follows.
As shown in the main text, both ga (n∗) and gb (n∗) are strictly increasing and concave in n∗
for any ε > 0. The vertical intercepts are
ga (0) = lim
n∗→0
ga (n∗) = 0, (A19)
gb (0) = lim
n∗→0
gb (n∗) =
δ (1 + β)
σγ (1− δ) −
(1− μ) (1 + β)
σγ (1− δ) (1− μδ) . (A20)
Expression (A20) implies that15
μ > (1 + δ)−1 =⇒ gb (0) > ga (0) = 0, (A21)
μ < (1 + δ)−1 =⇒ gb (0) < ga (0) = 0. (A22)
Case (A21) is characterized by the fact that the vertical intercept of gb is higher than ga (0) =
0. Case (A22) is characterized by the fact that the vertical intercept of gb is lower than
ga (0) = 0. The issue of the number of intersections can be addressed by comparing the
curvature of the two functions as captured by the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcients (APa and APb),
respectively equal to
APa = −g
a (n∗)
′′ n∗
ga (n∗)
′ = 1− σ, (A23)
APb = −g
b (n∗)
′′ n∗
gb (n∗)
′ =
2n∗
n∗ + δε
. (A24)
While APa is constant, positive, and smaller than unity, expression (A24) implies
∂APb
∂n∗
=
2δε
(n∗ + δε)
2 > 0, (A25)
lim
n∗→0
APb = 0 < APa, (A26)
lim
n∗→∞
APb = 2 > APa, (A27)
Expressions (A25)-(A27) imply that the curvature of gb (n∗) falls short of that of ga (n∗) in
the origin, and then monotonically increases, eventually exceeding that of ga (n∗) for higher
values of n∗. This implies the following results:
14As shown in expression (2.47), when ε > 0, the curve gb (n∗) is bounded above by limε→0 gb (n∗). In
order to have an intersection ga = gb it is thus necessary to have limε→0 gb (n∗) > 0, which in turn requires
satisfying (A18).
15Setting gb (0) > 0 and substituting the last term in (A20) we obtain δ > 1−μ1−μδ , which can be re-written as
μ
(
1− δ2) > 1 − δ. Substituting 1 − δ2 = (1− δ) (1 + δ) and rearranging terms we obtain expression (A21),
and therefore expression (A22).
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(a) Suppose that μ > (1 + δ)−1. From (A21) we have gb (0) > ga (0). Given this, expressions
(A25)-(A27) imply that the condition ga = gb can be satisﬁed only by a unique intersec-
tion where gb (n∗) cuts ga (n∗) from above, as shown in Figure 2.2 (a). This intersection
characterizes a feasible equilibrium provided that parameters imply n∗ > δ.
(b) Suppose that μ < (1 + δ)−1. From (A21) we have gb (0) < ga (0), and expressions (A25)-
(A27) imply that the condition ga = gb can be satisﬁed by two intersections, n′ > 0 and
n′′ > 0, with n′ < n′′. As shown in Figure 2.2 (b), the ’high’ intersection n′′ has the
same properties as the unique equilibrium arising in Diagram (a): ga = gb is satisﬁed
with gb (n∗) cutting ga (n∗) from above; the ’low’ intersection n′, instead, satisﬁes the
condition ga = gb with gb (n∗) cutting ga (n∗) from below.
Given cases (a) and (b), if we can rule out n′ as unfeasible, we obtain the proof that the
steady-state equilibrium of the economy is unique, and is characterized by an intersection
in which gb (n∗) cuts ga (n∗) from above. The proof is as follows. Suppose that parameters
are such that ga = gb is satisﬁed with n∗ = δ. From (A24), this intersection would be
characterized by
n∗ = δ =⇒ APb = 2
1 + ε
. (A28)
From (A23) and (A28), it follows that, for any ε < 1, we have APb > APa.
16 That is, an
intersection ga = gb with n∗ = δ can only be satisﬁed with gb (n∗) cutting ga (n∗) from above.
This reasoning can be repeated for any intersection in which n∗ > δ: since APb is increasing
in n∗ while APa is ﬁxed, any intersection ga = gb with n∗ > δ is characterized by gb (n∗)
cutting ga (n∗) from above. It follows from this result that the candidate equilibrium n′ which
arises in case (b) with gb (n∗) cutting ga (n∗) from below is necessarily characterized by n′ < δ,
and this is not a feasible equilibrium. The conclusion is that, irrespective of whether we are
in case (a) or in case (b), there may exist only one feasible steady state with n∗ > δ, and
16Notice that ε < 1 is a suﬃcient condition although it is not strictly necessary for the above argument. In
general, APb > APa is obtained whenever ε <
1+σ
1−σ . We emphasize the condition ε < 1 as this is a reasonable
assumption.
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this equilibrium is represented by an intersection in which gb (n∗) cuts ga (n∗) from above.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. If nmax > 1, there exists a critical value of habit formation εδ > 0
for which we obtain an equilibrium n∗ = δ. Being gb (n∗; ε) strictly declining in ε, well-deﬁned
equilibria are characterized by values of ε lying in the interval 0 ≤ ε < εδ. Since δ < 1, the
equilibrium n∗ = 1 is feasible, i.e. it lies in the interior of the relevant region - see Figure
2.2. Since ∂gb/∂ε < 0, the equilibrium n∗ = 1 is associated with a critical value of the habit
coeﬃcient ε¯ such that 0 < ε¯ < εδ. As a consequence, there exists a subset of well-deﬁned
equilibria associated with growing population (characterized by 0 < ε < ε¯ and n∗ > 1), and
another subset associated with declining population (characterized by ε¯ < ε < εδ and n∗ < 1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. From Lemma 3, if ε falls in the intervals mentioned in cases
(i), (ii) and (iii), we respectively have increasing, decreasing, and constant population. The
proof is completed by recalling that Yt+1/Yt = n∗ holds in the steady-state by virtue of (2.49).
Q.E.D.
Derivation of (2.50)-(2.52) Equations (2.51)-(2.52) directly follow from (2.35)-(2.36).
Equation (2.50) can be obtained as follows. Re-writing (2.52) at time t and substituting
λt = rt+1 [ct (rt+1 + ε)]
−1 from (2.37) we get
λt−1ct =
δrt+1rt
nt−1 (rt+1 + ε)
. (A29)
Substituting λt−1 = rt [ct−1 (rt + ε)]
−1 from (2.37) and et = ct−1 [βrt + ε (1 + β)] from (2.17)
we have
et
nt−1
= ct
(rt+1 + ε) [βrt + ε (1 + β)]
δrt+1 (rt + ε)
. (A30)
Plugging (A30) in (2.33), and substituting (2.37) to eliminate ct we obtain
ntkt+1 = f (kt)− f
′ (kt+1)
λt (f ′ (kt+1) + ε)
[
1 +
(f ′ (kt+1) + ε) [βf ′ (kt) + ε (1 + β)]
δf ′ (kt+1) (f ′ (kt) + ε)
]
, (A31)
2. Habit Formation, Dynastic Altruism, and Population Dynamics 63
which implies (2.50) in the text.
Simulation method. Backward iteration requires to determine an initial value to evalu-
ate the time-reversed system up to a termination criterion, and to revert the obtained sequence
of solutions. Since the analytical selection of an initial value on the stable manifold is gener-
ally not available, the initial value is given by a point in the neighborhood of the steady state.
A good approximation is obtained by making use of the stable eigenvector of the Jacobian J∗
which is tangent to the saddle path at the stationary solution (k∗, λ∗, n∗). We thus set
k0
λ0
n0
=
k∗
λ∗
n∗
+ didd,
where di represents the initial deviation from the equilibrium and dd deﬁnes the direction.
The initial values (k0, λ0, n0) are set equal to (kt+1, λt+1, nt+1) and the system (2.50)-(2.52)
is solved backward for (kt, λt, nt), and so on. In the simulation, the approximations of the
linearized system proved to be a good ﬁrst guess for the solution of the system. The linearized
system is
∣∣∣∣∣∣
kt
λt
nt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
A1 ν
t
1
A2 ν
t
2
A3 ν
t
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∗
λ∗
n∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where P contains the eigenvectors p1, p2, p3, and A1, A2, A3 represent arbitrary constants.
Since ν1, ν2 > 1, it follows immediately that A1 = A2 = 0, such that
kt = p3,1A3ν
t
3 + k∗
λt = p3,2A3ν
t
3 + λ∗
nt = p3,3A3ν
t
3 + n∗.
Since k0 is given, A3 is obtained as
k0−k∗
e3,1
= A3.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Multiplying both terms of (2.50) by λt+1 and substituting
(2.51) we obtain
δλt+1kt+1f
′(kt+1) = λtf(kt)− f
′(kt+1)
f ′(kt+1) + ε
− βf
′(kt+1) + ε(1 + β)
δ(f ′(kt+1) + ε)
. (A32)
Since f ′(kt+1) = rt+1 and kt+1f ′(kt+1) = μf(kt+1), we can deﬁne the shadow value of output
per capita as Qt ≡ λtyt = λtf (kt) and rewrite (A32) as
Qt+1 =
1
μδ
[
Qt − rt+1
rt+1 + ε
− βrt+1 + ε(1 + β)
δ(rt+1 + ε)
]
. (A33)
If ε = 0, this expression reduces to
Qt+1 =
1
μδ
(
Qt − β + δ
δ
)
, (A34)
which displays a unique steady-state Qss =
β+δ
δ(1−μδ) . Since μδ < 1, this steady-state is unstable,
and explosive paths can be ruled out as suboptimal: if limt→∞Qt = −∞ capital per worker
must become negative in ﬁnite time, whereas limt→∞Qt = +∞ would violate the transversal-
ity condition limt→∞ λtkt = 0. Hence, when habits are inactive, the shadow value of output
per capita jumps at Qss at time zero, and stays there forever (this result is intuitive, since
(2.37) implies that, when ε = 0, the shadow value of ﬁrst-period consumption is constant and
equal to unity at each point in time). The fact that Qt = Qss in each t implies that fertility
rates exhibit no transition. To see this, rewrite (2.36) as
nσt+1 =
1
δ
nσt +
1
σγ
[(1− μ)Qt+1 − (1 + β)] . (A35)
If ε = 0 we have Qt+1 = Qss, and (A35) displays an unstable steady-state in fertility rates.
Ruling out explosive paths that would make nt diverge to plus/minus inﬁnity, the only possible
equilibrium with inactive habits is characterized by Qt = Qss and nt = nmax at each point in
time, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Derivation of (2.53). From (2.35) and (2.37)
ct+1
ct
=
δ (rt+1 + ε) rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ε)
.
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Using (2.34) to substitute ct, and rearranging terms, we have
ct+1
et+1
=
δ (rt+1 + ε) rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ε) [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)]
.
Multiplying both sides by Nyt+1/N
o
t+1, and recalling that N
o
t+1 = N
y
t , we have
Ct+1
Et+1
=
δ (rt+1 + ε) rt+2
(rt+2 + ε) [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)]
which implies (2.53) in the text.
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Abstract
R&D-based growth models suggest a positive association between population growth and pro-
ductivity growth along the balanced growth path. In view of non-renewable natural resources,
most notably technological progress is essential in order to generate sustained economic growth
in the long-run. Recent history in developed countries is characterized by declining fertility
rates caused (inter alia) by skill-biased technological change, such that the latter may pose
a threat on long-run growth by itself. We therefore integrate micro-founded fertility and
educational choices into a model of directed technological change with non-renewable natu-
ral resources, in order to reveal the interaction between population dynamics, technological
change, and natural resource depletion.
Keywords: OLG-Model, Endogenous Fertility, Directed Technological Change, Non-renewable
Natural Resources
JEL: J13, O13, O4
66
3. Technological Change, Population Dynamics, and Natural Resource Depletion 67
3.1 Introduction
Scale invariant growth models suggest a positive association between population growth and
productivity growth along the balanced growth path. Most notably productivity growth may
be suﬃcient to generate sustained economic growth in view of exhaustible natural resources.
Since skill-biased technological progress induces among other factors a decline in fertility rates,
we argue that productivity growth may dig its own grave through the induced feed-back eﬀect
on fertility rates and may generate by itself a threat on long-run growth. We believe that
this results have strong implications for economic policies aiming at sustainable development
in view of nonrenewable natural resources, since the long-run productivity growth rate is not
policy invariant anymore and dependent on the endogenous population’s growth rate as well
as the depletion rate of natural resources.
The economic framework we employ can be summarized as follows: parents decide ratio-
nally about the number of children and their educational level, where the latter is driven by
the expected skilled-wage premium. Educational choices of parents for their oﬀspring gener-
ate diﬀerential fertility between skilled and unskilled households, in the spirit of Galor and
Mountford (2006), and de la Croix and Doepke (2003). The revenue of skilled labor relative
to unskilled labor in turn depends on the skill bias of technological progress (Acemoglu, 1998;
2002). In this fashion directed technological progress is responsive to the skilled-unskilled
labor ratio, which is in our setting an outcome of educational investments and fertility de-
cisions of parents for their children. In addition, production is subject to an essential and
non-renewable natural resource.
The focus of our analysis will be the interaction between skill-biased technological change,
population dynamics and resource depletion in the long-run and during the transition to a
long-run equilibrium. In order to address the transitional dynamics, we perform numerical
experiments under realistic parameters, dealing with temporary and/or long-run increases in
the skilled-unskilled population ratio. Given that the transition to the balanced growth path
is characterized by skill-biased technological change and therefore declining fertility rates, we
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ﬁnd that a declining growth rate of the labor force meets an increasing demand for skilled
labor in the education sector, such that the depletion rate of natural resources is increasing.
In the long-run, a higher skilled-unskilled population ratio is associated with a lower depletion
rate of natural resources, but possibly lower productivity growth.1
By integrating the interaction between skill-biased technological change, declining population
growth and resource depletion into a theoretical framework, our paper relates to the following
empirical regularities and theoretical building blocks: In the past sixty years, the relative
supply of skilled labor has increased sharply in the U.S. as well as in other industrialized
countries. Moreover, and contrary to the predictions of a neoclassical framework with con-
cave production technologies, there has been a sharp increase in the skilled wage premium
since the 1970s. The standard explanation for this pattern is an acceleration in the skill bias
of capital-embodied technological change (Autor et al., 1998 and Hornstein et al., 2005). At
the same time, increasing demand for human capital and increasing wages can be seen as
being responsible for the decline in average fertility rates - an observation which constitutes
one of the major stylized facts that characterized the development process of industrialized
countries (Galor and Weil, 1996; 2000).2 The economic channel which links increasing demand
for human capital to declining fertility rates works through a trade-oﬀ between the number of
children parents wish to raise and the amount of resources they spend on eduction per child
(see for example de la Croix and Doepke 2003). Given a high intergenerational persistence,
fertility decisions and investments in education per child are transferred from one generation
to another and interact with macroeconomic aggregates.3
In 2007, OECD petroleum consumption amounted to 57% of the world petroleum consumption
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2008) and per capita energy use diﬀer between
1Models of directed technical change have been applied in environmental economics by Andre and Smulders
(2005), Di Maria and Smulders (2004), Di Maria and van der Werf (2005), and Di Maria and Valente (2006).
Di Maria and Smulders (2004) analyze the eﬀects of pollution and Andre and Smulders (2005) study a labor-
resource economy. Di Maria and Valente (2006) are probably the ﬁrst who provide a micro-foundation of
purely resource-augmenting technical progress.
2For a comprehensive overview over aspects of the demographic transition, see Galor (2005) and Lee (2003).
For the emergence of lowest-low fertility rates in Europe, see Kohler et al. (2002).
3For empirical and theoretical evidence, see Kremer and Chen (2000); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980); de
la Croix and Doepke (2003,2004). For a more detailed discussion see Scha¨fer and Valente (2011).
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Figure 3.1: World depletion rate of crude-oil. Sources: Weil (2005) and own calculations.
the richest and the poorest group of countries by a factor ten (Weil, 2005). In addition
the world depletion rate of crude oil is increasing, see Figure 3.1, where OECD petroleum
consumption increased by a factor greater than two between 1960 and 2005 (U.S. Energy
Information Administration, 2006). This piece of evidence points into the direction that
economic development comes along - at least during the transition - with declining fertility
rates and an increasing depletion rate of natural resources.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the optimization
problem of households. Section 3.3 describes the production side of the model. Section 3.4
presents the equilibrium structure and the dynamic system. The balanced growth path (long-
run equilibrium) is described in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we calibrate the model and explore
its dynamic behavior. Finally, Section 3.7 summarizes and concludes.
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3.2 Households
We consider two groups of households, skilled and unskilled, where parents decide about edu-
cational attainment of their oﬀspring. In accordance with empirical observations reporting a
high intergenerational persistence in education, we assume that the group of skilled households
raises only skilled oﬀspring. In other words, downward mobility and discrimination among
oﬀspring with respect to educational choices are absent as we focus on developed economies
with low fertility rates, which makes the emergence of the former and latter unlikely. The
fraction of unskilled households raising skilled oﬀspring will be determined endogenously in
equilibrium. Hence, there exist three types of agents, skilled households raising skilled oﬀ-
spring, unskilled households raising unskilled oﬀspring and unskilled households raising skilled
oﬀspring.
3.2.1 Preferences and Budget Constraints
The economy under consideration is populated by a continuum of overlapping generations. In
this setting, time is discrete, indexed by t and ranges from 0 to ∞. Households live for three
periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. All economically relevant decisions are made in
the second period of life, adulthood. Adult agents supply one unit of work time each to ﬁrms,
raise children and save, whereas old agents consume their savings. The economy is populated
by two groups of households, skilled and unskilled, denoted by Lit (i = u, s), respectively,
earning a wage income wit in their second period of life. Moreover, there are two types of
children, ni,jt , either trained to be skilled workers or unskilled workers in t + 1, denoted by
j = u, s. Preferences of a member i = u, s of generation t that is born in t−1 are deﬁned over
consumption in t and t + 1 as well as the potential aggregate income of her children. They
are speciﬁed as
uit = ln c
i
t + ν ln(w
j
t+1n
i,j
t ) + ρ ln c
i
t+1, (3.1)
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where ct and ct+1 are present and future consumption. w
j
t+1n
i,j
t reﬂects total potential income
of an individual’s oﬀspring weighted by the altruism factor ν. Moreover, ρ represents as usual
the individual discount factor of future consumption.
We denote the fraction of unskilled households investing in education for their children by
θt ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the two population groups evolve according to
Lst+1 = θtn
u,s
t L
u
t + n
s,s
t L
s
t (3.2)
and
Lut+1 = (1− θt)nu,ut Lut . (3.3)
The education system is privately funded. As teaching requires skilled labor, LEst , schooling
fees depend on the wage rate for skilled labor, wst , and the exogenously ﬁxed teacher-student
ratio, φ.4 Since the education sector is subject to a non-deﬁcit condition, tuition fees have to
cover the wage sum of teachers
wstφ(n
s,s
t L
s
t + n
u,s
t θtL
u
t ) = w
s
tL
Es
t . (3.4)
Consequently, the cost to bring up a skilled child amounts to wstφ. Regardless of the type
of children parents wish to raise, fertility is subject to forgone wage earnings, in terms of
opportunity costs and consumption needs of children. To this end, parents have to relinquish
the fraction z of their wage income per child. Therefore, child-rearing costs for unskilled
children amount to zwitn
i,u
t with i = u because only unskilled households raise unskilled
oﬀspring. Total child-rearing costs for skilled oﬀspring on the other hand amount to (zwit +
wstφ)n
i,s
t , with i = u, s.
In order to cover old age consumption, members of generation t can buy property rights to
natural resources (natural capital) and invest in the capital market (man-made capital). We
denote the stock of the exhaustible natural resource in period t by Mt
5, and its extraction
4For similar assumptions regarding the schooling sector see Eicher (1996,1999), and Bhagwati and Srini-
vasan (1977).
5We denote aggregate levels in capital letters and per capita levels in lower case letters.
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allocated to production by Rt. The economy is initially endowed with a resource stock M0 >
0. At the beginning of the current period, t, the stock of exhaustible natural resources is
determined by the past resource stock minus extraction in the current period, hence, Mt =
Mt−1 − Rt. Each member of generation t buys mit units of natural resources from the old
age generation at the competitive price pRt . When she retires in t + 1, she sells a part of her
natural resources to ﬁrms for use in production and the property rights of the remaining part
to the adult cohort born in period t at price pRt+1 per unit of natural resources. The level
of future consumption equals revenues from investments in man-made capital on the capital
market ((1 + rt+1)s
i
t), plus earnings from selling natural resources to ﬁrms (extraction) and
the selling of the property rights to natural resources to the adult cohort born in t (pRt+1m
i
t),
hence
cit+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
i
t + p
R
t+1m
i
t, (3.5)
with i = u, s.
Thus, the budget constraint of a skilled household raising skilled oﬀspring (i, j = s), for
unskilled households raising unskilled oﬀspring, (i, j = u), and for unskilled households raising
skilled oﬀspring, (i = u and j = s) read as
wst ≥ zwstns,st + wstφns,st + cst + pRt mst + sst , (3.6)
wut ≥ zwut nu,ut + cut + pRt mut + sut , (3.7)
wut ≥ (zwut + φwst )nu,st + cut + pRt mut + sut . (3.8)
3.2.2 Optimization
A member i = u, s of generation t chooses {cit, ni,jt cit+1, sit, mit} so as to maximize the utility
function given by Eq.(4.2.4), with j = s, if i = s and j = u, s, if i = u. Regardless of the
type of household and which type of children a household wishes to raise, the maximization
over natural resources (mit), and investment in the capital market (s
i
t) imply a non-arbitrage
condition between the two assets known as Hotelling’s rule, such that marginal returns on
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both assets are equalized
1 + rt+1 =
pRt+1
pRt
. (3.9)
Hence, the marginal return of investment in the exhaustible resource stock,
pRt+1
pRt
, must equal
the marginal return of investment in the capital market used to ﬁnance research and devel-
opment (R&D).
Maximizing (4.2.4) subject to (3.6)-(3.8), respectively, yields
cit =
1
1 + ν + ρ
wit, (3.10)
sit =
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
wit − pRt mit, (3.11)
with i = u, s. Skilled households raise skilled oﬀspring and maximize (4.2.4) subject to (3.6),
implying that
ns,st =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)(z + φ)
. (3.12)
Since skilled households earn a wage income income, wst , heterogeneity does not inﬂuence their
educational decisions. However, it is worth noting that their fertility decisions also depend
negatively on the fraction of wage income that is transferred to their oﬀspring, z, and the
student-teacher ratio, φ. Unskilled households raising unskilled oﬀspring, maximize (4.2.4)
subject to (3.7), implying that
nu,ut =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)z
. (3.13)
As this type of household does not invest in education, the number of unskilled children raised
in unskilled households is not inﬂuenced by the parameter φ. Comparing (3.12) and (3.13)
shows that skilled parents raise fewer children than unskilled parents, due to the existence of
education costs. Moreover, when wut < w
s
t , unskilled households have less resources available
for present and future consumption. Maximizing lifetime utility (4.2.4) subject to (3.8) implies
nu,st =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)
wut
(wut z + w
s
tφ)
=
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)
1
(z + ωtφ)
, (3.14)
3. Technological Change, Population Dynamics, and Natural Resource Depletion 74
with ωt =
wst
wut
.
Apparently, the skilled wage premium ωt plays a crucial role in the decision of unskilled
households that wish to educate their oﬀspring to skilled workers. The higher the skilled-
wage premium, the higher the educational cost per child compared to the wage income of an
unskilled household, such that the number of skilled children born in unskilled households is
inversely related to ωt.
3.2.3 The Share of Unskilled Households Raising Skilled Oﬀspring
Unskilled households raise either unskilled or possibly skilled children. The fraction of un-
skilled households raising skilled oﬀspring is denoted by θt ∈ [0, 1]. For θt > 0, lifetime utility
of unskilled parents raising skilled oﬀspring must at least equal lifetime utility of unskilled
parents raising unskilled oﬀspring. In light of the solution to the optimization problem of un-
skilled households (3.10), (3.11), (3.13) and (3.14), we can establish the following proposition
Proposition 7
The group of unskilled households raises both types of children, i.e. nu,st > 0 and n
u,u
t > 0, if
uu,ut = u
u,s
t , such that
6
wst+1
wut+1
= ωt+1 =
z + ωtφ
z
. (3.15)
Relation (3.15) is an indiﬀerence condition, which will determine the fraction 0 ≤ θt ≤ 1 in
equilibrium. As parents are altruistic towards their oﬀspring with respect to the oﬀspring’s
aggregate potential labor income, the future wage diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled
labor, ωt+1, must at least compensate for the cost ratio between skilled and unskilled oﬀspring.
Moreover, as the right-hand side of (3.15) is greater than one, it follows that (3.15) holds only
if wst+1 > w
u
t+1.
7 Comparing the respective fertility decisions yields
nu,ut > n
s,s
t > n
u,s
t , (3.16)
6The proof follows directly from (3.10),(3.11) and (3.13),(3.14) given that: uu,ut = u
u,s
t .
7Similar to de la Croix and Doepke (2003) fertility diﬀerentials are generated by wage diﬀerentials. The
diﬀerence is that de la Croix and Doepke consider a continuous wage distribution.
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given that (3.15) holds. The fertility of unskilled households raising unskilled oﬀspring is the
highest since they do not allocate resources to education, whereas the opposite is true for
unskilled parents raising skilled oﬀspring. Since the latter have to pay tuition fees in terms of
wst , where w
u
t < w
s
t , they trade a lower number of children against a higher income for their
oﬀspring. Hence, the fertility of unskilled parents raising skilled oﬀspring is the lowest.
3.3 Production
Aggregate output, Yt, is composed of two intermediates, Y
s
t and Y
u
t , stemming from two
diﬀerent production processes, one using skilled labor, and the other one using unskilled
labor and a set of machines, xst and x
u
t , which are complementary to each kind of labor,
respectively. The production of machines requires the existence of technological knowledge (a
blueprint or design), labor and natural resources. Blueprints are the outcome of purposeful
investments in research and development (R&D). Labor markets for skilled and unskilled labor
are competitive and each kind of labor is assumed to move vertically within the production
processes. This assumption takes diﬀerent skill-intensities and a low inter-sectoral mobility
of skilled and unskilled labor into account. Moreover, skilled labor is employed in production
as well as in education.
3.3.1 Final Good Production
Final output is composed of intermediate goods, Y st and Y
u
t , both stemming from two diﬀerent
production processes. The elasticity of substitution between Y st and Y
u
t is determined by
ε ∈ (0,∞) such that the production of ﬁnal output is subject to the following nested CES-
production function
Yt =
[
γ(Y ut )
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y st )
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
. (3.17)
The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is a distribution parameter determining how important the two
goods are for aggregate output. In each period the price of ﬁnal output, is normalized to 1 -
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that is pYt ≡ 1, where the prices of Y st and Y ut are denoted by pY st and pY ut , such that8
[
γε(pY ut )
1−ε + (1− γ)ε(pY st )1−ε
] 1
1−ε = pYt = 1. (3.18)
3.3.2 Production of Intermediates and Machines
The production of Y st and Y
u
t requires skilled and unskilled labor, as well as a range of labor
complementary machines, xst and x
u
t , respectively. In each period of time, t, there are N
i
t
(i = u, s) diﬀerent types of machines available. Production functions of both intermediates
read as
Y it =
1
1− β
∫ N it
0
xit(l)
1−βdl (LY it )
β , (3.19)
with 0 < β < 1 and i = u, s.
Machines, xi, are manufactured with skilled or unskilled labor, Lxit , respectively, and natural
resources, Rxit (i = u, s), where labor as well as natural resources are considered to be essential
for the production of machines. Moreover, we assume that current technological knowledge in-
creases factor productivity in the machine producing sector.9 Therefore, production functions
for a machine of type l in sector s or u read as
xit(l) = GN
i
t (L
xi
t (l))
1−α(Rxit (l))
α, (3.20)
with G = A, if i = s and G = B, if i = u and A,B > 0.
3.3.3 Research and Development
R&D constitutes the search for new designs (blueprints) of machines. To this end, research
ﬁrms rent labor services, capital inputs and natural resources while taking the current level of
technological knowledge as given. It simpliﬁes the analysis considerably though, if we assume
that all the three of these factors combine to produce blueprints in exactly the same way that
8For details see Appendix B.1.
9It is debateable wether this assumption induces an over-optimistic perspective with respect to non-
reproducible capital into the model, but it is necessary to generate steady-state growth.
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they combine to produce ﬁnal output, i.e. we apply the so called lab-equipment approach.10
In addition we assume that blueprints are depreciated entirely after one period. We consider
this to be quite realistic, since one period encompasses approximately 30 years and ﬁrms
producing a steam engine must become obsolete at some point in time.11 Both R&D sectors
generate new blueprints according to the following scale invariant production function
N st+1 =
ηs
(N st )
δ
(Dst ) and N
u
t+1 =
ηu
(Nut )
δ
(Dut ), (3.21)
where Dst and D
u
t are spending on R&D (in units of the ﬁnal good) for skilled- and unskilled-
labor complementary types of machines, respectively. The parameters ηs and ηu are produc-
tivity parameters that allow the cost of innovation to diﬀer. Finally, we will distinguish the
cases δ > 0 and δ < 0. In the former, technological advances are partially hedged out by
diminishing technological opportunities (Evenson, 1984; Kortum, 1993; Jones and Williams,
2000), when it may become more and more complicated to achieve productivity gains. In
the case of δ < 0, there are intertemporal knowledge spillovers; a case which is labeled as
”standing on the shoulders of giants” in the literature.
3.4 Equilibrium
The usual characteristics of a symmetric equilibrium imply equal prices and quantities for each
type of machine, such that pxit (l) = p
xi
t , and x
xi
t (l) = x
xi
t . Machine producers maximize proﬁts
πxit = [p
xi
t − cxit ]xit, where marginal production costs amount to cxit (wit, pRt ) = (
wit)
1−α
(pRt )
α
AN it (1−α)1−ααα ,
with i = s, u (for details see Appendix B.2). Perfect competition on goods and factor mar-
kets implies that an equilibrium in the machine producing and the intermediate sector is
characterized by the following properties, for periods t = 0, 1, ...,∞:
10By doing so, we also take into account the criticism stressed by resource economists with respect to the
so-called ”knowledge driven” speciﬁcation, in which (skilled) labor is the only input to R&D and its therefore
seemingly overly optimistic assumption that R&D could take place without natural resources.
11As in our case, complete depreciation is a common assumption in OLG models of the Diamond type with
natural resources in order to assure analytical tractability. Without complete depreciation, the old generation
would sell its assets on the capital market to the adult cohort. The latter would split up its savings between
existing blueprints and investments in R&D. Under full depreciation the amount of savings is entirely allocated
to R&D.
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Lemma 4
(i) Demand for machines is equally spread over all types of machines
xit =
(
pY it
pxit
) 1
β
LY it , i = s, u. (3.22)
Proﬁts are maximized, if pxit =
cxit (w
i
t,p
R
t )
1−β , such that
πxit = β(1− β)
1−β
β (pY it )
1
βLY it (c
xi
t )
β−1
β , i = s, u (3.23)
and the level of intermediates is given as
Y it = (1− β)
1−2β
β N it
(
pt
Y i
cxit
) 1−β
β
LY it , i = s, u. (3.24)
(ii) The relative price of the two intermediates is given by
pt =
pY st
pY ut
=
1− γ
γ
(
Y st
Y ut
)− 1
ε
=
(
1− γ
γ
) βε
σ
(
N st
Nut
LY st
LY ut
)−β
σ
(
cxut
cxst
)− 1−β
σ
, (3.25)
with σ ≡ ε− (ε− 1)(1− β).
In light of Lemma 4, a labor market equilibrium determines the wage diﬀerential between
skilled and unskilled labor as well as the allocation of labor across sectors, such that
Proposition 8
(i) The skilled wage premium ωt =
wst
wut
reads as
ωt =
(
1− γ
γ
) εβ
σξL
(
N st
Nut
)σ−1
σξL
(
LY st
LY ut
)− β
σξL
(
A
B
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σξL
, (3.26)
where the equilibrium allocation of labor obeys
LY st =
β
ξL
(Lst − LEst ), Lxst =
ξLx
ξL
(Lst − LEst ), (3.27)
LY ut =
β
ξL
Lut , L
xu
t =
ξLx
ξL
Lut , (3.28)
with ξLx = (1−α)(1−β), ξL = β+(1−α)(1−β), LY st +Lxst +LEst = Lst , LY ut +Lxut = Lut
(for details see Appendix B.3).
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(ii) Demand for labor in the education sector is determined by the total number of children
sent to school: LEst = φ(n
s,sLst + θtn
u,s
t L
u
t ), such that
LY st
LY ut
=
Lxst
Lxut
= (1− φns,s)L
s
t
Lut
− φθtnu,st . (3.29)
Naturally, if σ > 1 the skilled wage premium of the current period is increasing in the
present blueprint ratio
Nst
Nut
because the two intermediates are gross substitutes in ﬁnal good
production. The relative factor reward of skilled labor declines, however, in the current
skilled-unskilled employment ratio,
LY st
LY ut
for a given blueprint ratio,
Nst
Nut
, as labor is subject to
diminishing marginal returns. Further below we will see that the share of extracted natural
resources allocated to the s− or u− sector and the evolution of the blueprint ratio depend
likewise on σ ≷ 1. More speciﬁcally, an expected increase in the employment ratio of skilled
and unskilled labor
LY st+1
LY ut+1
will increase the proﬁtability of skilled-labor complementary inno-
vations by means of the market size eﬀect and will bias technological progress towards the
s−sector, whenever σ > 1.
Natural resources are mobile within the machine producing sectors and an eﬃcient use of
natural resources requires that resource demand of the machine producing sectors equals the
overall amount of natural resources extracted, such that Rxut + R
xs
t = Rt. Moreover, perfect
competition on the market for natural resources results in12
Proposition 9
In each period t = 0, ..,∞, the shares of extracted natural resources allocated to the s− or
u−sector, ϕxit , i = s, u are driven by the blueprint ratio, N
s
t
Nut
, the skilled-labor ratio employed
in intermediate production,
LY st
LY ut
, and the ratio of marginal production costs of machines,
12For details see Appendix A1 and B.4.
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cxit
cxi t
, i = s, u, such that
Rxut =
ϕxut︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
1 +
(
1−γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
Nst
Nut
)σ−1
σ
(
LY st
LY ut
)σ−1
σ
(
cxut
cxst
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
Rt (3.30)
Rxst =
(
1−γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
Nst
Nut
)σ−1
σ
(
LY st
LY ut
)σ−1
σ
(
cxut
cxst
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
1 +
(
1−γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
Nst
Nut
)σ−1
σ
(
LY st
LY ut
)σ−1
σ
(
cxut
cxst
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−ϕxut =ϕxst
Rt. (3.31)
If σ > 1 the market size for machines plays a crucial role in the sense that relative proﬁtabil-
ity, πst /π
u
t , increases in accordance with that type of labor which is complementary to the
respective type of machine. In conclusion, demand shares for natural resources depend not
only on γ, i.e. ϕxut = γ and ϕ
xs
t = 1 − γ, if σ = 1, but also on the blueprint ratio, N
s
t
Nut
, the
employment ratio in intermediate production,
LY st
LY ut
, and the marginal production cost ratio,
cxut
cxst
= A
B
Nst
Nut
ωα−1t .
Having established the equilibria on the markets for intermediate goods and machines, the
labor market and the market for natural resources, we now turn to the capital market and
the dynamics of resource extraction, i.e. the depletion rate of natural resources. Free entry in
R&D drives proﬁts down to zero in both R&D-sectors. The value of each blueprint equals the
discounted proﬁt stream (i.e. πxit+1/(1 + rt+1)) generated by patent owners, that is, machine
producers. On the other hand, Eq. (3.21) implies that the marginal productivity of one
unit of ﬁnal output allocated to R&D equals ηi(N it )
−δ. As pYt has been normalized to 1, the
technology market clearing condition reads as
πxst+1
πxut+1
=
ηu
ηs
(
Nut
N st
)−δ
, (3.32)
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such that the evolution of the blueprint ratio in the subsequent period is obtained from (3.23)
and (3.25) as 13
N st+1
Nut+1
=
[(
ηs
ηu
)(
N st
Nut
)−δ] (β+(σ−1)ξL)β−ξR(σ−1)
[(
1− γ
γ
)εβ (LY st+1
LY ut+1
)(σ−1)ξL (
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)] 1β−ξR(σ−1)
, (3.33)
where ξR = α(1− β) and β− ξR(σ− 1) > 0 within the range of plausible parameter values.14
For σ > 1, the blueprint ratio in t + 1 will be biased towards skilled labor complementary
innovations if it is expected that the skilled-unskilled labor ratio,
LY st+1
LY ut+1
, increases in the inter-
mediate sector. An increase in A
B
enhances the eﬃciency of labor and natural resources in
the machine production of sector s relative to sector u, such that relative marginal produc-
tion costs,
cxut
cxst
, and relative proﬁtability of skilled labor complementary innovation increase.
If δ > 0, the number of existing blueprints dampens the speed of innovations in the future
because it is comparatively diﬃcult to innovate skill-complementary machines for the next
period. For δ < 0, in contrast, the existing level of blueprints speeds up innovations due to
positive intertemporal knowledge spillovers.
Outlays for R&D are ﬁnanced by aggregate savings St which are not invested in ownership of
natural resources implying that the amount of aggregate savings can be written as15
St = p
Y u
t Y
u
t
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
ξL
[
1 + ωt
Lst
Lut
]
− ξ
R
ϕxut
1− τt
τt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z1t
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭ . (3.34)
Free entry in R&D and perfect capital markets imply equality between future aggregate
proﬁts and revenues of aggregate savings allocated to the R&D-sector u or s, such that
N it+1π
i
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)D
i
t. Thus, we obtain from the technology market clearing condition
13For details see Appendix B.5.
14Note that:β ≈ 0.65 and ξR around 0.04 - see Section 3.6 for more details, such that σ > 17.25 would be
necessary, in order to violate β − ξR(σ − 1) > 0.
15For details see Appendix B.6.
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(3.32), given that Dst +D
u
t = St:
Dut =
1
1 + Ωt
St and D
s
t =
Ωt
1 + Ωt
St, (3.35)
with Ωt =
Nst+1
Nut+1
ηu
ηs
(
Nst
Nut
)δ
=
Nst+1π
xs
t+1
Nut+1π
xu
t+1
and
Nst+1
Nut+1
given by (3.33).
Clearly, a prerequisite not only for sustained economic growth, but also for a non-trivial
interior solution of the model is St > 0 implied by Z1t > 0, i.e.
ρ
1+γ+ρ
ξL
[
1 + ωt
Lst
Lut
]
> ξ
R
ϕxut
1−τt
τt
.
Therefore, it is not suﬃcient that the labor income share exceeds the natural resource income
share, i.e. ξL > ξR. A necessary condition for St > 0 and sustained economic growth therefore
is a suﬃciently high expenditure share for old-age consumption ρ
1+γ+ρ
.
Bearing in mind that the price per unit of natural resources equals its value marginal product
in intermediate production, the evolution of the natural resource price, gp
R
t+1, is given by
the change in the value marginal product of natural resources.16 On the other hand, in
equilibrium, the change of this factor price is tied to the interest factor by Hotelling’s rule
(1 + rt+1 = g
pR
t+1), where the technology market clearing condition (1 + rt+1 = π
i
t+1η
i(N it )
−δ,
with i = u, s) links the interest rate to the proﬁtability of future innovations. Thus, the
dynamics of the depletion rate of natural resources τ is reduced to the following diﬀerence
equation17
τt+1 =
Z1t
Z2t
τt
1− τt
(
gϕ
Rxu
t+1
)−1
. (3.36)
with Z2t = β(1− β)(1 + Ωt).
As we remarked before, a necessary condition for aggregate savings being positive is Z1t > 0.
Otherwise, savings, demand for machines and the depletion rate would jump to zero implying
zero output in the machine and the intermediate goods producing sectors. It is precisely the
behavior of Z1t
Z2t
which steers natural resource depletion during the transition and in the long-
run. During the transition, an increase in Z1t as compared to Z2t - which contains aggregate
relative proﬁts of future innovations (see (3.35)) - increases the depletion rate of natural
16We denote the gross growth rate of x, xt+1xt , by g
x
t+1.
17For details see Appendix B.7(a).
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resources. We will now clarify the mechanism behind diﬀerence equation (3.36) by starting
from a diﬀerent point of origin. In equilibrium, demand for machines in sector i = u, s has to
match its supply18
X it = N
i
tx
i
t = N
i
t
(
pY it
cxit
) 1
β
LY it = N
i
tG
(
Lxit
)1−α (
ϕxit Rt
)α
, (3.37)
with Rt = τtMt−1 and G = A ∨B, if i = s ∨ u.
Accordingly, depletion of natural resources must increase whenever demand for machines in
one or both sectors augments in such a way that factor reallocation (changes in ϕxit ) alone
is not suﬃcient, and a higher extraction of natural resources becomes necessary. In light of
(3.37), changes in demand for and the output of machines in sector u are given by
(
g
pY u
cxu
t+1
) 1
β
gL
u
t+1 =
(
gL
u
t+1
)1−α (
gϕ
xu
t+1g
R
t+1
)α
, (3.38)
such that, after some manipulations,
Z1t
Z2t
(
gϕ
xu
t+1
)−1
= gRt+1. (3.39)
As gRt+1 =
τt+1
τt
(1− τt), the last equation implies (3.36).
In sum, the evolution of the economy is governed by a four-dimensional system of diﬀerence
equations containing the laws of motion for the population ratio, L
s
Lu
, the blueprint ratio, N
s
Nu
,
the depletion rate, τ , and the fraction of unskilled households raising skilled oﬀspring, θ:
Lst+1
Lut+1
=
θtn
u,s
t + n
s,s L
s
t
Lut
(1− θt)nu,u , (3.40)
N st+1
Nut+1
=
[(
ηs
ηu
)(
N st
Nut
)−δ] (β+(σ−1)ξL)β−ξR(σ−1)
(3.41)
[(
1− γ
γ
)εβ (LY st+1
LY ut+1
)(σ−1)ξL (
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)] 1β−ξR(σ−1)
, (3.42)
τt+1 =
Z1t
Z2t
τt
1− τt
(
gϕ
Rxu
t+1
)−1
, (3.43)
18For details see Appendix B.7(b).
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with
LY st+1
LY ut+1
= (1− φns,s)Lst+1
Lut+1
− φθt+1nu,st+1 and indiﬀerence condition (3.15)
ωt+1 =
z + ωtφ
z
.
which determines θt+1 implicitly via (3.26).
3.5 Balanced Growth
Imposing steady state conditions, and denoting by subscript ’∗’ stationary values, the long-run
equilibrium is characterized by (for details see Appendix A.2):
Proposition 10
Along the unique balanced growth path,
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗ ,
(
Ns
Nu
)
∗ , θ∗ and τ∗ are constant, such that
ω∗, pY s∗ , p
Y u
∗ are constant as well.
(i) From (3.40), the skilled-unskilled population ratio is identiﬁed as(
Ls
Lu
)
∗
=
θ∗nu,s∗
(1− θ∗)nu,u − ns,s . (3.44)
Employment ratios in production are therefore given by (see Proposition 8): (L
Y s
LY u
)∗ =(
Lxs
Lxu
)
∗ = (1− φns,s)
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗ − φθ∗nu,s∗ .
(ii) In steady state, the share of unskilled households educating skilled oﬀspring θ∗ is deter-
mined by
ω∗ =
z
z − φ, (3.45)
where ω∗ =
[(
ηs
ηu
)σ−1 (
1−γ
γ
)εβ(1+δ) (
LY s
LY u
)σ−1−β(1+δ)
∗
(
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)(1+δ)] 1ψ
.
(iii) The blueprint ratio and the depletion rate satisfy:
(
N s
Nu
)
∗
=
[(
ηs
ηu
)β+(σ−1)ξL (
1− γ
γ
)εβ (
LY s
LY u
)(σ−1)ξL
∗
(
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)] 1ψ
, (3.46)
τ∗ = 1− Z1∗
Z2∗
, (3.47)
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where ψ = β − ξR(σ − 1) + δ(β + (σ − 1)ξL) > 0 in the range of plausible parameters.
(iv) Skilled and unskilled-labor complementary innovations evolve along the balanced growth
path in compliance with
g∗ = gN
i
∗ =
[
nξ
L
∗ (1− τ∗)ξ
R
] 1
δ
, i = u, s, (3.48)
where n∗ = (1− θ∗)nu,u = θ∗
(
Lu
Ls
)
∗ n
u,s
∗ + n
s,s represents the average number of children
in steady state.
In light of Item (iv) of Proposition 10, it follows that the long-run growth rate of the population
has a positive impact on the growth rate of innovations as long as δ > 0. Whenever, long-
run population growth stabilizes below or at the reproduction level, n∗ = 1, the long-run
growth rate of productivity (g∗ − 1) becomes negative, given δ > 0. In this sense, skill-biased
technological change would dig its own grave via the negative feedback eﬀect induced by the
decline in fertility because ∂n∗
∂θ∗ < 0. If one considers positive population growth as not feasible
due to space restrictions and/or making allowance for United Nations’ long-run population
projections that predict a stationary world population after the year 2150, the steady state
exhibits no population growth, such that n∗ = 1 should be a reasonable prediction for the
future. Under these circumstances the maximum productivity growth rate would be 0 (see
(3.48)) for τ∗ = 0 and δ > 0. Hence for any interior solution 0 < τ∗ < 1, the economy would
exhibit negative productivity growth and a negative growth rate of the wage rate in both
sectors (see Corollary 1 below). In other words, a stationary population confronted with non-
renewable natural resources is not able to generate sustained economic growth in our setting,
when the productivity of R&D is negatively related to the level of technology (δ > 0). A
prerequisite for long-run growth in the face of stationary or shrinking populations therefore
includes positive external returns in R&D with respect to the existing stock of blueprints, i.e.
δ < 0 in our speciﬁcation.
The population’s growth rate depends on the composition of the population in terms of
skilled and unskilled households and the induced skill bias of innovations. In reality, both are
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triggered by the schooling sector, i.e. φ, and the research infrastructure as captured by η
s
ηu
. In
the following proposition, we characterize the behavior of the share of unskilled households
raising skilled oﬀspring in the long-run, θ∗, and the depletion rate of natural resources, τ∗,
with respect to variations in the teacher-student ratio φ and the productivity ratio in R&D,
ηs
ηu
(for details see Appendix A.3):
Proposition 11
Along the balanced growth path:
(i) The skilled wage premium is speciﬁed as ω∗ = zz−φ , such that
∂θ∗
∂φ
> 0 and ∂θ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
< 0.
(ii) The reaction of the long-run depletion rate τ∗ w.r.t. changes in φ and
ηs
ηu
is ambiguous,
i.e. ∂τ∗
∂φ
, ∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
≷ 0.
Item (i) of Proposition 11 follows from Item (ii) of Proposition 10. An increase in φ raises
the right-hand side of (3.45), such that ω∗ and therefore the skilled-unskilled population ratio
must increase, which requires an increase in the share of unskilled households raising skilled
oﬀspring θ∗. Hence ∂θ∗∂φ > 0. Conversely, an increase in
ηs
ηu
raises the left-hand side of (3.45)
where the right-hand side remains constant. Thus, the skilled-unskilled population ratio must
decline in the long-run, such that θ∗ declines and ∂θ∗∂ ηs
ηu
< 0.
The sign of ∂τ∗
∂φ
and ∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
in turn is ambiguous (Item (ii) of Proposition 11). Whether ∂τ∗
∂φ
is pos-
itive or negative depends essentially on ∂Z1
∂φ
≶ ∂Z2
∂φ
(for details see Appendix A.3). Intuitively,
whenever ∂Z2
∂φ
> ∂Z1
∂φ
, the reaction of relative proﬁtability of skill-complementary innovations
with respect to variations in φ is larger than the reaction of aggregate savings, such that the
depletion rate of natural resources must increase, i.e. ∂τ∗
∂φ
> 0. An analogous argument applies
for ∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
. Since an increase in φ or a reduction in η
s
ηu
cause an increase in θ∗, the average growth
rate of the population n∗ must decline. The latter in turn causes a negative impact on the
long-run growth rate of productivity, if δ > 0, and is conducive to economic growth whenever
positive spillover eﬀects exist with respect to existing technological knowledge, i.e. δ < 0.
In the following section, we confront our model with realistic parameters as they are used in
other studies and calibrate the model such that it ﬁts observed macroeconomic aggregates. In
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Figure 3.2: Reaction of the long-run depletion rate of natural resources, τ∗ with respect to
changes in the teacher-student ratio, φ and relative research productivity η = η
s
ηu
.
this way analytical ambiguity can be restricted, such that we obtain (see Figure 3.2): ∂τ∗
∂φ
< 0
and ∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
> 0 and ∂g∗
∂φ
≷ 0 and ∂g∗
∂ η
s
ηu
≷ 0 for δ ≶ 0.19
The levels of per-capita consumption cit and c
i
t+1 depend on wage incomes w
i
t, i = u, s, such
that the evolution of per-capita consumption levels is tied to the evolution of wages.
Corollary 1
In the long-run, the evolution of wages, gw
i
∗ , with i = u, s, is given by (for details see Appendix
A.4):
gw
i
∗ =
⎡
⎢⎣ gN i∗(
gp
R
∗
)ξR
⎤
⎥⎦
1
ξL
=
[
nξ
L
∗ (1− τ∗)ξ
R
] 1
δ
[
1− τ∗
n∗
]ξR
. (3.49)
The economy moves along a sustainable growth path, whenever gw
i
∗ ≥ 1, which implies at
least non-declining per-capita consumption levels in the long-run. From (3.49), sustainable
19The behavior of the depletion rate with respect to changes in φ and η
s
ηu is presented in Figure 3.2. Indeed,
τ∗ follows a u-shaped relation with respect to changes in φ, where the increasing arm is not relevant since the
implied θ∗ is close to 1 for φ > 0.14 and a realistic range of φ falls within 0.045 and 0.055, such that ∂τ∗∂φ < 0.
Similarly, in order to match current data η
s
ηu should fall between 2 and 2.5, such that
∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
> 0.
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development in its weakest form requires that productivity growth must at least compensate
for the increase in the natural resource price caused by an increasing shortage of natural
resources.
3.6 Computational Experiments
Our focus is the interaction between skill-biased technical change, population dynamics and
resource depletion. Along the balanced growth path we found that φ and η
s
ηu
aﬀect the
population’s growth rate and the depletion rate of natural resources. In order to address
the dynamic implications of our theory, we calibrate our model and conduct the following
numerical experiments: ﬁrst, an exogenous increase in the skilled-unskilled population ratio,
Ls
Lu
, which had been observed in the US due to the Vietnam war in the 1960s, see Acemoglu
(1998,2002), or due to immigration policies biased towards skilled labor like in the US and
many other industrialized countries. This experiment generates only transitory eﬀects since
the steady state remains unaﬀected. Second, an increase in φ, i.e. changes in education costs
which may mirror changes in the quality of the education system.20
3.6.1 Calibration
Since one period encompasses approximately thirty years, we choose for the discount factor
of future consumption, ρ, a value that is standard in real-business-cycle literature: 0.99 per
quarter, i.e. ρ = 0.99120 in our context. The parameter β represents the labor share in
intermediate goods production and is set to 0.65. In the U.S., energy expenditures as a
share of GDP amounted to 8.8% in 2006 with a maximum close to 14% at the beginning
of the eighties (see Energy Information Administration, 2009). Hence 8.8% constitutes an
upper limit for the resource income share of non-renewables in our model. We therefore set
α = 0.08, which implies ξR = α(1 − β) = 0.028 in each intermediate sector. The parameter
φ reﬂects the teacher-student ratio and is set to 1/20. Moreover, child-rearing is subject to
20We omit an explicit presentation of the consequences of a shock in η
s
ηu , since the eﬀects do qualitatively
not diﬀer to a shock in φ, except for ω∗ which remains unaﬀected (see Figure 3.5 in Appendix C).
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forgone consumption possibilities and losses in potential lifetime earnings which amount to
13% for highly educated women and higher if women drop out of the labor market completely
(Dankmeyer, 1996). The direct time cost for parents raising a child to adulthood amounts
to 50% of parents’ time endowment (see de la Croix and Doepke, 2003), which would imply
z = 0.075 as a lower limit. Taking losses in lifetime earnings into account, we set z = 0.15,
which implies a skilled wage premium ω∗ = 1.5 which matches U.S. data (Acemoglu, 2002).
The weight ν of children in the utility function drives the growth rate of the population.
We choose a value of ν = 0.26, which generates approximately zero population growth along
the balanced growth path (−0.0007 ≈ 0 per year). Now there are ﬁve parameters left: the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in ﬁnal good production, ε, the weight
of Y ut in ﬁnal good production, γ, the ratio of the productivity parameters in R&D, η =
ηs
ηu
,
the ratio of productivity parameters in machine production A
B
, and the externality parameter
in R&D, δ. We calibrate these parameters so that they match a long-run productivity growth
rate of 2.4%, an investment share It
Yt
in the vicinity of 14.43%, ﬁtting the 10 year average of US
private ﬁxed capital formation as a share of GDP21 (OECD Economic Outlook Database), an
employment share in education of around 2%, and a long-run decline in the natural resource
stock of 2.4% per year, which causes, via Hotelling’s rule a long-run interest rate close to 4%.
The remaining parameters are therefore ﬁxed as follows: ε = 2.4, γ = 0.655, η
s
ηu
= 2.2, δ =
−0.045, and A
B
= 8.22
3.6.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
Experiment 1: Increase in the skilled-unskilled population ratio
Lst
Lut
21Note that: ItYt =
[
γε+(1−γ)ε(pt)1−ε
] 1
ε−1
[
γ+(1−γ)
(
Y st
Y ut
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
Z1t, for details see Appendix B.9.
22The numeric method is described in Appendix B.10 and presented in the Numerical Appendix 9.2. Given
the parameter constellation the dynamic system exhibits two positive eigenvalues within the unit circle and
two outside the unit circle, such that the economy is subject to saddle-point stability. This constellation
is robust for a very large range of parameters, except for ε < 2. Note also that the transitory behavior is
independent from δ ≷ 0.
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In our ﬁrst experiment, we analyze transitory eﬀects of an exogenous increase in the skilled-
unskilled population ratio with respect to the interaction between skill-biased innovations,
population dynamics and the depletion of natural resources. In our experiment, the unantici-
pated shock occurs in period t = 0, while our point of reference is the steady state determined
by the parameter constellation mentioned above. The results are presented in Figure 3.3.
Given the blueprint ratio
Nst
Nut
in the current period, an increase in the skilled-unskilled popu-
lation ratio,
Lst
Lut
, leads to a decline in productivity of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor.
Therefore, the current wage ratio ωt is reduced such that it is more aﬀordable for unskilled
households to raise skilled oﬀspring, i.e. nu,st increases (see Eq. 3.14), provided that θt > 0.
Recall now, that the skilled-unskilled population ratio also adjusts by means of changes in
the fraction of unskilled households raising skilled oﬀspring, θt.
As the skilled-unskilled population ratio is above its long-run value, θt must adjust in compli-
ance with (3.15) from below to its long-run value which ensures a decline of
Lst
Lut
. The growth
rate of the unskilled labor force, gLut+1, is now above its long-run value and the growth rate of
the skilled labor force, gLst+1, is below it. Since we know, moreover, that: n
u,u > ns,s > nu,st ,
the growth rate of the population, nt, must be above its long-run value as well and popu-
lation growth is essentially driven by an expansion of the unskilled labor force. The drop
in the number of children sent to school caused by the decline of θt, lowers the fraction of
skilled labor,
LEst
Lt
, allocated to the education sector. The latter and the initial increase in the
skilled-unskilled population ratio induce an increase in skilled-unskilled employment ratios in
both production sectors which again is compatible with the observed decline in ωt.
23 Since
the market size for skilled-labor complementary machines has increased, given the current
blueprint ratio
Nst
Nut
, relative aggregate demand for skilled-labor complementary machines X
s
Xu
increases, such that the share of extracted natural resources allocated to the s-sector, ϕxst ,
must increase. The increased relative market size for skilled labor complementary machines
reﬂects also higher employment of labor in the s−sector such that the depletion rate of natural
resources τt is reduced. Hence, the current working cohort invests more in natural resources.
23Note that
LY st
LY ut
=
Lxst
Lxut
due to symmetry assumptions (see also Eqs. (3.27) and (3.28)).
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Figure 3.3: Experiment 1 - impulse response functions with respect to an increase in the
skilled-unskilled population ratio L
s
Lu
.
At the same time, the investment share of GDP, It
Yt
, declines.
In the subsequent period, the skilled-unskilled population ratio shrinks according to the fer-
tility decisions of the previous period (θt declined in the previous period). The new level of
the skilled-unskilled population ratio is still above its long-run value and has been anticipated
by the allocation of savings to both R&D-sectors in the previous period, i.e.
Dst
Dut
increased in
the previous period. Therefore, technological progress is biased towards skilled-labor comple-
mentary innovations, such that
Nst
Nut
is now above its long-run value as well (see Eq. (3.33)).
Accordingly, the skilled-wage premium increases and overshoots its long-run level, which
makes education for unskilled households less aﬀordable, such that nu,st decreases to below
its long-run value. At the same time, more unskilled households wish to train their oﬀspring
to skilled workers. Consequently, θt rises in compliance with indiﬀerence condition (3.15),
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which results in a higher demand for skilled labor in the education sector. As the skilled-
unskilled population ratio shrinks and population growth is mainly created by an expansion
of the unskilled population group, the increase in θt leads to an increase in demand for skilled
labor in the education sector relative to the overall working force , i.e.
LEst
Lt
increases. Again,
with regard to adjustments in natural resource use in production, we have to consider two
eﬀects: First, the adjustment in the share of extracted natural resources allocated to the s- or
u-sector, ϕit , i = u, s, and second, the adjustment in the extraction rate of natural resources,
i.e. τt. The aforementioned decline in the skilled-unskilled population ratio as compared to
the previous period accompanied by an increase in θ and
LEst
Lt
during the transition leads to
a drop in skilled-labor employment ratios in production. Thus, it appears that the skill bias
of innovations is declining and the share of natural resources allocated to the s- (u-) sector is
diminishing (growing). The u−sector in turn, is subject to declining population growth as θ
increases towards its long-run value. Consequently, the depletion rate τt increases in order to
match aggregate machine demand and follows the movement of θt. As τt increases, households
shift their investments from natural capital to the capital market, such that the investment
share of GDP is increasing during the transition. The increase in θt, in turn, is responsible for
a decline in population growth nt. Hence, the model suggests an inverse relationship between
τt and nt after an increase in
Lst
Lut
.
Experiment 2: Increase in the teacher-student ratio φ
In our second numerical exercise (see Figure 3.4), we increase the teacher-student ratio φ by
1% which may reﬂect an increase in the quality of schools.
(a) Long-run
Indiﬀerence condition (3.15) implies that the long-run wage diﬀerential adjusts to ω∗ = zz−φ .
After an increase in φ, it is more beneﬁcial for the unskilled population group to raise skilled
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oﬀspring.
Consequently, θ∗ increases. With a higher fraction of unskilled households raising skilled
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Figure 3.4: Experiment 2 - impulse response functions with respect to an increase in the
teacher-student ratio, φ.
1cm
oﬀspring, the long-run skilled-unskilled population ratio
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗ must increase as well. Con-
sequently, relative demand for skilled-labor complementary machines
(
Xs
Xu
)
∗ increases which
generates an increase in the ratio of R&D expenditures
(
Ds
Du
)
∗ and the blueprint ratio
(
Ns
Nu
)
∗.
Therefore, the share of extracted natural resources allocated to the s-sector, ϕxs∗ , must increase
as well. With a higher fraction of unskilled households wishing to educate their oﬀspring to
skilled workers, the long-run growth rate of the population, n∗, must decline. In light of
Proposition 11, a higher share of unskilled households raising skilled oﬀspring is associated
with a lower depletion rate of natural resources. At the same time the investment share of
GDP, ( I
Y
)∗, increases in the long-run, where long-run productivity growth amounts to 2.62%
as compared to 2.4% in the baseline scenario.
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(b) Transition
An increase in φ implies that the skilled-wage premium ωt must increase to its new long-run
value equal to w∗ = zz−φ . Hence, the current wage diﬀerential is below its long-run value,
as well as the skilled-unskilled population ratio. A smooth convergence of the latter to its
new long-run value requires the share of unskilled households raising skilled oﬀspring, θt, to
adjust from above to the new long-run value. Hence, the growth rate of the skilled population
group must be above its long-run value, too. The opposite is true for the unskilled population
group. As nu,u > ns,s > nu,st , the growth rate of the population is converging from below to
its actual long-run value.
The increase in θt raises demand for skilled labor in the education sector such that
LEst
Lt
in-
creases at the expense of employment ratios of skilled labor in production. Consequently, the
wage diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled labor increases. Since the (relative) market
size for skilled-labor complementary innovations is currently reduced, the share of natural
resources allocated to the u-sector must increase, i.e. ϕxst declines. At the same time, the
depletion rate increases in order to satisfy aggregate demand for machines. During the tran-
sition θt converges from above to its higher long-run value, such that relative demand for
skilled labor is declining in the education sector as well. As this process comes along with an
increasing skilled-unskilled population ratio, the employment ratios of skilled labor in produc-
tion must rise. Therefore, skill-biased technological change meets an increase in the skilled
population group. The (transitory) decline in θt and the increase in relative wages that is
responsible for a decline in nu,st cause a decline in the growth rate of the skilled population
group and an increase in the growth rate of the unskilled population group. With a lower
demand for labor in the education sector and increasing employment ratios of skilled labor
in production the depletion rate of natural resources declines during the transition while the
growth rate of the population is increasing.
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3.7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper integrates the features of skill-biased technological change, fertility decline and
natural resource use into a comprehensive framework. More in detail, we consider an overlap-
ping generations economy populated by skilled and unskilled households. Educational choices
of parents for their oﬀspring generate diﬀerential fertility between skilled and unskilled house-
holds, in the spirit of Galor and Mountford (2006), and de la Croix and Doepke (2003). The
production side of the model is characterized by a scale invariant two-sector growth model
with multiple production stages. Moreover, the direction of technological change is deter-
mined by the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labor (Acemoglu, 1998; 2002) resulting
from the educational choices of parents for their oﬀspring. In addition, production is subject
to a non-renewable natural resource as an essential input.
Our analysis reveals with respect to the long-run, the following results: First, an increase in
the skilled population group relative to the unskilled population group reduces the growth rate
of the population and lowers the depletion rate of natural resources. Second, whenever pop-
ulation growth stabilizes at or even below the replacement level, sustained economic growth
can only be achieved by intertemporal knowledge spillover with respect to research and de-
velopment. Otherwise, skill-biased productivity growth would dig its own grave through the
induced negative feedback-eﬀect of the fertility decline.
As regards the transition, we obtain the following results: During the transition to the steady
state, the depletion rate of natural resources follows the evolution of the share of unskilled
households raising skilled oﬀspring. As the latter is inversely related to the growth rate of
the population, the model suggests an inverse relation between population growth and the
depletion rate of natural resources during the transition to the long-run equilibrium (steady
state). Generally speaking, the last result hinges on the demand for skilled labor in the
education sector triggered by the share of unskilled households raising skilled oﬀspring. An
increase in the latter reduces population growth and advances demand for natural resources
in production in order to compensate for the reallocation of skilled labor from production to
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education.
We believe that this results have strong implications for economic policies aiming at sustain-
able development in view of nonrenewable natural resources, since the long-run productivity
growth rate is not policy invariant anymore and dependent on the endogenous population’s
growth rate as well as the depletion rate of natural resources.
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3.9 Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 9
Given the ratio of marginal production cost for machine producing ﬁrms in the s- and the
u-sector
cut
cst
=
A
B
N st
Nut
ωα−1t , (3.50)
we obtain together with (3.26)
cut
cst
=
(
1− γ
γ
) εβ(α−1
σξL
(
N st
Nut
) 1−α(1−σβ)
σξL
(
LY st
LY ut
)−β(α−1)
σξL
(
A
B
)σβ+(1−α)(1−β)
σξL
. (3.51)
Making use of the last expression, ϕxut and ϕ
xs
t read in light of (3.30) and (3.31) as
ϕxut =
1
1 +
(
1−γ
γ
) ε(σ+ξLx)
σ2ξL
(
Nst
Nut
) (σ−1)(σβ+ξL)
σ2ξLβ
(
LY st
LY ut
) (σ−1)ξLx
σ2ξL
(
A
B
) (σ−1)(1−β)(σβ+ξLx)
σ2ξLβ
(3.52)
and
ϕxst =
(
1−γ
γ
) ε(σ+ξLx)
σ2ξL
(
Nst
Nut
) (σ−1)(σβ+ξL)
σ2ξLβ
(
LY st
LY ut
) (σ−1)ξLx
σ2ξL
(
A
B
) (σ−1)(1−β)(σβ+ξLx)
σ2ξLβ
1 +
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γ
) ε(σ+ξLx)
σ2ξL
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Nut
) (σ−1)(σβ+ξL)
σ2ξLβ
(
LY st
LY ut
) (σ−1)ξLx
σ2ξL
(
A
B
) (σ−1)(1−β)(σβ+ξLx)
σ2ξLβ
. (3.53)
Consequently, ϕxut (ϕ
xs
t ) is declining (increasing) in
Nst
Nut
and
LY st
LY ut
, if σ > 1.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 10
Item (i),(ii) and (iii):
Along the balanced growth path, the blueprint ratio, employment ratios of labor and the wage
diﬀerential of skilled labor are constant, we therefore know that
(
N s
Nu
)
∗
=
(
ηs
ηu
) σ
1+δσ
(
1− γ
γ
) ε
1+δσ
(
LY s
LY u
) σ−1
1+δσ
∗
(
cu
cs
) (σ−1)(1−β)
β(1+δσ)
∗
. (3.54)
Substitution for
cut
cst
yields
(
N s
Nu
)
∗
=
(
ηs
ηu
)σβ
ψ1
(
1− γ
γ
) εβ
ψ1
(
LY s
LY u
) (σ−1)β
ψ1
∗
(
A
B
ωα−1∗
) (σ−1)(1−β)
ψ1
, (3.55)
with ψ1 = β(1 + δσ)− (σ − 1)(1− β).
Proceeding in a similar fashion we obtain for the skilled wage premium
ω∗ =
(
1− γ
γ
) εβ
ψ2
(
N s
Nu
)σ−1
ψ2
∗
(
LY s
LY u
)− β
ψ2
∗
(
A
B
) (σ−1)(1−β)
ψ2
, (3.56)
with ψ2 = σβ + (1− α)(1− β)(σ − 1).
Combining (3.55) and (3.56) yields
ω∗ =
[(
ηs
ηu
)σ−1(
1− γ
γ
)εβ(1+δ)(
LY s
LY u
)σ−1−β(1+δ)
∗
(3.57)
(
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)(1+δ)] 1ψ
,
(
N s
Nu
)
∗
=
[(
ηs
ηu
)β+(σ−1)ξL (
1− γ
γ
)εβ (
LY s
LY u
)(σ−1)ξL
∗
(3.58)
(
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)] 1ψ
,
with ψ = β − ξR(σ − 1) + δ(β + (σ − 1)ξL).
Since (L
s
Lu
)∗ =
θ∗nu,s∗
(1−θ∗)nu,u−ns,s , (
LY s
LY u
)∗ = (1−φns,s)(LsLu )∗−φθ∗nu,s∗ and ω∗ = zz−φ with ω∗ specifed
3. Technological Change, Population Dynamics, and Natural Resource Depletion 101
by (3.56), we yield
(1− φns,s)
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗
− φθ∗nu,s∗ = Φ¯,
with Φ¯ =
[(
z
z−φ
)ψ (
ηs
ηu
)1−σ (
1−γ
γ
)εβ(1+δ) (
A
B
)(1−σ)(1−β)(1+δ)] 1σ−1−β(1+δ)
, such that
θ2∗ + θ∗
Φ2
Φ1
− Φ3
Φ1
= 0, (3.59)
with Φ1 = φn
u,unu,s∗ ; Φ2 = (1 − φns,s)nu,s∗ + Φ¯nu,s − (nu,u − ns,s)φnu,s∗ ; Φ3 = Φ¯(nu,u − ns,s).
With one positive and one negative root, the solution to (3.59) is unique. Hence, (L
s
Lu
)∗, (L
Y s
LY u
)∗
and (N
s
Nu
)∗ are unique and constant as well which implies that pY s∗ and p
Y u
∗ are constant and
unique as well (see Appendix B. 8). Since, τ∗ is also deﬁned in a unique way (see Proof of
Proposition 10), there exists a unique balanced growth path.
Item (iv):
In the presence of a symmetric equilibrium, the production function of intermediate Y i, i =
u, s writes as
Y it = N
i
t (L
xi
t )
(1−α)(1−β)(Rxit )
α(1−β)(LY i)β, (3.60)
such that the steady state gross-growth rate of Y it : g
Y i
∗ , i = u, s is given by
gY i∗ = g
Ni
∗ (g
L
∗ )
ξL(gR∗ )
ξR. (3.61)
Since innovations evolve according to (3.21) and are fueled by aggregate savings, we obtain
in steady state gDi∗ = g
Y i
∗ . Moreover, in steady state, we yield from (3.21)
1 =
gDi∗
(gNi∗ )1+δ
=
gY i∗
(gNi∗ )1+δ
. (3.62)
Hence,
(gNi∗ )
1+δ = gY i∗ = g
Ni
∗ (g
L
∗ )
ξL(gR∗ )
ξR (3.63)
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and
gN
i
∗ =
[
nξ
L
∗ (1− τ∗)ξ
R
] 1
δ
, (3.64)
since gRt+1 = (1− τt) τt+1τt and τ∗ = τt = τt+1.
In Appendix B.8, we exploit the general equilibrium structure more in detail, in order to
verify gN
i
∗ , i = u, s.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 11
Item (ii):
From (3.52) we know that
ϕxu∗ =
1
1 + Ψ∗
, (3.65)
with Ψ∗ =
(
1−γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
Ns
Nu
)σ−1
σ
∗
(
LY s
LY u
)σ−1
σ
∗
(
A
B
(
Ns
Nu
)
∗
ωα−1∗
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
.
Hence, in view of (3.47), the long-run depletion rate is speciﬁed by
τ∗ = 1− Z1∗
Z2∗
, (3.66)
τ∗ = 1−
ρ
1+ν+ρ
ξL
[
1 + z
z−φ
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗
]
− ξR(1 + Ψ)1−τ∗
τ∗
β(1− β)
[
1 + η
u
ηs
(
Ns
Nu
)1−δ
∗
] . (3.67)
Therefore,
τ 2∗ +
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
A︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
ξL
[
1 +
z
z − φ
(Ls
Lu
)
∗
]
+
B︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξR(1 + Ψ)−Z2∗
Z2∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ τ∗ −
ξR(1 + Ψ)
Z2∗
= 0, (3.68)
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with one positive and one negative root, such that the only economic meaningful solution is
given by
τ∗ = −B + A− Z2∗
2Z2∗
+
√
1
4
(
B + A− Z2∗
Z2∗
)2
+
B
Z2∗
, (3.69)
where the discriminant is always positive, since B
Z2∗
> 0.
In order to detect the behavior of τ∗ in response to shifts in θ∗, we deﬁne the following implicit
function, F , with
F = 1− Z1∗
Z2∗
− τ∗, (3.70)
where
Z1∗ =
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
ξL
(
1 +
z
z − φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω∗
(Ls
Lu
)
∗
)
− ξR(1 + Ψ∗)1− τ∗
τ∗
, (3.71)
Z2∗ = β(1− β)
(
1 +
ηu
ηs
(N s
Nu
)1+δ
∗
)
(3.72)
and η
u
ηs
(
Ns
Nu
)1+δ
∗
equals aggregate relative proﬁts of future innovation (N
s
Nu
)∗( π
xs
πxu
)∗.
In light of the Implicit function theorem it follows immediately that
∂τ∗
∂φ
≈ dτ∗
dφ
= − Fφ
Fτ∗
, (3.73)
where
Fτ∗ = −
ξR(1 + Ψ∗)
Z2∗
1
τ 2∗
− 1 < 0 (3.74)
and
Fφ = −
∂Z1∗
∂φ
Z2∗ − ∂Z2∗∂φ Z1∗
(Z2∗)2
, (3.75)
with
∂Z1∗
∂φ
=
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
ξL
[∂ω∗
∂φ
(Ls
Lu
)
∗
+ ω∗
∂(L
s
Lu
)∗
∂φ
]
− ξR1− τ∗
τ∗
∂Ψ∗
∂(L
Y s
LY u
)∗
∂(L
Y s
LY u
)∗
∂φ
, (3.76)
∂Z2∗
∂φ
= β(1− β)(1 + δ)η
u
ηs
(N s
Nu
)δ
∗
∂(N
s
Nu
)∗
∂(L
Y s
LY u
)∗
∂(L
Y s
LY u
)∗
∂φ
. (3.77)
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Hence, ∂τ∗
∂φ
= − Fφ
Fτ∗
≶ 0, if
∂Z1∗
∂φ
Z2∗ − ∂Z2∗
∂φ
Z1∗ ≷ 0, (3.78)
as Z1∗, Z2∗, ∂Z1∗∂φ ,
∂Z2∗
∂φ
> 0 for economic meaningful solutions.
Moreover for interior solutions, i.e. 0 < τ∗ < 1: Z1∗ < Z2∗, such that ∂Z2∗∂φ >
∂Z1∗
∂φ
is a
necessary condition for ∂τ∗
∂φ
> 0.
As regards ∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
, we obtain
∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
= −
F ηs
ηu
Fτ∗
, (3.79)
where
F ηs
ηu
= −
∂Z1∗
∂ η
s
ηu
Z2∗ − ∂Z2∗∂ ηs
ηu
Z1∗
Z22∗
, (3.80)
with
∂Z1∗
∂ η
s
ηu
=
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
ξLω∗
∂(L
s
Lu
)∗
∂ η
s
ηu
− ξR1− τ∗
τ∗
∂Ψ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
, (3.81)
∂Z2∗
∂ η
s
ηu
= −β(1− β)
[( ηs
ηu
)−2(N s
Nu
)1+δ
∗
+ (1 + δ)
(ηs
ηu
)−1(N s
Nu
)δ
∗
(∂(Ns
Nu
)∗
∂ η
s
ηu
)]
, (3.82)
and Z1∗, Z2∗ > 0; ∂Z1∗∂ ηs
ηu
, ∂Z2∗
∂ η
s
ηu
< 0 for economic meaningful solutions. Therefore, ∂τ∗
∂ η
s
ηu
> 0, if
|∂Z2∗
∂ η
s
ηu
| < |∂Z1∗
∂ η
s
ηu
|.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Since,
Nut+1 =
ηuDut
(Nut )
δ
=
ηuSut
(1 + Ωt)(Nut )
δ
=
ηupY ut Y
u
t Z1t
(1 + Ωt)(Nut )
δ
, (3.83)
Nut+1 =
ηuZ1t
(1 + Ωt)(Nut )
δ
[
(1− β) 1−2ββ Nut (pY ut )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY ut
]
, (3.84)
gN
u
t+1 =
Nut+1
Nut
=
ηuZ1t
(1 + Ωt)(Nut )
δ
[
(1− β) 1−2ββ (pY ut )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY ut
]
, (3.85)
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and {Ωt, Z2t, pY ut , gNu∗ } = const. in steady state, we obtain
gN
u
t+1
gN
u
t
=
gN
u
∗
gNu∗
= 1 =
(
gN
u
∗
)−δ (
gc
u
∗
)β−1
β n∗. (3.86)
As moreover
cut =
(
pRt
)α
(wut )
1−α
BNut α
α(1− α)1−α , (3.87)
it follows
gc
u
∗ =
(
gN
u
∗
)−1 (
gp
R
∗
)α (
gw
u
∗
)1−α
. (3.88)
Therefore it remains to specify gw
u
∗ and g
pR
∗ . Since
wut =
⎡
⎣(1− β)1−2βpY ut Nut
( (
pRt
)α
Bαα(1− α)1−α
)β−1⎤⎦
1
ξL
, (3.89)
we obtain
gw
u
∗ =
⎡
⎢⎣ gNu∗(
gp
R
∗
)ξR
⎤
⎥⎦
1
ξL
. (3.90)
As moreover gN
u
∗ = g
Ns
∗ : g
wu
∗ = g
ws
∗ .
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B. Further Derivations - Not for Publication
B.1 Derivation of the price index
For readers’ convenience we omit the time index. Aggregate output Y is composed out of two
intermediates Y u and Y s and is subject to the following CES-production function:
Y =
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s) ε−1ε
] ε
ε−1
. (3.2.1)
Competitive behavior implies the following optimality conditions for proﬁt maximizing factor
demand, given that pY ≡ 1
∂Y
∂Y u
=
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s) ε−1ε
] ε
ε−1−1
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε
−1 − pY u = 0, (3.2.2)
∂Y
∂Y s
=
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s) ε−1ε
] ε
ε−1−1
(1− γ)(Y s) ε−1ε −1 − pY s = 0. (3.2.3)
Hence, relative factor prices for intermediates read
pY s
pY u
=
1− γ
γ
(
Y s
Y u
)− 1
ε
, (3.2.4)
implying that
Y s =
(
1− γ
γ
)ε(
pY u
pY s
)ε
Y u. (3.2.5)
Moreover, production costs write as
C = pY uY u + pY sY s, (3.2.6)
C = pY uY u + pY s
(
1− γ
γ
)ε(
pY u
pY s
)ε
Y u, (3.2.7)
C = Y u
[
pY u + pY s
(
1− γ
γ
)ε(
pY u
pY s
)ε]
. (3.2.8)
In light of the last expression we are able to express factor demand for intermediates in
ﬁnal good production in terms of production costs, C, factor prices and parameters of the
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production function
Y u =
C
pY u + pY s
(
1−γ
γ
)ε (
pY u
pY s
)ε , (3.2.9)
Y u =
C
(pY u)εγ−ε[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] , (3.2.10)
Y u =
C(pY u)−εγε
(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε . (3.2.11)
Manipulating terms, yields
(Y u)
ε−1
ε =
C
ε−1
ε (pY u)1−εγε−1
[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] ε−1ε , (3.2.12)
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε =
C
ε−1
ε (pY u)1−εγε
[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] ε−1ε , (3.2.13)
and similarly
(1− γ)(Y s) ε−1ε = C
ε−1
ε (pY s)1−ε(1− γ)ε
[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] ε−1ε . (3.2.14)
Taking this two results together yields
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s) ε−1ε = (3.2.15)
=
C
ε−1
ε (pY u)1−εγε
[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] ε−1ε +
C
ε−1
ε (pY s)1−ε(1− γ)ε
[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] ε−1ε , (3.2.16)
=
C
ε−1
ε
[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] ε−1ε
[
γε(pY u)1−ε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] , (3.2.17)
=
C
ε−1
ε
[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε]− 1ε . (3.2.18)
Since, Y =
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s) ε−1ε
] ε
ε−1
=
[
C
ε−1
ε
[(pY u)1−εγε+(1−γ)ε(pY s)1−ε]− 1ε
] ε
ε−1
,
it follows immediately that
Y = C[(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] 1ε−1 , (3.2.19)
and ﬁnally
Y [(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] 11−ε = C, (3.2.20)
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with pY ≡ 1 = [(pY u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε] 11−ε representing the price index of Y .
B.2 Marginal Production Costs of Machines
Aggregate output in the machine producing sector reads as
X it = GN
i
t
(
Lxit
)1−α (
Rxit
)α
, (3.2.21)
with G = A ∨G = B if i = s ∨ i = u.
Perfect competition and proﬁt maximizing behavior imply
Rxit =
α
1− αL
xi
t
wit
pRt
. (3.2.22)
Combining the last expression with the aggregate cost functions in the machine producing
sectors yields
C it = w
i
tL
xi
t + p
R
t R
xi
t = w
i
tL
xi
t +
α
1− αL
xi
t
wit
pRt
=
1
1− αw
i
tL
xi
t . (3.2.23)
Hence,
Lxit =
(1− α)C it
wit
, (3.2.24)
and
Rxit =
αC it
pRt
. (3.2.25)
Combining the last two expressions with the production function gives
X it = GN
i
tC
i
t(1− α)1−α
(
wit
)α−1
αα
(
pRt
)−α
. (3.2.26)
Obviously,
C it = X
i
t
(wit)
1−α (
pRt
)α
GN it (1− α)1−ααα
. (3.2.27)
In conclusion the ratio of marginal production costs reads as
cut
cst
=
A
B
N st
Nut
wα−1t . (3.2.28)
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B.3 Labor Markets
Perfect competition and proﬁt maximizing behavior imply wY it = w
xi
t and
pY it
∂Y it
∂LY it
= pxit
∂X it
∂Lxit
. (3.2.29)
Since, pxit =
cxit
1−β
pxit
cxit
=
(1−α)Xit
Lxit
(1− β)β Y it
Lxit
. (3.2.30)
Since aggregate production of machines in sector i = u, s is given by X it = N
i
tx
i
t we yield in
light of (3.22) and (3.24)
Lxit =
(1− α)(1− β)
β
LY it . (3.2.31)
As moreover Lut = L
Y u
t + L
xu
t and L
s
t − LEst = LY st + Lxst , it follows
LY st =
β
ξL
(Lst − LEst ), Lxst =
ξLx
ξL
(Lst − LEst ), (3.2.32)
LY ut =
β
ξL
Lut , L
xu
t =
ξLx
ξL
Lst , (3.2.33)
with ξLx = (1− α)(1− β) and ξL = β + (1− α)(1− β).
B.4 Allocation of Extracted Natural Resources
Prefect competition and proﬁt maximizing behavior imply
pRt = p
xu
t α
Xst
Rxst
= pxst α
Xut
Rxut
. (3.2.34)
Since pxit =
cxit
1−β , we obtain
cxut
cxst
Xst
Xut
=
cxut
cxst
N st x
s
t
Nut x
u
t
=
(cxut
cxst
) 1−β
β
p
1
β
t
N st
Nut
LY st
LY ut
=
Rxst
Rxut
. (3.2.35)
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Substitution pt =
pY st
pY ut
yields
Rxst
Rxut
=
(
1− γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
N st
Nut
)σ−1
σ
(
LY st
LY ut
)σ−1
σ
(
cxut
cxst
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
. (3.2.36)
As an eﬃcient use of extracted natural resources requires Rxst +R
xu
t = Rt,
we ﬁnally arrive to
Rxut =
1
1 +
(
1−γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
Nst
Nut
)σ−1
σ
(
LY st
LY ut
)σ−1
σ
(
cxut
cxst
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
= ϕxut Rt, (3.2.37)
Rxst =
(
1−γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
Nst
Nut
)σ−1
σ
(
LY st
LY ut
)σ−1
σ
(
cxut
cxst
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
1 +
(
1−γ
γ
) ε
σ
(
Nst
Nut
)σ−1
σ
(
LY st
LY ut
)σ−1
σ
(
cxut
cxst
) (σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
= ϕxst Rt. (3.2.38)
B.5 Dynamics of the Blueprint Ratio
In light of (3.32) and (3.23), we know that
N st+1
Nut+1
=
(
ηs
ηu
)σ (
1− γ
γ
)ε(LY st+1
LY ut+1
)σ−1(
N st
Nut
)−δσ (cut+1
cst+1
) (σ−1)(1−β)
β
, (3.2.39)
such that substitution for ωt+1 in the marginal cost ratio yields
N st+1
Nut+1
=
(
ηs
ηu
)σ (
1− γ
γ
)ε(LY st+1
LY ut+1
)σ−1(
N st
Nut
)−δσ (
A
B
N st+1
Nut+1
ωα−1t+1
) (σ−1)(1−β)
β
, (3.2.40)
N st+1
Nut+1
=
(
ηs
ηu
)σ (
1− γ
γ
)ε(LY st+1
LY ut+1
)σ−1(
N st
Nut
)−δσ [
A
B
N st+1
Nut+1
(3.2.41)
((
1− γ
γ
)εβ (N st+1
Nut+1
)σ−1(LY st+1
LY ut+1
)−β (
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β))α−1σξL ⎤⎦
(σ−1)(1−β)
β
.
Collecting terms and solving for
Nst+1
Nut+1
yields
N st+1
Nut+1
=
[(
ηs
ηu
)(
N st
Nut
)−δ] (β+(σ−1)ξL)β−ξR(σ−1)
(3.2.42)
[(
1− γ
γ
)εβ (LY st+1
LY ut+1
)(σ−1)ξL (
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)] 1β−ξR(σ−1)
.
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B.6 Aggregate Savings
Aggregate savings are given by the sum of savings in both population groups
St = (s
u
t − pRt mut )Lut + (sst − pRt mst )Lst . (3.2.43)
Hence,
St =
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
(wut L
u
t + w
s
tL
s
t )− pRt Mt, (3.2.44)
=
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
wut L
u
t
[
1 + ωt
Lst
Lut
]
− pRt Mt, (3.2.45)
where Mt represents the aggregate natural resource stock in period t. Since
wut = p
Y u
t β
Y ut
LY ut
, (3.2.46)
pRt = p
Y u
t ξ
R Y
u
t
Rxut
, (3.2.47)
and
LY ut =
β
ξL
Lut , (3.2.48)
Rt = τtMt−1, (3.2.49)
Rxut = ϕ
xu
t Rt, (3.2.50)
we obtain
St =
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
ξLpY ut Y
u
t
[
1 + ωt
Lst
Lut
]
− pY ut ξR
Y ut
Rxut
Mt, (3.2.51)
=
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
ξLpY ut Y
u
t
[
1 + ωt
Lst
Lut
]
− p
u
t ξ
RY ut Mt
ϕxut τtMt−1
. (3.2.52)
Since Mt
Mt−1 = 1− τt, it follow outright that
St = p
Y u
t Y
u
t
{
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
ξL
[
1 + ωt
Lst
Lut
]
− ξ
R
ϕxut
1− τt
τt
}
. (3.2.53)
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B.7 Depletion Rate of Natural Resources
(a)
The derivation of the dynamic equation of the depletion rate of natural resource takes account
for the fact that the price per unit of natural resources equals its value marginal product in
intermediate production where the evolution of the natural resource price, gp
R
t+1, is given
by the change in the value marginal product of natural resources. On the other hand, in
equilibrium the change of this factor price is tight to the interest factor by Hotelling’s rule
(1+rt+1 = g
pR
t+1). Moreover the technology market clearing condition (1+rt+1 = π
u
t+1η
u(Nut )
−δ)
links the interest rate to the proﬁtability of future innovations. To begin with we start with
the free-entry condition in R&D
1 + rt+1 = π
u
t+1η
u (Nut )
−δ . (3.2.54)
Hotelling’s rule ties the interest rate to the evolution of the resource price, such that 1+rt+1 =
gp
R
t+1. Hence,
πut+1η
u (Nut )
−δ = gp
R
t+1. (3.2.55)
The factor price of natural resources in equilibrium is given by
pRt = p
Y u
t α(1− β)Nut B (Lxut )(1−α)(1−β) (Rxut )α(1−β)−1
(
LY ut
)β
. (3.2.56)
Taking account for labor demand in equilibrium yields in terms of gross growth rates:
gp
R
t+1 = g
pY u
t+1 g
Nu
t+1
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL (
gϕ
xu
t+1g
R
t+1
)ξR−1
. (3.2.57)
Since Mt = Mt+1 +Rt+1, it follows Rt+1 = Mt
[
1− Mt+1
Mt
]
and
Rt+1
Rt
=
Mt
Mt−1
[
1− Mt+1
Mt
1− Mt
Mt−1
]
. (3.2.58)
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As additionally Rt+1 = τt+1Mt, we yield
Mt+1 = Mt −Rt+1 = (1− τt+1)Mt, (3.2.59)
Mt+1
Mt
= (1− τt+1). (3.2.60)
Therefore,
gRt+1 =
Rt+1
Rt
= (1− τt)
[
1− (1− τt+1)
1− (1− τt)
]
= (1− τt)τt+1
τt
, (3.2.61)
and
gp
R
t+1 = g
pY u
t+1 g
Nu
t+1
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
. (3.2.62)
Since πut+1η
u (Nut )
−δ = gp
R
t+1, we obtain
πut+1η
u (Nut )
−δ = gp
Y u
t+1 g
Nu
t+1
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
. (3.2.63)
In order to specify the law of motion for the depletion rate, it remains to determine the
equilibrium rate of technological progress gN
u
t+1 which depends on aggregate savings.
Since pY ut Y
u
t = w
u
t L
Y u
t + p
xu
t X
u
t , it follows
pY ut Y
u
t = βp
Y u
t
Y ut
LY ut
LY ut + p
xu
t X
u
t , (3.2.64)
and pY ut Y
u
t =
pxut X
u
t
1−β .
Proﬁts of a machine producing ﬁrm in sector u read as
πut = p
xu
t x
u
t − cut xut . (3.2.65)
Hence, πut + c
u
t x
u
t = p
xu
t x
u
t , where substitution for π
u
t and x
u
t yields
pxut x
u
t = β(1− β)
1−β
β (put )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY ut + c
u
t
(
(1− β)pY ut
cut
) 1
β
LY ut , (3.2.66)
= (1− β) 1β (put )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY ut
[
β
1− β + 1
]
, (3.2.67)
= (1− β) 1−ββ (put )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY ut =
πut
β
. (3.2.68)
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Therefore, we are allowed to specify
put Y
u
t =
putX
u
t
1− β =
Nut π
u
t
β(1− β) . (3.2.69)
Combining the last expression with aggregate savings (3.34), we yield
St =
Nut π
u
t
β(1− β)Z1t. (3.2.70)
As Dut =
1
1+Ωt
St we yield together with (3.21)
Nut+1 =
ηu (Nut )
1−δ πut
β(1− β)
Z1t
1 + Ωt
. (3.2.71)
Deﬁning Z2t = β(1− β)(1 + Ωt) and Z3t = Z1tZ2t yields
Nut+1 = η
u (Nut )
1−δ πut Z3t, (3.2.72)
gN
u
t+1 = η
u (Nut )
−δ πut Z3t. (3.2.73)
Combining the last expression with
πut+1η
u (Nut )
−δ = gp
Y u
t+1 g
Nu
t+1
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
, (3.2.74)
yields
πut+1η
u
(Nut )
δ
= gp
Y u
t+1 η
u (Nut )
−δ πut Z3t
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
, (3.2.75)
gπ
u
t+1 = g
pY u
t+1Z3t
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
. (3.2.76)
With gπ
u
t+1 =
(
gp
Y u
t+1
) 1
β (
gc
u
t+1
)β−1
β gL
u
t+1, we obtain further
(
gp
Y u
t+1
gc
u
t+1
) 1−β
β
= Z3t
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL−1 (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
. (3.2.77)
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Since wY ut = w
xu
t , we know that p
Y u
t β
Y ut
LY ut
= pxut (1 − α) X
u
t
Lxut
. Substituting for the respective
output levels, yields
pY ut
β
1− βN
u
t B
1−β (Lxut )
(1−α)(1−β) (Rxut )
α(1−β) (LY ut )β−1 = (3.2.78)
=
cut
1− βBN
u
t (L
xu
t )
−α (Rxut )
α(1−β) .
Hence,
pY ut βB
1−β
(
ξLx
ξL
Lut
)(1−α)(1−β)
(ϕxut Rt)
α(1−β)
(
β
ξL
Lut
)β−1
= (3.2.79)
= cut (1− α)B
(
ξLx
ξL
Lut
)−α
(ϕxut Rt)
α
pY ut βB
−β
(
ξLx
ξL
)1−β(1−α) (
β
ξL
)β−1
(Lut )
αβ (ϕxut Rt)
−αβ = cut (1− α) (3.2.80)
pY ut
cut
=
1− α
β
Bβ
(ϕxut )
αβ(
ξLx
ξL
)1−β(1−α) (
β
ξL
)β−1
(
Rt
Lut
)αβ
, (3.2.81)
such that(
gp
Y u
t+1
gc
u
t+1
) 1−β
β
=
(
gϕ
xu
t+1g
R
t+1
gL
u
t+1
)α(1−β)
. (3.2.82)
Since on the other hand(
gp
Y u
t+1
gc
u
t+1
) 1−β
β
= Z3t
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL−1 (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
, (3.2.83)
it follows immediately that24(
gϕ
xu
t+1g
R
t+1
gL
u
t+1
)α(1−β)
= Z3t
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL−1 (
gϕ
xu
t+1
)ξR−1(
(1− τt)τt+1
τt
)ξR−1
, (3.2.84)
1 = Z3t
(
gϕ
xu
t+1
1− τt
τt
τt+1
)−1
, (3.2.85)
and
τt+1 = Z3t
τt
1− τt
(
gϕ
xu
t+1
)−1
. (3.2.86)
24Remember: ξR = α(1 − β) and ξL + ξR = 1.
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(b)
An alternative point of origin is the equilibrium on the market for machines which determines
equality between aggregate output and aggregate demand for machines in sector i = u, s,
such that for example
Nut x
u
t = N
u
t
(
pY ut
cut
) 1
β
LY ut = BN
u
t (L
xu
t )
1−α (ϕxut Rt)
α , (3.2.87)
xut =
(
pY ut
cut
) 1
β
LY ut = B (L
xu
t )
1−α (ϕxut Rt)
α . (3.2.88)
Since Rt = τtMt−1, τt increases whenever the left-hand side of the last expression increases
by more than the right-hand side holding the depletion rate constant, that is increases in Lxut
and pure reallocation of natural resources (changes in ϕut ) are not suﬃcient. Since the gross
rate of growth of machine production in sector u is given by
gxut+1 =
(
g
pY u
cu
t+1
) 1
β
gL
u
t+1 =
(
gL
u
t+1
)1−α (
gϕ
xu
t+1g
R
t+1
)α
, (3.2.89)
and we know in light of (3.2.83) that(
g
pY u
cu
t+1
) 1−β
β
= Z3t
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL−1 (gϕxut+1gRt+1)ξR−1 , (3.2.90)
it follows outright that
(Z3t)
1
1−β
(
gL
u
t+1
)
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξL − 1 + α(1− β)
1− β (gϕxut+1)
=−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξR − 1− α(1− β)
1− β = (3.2.91)
=
(
gRt+1
)
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(1− β) + 1− ξR
1− β ,
such that again
gRt+1 = (1− τt)
τt+1
τt
= Z3t
(
gϕ
xu
t+1
)−1
, (3.2.92)
τt+1 =
τt
1− τtZ3t
(
gϕ
xu
t+1
)−1
. (3.2.93)
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B.8 Productivity Growth
This proof exploits the general equilibrium structure more in detail in order to verify the
growth rate of innovations gN
i
∗ .
As we are able to specify,
gc
u
∗ =
(
gN
u
∗
)−1 (
gp
R
∗
)α (
gw
u
∗
)1−α
, (3.2.94)
gc
u
∗ =
(
gN
u
∗
)−1 (
gp
R
∗
)α⎛⎜⎝ gNu∗(
gp
R
∗
)ξR
⎞
⎟⎠
1−α
ξL
, (3.2.95)
gc
u
∗ =
(
gN
u
∗
gp
R
∗
)αβ
ξL
. (3.2.96)
As pRt = p
Y u
t ξ
R Y
u
t
Rxut
, we yield
gp
R
t+1 = g
pY u
t+1 g
Nu
t+1
(
gL
u
t+1
)ξL (
gϕ
xu
t+1g
R
t+1
)ξR−1
, (3.2.97)
with pY ut and ϕ
xu
t being constant in steady state, we obtain
gp
R
∗ = g
Nu
∗ n
ξL
∗ (1− τ∗)ξ
R−1. (3.2.98)
Combining the last expression with gc
u
∗ gives
gc
u
∗ = n
αβ
∗ (1− τ∗)
ξR−1)αβ
ξL . (3.2.99)
Since in steady state
1 =
(
gN
u
∗
)−δ (
gc
u
∗
)β−1
β n∗, (3.2.100)
we yield
gN
u
∗ = g
Ns
∗ =
[
n∗(1− τ∗)
ξR
ξL
] 1−ξR
δ
=
[
nξ
L
∗ (1− τ∗)ξ
R
] 1
δ
, (3.2.101)
since ξR + ξL = 1.
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B.9 Investment Share of GDP
Since we consider a closed economy: It = St. Investment as a share of GDP,
It
Yt
, writes as
It
Yt
=
put Y
u
t Z1t
Yt
. (3.2.102)
Since pYt ≡ 1 =
[
γε(pY ut )
1−ε + (1− γ)ε(pY st )1−ε
] 1
1−ε
, we obtain
1 = pY ut
[
γε + (1− γ)ε
(pY st
pY ut
)1−ε] 1
1−ε
, (3.2.103)
pY ut =
[
γε + (1− γ)ε(pt)1−ε
] 1
ε−1
.25 (3.2.104)
For
Y ut
Yt
, we yield
Y ut
Yt
=
Y ut[
γ
(
Y ut
) ε−1
ε
+ (1− γ)
(
Y st
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
, (3.2.105)
Y ut
Yt
=
1[
γ + (1− γ)
(
Y st
Y ut
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
, (3.2.106)
with
Y st
Y ut
=
Nst
Nut
p
1−β
β
t
cut
cst
1−β
β LY st
LY ut
.
Hence,
It
Yt
=
put Y
u
t Z1t
Yt
, (3.2.107)
It
Yt
=
[
γε + (1− γ)ε(pt)1−ε
] 1
ε−1
[
γ + (1− γ)
(
Y st
Y ut
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
Z1t, (3.2.108)
with
(
I
Y
)
∗
= const..
B.10 Method
As described above, the dynamic behavior is fully determined by a four-dimensional system
of diﬀerence equations - as given by (3.40)-(3.43) and (3.15) - involving two state variables:
25Note that this veriﬁes also that pY u∗ is constant as p∗ is constant. As p
Y s
∗ = p∗p
Y u
∗ , it follows outright
that pY s∗ = const..
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Ls
Lu
and N
s
Nu
, as well as two jump variables: θ and τ . The Jacobian of the dynamic system
evaluated at the steady state, J∗, is equal to
J∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
Lst+1
Lut+1
∂θt
|∗
∂
Lst+1
Lut+1
∂
Lst
Lut
|∗
∂
Lst+1
Lut+1
∂
Nst
Nut
|∗
∂
Lst+1
Lut+1
∂τt
|∗
∂θt+1
∂θt
|∗ ∂θt+1
∂
Lst
Lut
|∗ ∂θt+1
∂
Nst
Nut
|∗ ∂θt+1∂τt |∗
∂
Nst+1
Nu
t+1
∂θt
|∗
∂
Nst+1
Nu
t+1
∂
Lst
Lut
|∗
∂
Nst+1
Nu
t+1
∂
Nst
Nut
|∗
∂
Nst+1
Nu
t+1
∂τt
|∗
∂τt+1
∂θt
|∗ ∂τt+1
∂
Lst
Lut
|∗ ∂τt+1
∂
Nst
Nut
|∗ ∂τt+1∂τt |∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (3.2.109)
The dynamic system exhibits numerically two unstable eigenvalues (λ1, λ4 > 1) and two stable
eigenvalues (λ2, λ3 < 1), such that the dynamics of the economy is subject to saddle-point
stability along a two-dimensional manifold.26 The solution of the linearized system reads as∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Lst
Lut
θt
Nst
Nut
τt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A1 λ
t
1
A2 λ
t
2
A3 λ
t
3
A4 λ
t
4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗
θ∗(
Ns
Nu
)
∗
τ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (3.2.110)
where P contains the eigenvectors p1, p2, p3, p4 and A1, A2, A3, A4 represent arbitrary con-
stants. With λ1, λ4 > 1, it follows immediately that A1 = A4 = 0, such that
Lst
Lut
= p2,1A2λ
t
2 + p3,1A3λ
t
3 +
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗
(3.2.111)
θt = p2,2A2λ
t
2 + p3,2A3λ
t
3 + θ∗ (3.2.112)
N st
Nut
= p2,3A2λ
t
2 + p3,3A3λ
t
3 +
(
N s
Nu
)
∗
(3.2.113)
τt = p2,4A2λ
t
2 + p3,4A3λ
t
3 + τ∗. (3.2.114)
With
Lst=0
Lut=0
=
(
Ls
Lu
)
0
> 0 and
Nst=0
Nut=0
=
(
Ns
Nu
)
0
> 0 given, the unknown constants A2, A3 are
determined by the solution of(
Ls
Lu
)
0
= p2,1A2 + p3,1A3 +
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗
, (3.2.115)(
N s
Nu
)
0
= p2,3A2 + p3,3A3 +
(
N s
Nu
)
∗
, (3.2.116)
26In the second row of J∗ we applied the Implicit function theorem numerically to (3.15). Moreover we
plotted the characteristic polynomial with respect to changes in one parameter. It turned out that the
constellation of eigenvalues is robust. For ε < 2, the system becomes unstable.
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such that the initial values 0 < τ0 < 1 and 0 ≤ θ0 ≤ 1 are known.
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The Growth Drag of Pollution
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Abstract
Higher child mortality reduces the willingness of parents to invest in children’s education
and increases their desired level of fertility. In this context, economic inequality is not only
decisive for human capital investments and the emergence of diﬀerential fertility, but also for
agents’ exposure to environmental pollution because wealthier households live in cleaner areas.
This is the key mechanism through which environmental conditions may impose a growth
drag on the economy. In addition, preferred levels of tax-ﬁnanced abatement measures diﬀer
between population groups with diﬀerent exposures to pollutants, in the sense that the least
aﬀected population group prefers the lowest tax rate. Thus, the adverse eﬀect of inequality
and pollution on economic growth is ampliﬁed, if the population group that is least aﬀected
decides about the level of tax-ﬁnanced abatement measures.
Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Endogenous fertility, Inequality, Pollution
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4.1 Introduction
The transition from stagnation to growth originated by the industrial revolution caused, via
an immense degradation of the environment, adverse eﬀects on individuals’ health state in
terms of morbidity and life expectancy. Moreover, this transition has been accompanied by
a massive shift in demographic variables, the demographic transition. The related decline in
fertility rates was mainly the result of increasing parental expenditures for their oﬀspring’s
human capital which paved ultimately the way for sustained economic growth in per capita
terms (Galor and Weil, 2000 and Galor, 2011).
In this paper we analyze the link between child mortality and degradation of the environment
through economic development, in the sense that the latter may be conducive for children’s
survival probabilities, but may also generate adverse impacts on children’s probability to
survive to adulthood. Higher child mortality reduces the willingness of parents to invest in
children’s education and increases their desired level of fertility. In this context, economic
inequality is not only decisive for human capital investments and the emergence of diﬀerential
fertility (de la Croix and Doepke, 2003), but also for agents’ exposure to environmental pollu-
tion because wealthier households live in cleaner areas.1 The exposure to pollutants triggers
again children’s probability to survive to adulthood and the willingness of parents to invest
in education. This is the key mechanism and the novelty of our approach through which
environmental conditions may impose a growth drag on the economy.
The initially adverse impact of economic development on individuals’ health is mirrored in
the evolution of life expectancies at birth as shown in Figure 4.1a). Average life expectancies
at birth stagnated during the second phase of the industrial revolution and started to increase
only in the last four decades of the 19th century. In cities, life expectancies at birth started
even to decline and reached a level passed in the 15th century already, although per capita
output was already growing .
1Szreter (1997) argues ”...there is indeed something intrinsically dangerous and socially destabilizing in the
wake of economic growth...”. He motivates his statement by the following observations: (1) local authorities
were failing the management of their environments, and, (2) as a consequence of it wealthier citizens moved
to the periphery of the cities.
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Figure 4.1: a) expectation of life at birth (London excluded) (Szreter, 1997), and b) ratio of
infant mortality rates in urban and rural regions (Bairoch, 1988)
Low life expectancies at birth are caused by high infant mortality rates at this time. Bairoch
(1988) - see Figure 4.1b) - documents impressively the initial increase in child mortality rates
in cities relative to rural areas during the industrial revolution. Moreover, Figure 4.1b) shows
an inverted u-shaped pattern of infant mortality rates in urban areas compared to rural areas.
It is well documented that the gap in mortality rates between cities and rural areas was evoked
by environmental degradation and pollution. In this line of argumentation the signiﬁcance of
water as an industrial raw material has been documented by Hassan (1985): fresh water was
used for commercial purposes while the new entrepreneurial class saw no point in spending
money for sanitation and sewage treatment plants. In addition Hainse (2004) and Komlos
(1998) provide evidence for increased morbidity over the same period of time indicating that
physical height of soldiers declined during the 19th century in the U.S. as well as England
and the Netherlands.
Even in the presence, externalities of the growth process on the environment are well doc-
umented, for example the combined health and non-health cost of outdoor air and water
pollution for China’s economy comes to around 5.8% of the GDP per year (World Bank,
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2007). Chay and Greenstone (2003) provide evidence for the impact of air pollution on in-
fant mortality in the U.S. during the recession period 1981-82 and conclude that a 1-percent
reduction in total suspended particulates results in a 0.35-percent decline in infant mortality
at the county level.
To our best knowledge Mariani, Perez-Baharona and Raﬃn (2010) is the only and proba-
bly the ﬁrst paper which relates life expectancy and environmental quality to poverty traps.
This paper complements their work in the sense that we relate child mortality and economic
inequality to environmental pollution and prospects of future growth. In our overlapping
generations framework households decide about the number of children they wish to raise as
well as their quality in terms of education and health.2 A low survival probability of children,
induced by a low level of economic development and/or a high degradation of the environ-
ment, reduces parents’ willingness to invest in child quality and increases their desired level
of fertility. Inequality in terms of relative human capital induces diﬀerential fertility a la de
la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) and regionally diﬀering exposures to pollutants. The latter
intensiﬁes the link between inequality and the demographic transition, i.e. more inequality
delays the fertility decline, increases the populations’ growth rate and reduces growth. In ad-
dition, preferred levels of tax-ﬁnanced abatement measures diﬀer between population groups
with diﬀerent exposures to pollutants, in the sense that the least aﬀected population group
prefers the lowest tax rate. Thus, the adverse eﬀect of inequality and pollution on economic
growth is ampliﬁed, if the population group that is least aﬀected decides about the level of
abatement measures. Within this frame, we are able to replicate the historical development
path in accordance to empirical patterns: ﬁrst, in early stages of economic development, there
is no abatement since the marginal beneﬁt of abating is low. Moreover, the preferred amount
of abatement is inversely related to agents’ exposure to pollutants, i.e. wealthier agents pre-
fer less abatement. Second, there is a slow take-oﬀ in terms of income per capita growth.
Third, the pollution stock increases through economic development. Fourth, the evolution of
the populations’ growth rate and the evolution of children’s regional mortality diﬀerentials is
2With respect to the channel connecting fertility and health our work is also related to Strulik (2004, 2008).
The diﬀerence is that we allow for inequality, pollution, and endogenous growth.
4. The Growth Drag of Pollution 126
hump-shaped.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 4.2, we introduce our overlap-
ping generations framework with inequality. Section 4.3 describes the equilibrium structure
of the model and in Section 4.4, we introduce regional diﬀerences with respect to the expo-
sure to pollutants. Section 4.5 performs numerical experiments dealing with the (long-run)
eﬀects of diﬀerent amounts of initial inequality and the growth drag of pollution. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Human Activities and Pollution
In this setting, time is discrete, indexed by t and ranges from 0 to ∞. A large number of ﬁrms
produce aggregate output Yt using a constant returns to scale technology of Cobb-Douglas
type, where Kt denotes aggregate physical capital and Lt aggregate eﬀective labor, such that
Yt = AK
α
t L
1−α
t , (4.2.1)
with A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1).
The environmental impact of human activity can be captured by population size, aﬄuence
and technology.3 Here, human activity injects emission, Et, through the production process
into the eco-system. Emissions may be attenuated by abatement measures, Mt, ﬁnanced by
a proportional tax, τt, on production, and may be dampened by the compatibility of human
activities with the environment reﬂected by Πt, such that the level of emissions in period t is
given by
Et = Π
−1
t (b2Yt − b3Mt) = Π−1t (b2 − b3τt)Yt, (4.2.2)
with 0 < b3 < b2 and Mt = τtYt.
For simplicity we assume a one-to-one relationship between the skill level of the working force,
3This refers to the so-called IPAT-identity, where the impact is reﬂected by population size, aﬄuence and
technology, see Perman et al. (2003).
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i.e. aggregate human capital Ht, and Πt, such that Πt = Ht. Moreover, the environment is
adversely aﬀected by population size, Nt. On the other hand, the environment regenerates at
a constant rate b1 per period of time. Therefore the stock of pollutants reﬂecting the degree
of environmental degradation evolves over time according to
Pt+1 = (1− b1)Pt + Et + b4Π−1t Nt = (1− b1)Pt + (b2 − b3τt)
Yt
Ht
+ b4
Nt
Ht
, (4.2.3)
with 0 < b1 < 1, 0 < b3 < b2, b4 > 0 and 0 ≤ τt < 1.
4.2.2 Households
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of overlapping generations and a large number
of households indexed by i, where a type-i household is equipped with human capital, hit,
and inherited assets, b˜it−1. Households live for two periods: childhood and adulthood. All
economically relevant decisions are made in the adult period of life. Adult households care
about the level of their own consumption, cit, and the number of surviving oﬀspring π
i
tn
i
t,
where πit denotes the survival probability per child and n
i
t the number of children. Survival
of childhood, πit, is inﬂuenced by parental expenditures on health and nutrition, d
i
t, and by
the economic environment, π¯t, i.e. π
i
t = π
i
t(d
i
t, π¯t), where π¯t is exogenous to the household.
Moreover, agents derive utility from the level of human capital per child, hit+1, and the amount
of bequests per child, bit. To the contrary, agents derive a disutility from the future level of
pollution, Pt+1, such that preferences of a member i of generation t that is born in t− 1 are
speciﬁed as
uit = ln c
i
t + ρ ln b
i
t + γ
[
ln πitn
i
t + β ln h
i
t+1
]
− μ lnPt+1, (4.2.4)
with ρ, γ, β, μ > 0.
The exogenous survival component π¯t depends on the stage of economic development reﬂected
by the average level of human capital, h¯t, and the level of pollutants, Pt
π¯t = ψ0
h¯t
1 + h¯t
− ψ1 Pt
1 + Pt
, (4.2.5)
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with ψ0, ψ1 > 0.
4
π¯t has a positive impact on the survival probability of each child, directly, and indirectly
through an enhancement of the productivity of private expenditures, dit. Therefore, the
probability to survive childhood in household i is determined by
πit = min{1, λ(λ¯dit)π¯t}, 0 < λ < 1 < λ¯.5 (4.2.6)
Human capital per child depends on education, eit, the parental level of human capital, h
i
t,
and the average level of human capital, h¯t
hit+1 = (ε+ e
i
t)
η(hit)
ν(h¯t)
1−ν , (4.2.7)
where η ∈ (0, 1) reﬂects the impact of education on the level of human capital. ν ∈ (0, 1) de-
notes the intergenerational transmission of human capital or the intergenerational persistence
between parental human capital and the level of human capital per child. The parameter
ε > 0 allows for eit = 0.
We denote post-tax variables by ”ˆ”, such that post-tax income of agent i endowed with one
unit of time, human capital hit, and assets b˜
i
t−1 reads as
yˆit = (1− τt)(wthit +Rtb˜it−1), (4.2.8)
where wt and Rt represent the wage rate per eﬃcient unit of labor and the return on capital.
The budget constraint of agent i is then given by
yˆit = (wˆth
i
tz + wˆth¯te
i
t + b
i
t + d
i
t)n
i
t + c
i
t. (4.2.9)
Child rearing costs are captured by: ﬁrst, forgone wage earnings, wˆth
i
tzn
i
t, with 0 < z < 1
denoting the time share necessary to raise one child to adulthood. Second, expenditures for
education, wˆth¯te
i
tn
i
t, where education is provided by an educational sector employing teacher
equipped with the average level of human capital, h¯t. Third, expenditures on nutrition, d
i
t,
4This formulation implies that π¯t is ﬁnite as each term of the function converges to ψ0 or ψ1.
5λ and λ¯ are scale parameters implemented for the numerical exercises conducted further below.
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and the level of bequests per child, bit. Maximizing lifetime utility as given by (4.2.4) subject
to the budget constraint (4.2.9), and the evolution of human capital per child (4.2.7), while
ignoring the impact on the evolution of the aggregate pollution stock yields
cit =
1
1 + γ
yˆit, (4.2.10)
nit =
γ
1 + γ
yˆit
wˆt[h
i
tz + h¯te
i
t] + b
i
t + d
i
t
, (4.2.11)
eit =
βηzxit − (γ(1− π¯t)− ρ)ε
γ(1− βη − π¯t)− ρ , (4.2.12)
dit =
γπ¯t(z − εxit )
γ(1− βη − π¯t)− ρwˆth
i
t, (4.2.13)
bit =
ρ(z − ε
xit
)
γ(1− βη − π¯t)− ρwˆth
i
t, (4.2.14)
with γ(1− βη − π¯t)− ρ > 0 and zxit − ε > 0, where xit = h
i
t
h¯t
represents household i’s relative
level of human capital.
Households spent a fraction 1
1+γ
of their post-tax income on consumption. The remaining
part, γ
1+γ
, is spent on child rearing. Fertility, nit, is positively related to the level of inherited
wealth, but it is negatively related to expenditures on child quality as captured by eit, d
i
t and
the level of bequests, bit, per child. These variables depend in turn positively on the level of
parental relative human capital, xit, and the exogenous component of the survival probability,
π¯t. This means that a favorable environment which increases the number of surviving oﬀspring
reduces the desired level of fertility. Consequently, more resources are available for education,
nutrition and bequests. Conversely, education may be zero if either xit is low and/or the
exogenous component of the mortality risk per child, (1− π¯t), is high, i.e. if
βηzxit < (γ(1− π¯t)− ρ)ε, (4.2.15)
then eit = 0 and
nit =
γ
1 + γ
yˆit
wˆthitz + b
i
t + d
i
t
, (4.2.16)
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with
bit =
ρz
(γ − ρ)(1− π¯t)− ρπ¯t wˆth
i
t, (4.2.17)
dit =
π¯tz
1− π¯t wˆth
i
t + b
i
t. (4.2.18)
At the beginning of the second period of life (adulthood), bequests of children that didn’t
survive to adulthood are redistributed equally within the family among the surviving oﬀspring.
Thus, wealth per adult at the beginning of period t+ 1 is
b˜it =
bit
πit
. (4.2.19)
4.2.3 Policy
The government sets a tax rate 0 ≤ τt < 1 so as to maximize lifetime utility (4.2.4) of
a representative adult, j, given optimal decisions (4.2.10)-(4.2.14) and the evolution of the
pollution stock, (4.2.3)
ujt = max
{0≤τ jt <1}
{
ln cjt + ρ ln b
j
t + γ
[
ln πjtn
j
t + ρ lnh
j
t+1
]
−μ ln
[
(1− b1)Pt +H−1t (b2Yt − b3τtYt + b4Nt)
] }
, (4.2.20)
such that the ﬁrst-order condition equilibrating marginal cost and beneﬁts reads as
−1 + ρ+ γπ¯t
1− τ jt
+
μb3Yt
Ht[(1− b1)Pt + (b2−b3τ
j
t )Yt+b4Nt
Ht
]
= 0. (4.2.21)
In light of the last expression, we can thus establish the following results
Proposition 12
(i) Since the preferred tax rate of an agent j is in this case independent from her level of
income and wealth, the preferred tax rate is the same for all agents i, such that the
government implements the tax rate τ = τ j , where
τt =
(1− b1)(1− ρ− γπ¯t)Pt HtYt + (1 + ρ+ γπ¯)(b2 + b4NtYt )− μb3
b3(1 + ρ+ γπ¯t − μ) . (4.2.22)
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(ii) Deﬁning marginal beneﬁts of the tax as MBT = μb3Yt
Ht[(1−b1)Pt+ (b2−b3τt)Yt+b4NtHt ]
yields
a) limKt→0MBT = limHt→0MBT = 0.
b) MBT is monotonously increasing in Kt.
c) MBT is hump-shaped in Ht.
d) In the long run, the tax rate is asymptotically constant, if the long-run growth
rate of aggregate output is at least as high as the population’s net-growth rate, i.e.
gY∗ ≥ gN∗ .
It follows that the tax rate is potentially zero in earlier stages of economic development
characterized by low levels of Kt and Ht (Item (ii) a)). If this is the case it needs economic
development in terms of capital formation and or human capital accumulation which both
increases pollution but also increases marginal beneﬁts from taxation, i.e. MBT . Because of
Item (ii) c), the tax rate may be hump-shaped. The ambiguous sign of MBT with respect
to changes in Ht stems from the twofold eﬀect of human capital on the environment. On the
one hand Ht increases production and on the other hand the compatibility of production to
the environment. In the long-run, the tax rate is realistically constant since the population’s
growth rate is around the reproduction level in developed countries and projected to be zero
for the world as whole (see United Nations 1998).
4.3 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1
Given a large number of households i ∈ [1, ...,N0], in period t = 0, an initial distribution of
human capital determining the average stock of human capital, h¯0, an (equal) initial distri-
bution of wealth with bi−1 = b−1∀ i implying K0, and given an initial stock of pollution P0,
an equilibrium consists of a sequence of aggregate quantities {Kt, Kt+1, Lt, Pt, Pt+1,Nt,
Nt+1, Ht, Ht+1, h¯t, h¯t+1}∞t=0, a sequence of factor prices and tax rates {wt, Rt, τt}∞t=0, and a
sequence of optimal decisions {cit, nit, eit, dit, bit}∞t=0 that maximize lifetime utility.
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Perfect competition implies that equilibrium rates of reward read as
wt = (1− α)Akαt , (4.3.1)
Rt = rt + δ = αAk
α−1
t , (4.3.2)
where δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital and kt =
Kt
Lt
.
At t = 0, population size Nt equals the number of households (dynasties). The size of a
type-i ∈ [1, ...,N0] household with relative human capital endowment xit evolves from one
period to another according to N it+1 = π
i
tn
i
tN
i
t . Hence population size in t + 1 is obtained as
Nt+1 =
N0∑
i=0
N it+1. (4.3.3)
Average human capital in t is given by h¯t =
∑N0
i=1
N it
Nth
i
t and evolves according to
h¯t+1
h¯t
=
∑N0
i=1
N it+1
Nt h
i
t+1∑N0
i=1
N it
Nth
i
t
. (4.3.4)
From (4.2.7) and the fact that a household endowed with average human capital is charac-
terized by xit = 1, the dynamics of relative human capital of household i is described by
xit+1 =
(
zxit − ε
z − ε
)η
(xit)
ν . (4.3.5)
Time devoted to child rearing and education is not available for production, such that
Lt =
N0∑
i=1
N it
[
(1− znit)hit − eitnith¯t
]
. (4.3.6)
Next period’s stock of aggregate capital is determined by the sum of wealth per child surviving
to adulthood
Kt+1 =
N0∑
i=1
N it+1b˜
i
t. (4.3.7)
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A : xi,At+1
B : xi,Bt+1|{π¯A∗ ,π¯B∗ }
xi,jt+1
xi,jt
xi,A∗ = 1x
i,B
∗ |{π¯A∗ ,π¯B∗ }x˜
A
B
Figure 4.2: Evolution of relative human capital xit. AA-locus: evolution of x
i,A
t . BB-locus:
evolution of xi,Bt given {π¯At , π¯Bt }.
4.4 Inequality and Regional Survival Diﬀerentials
Consider a population that inhabits two areas denoted by A and B. Both areas diﬀer with
respect to the residents’ exposure to pollutants in the sense that children of region B suﬀer
a higher impact of environmental pollution on their exogenous component of the survival
probability, i.e.
π¯jt = ψ0
h¯t
1 + h¯t
− ψj1
Pt
1 + Pt
, j = A,B, (4.4.1)
with ψA1 < ψ
B
1 , such that π¯
B
t < π¯
A
t .
Since exposure to pollutants will be negatively associated to housing prices we can expect
that richer agents live in healthier areas. We implement a shortcut of a housing market, in
the sense that agents are allocated to region A or B according their relative level of human
capital xit: agents with relative human capital x˜ ≥ xit live in region A and type-B agents are
characterized by xit < x˜.
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Proposition 13
(i) xi,At evolves according to
xi,At+1 =
(
zxi,At − ε
z − ε
)η
(xi,At )
ν , (4.4.2)
with a stationary and stable solution at xi,At = x
i,A
∗ = 1 for all t and i ∈ {A}.
(ii) The evolution of relative human capital of region-B agents is triggered by the diﬀerential
between the external component of children’s survival probability, π¯jt , j = A,B, in the
sense that
xi,Bt+1 =
(
zxi,Bt − ε
z − ε
)η (
γ(1− βη − π¯At )− ρ
γ(1− βη − π¯Bt )− ρ
)η
(xi,Bt )
ν . (4.4.3)
Since π¯At > π¯
B
t , it follows that
γ(1−βη−π¯At )−ρ
γ(1−βη−π¯Bt )−ρ < 1 which implies that relative human
capital of type-B agents evolves at a slower pace as compared to type-A agents.
The evolution of xi,jt , j = A,B is depicted in Figure 4.2 and follows the solid gray line.
Agents with xit ≥ x˜ are allocated to region A and the evolution of their relative human
capital stock follows the solid part of the A-locus. Agents with xit < x˜ are allocated to region
B and the evolution of their relative human capital stock follows the solid part of the B-
locus.6 Region-B agents face a higher impact of pollutants to their external component of
the survival probability, i.e. π¯Bt < π¯
A
t . Therefore, type-B agents exhibit a higher fertility
and lower investments in education per child. Furthermore, the forces of the quality quantity
trade-oﬀ are ampliﬁed via a below average level of human capital. Therefore, relative human
capital xi,Bt is converging with a lower speed to its lower long-run value.
Contrary to Section 4.2.3, the magnitude of the tax rate depends now on the location of the
agent whose preferences are decisive for the government, i.e. j = A,B.
6Note that the location of the B-locus is conditional on the state of the external component of children’s
survival probability π¯jt , j = A,B, but ﬁxed along the BGP with π¯
j
t = π¯
j
∗ = const., j = A,B. Moreover,
both, the A and the B-locus exhibit an unstable steady state to the left of x˜ because of ε > 0, which would
imply zero human capital for some dynasties in the long-run. Empirically this region is irrelevant since it
exceeds the maximal possible number of children over the life course by far. The assumption that agents with
average human capital live in region A is not harmful: if they were allocated to the B-region, xi,Bt would
evolve according to (4.4.2) and xi,At would then be positively inﬂuenced by the survival diﬀerential between
the A and the B region.
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Proposition 14
The tax rate is declining in the external component of children’s survival probability, given
Pt, Ht,Kt,Nt and the suﬃcient condition μ < 2, i.e.
∂τ j
∂π¯jt
=
−γ(b1 − 1)(μ− 2)
b3(1 + ρ+ γπ¯
j
t − μ)2
PtHt
Yt︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if μ<2
− γμ(b2 − b3 + b4
Nt
Yt
)
b3(1 + ρ+ γπ¯
j
t − μ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0, (4.4.4)
with 0 < b1 < 1 and b2 > b3 < 0.
4.5 Numerical Experiments
Before we turn to the numerical evaluation of our model, we present the underlying set
of parameters and a sketch of the method in the next subsection. In our ﬁrst numerical
experiment (Section 4.5.2), we abstract from diﬀerences in regional exposures to pollutants
in order to analyze the link between child mortality, inequality, and pollution in isolation.
In Section 4.5.3, we introduce regional survival diﬀerentials of children into the model and
conduct the following numerical experiments: First, we investigate changes in the initial
distribution of the population over the regions, due to diﬀerent amounts of initial inequality,
while population group A decides about the tax rate . Second, we examine the long-run eﬀects
of changes in this initial distribution on the long-run performance of the economy, given that
either population group A’s or B’s preferred tax rate is implemented.
4.5.1 Calibration and Method
We choose parameters of the model such that the balanced growth path of the model ﬁts
to empirical observations of the US economy and United Nations long-run projections. One
period in our model has a length of 30 years. We ﬁx the capital income share in the production
of Yt, α at 0.3. Moreover, capital depreciates within 30 years entirely, i.e. δ = 1. As regards
child-rearing time, we ﬁx the time share necessary to raise one child to adulthood, z, at 0.07
which implies opportunity costs about 15 percent of parents’ time endowment (see de la Croix
and Doepke, 2003 and Knowles, 1999). The remaining parameters are ﬁxed in an iterative
4. The Growth Drag of Pollution 136
way. In order to match a long-run interest rate of 4% per year, an investment share in the
Technology α = 0.3; δ = 1; A = 0.25
Pollution b1 = 0.85; b2 = 1.42 ; b3 = 1.365; b4 = 0.035
Human capital B = 3.3; η = 0.25 ; ν = 0.5; ε = 0.01; x˜ = 0.7
Preferences ρ = 0.315; γ = 0.92; β = 0.45; μ = 1.95
Survival ψ0 = 0.45; ψ
A
1 = 0.1; ψ
B
1 = 0.17; λ = 0.25; λ¯ = 1000
Child-rearing z = 0.07
Table 4.1: Parameters
vicinity of 14% ﬁtting the 10 year average of US private ﬁxed capital formation as a share
of GDP, we set ρ = 0.315 and A = 0.25. The long-run growth rate per year should not be
larger than 2% and not be lower than 1.7% while population growth is zero. This implies
γ = 0.92, β = 0.45 and B = 3.3, while ε = 0.01, η = 0.25 and ν = 0.6 are chosen such
that implied fertility diﬀerential between the wealthiest and the poorest households does not
exceed three surviving children and the average expenditure share for education is in between
5-7%. Since, we consider the evolution of a single pollution stock and abstract therefore from
any interaction between pollutants, we assume a rather risk averse calibration as far as the
absorptive capacity of the environment is concerned, i.e. we set b1 = 0.85. In order to take
account for the observation of an environmental Kuznets curve, which is apparently more
realistic as far as local pollutants are concerned, we set b2 = 1.42, b3 = 1.365, b4 = 0.035 and
μ = 1.95, ψ0 = 0.45, ψ
A
1 = 0.1, ψ
B
1 = 0.17.
7 This also implies an upper boundary for the
pollution tax of 0.12 compatible with the afore mentioned long-run interest rate of 4% and
the investment share of 14%. In order to get a reasonable ﬁt of the transition period we set
λ = 0.25 and λ¯ = 1000. x˜ = 0.7 implies that (depending on initial inequality) between one
and two third of the population live in the less healthy region B.
For the simulation of the model we generate a large number of households N0 = 1000 and
draw for each of them an initial level of human capital hi0 from a log-normal distribution
7Whether or not the evolution of environmental quality follows an inverted u-shaped pattern at a global
level is debatable. Since we focus rather on local pollution, the emergence of a Kuznets curve may be a
reasonable ﬁt, see for example Perman et al (2003). Note also that the qualitative results of the paper are
independent from the emergence of an environmental Kuznets curve.
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F (μh,0, σ
2
h,0).
8 Given an equal distribution of wealth, i.e. b˜i0 = b˜0, the initial capital stock, K0
is known. Given P0, the only unknown is aggregate labor supply to production which in turn
depends on households’s decisions. We therefore estimate labor supply by means of the delta
method9 using the moments of the log-normal distribution and households’ optimal decisions
(4.2.10)-(4.2.14), the tax rate (4.2.22) and factor prices (4.3.1),(4.3.2). Now the solutions for
our artiﬁcial sample of households are obtainable and the state of the economy for the next
period is calculated from the equilibrium conditions as described in Section 4.3. The next
step of the iteration starts again with the delta method and the stopping criterion is 10−5.10
4.5.2 Transitory Dynamics and Initial Inequality
For the moment, we abstract from diﬀerences in regional exposures to pollutants and analyze
the link between child mortality, inequality, and pollution in isolation. Under this circum-
stances, inequality in terms of initial human capital endowment has no long-run eﬀect. The
evolution of relative human capital follows (4.3.5), such that relative human capital converges
to xi∗ = 1 for all i and t. The results are depicted in Figure 4.3. Note also that growth rates
of variables between two periods denoted by g are adjusted to their 30 years average. So
far, our model is able to capture several empirical regularities of economic development: a
hump-shaped behavior of the (net-) population’s growth rate, a slow take-oﬀ, i.e. increasing
growth rates in output per capita, an environmental Kuznets curve, increasing expenditures
on abatement measures, and increasing survival probabilities of children.
Initially, the number of births is high while the net population’s growth rate is low due to
low survival probabilities of children. In this stage, low survival probabilities of children are
owed to a low exogenous component of children’s survival probability, π¯t, caused by a low
stage of economic development reﬂected by the average stock of human capital, h¯t. A low
π¯t induces, while the majority of households exhibits a low x
i
t, a high number of births with
little resources left for expenditures on education and health. Some households are even at
8In the baseline scenario, we set μh = 0.2 and σh = 0.25.
9See for example Oehlert (1992).
10The routines can be found in the Numerical Appendix 9.3.
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Figure 4.3: Baseline scenario: σ0= low (solid line) and σ0=high (dashed line)
the corner solution eit = 0, whereas other households start to invest in education. Thus, the
growth rate of output per capita and human capital is low. A slowly increasing level of aggre-
gate production increases pollution. At the same time households investing in human capital
contribute to an increase in the average level of human capital, h¯t. If the latter eﬀect over-
compensates the adverse eﬀect of increasing pollution on the external survival component, π¯t
starts to increase. The increase in π¯t strengthens the forces of the quality quantity trade-oﬀ,
i.e. average expenditures on health and education increase, lower the number of births and
reduce child mortality. Since most households are characterized by a low xit, the reduction
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in the number of births is not very strong. Thus the net-population’s growth rate starts to
increase. An increase in the level of human activities captured by population size and the level
of aggregate production induces a fast increase in the pollution stock. When the government
starts to raise taxes and the level of human capital is high enough, the pollution stock may
decline. Eventually, the probability to survive childhood approaches one such that the forces
responsible for an increase in the net-population’s growth rate disappear. Net-population
growth reaches a maximum and starts to decline.
Higher initial inequality (dashed line)11 lowers average expenditures on child quality, (educa-
tion and health). Since this reduces the growth rate of human capital and the accumulation
of capital, the implementation of abatement measures is delayed and τt declines compared to
baseline scenario (see Prop. 12, Item (ii)), such that the external component of children’s
survival probability, π¯t, declines as well which reinforces the negative eﬀect of inequality on
child quality and thus increases the number of births. Due to an increased mortality risk of
children in response to an increase in initial inequality, the net-population’s growth rate may
fall below the one of the baseline scenario before net-population growth reaches its maximum.
Since π¯ increases at a slower pace the peak of the population’s growth rate is delayed. Once
children’s survival probability reaches one, however, net population growth equals the number
of births, such that from now on a more unequal society must be characterized by a higher
population’s growth rate. Due to a lower growth rate of human capital per-capita, output
growth falls during the transition below the level realized in the baseline scenario.
4.5.3 Regional Survival Diﬀerentials
Let’s consider now a population which inhabits two regions, A and B, where population
group B suﬀers a higher exposure to pollutants than population group A. Therefore, initial
inequality in human capital endowments triggers the distribution of the population over the
two regions and aﬀects the evolution of the economy not only during the transition but also
in the long-run (see Figure 4.2). In the following two experiments, we analyze therefore: (1)
11We keep the mean of the initial distribution of human capital constant.
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t t t
πA πB πAt − πBt
Figure 4.4: Changes in the initial distribution of the population over the two regions and
implementation of τA. Baseline: solid line; increased inequality: dashed line
changes in the initial distribution of the population over the two regions given that population
group A decides about the tax rate, and, (2) the long-run eﬀects of initial inequality given
that either population group A’s or population group B’s preferred tax rate is implemented.
(1) Changes in the initial inequality while group A decides about the tax rate
We change the initial distribution of the population over the two regions by changing the initial
distribution of relative human capital while we keep the mean of the distribution constant.
The results of this experiment are depicted in Figure 4.4.
As π¯At > π¯
B
t and since type-A agents are equipped with a higher relative human capital stock
than type-B agents, type-B agents invest less in child quality and exhibit a higher number
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of births. Lower expenditures on health and nutrition in conjunction with a lower external
component of children’s survival probability induce a slower increase in children’s survival
probability in region B as compared to region A. Consequently, the mortality diﬀerential
between region B and A as expressed by πAt −πBt = (1−πBt )− (1− πAt ) must increase. Since
the increase in children’s survival probability is subject to declining marginal returns with
respect to expenditures on health and nutrition, and since π¯jt , j = A,B is also concave in all
its arguments, mortality diﬀerentials must decline again, eventually accelerated if region A
reaches the upper boundary of one. Higher initial inequality (dashed line) implies that more
households are living in region B, such that the forces of initial inequality are aggravated by a
lower external survival component in region B. Due to high child mortality, per capita growth
may even be temporarily above the level of the baseline scenario which could be referred
to as the dark side of economic development. Higher initial inequality reduces the growth
rate of human capital accumulation through fertility diﬀerentials and a higher exposure to
pollutants of children living in region B. A lower stock of aggregate human capital reduces
therefore the tax rate which dampens the increase in the external survival component in both
regions implying lower private expenditures on child quality and a higher number of births in
the economy. Therefore per capita growth is reduced, and survival probabilities of children
increase in both regions at slower pace, while the mortality diﬀerential between the regions is
ampliﬁed.
(2) Long-run eﬀects of initial inequality while either group A or B decides about
the tax rate
Again we increase initial inequality in human capital while we keep the average of the dis-
tribution constant. The results of the long-run eﬀects are presented in Table 4.2. There we
consider two scenarios in the sense that either population group A (left-hand side panel) or
B (right-hand side panel) is decisive for the tax rate, for example because either the median-
voter is located in the region A (B) or the political process is biased towards the rich (poor).
Apparently population group B which is more aﬀected by pollution prefers a higher tax rate
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σh,0 = 0.25 σh,0 = 0.5 σh,0 = 0.75 σh,0 = 0.25 σh,0 = 0.5 σh,0 = 0.75
τA∗ 0.07798 0.06723 0.05999 τB∗ 0.11569 0.10789 0.09819
g
Y/N
∗ 0.01829 0.01784 0.01753 g
Y/N
∗ 0.01840 0.01802 0.01761
P∗ 0.07117 0.07299 0.07423 P∗ 0.06754 0.06891 0.07063
π¯A∗ 0.44335 0.44319 0.44308 π¯A∗ 0.44367 0.44355 0.44340
π¯B∗ 0.43873 0.43843 0.43824 π¯B∗ 0.43924 0.43907 0.43878
Table 4.2: Long-run eﬀects of increasing initial inequality. Left panel: population group A’s
preferred tax rate is implemented. Right panel: population group B’s preferred tax rate is
implemented.
(τB∗ > τ
A
∗ , since in light of Prop. 14:
∂τ j∗
∂π¯j∗
< 0). Higher initial inequality reduces the tax rate
and induces a higher stock of pollution because the economy accumulates human capital at
a slower pace. Therefore the exogenous components of children’s survival probabilities are
lower. A lower π¯j∗, j = A,B is the second channel that reduces human capital accumulation
(and increases population growth). Hence, the long-run growth rate is inversely related to
initial inequality due to the adverse eﬀect of pollution on human capital investments. The
eﬀects are weakened, if the population group that is most aﬀected by pollutants decides about
the tax rate, since this group prefers the highest tax rate.
4.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the link between child mortality and degradation of the environment
through economic development. Higher child mortality reduces the willingness of parents to
invest in children’s education and increases their desired level of fertility. In this context,
economic inequality is not only decisive for human capital investments and the emergence of
diﬀerential fertility, but also for agents’ exposure to environmental pollution because wealthier
households live in cleaner areas. The exposure to pollutants triggers again children’s proba-
bility to survive to adulthood and the willingness of parents to invest in education. This is
the key mechanism and the novelty of our approach through which environmental conditions
may impose a growth drag on the economy.
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Higher initial inequality lowers average expenditures of parents on child quality, in terms of
education and health. Since this reduces the growth rate of human capital, the technological
impact on the environment aggravates while tax-ﬁnanced abatement measures shrink. Hence,
the pollution stock increases which lowers the survival probability of children. The latter
reinforces the negative eﬀect of inequality on child quality and thus increases the number of
births with a lower survival probability per child. With less children surviving to adulthood,
the growth rate of per-capita income may be temporarily above a reference scenario with
lower inequality. This phenomenon may be coined as the dark side of economic development.
If a society is characterized by regional diﬀerentials of citizens’ exposure to pollutants, in the
sense that wealthier agents live in cleaner areas, the link between inequality and pollution
aﬀects the long-run growth rate of the economy through regional diﬀerences in child mortality
rates. The evolution of the regional diﬀerential of child mortality rates follows the empiri-
cally observed hump-shaped pattern. The long-run growth rate is inversely related to initial
inequality due to the adverse eﬀect of pollution on human capital investments. A slower
take-oﬀ in growth rates shifts the pace of the demographic transition and is accompanied
by an increase in children’s regional mortality diﬀerential. The eﬀects are weakened, if the
population group that is most aﬀected by pollutants decides about the level of tax-ﬁnanced
abatement measures, since this population group prefers the highest tax rate.
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4.8 Appendix
Households
Maximizing (4.2.4) subject to (4.2.9) by recognizing (4.2.7) but ignoring the impact on Pt+1
yields the following set of ﬁrst-order conditions with λt denoting the shadow price,
1
cit
= λit, (4.8.1)
γ
nit
= λit[(1− τt)wthitz + (1− τt)wth¯teit + bit + dit], (4.8.2)
γβη
eit + ε
= λit(1− τt)wth¯tnit, (4.8.3)
β
bit
= λitn
i
t, (4.8.4)
γ
∂πit
∂dit
πit
= λitn
i
t. (4.8.5)
Equating (4.8.3) and (4.8.2) yields
eit =
βη
1− βη
(
zxit +
bit + d
i
t
(1− τt)wth¯t
)
− ε
1− βη . (4.8.6)
Equating (4.8.4) and (4.8.2) and recognizing that xit =
hit
h¯t
yields together with (4.8.6)
ρ
bit
=
γ
(1− τt)wthit(z + e
i
t
xit
+
bit+d
i
t
(1−τt)wthit )
(4.8.7)
⇒ bit =
δ
γ(1− βη)− ρ
[
(z − ε
xit
)(1− τt)wthit + dit
]
. (4.8.8)
Equating (4.8.5) and (4.8.2) using (4.8.6) and (4.8.8) yields
dit =
γπ¯t(z − εxit )
γ(1− βη − π¯t)− ρwˆ
i
th
i
t, (4.8.9)
which implies with (4.8.8) and (4.8.8)
bit =
ρ(z − ε
xit
)
γ(1− βη − π¯t)− ρwˆth
i
t, (4.8.10)
eit =
βηzxit − (γ(1− π¯t)− ρ)ε
γ(1− βη − π¯t)− ρ . (4.8.11)
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Proposition 12
Item (ii):
Deﬁne the production function as Yt = AK
α
t (νtHt)
1−α with νt representing the share of human
capital devoted to the production sector, such that MBT writes as
MBT =
μb3AK
α
t (νtHt)
1−α
Ht[(1− b1)Pt + (b2−b3τt)AK
α
t (νtHt)
1−α+b4Nt
Ht
]
(4.8.12)
⇒ MBT =
Λ1︷ ︸︸ ︷
μb3Aν
1−α
t
[(1− b1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ2
Pt(Ht/Kt)α + (b2 − b3τt)Aν1−αt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ3
+b4Nt/(Kαt H1−αt )]
. (4.8.13)
Apparently,
lim
Kt→0
MBTt = lim
Ht→0
MBTt = 0, (4.8.14)
lim
Ht→∞
MBTt = 0, (4.8.15)
lim
Kt→∞
MBTt =
Λ1
Λ3
> 0. (4.8.16)
From (4.8.14) it follows Item (ii)a).
Item (iii)b) follows from
∂MBTt
∂Kt
=
Λ1
(
Λ2αPtHαt
K1+αt
+ b4αNt
K1+αt H
1−α
t
)
(
Λ2PtHαt
Kαt
+ Λ3 +
b4Nt
Kαt H
1−α
t
)2 > 0, (4.8.17)
(4.8.14) and (4.8.16).
Item (ii)c) follows from
∂MBTt
∂Ht
= −
Λ1
(
Λ2αPtHαt
Kαt Ht
− b4(1−α)Nt
Kαt H
2−α
t
)
(
Λ2PtHαt
Kαt
+ Λ3 +
b4Nt
Kαt H
1−α
t
)2  0, (4.8.18)
with ∂MBTt
∂Ht
= 0 at H˜ = (1−α)b4Nt
Λ2αPt
> 0. Then it follows immediatley in light of (4.8.14) and
(4.8.15) that MBT is hump-shaped in Ht.
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Remark:
∂τt
∂μ
=
Λ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− b1)(1− ρ− γπ¯t)PtHt
Yt
+ (1 + ρ+ γπ¯t)(b2 + b4Nt/Yt)−b3(1 + ρ+ γπ¯t)
b3(1 + ρ+ γπ¯t − μ)2 .(4.8.19)
Note that Λ > 0 for any τ > 0. As moreover
∂τt
∂μ
=
(1− b1)(1− ρ− γπ¯t)PtHtYt + (1 + ρ+ γπ¯t)(b2 − b3 + b4Nt/Yt)
b3(1 + ρ+ γπ¯t − μ)2 , (4.8.20)
it follows immediately that ∂τt
∂μ
> 0, since b2 > b3.
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Abstract
This paper aims at better understanding the ineﬃciency due to distributional conﬂicts, which
are inherent in every market economy. To this end, we set up a simple general equilibrium
model with the following characteristics: two groups of agents (capitalists and workers), an
endogenous income tax, productive government expenditures, social transfers, and an outside
option for capital. The political mechanism employed in this paper accounts for the evidence
showing that the degree of organization of major interest groups has an impact on political
outcomes and, in addition, allows for strategic interaction among major interest groups. We
decompose the overall ineﬃciency into three components: (i) a fundamental time inconsis-
tency problem; (ii) strategic interaction in the political process; (iii) heterogeneity among
individuals and the resulting unavoidable conﬂict of interest. A numerical exercise (based
on OECD data) shows that the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency may cause a substantial
output loss of about 7%.
Keywords: Distributional conﬂict; Time inconsistency; Strategic interaction; Heterogeneity.
JEL: E6; H2; O4.
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5.1 Introduction
Conﬂict over the distribution of resources (i.e. ”distributional conﬂict”) is an unavoidable
characteristic of every market economy. We believe that the way these conﬂicts are carried
out has ﬁrst-order implications for economic eﬃciency and economic development. Much
research has recently been devoted to less developed economies which are characterized by
imperfect property rights (e.g. Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Strulik, 2005; Gonzalez and
Neary, 2005). But even in developed economies with perfect property rights fundamental
distributional conﬂicts prevail. These conﬂicts are typically carried out via the political
process. The probably most important channel consists in the manipulation of the tax and
expenditure system by major interest groups in their favor.1
We aim at a better understanding of the sources and consequences of distributional conﬂicts in
developed economies. To this end, a simple general equilibrium model is set up that captures
the major characteristics of modern economies, relevant for the analysis of distributional
conﬂicts, i.e. two groups of agents (capitalists and workers), an endogenous income tax,
productive government expenditures, social transfers, and an outside option for capital. We
use this model to investigate the macroeconomic consequences of distributional conﬂicts.
The paper at hand contributes to the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of distri-
butional conﬂicts along three dimensions: (i) The political mechanism, which gives rise to the
equilibrium tax rates, deviates from the most commonly used political mechanism, i.e. the
median voter principle. This is not to say that the median voter principle is an invalid descrip-
tion of political processes. However, real-world political processes are also characterized by a
country’s speciﬁc political institutions, its political culture, and especially by the degree of or-
ganization of major interest groups.2 For instance, empirical data show that there is a strong
1There are, of course, other channels like the implementation of regulaltions to the advantage of speciﬁc
groups. More generally, a number of real-world institutions are designed and implemented to favor speciﬁc
groups in society. We focus on taxes and expenditures as an important example. However, the analysis should
be considered as being more general and applicable also to other channels.
2In the median voter model all that matters is the preference of the median voter. Moreover, when it comes
to the analysis of distributional conﬂicts among two major groups in society, the median voter principle is
less instructive since it implies that it is always the larger group that can implement its preferred policy,
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positive correlation between unionization rates and average tax rates across OECD economies;
see Figure 5.1 below. This simple correlation indicates that the (relative) strength of major
interest groups might aﬀect the political outcome. The political mechanism employed in this
paper, despite its simplicity, is consistent with this observation. Moreover, the model gives rise
to a richer set of implications. Depending on the parameters of the model, the political equi-
librium belongs to one of three regimes (”dominance of capitalists”, ”dominance of workers”,
”no group dominates”). A further advantage is that the political mechanism employed in this
paper allows us to distinguish between the presence and the absence of strategic interaction
in the political sphere. (ii) The analysis shows that the decentralized equilibrium is generally
ineﬃcient. An interesting result is that the decentralized tax rate can be either too high or
too low. This implies that it is not in general one group which can be held responsible for an
ineﬃcient tax rate. The distributional conﬂict gives rise to either ”weak ineﬃciency” (i.e. the
tax rate deviates from the ﬁrst-best solution but a change in the tax rate would at least hurt
one group) or ”strong ineﬃciency” (i.e. the tax rate deviates from the ﬁrst-best solution and
can be changed such that both groups would be better oﬀ). (iii) The main contribution of the
paper lies, however, in the decomposition of the overall distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency into
three components. The ﬁrst component reﬂects a fundamental time inconsistency problem,
which is due to the fact that dominant groups are in general unable to commit to a speciﬁc
policy (Acemoglu, 2003). The second component is associated with the presence of strategic
interaction in the political process. The third component results from heterogeneity among
individuals and the resulting unavoidable conﬂict of interest. Since the underlying general
equilibrium model captures the major characteristics relevant for the analysis of distributional
conﬂicts, we employ a calibrated version of the model (using OECD data) to demonstrate the
numerical importance of distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency. The model implies a proportional
output loss of about 7%, which indicates that the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency may be
quite substantial. We also use the calibrated model to assess the relative importance of the
three components mentioned above (time inconsistency, strategic interaction, heterogeneity).
irrespective of the political inﬂuence of the other group.
5 Macroeconomic Consequences of Distributional Conﬂicts 152
There are, of course, a number of papers which deal with diﬀerent aspects of distributional
conﬂicts from a macroeconomic perspective. Hassler et al. (2003) employ a dynamic OLG
model with endogenous redistribution, based on the median voter principle, to investigate
the conditions for the ”survival of the welfare state”. This paper contributes substantially
to our understanding on the sources of persistent and distortionary redistribution. Acemoglu
(2003) argues that ineﬃcient institutions, resulting from fundamental distributional conﬂicts
in society, are likely to persist due to insurmountable commitment problems in the political
sphere. In addition, there are three strands of well established contributions, which should be
mentioned here: Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981) investigate the
sources and consequences of redistribution with distortionary taxation. Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Fischer (1980) consider the time inconsistency problem in the context of capital
taxation. Finally, Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Bertola (1993)
focus on the implications of distributional conﬂicts in a dynamic perspective. All of these
papers do not, however, dig deeper into the diﬀerent components of the distributional-conﬂict
ineﬃciency, as they arise in every market economy, which is what we consider as our main
contribution.
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Figure 5.1: Tax rates and unionization rates in 2000 (OECD, 2006; ILO, 2006; Golden and
Lange, 2006).
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 introduces the basic model, which is employed
in Section 5.3 to develop the decentralized equilibrium. Section 5.4 describes the ﬁrst-best
solution. The diﬀerent forms of distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciencies are described in Section
5.5. The subsequent Section 5.6 decomposes the overall ineﬃciency into three fundamental
components. The model is used in Section 5.7 to evaluate the quantitative importance of the
ineﬃciency and to assess the relative importance of the diﬀerent mechanisms. Finally, Section
5.8 provides a short summary and some conclusions.
5.2 The Structure of the Model
The model economy under study has the following characteristics: Output and factor markets
are perfectly competitive. There are two types of agents, capitalists (of mass one) and workers
(of mass L), which are asymmetrically aﬀected by changes in the tax rate. Government
revenues are used to ﬁnance productive government expenditures and lump-sum transfers in
favor of workers. Tax revenues are collected by levying a unique income tax on capital and
labor income. The model captures a fundamental distributional conﬂict, namely the struggle
over market income net of taxes and transfers between capitalists and workers in modern
societies.
5.2.1 Production Technology and Factor Prices
The output technology for the single ﬁnal output good YM exhibits constant returns to scale
in private inputs:
YM = G
βKαM(uL)
1−α, (5.2.1)
where 0 < α, β < 1, G denotes productive government expenditures, KM is capital employed
in the domestic market sector, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 is working time per worker, and L is ”the number”
of workers. Using G = qτYM (to be explained below) the reduced form technology reads (for
5 Macroeconomic Consequences of Distributional Conﬂicts 154
details see the appendix):
YM = (qτ)
β
1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−β , (5.2.2)
where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is the unique tax rate levied on capital and labor income and α ≤ q ≤ 1
is the share of tax revenues devoted to productive government expenditures.3 Competitive
factor prices can be expressed as (for details see the appendix):
r = α(qτ)
β
1−βK
α−1+β
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−β (5.2.3)
w = (1− α)(qτ) β1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
β−α
1−β , (5.2.4)
where r is the rate of return on capital and w denotes the wage rate.
5.2.2 Capitalists and Workers
There are two types of agents, namely capitalists and workers. Both earn a competitive
market income which is subject to a unique income tax. This simplifying assumption is not
at all implausible. For instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 305) notice that ”in a sample
of 14 OECD countries, the average eﬀective tax rate on capital and labor were about the
same (about 38%) over the period 1991-1995.”
The typical capitalist can employ his capital stock in the domestic market sector earning a
rate of return r. The resulting market income is subject to an income tax τ . Alternatively, he
has the option to earn the ﬁxed rate of return r¯ > 0 by investing abroad. Following Persson
and Tabellini (1991) and Lejour and Verbon (1997) we assume that investments abroad are
subject to transaction costs, which accrue each period. This might be due to transaction costs
associated with foreign investments resulting from, for instance, the foreign contract law, the
tax system, and foreign labor market institutions. Investment costs of investing abroad are
convex in foreign investments and given by εK−KM
K
(K − KM), where K > 0 is the overall
stock of capital owned by the typical domestic capitalist and ε ≥ 0. For simplicity, we assume
3The restriction α ≤ q is important since the workers’ preferred tax rate would otherwise turn negative.
Moreover, this restriction is likely to be satisﬁed empirically, see Section 5.7.
5 Macroeconomic Consequences of Distributional Conﬂicts 155
also that the rate of return for investments abroad is not subject to an income tax. Taken
together, income of the typical capitalist is given by:
yK = (1− τ)rKM + (r¯ − εK −KM
K
)(K −KM). (5.2.5)
The problem of the typical capitalist then reads:4
max
KM ,τ
yK s.t. (5.2.5), (6.2.2), and K −KM ≥ 0.
Notice that income is maximized by choosing KM and τ . These decisions are made sequen-
tially, as will be described in more detail below.
Each worker supplies 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 units of labor services (measured in units of time) inelastically
to the market. The wage rate per unit of labor is w. The resulting market income is subject
to an income tax τ . In addition, workers receive social transfers. The transfer per worker is
the total amount of tax revenues spent on social transfers divided by the number of workers,
i.e. (1− q)τYM/L. Hence, total income of the typical worker is given by:
yL = (1− τ)wu+ (1− q)τYM/L. (5.2.6)
The problem of the typical worker is as follows:
max
τ
yL s.t. (5.2.6), (6.2.3), and (5.2.2).
5.2.3 The Government
The government does two things: First, it collects government revenues according the tax
rate resulting from the political process. Second, it splits total tax revenues, according to the
ﬁxed share 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, into productive government expenditures G and lump-sum transfers
in favor of workers Q:
G = qτYM
Q = (1− q)τYM .
Notice that the government is assumed to run a balanced budget, i.e. G+Q = τYM .
4When maximizing with respect to KM capitalists take r as given. This changes when deciding on the
optimal tax rate, as explained below.
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5.2.4 The Political Process
Most theoretical models on distributional conﬂicts rely on electoral competition and the me-
dian voter principle.5 We do not follow this route for the following reasons: First, as outlined
above, the political tax rate determination process in the real world is quite complex and af-
fected by political culture, political institutions as well as the degree of organization of major
interest groups. Second, for reasons elaborated below, we think that one should not rule out
the presence of strategic interaction among major interest groups a priori.6
We employ a shortcut formulation which allows us to take the power of major interest groups
as well as the presence of strategic interaction among major interest groups into account.
Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that the equilibrium tax rate can be represented as a weighted sum
of the demands from the two groups:
τ = θτC + (1− θ)τL, (5.2.7)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 gives the weight of capitalists in the political process, i.e. 1 − θ is the
weight of laborers, 0 ≤ τC ≤ 1 is the (unique) income tax rate demanded by capitalists, and
0 ≤ τL ≤ 1 is the (unique) income tax rate demanded by laborers.
It is quite plausible to argue that there is indeed some element of strategic interaction among
major groups in society. This requires that both groups have, at least to some extent, resolved
their internal coordination problem. Of course, an inﬂuential position is Olson (1965) who has
argued that collective actions are very unlikely to occur in large groups because of inherent
free rider problems. However, this theory has been questioned because it leads to a number of
counterfactual implications. Medina (2006) argues that collective action problems typically
exhibit multiple equilibria, including both cooperation and non-cooperation. The solution to
the collective action problem, i.e. the selection of the cooperation equilibrium, then crucially
depends on common beliefs individuals have about the actions of others. Moreover, Elster
5According to Roemer (2001, p. 3) ”probably 95% of the formal literature in political economy since
Downs has employed this particular speciﬁcation.”
6For a critical discussion of the Downsian model of electoral competition and the median voter principle
see Roemer (2001, Chapter 1.2).
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(1982, p. 468) stresses repeated interactions and, in the case of workers, class consciousness
as mechanisms to overcome the collective action problem.7
Our modelling of the political process shares some similarities with Becker (1983), who has
presented an analysis of competition among pressure groups for political inﬂuence, which in
turn is instrumental to redistribution. The similarities are as follows: (i) political decisions
are the result of a competition among pressure groups, voting does not play an explicit role;
(ii) politicians and bureaucrats are assumed to carry out the implications of the political
equilibrium; (iii) there is strategic interaction among major interest groups. Since we focus
on the analysis of the resulting ineﬃciencies for any given political power of interest groups
and not on its explanation, the key diﬀerence concerns the simplifying assumption stating
that ”political inﬂuence” (θ in our notation) is exogenous and not, as in Becker (1983),
endogenously determined by political pressure.8 Moreover, Becker (1983) stresses that his
analysis does not necessarily contradict the importance of voting, which plays an obvious role
in many political systems. Instead, he argues that interest groups may acquire enough votes
by manipulating the opinions of voters because only few voters have much incentives to be
well informed (Becker, 1983, p. 396).
It should also be noted that the description of the political process chosen here allows for a
richer set of implications when compared to the median voter principle. In particular, since
capital ownership is typically highly concentrated, the median voter principle would result in
a decentralized tax rate equal to the tax rate preferred by the typical laborer. In contrast,
the tax rate aggregation rule (5.2.7) gives rise to diﬀerent political regimes, which crucially
depend on the parameter θ, as will be shown below.
7Lancaster (1973) investigates the implications of the distributional conﬂict in a setting of strategic in-
teraction between capitalists and workers. Acemoglu et al. (2006) study the process of coalition formation,
employing a dynamic game framework, in political environments.
8In Becker’s analysis ”political pressure” depends on the amount of resources allocated to produce political
pressure and other characteristics, like the size of the pressure group.
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5.3 The Decentralized Equilibrium
The timing of events is as follows: (i) capitalists decide on optimal KM ; (ii) the tax rate is
determined from the political process; (iii) production takes place and earnings are realized;
and (iv) consumption takes place. In the case of strategic interaction among major groups,
each group decides strategically, i.e. taking the aggregation rule τ ∗ = θτC + (1 − θ)τL into
account. The model is solved by backward induction.
5.3.1 Second Stage: Determination of τ ∗
Capitalists
The problem of the agent who acts on account of the group of capitalists reads:9
max
τC
{(1− τ)rKM} s.t. (6.2.2) and (5.2.7), (5.3.1)
where we assume that KM > 0, which is determined at the ﬁrst stage. From the ﬁrst-order
condition for an interior solution, one can readily derive the interior segments of capitalists’
reaction function (for details see the appendix):
τC =
β
θ
− 1− θ
θ
τL. (5.3.2)
Several aspects should be observed: (i) The slope of this reaction curve, which is exclusively
determined by the parameter reﬂecting the relative importance of the two groups θ, is ∂τC
∂τL
=
−1−θ
θ
< 0; (ii) If capitalists alone could determine the tax rate, i.e. θ = 1, one gets τ = τC = β,
which is the Barrovian result (Barro, 1990). (iii) If the capitalist’s political inﬂuence becomes
negligible, i.e. θ → 0, they would like to opt for lowest feasible tax rate such that the resulting
τ still is β. Since we have imposed τC ∈ [0, 1] the complete reaction function is given by (for
details see the appendix):
τC =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 for β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL > 1
β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL for 0 ≤ βθ − 1−θθ τL ≤ 1
0 for β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL < 0
. (5.3.3)
9Notice that we can ignore capital income earned in the outside option since this component is independent
of τ .
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Workers
The problem of the agent acting on account of workers is as follows (for details see the
appendix):
max
τL
{(1− τ)wu+ (1− q)τYM/L} s.t. (5.2.2), (6.2.3), and (5.2.7).
From the ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution, one can readily derive the interior
segments of the workers’ reaction function to read (see the appendix):
τL =
(α− 1)β
(1− θ)(α− q) −
θ
1− θτC . (5.3.4)
To enable a direct comparison with (5.3.2), we solve the preceding equation for τC :
τC =
(α− 1)β
θ(α− q) −
1− θ
θ
τL. (5.3.5)
Several points are worth being noticed: (i) Remember that we have imposed the restriction
α < q ≤ 1, which guarantees that the ﬁrst term on the RHS is indeed positive. If α > q
the reaction function of workers would be located in the negative quadrant, which is not
compatible with 0 ≤ τC ≤ 1. Moreover, for q < 1 the worker’s reaction function always
lies above the capitalist’s reaction function since (α−1)β
θ(α−q) >
β
θ
. (ii) The reaction curve of the
two groups run parallel to each other. This can be seen by inspecting (5.3.5), which implies
∂τC
∂τL
= −1−θ
θ
. As a consequence, the political equilibrium (τ ∗C , τ
∗
L) will be a corner solution for
at least one group provided that q < 1. (iii) Assuming that there are no transfers to workers
(q = 1) both groups prefer the same tax rate, i.e. τ ∗ = τ ∗L = τ
∗
C = β. In this case the two
reaction curves are identical and given by τC =
β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL; see equ. (5.3.2) and (5.3.5).
If the worker’s political impact becomes small, i.e. θ → 1, they would like to opt for the
highest feasible tax rate (see (5.3.4)) to prevent a solution τ ∗ = β. Since τL ∈ [0, 1] the
complete reaction function is given by (for details see the appendix):
τL =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for (α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC > 1
(α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC for 0 ≤ (α−1)β(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC ≤ 1
0 for (α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC < 0
. (5.3.6)
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Finally, it should be noted that income is constant along the interior branch of the reaction
curves.
Political Equilibria
We are now in the position to determine the aggregate tax rate, which is supported by a
political equilibrium. Depending on the underlying parameter constellation, there are three
possible solutions for the aggregate tax rate τ ∗ = θτ ∗C + (1− θ)τ ∗L. These cases are illustrated
by Figure 5.1 and summarized in Table 5.1. Notice that the reaction curve of capitalists
(dashed line) hits the τL-axis at
β
1−θ and the reaction curve of workers (solid line) hits the
τL-axis at
(α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) . Case (1) is labelled dominance-of-workers regime (DL): Provided that
(α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) < 1 (implying
β
1−θ < 1), one gets τ
∗
C = 0 and τ
∗
L =
(α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) < 1. The aggregate
tax rate is then given by τ ∗DL =
(α−1)β
α−q < 1.
10 Case (2) is dubed no-group-dominates regime
(ND): For β
1−θ < 1 ∧ (α−1)β(1−θ)(α−q) > 1 we have τ ∗C = 0 and τ ∗L = 1. The aggregate tax rate
therefore is τ ∗ND = 1 − θ. Case (3) is denoted as dominance-of-capitalists regime (DC): If
β
1−θ > 1 (implying that
(α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) > 1), then τ
∗
C =
β−(1−θ)
θ
and τ ∗L = 1. The aggregate tax
rate in this case reads τ ∗DC = θ
β−(1−θ)
θ
+ (1 − θ) = β. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the
results described above to ease the development of an economic intuition. Consider the regime
”dominance of workers”. If the political impact of workers is suﬃciently high in the speciﬁc
sense that the measure of their importance exceeds their desired tax rate, i.e. 1− θ > (α−1)β
α−q ,
then workers are able to implement their preferred tax rate (α−1)β
α−q by strategically demanding
a tax rate of unity (Case (1)).11 On the other hand, if capitalists are suﬃciently powerful in
the speciﬁc sense that θ > 1− β, then capitalists manage to implement their desired tax rate
β by strategically demanding a tax rate of zero (Case (3)).12 Finally, if both conditions for
10Notice that τ∗DL < 1 since we have assumed here that
(α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) < 1 and θ ∈ [0, 1].
11This should be interpreted in a metaphorical sense: Under strategic interaction workers demand the
”highest admissible tax rate”. In the real world there might be bounds on the ”highest admissible tax rate”.
For instance, it is quite plausible to argue that a tax rate demand which is ”too high” reduces the public
support in the political process.
12The fact that capitalists are more likely to implement their desired tax rate as β increases is due to the
fact that workers always desire a higher tax rate than β and hence it becomes in fact easier for capitalists to
implement their preferred tax rate as β increases.
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Figure 5.2: Reaction functions
Regime Condition Equilibrium tax rate
Case (1): Dominance of workers 1− θ ≥ (α−1)β
α−q τ
∗
DL =
(α−1)β
α−q
Case (2): No group dominates 1− θ < (α−1)β
α−q ∧ 1− θ > β τ ∗ND = 1− θ
Case (3): Dominance of capitalists 1− θ ≤ β τ ∗DC = β
Table 5.1: Diﬀerent political regimes and the equilibrium tax rate
political dominance are violated the equilibrium tax rate is 1− θ (Case (2)).
Next we turn to the equilibrium tax rate assuming that the two groups cannot solve their in-
ternal coordination problem such that there is no strategic interaction in the political process.
In this case, the aggregate tax rate, denoted as τ˜ ∗, is given by:
τ˜ ∗ = θβ + (1− θ)(α− 1)β
α− q . (5.3.7)
Without strategic interaction in the political sphere, the equilibrium tax rate is simply a linear
combination of the tax rates which maximizes income of the respective groups.
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We now have four diﬀerent solutions for the equilibrium tax rate, i.e. τ ∗DL, τ
∗
ND, τ
∗
DC , and τ˜
∗.
How do these compare to each other? To illustrate this point, assume that the underlying
set of parameters satisﬁes the restriction α < q < 1, such that (α−1)β
α−q > β holds. Figure 5.2
shows the resulting tax rates as a function of θ. The equilibrium tax rate, assuming strategic
interaction among major interest groups, is represented by the bold solid line, which comprises
three segments: (i) (α−1)β
α−q for 1− θ ≥ (α−1)βα−q ; (ii) 1− θ for β < 1− θ < (α−1)βα−q ; and (iii) β for
1 − θ ≤ β. In addition, the equilibrium tax rate in the absence of strategic interaction as a
function of θ is shown by the dashed curve.
Figure 5.2 suggests that strategic interaction among major interest groups induces a higher
tax rate compared to the case of no strategic interaction provided that laborers are strong in
the speciﬁc sense θ < θ∗ = α−q+β(1−α)
α+β−q(1+β) .
13 Conversely, strategic interaction induces a lower tax
rate provided that capitalists are strong in the sense θ > θ∗. Moreover, it is interesting to see
that a tax rate determination according to the median voter principle would yield the other
extreme, i.e. τ ∗ = (α−1)β
α−q for θ < 0.5 and τ
∗ = β for θ ≥ 0.5, provided that one interprets θ
as population share. The ranking of the four solutions can be summarized as follows:
0 < τ ∗DC < τ
∗
ND, τ˜
∗ < τ ∗DL < 1.
5.3.2 First Stage: Determination of KM
At the ﬁrst stage, capitalists decide on optimalKM . By doing so, they take the equilibrium tax
rate τ ∗ as given. OptimalKM is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition (1−τ ∗)r = r¯−εK−KMK ,
which can be stated more explicitly as follows:
(1− τ)α(qτ) β1−βK
α−1+β
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−β = r¯ − εK −KM
K
. (5.3.8)
This equation implicitly determines the equilibrium allocation K∗M as a function of model
parameters and τ , i.e. K∗M = KM(r¯, q, α, β, u, L, ε; τ). Unfortunately, this equation cannot
be solved analytically for KM . However, for the special case ε = 0 (i.e. no investment costs)
13The critical value θ∗ results from 1− θ = θβ + (1− θ) (α−1)βα−q .
5 Macroeconomic Consequences of Distributional Conﬂicts 163
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
τ ∗DL =
α−1
α−qβ
τ˜ ∗ = θβ + (1 − θ)α−1α−qβ
τ ∗DC = β
1 − θ
τ
θ
Figure 5.3: Equilibrium taxes.
an explicit solution is readily found:
K∗M =
(
r¯
(1− τ)α
) 1−β
α−1+β
(qτ)
β
1−α−β (uL)
1−α
1−α−β . (5.3.9)
This solution shows that the domestic capital supply is determined by the proﬁtability of the
outside option r¯, the tax rate τ (which unfolds two opposing eﬀects), and the amount of labor
supplied to the domestic market sector.
5.3.3 The Decentralized Equilibrium
At this stage we have determined the equilibrium tax rate τ ∗ as well as the equilibrium capital
allocation K∗M . Moreover, since the equilibrium amount of capital in the domestic market
sector, K∗M , can be written as a function of the tax rate τ , we can express income of capitalists
and workers (equ. (5.2.5) and (5.2.6)) as a function of the tax rate only. Hence, KM = KM(τ)
together with (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) gives:
yK(τ) = (1− τ)r(τ)KM(τ) + (r¯ − εK −KM(τ)
K
)(K −KM(τ)) (5.3.10)
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yL(τ) = (1− τ)w(τ)u+ (1− q)τYM(τ)/L. (5.3.11)
Figure 5.4 illustrates income of capitalists yK(τ), income of workers yL(τ), and aggregate
income yK(τ) + LyL(τ) as a function of the tax rate.14 It can be recognized that yK(τ) and
yL(τ) follow an inverted U-shape pattern. Both yK(τ) and yL(τ) increase initially with the
tax rate because an increase in τ leads to larger tax revenues, more productive government
spending, a rise in the marginal product of capital and labor, and hence an increase in
competitive factor prices. On the other hand, income net of taxes decreases with the tax
rate simply because the tax burden rises. Furthermore, in the case of workers, there is an
additional eﬀect since social transfers increase, given q, with tax revenues. This describes the
mechanics of the base model with r¯ = 0.15
The existence of a capital outside option, i.e. r¯ > 0, together with foreign investment costs,
i.e. ε > 0, adds the following mechanisms of tax rate changes. In this case, domestic capital
supply becomes endogenous and hence the income tax becomes distortionary. As τ increases,
capitalists tend to shift capital abroad. This reallocation causes the marginal (and average)
foreign investment costs to increase. Hence, yK(τ) decreases strongly as τ rises above a certain
threshold.
5.4 The First-best Solution
The ﬁrst-best tax rate is the solution to the following social planner’s problem:16
max
τ
{yK(τ) + LyL(τ)} s.t. (5.2.2), (6.2.3), (5.2.7), (5.3.10), and (5.3.11). (5.4.1)
14The underlying set of parameters is described in Table 5.2 below.
15It should be noticed that the income tax does not, in this case, bias any private allocation decisions.
Nonetheless, there is a unique ﬁrst-best tax rate, i.e. a unique tax rate which balances marginal beneﬁts and
costs of a change in the tax rate from the social perspective.
16Here the ﬁrst-best tax rate is determined by income maximization. Alternatively, the ﬁrst-best tax rate
could be determined by maximizing a utilitarian welfare function. Both procedures yield the same solution
provided that a lump-sum transfer scheme is available.
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Figure 5.4: Income as a function of the tax rate.
where the equilibrium amount of capital KM is determined by (5.3.8). Once more, an ana-
lytical solution is not available for the general case. Therefore, we will revert to numerical
procedures in the subsequent analysis.
There is, however, an interesting benchmark case, which enables an explicit solution. For the
special case r¯ = 0 the unique ﬁrst-best tax rate is given by (for details see the appendix):
τfb =
β
q
, (5.4.2)
which is increasing in the productivity of governmental expenditures β and declining in the
share of the budget allocated to productive government expenditures q.
5.5 Distributional-conﬂict Ineﬃciencies
After having characterized the decentralized equilibrium and the ﬁrst-best solution, we are
ready to investigate the ineﬃciency due to the distributional conﬂict inherent in every market
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economy. Consider the situation displayed in Figure 5.4. The decentralized tax rate lies
somewhere between τ ∗DC and τ
∗
DL (both are indicated by vertical lines). Given the parameters
of the model, the decentralized tax rate is crucially determined by the relative political power
of capitalists and workers, as captured by θ. The unique ﬁrst-best tax rate, on the other
hand, is indicated by the vertical line at τfb. There are at least two important observations
which are worth being discussed.
First, the decentralized tax rate can be either too high or too low. In a dominance of capitalist
regime, the decentralized tax rate is too low. In contrast, in a dominance of workers regime,
the decentralized tax rate is too high. The fact that the decentralized tax rate may deviate
from the ﬁrst-best tax rate indicates that there is at least weak ineﬃciency.17 This implies
that, at a theoretical level, the social planner could implement the ﬁrst-best tax rate, thereby
increasing aggregate income, and subsequently use a lump-sum transfer scheme to realize any
desired income distribution.
Second, provided that the tax rate is to the right of τ optL (the tax rate which maximizes the
workers’ income), the decentralized equilibrium exhibits strong ineﬃciency.18 This means that
a reduction in the tax rate would not only increase aggregate income but would clearly make
both groups better oﬀ. The ﬁnding of strong ineﬃciency points to substantial imperfections
in the politico-economic equilibrium. The reasons behind this failure will be discussed in the
next section.
5.6 A Decomposition of the Overall Ineﬃciency
The extent of the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency can be measured either by the gap between
the ﬁrst-best tax rate and the decentralized tax rate, i.e. Δτ = τfb − τ ∗  0, or by the gap
between aggregate income evaluated at the ﬁrst-best tax rate and aggregate income evaluated
at the decentralized tax rate, i.e. Δy = y(τfb)− y(τ ∗) ≥ 0.
17To be precise, weak ineﬃciency labels a situation where yK(τ∗) + yL(τ∗) < yK(τfb) + yL(τfb) holds.
18Strong ineﬃciency is characterized by yK(τ∗) < yK(τfb) and yL(τ∗) < yL(τfb).
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5.6.1 Time Inconsistency Due to Lack of Commitment
The ﬁnding of strong ineﬃciency is due to a time inconsistency problem inherent in the
market economy. There are two critical assumptions which give rise to this time inconsistency
problem: First, the existence of a suﬃciently proﬁtable outside option for capitalists. Second,
the underlying timing of events. More speciﬁcally, the assumption that capitalists ﬁrst decide
on their investments and then the political process determines the equilibrium tax rate is
crucial. The assumption on the underlying timing of events is motivated by the observation
that the relevant time horizon for foreign (direct) investments typically exceeds the time
horizon underlying political tax change decisions.
The basic logic behind the time inconsistency result runs as follows: When workers decide on
their preferred tax rate, they take the amount of capital invested in the domestic market sector
as given. Capitalists, on the other hand, anticipate the equilibrium tax rate resulting from
the political process at the second stage. Provided that workers are suﬃciently powerful, i.e.
θ is suﬃciently low, the anticipated tax rate can be so high that capitalists invest a signiﬁcant
amount of capital abroad. As a result, the workers’ income is depressed through two channels:
First, a lower amount of capital invested in the domestic market sector reduces the wage rate
because capital is complementary to labor. Second, a higher tax rate implies a lower amount
of capital invested in the domestic market sector, which leads to a lower domestic capital
income; notice that, in the relevant range, capital income in fact decreases with the tax rate.
Hence, tax revenues from capital income, total tax revenues and, given q, the amount of social
transfers in favor of workers fall.
We can use Figure 5.4 to illustrate the ineﬃciency as measured by Δτ = τ ∗ − τfb. The
time inconsistency problem can be easily eliminated from the model by reversing the timing
of events. If workers decide on their preferred tax rate before capitalists invest, the time
inconsistency problem vanishes. The reason is that, by construction, workers now take the
negative consequences of a higher tax rate due to the two channels described above into
account. The preferred tax rate in this case is τ optL , i.e. the tax rate which maximizes the
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income of workers. Hence, the ineﬃciency due to the time inconsistency problem is given by
Δτ = τ ∗DL − τ optL .
The time inconsistency problem is basically due to the lack of a commitment technology. One
could argue that workers are in fact better oﬀ if they could commit to demand a tax rate
according to τ optL = θτC + (1 − θ)τL instead of τ ∗DL = θτC + (1 − θ)τL. This would indeed
be optimal in the pre-investment situation. In the post-investment situation, however, this
solution is not incentive compatible anymore. Therefore, any attempt to commit to a strategy
according to τ optL = θτC + (1− θ)τL is not credible. Capitalists understand this commitment
problem and hence correctly anticipate the strategy τ ∗DL = θτC + (1− θ)τL.
It is instructive to view this problem from a slightly diﬀerent perspective. Acemoglu (2003) has
recently argued that a Political Coase Theorem is generally impossible. His main argument
stresses the fact that every contract needs a third party which enforces the contract. Once
dominant groups are involved, this enforcement is not guaranteed anymore. This is due to
the fact that dominant groups can, by deﬁnition, control the government and hence there is
in fact no independent superordinate third party.
5.6.2 Strategic Interaction in the Political Process
Does the existence of strategic interaction among major interest groups intensify or moderate
the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency? At a general level, the answer to this question is
ambiguous. Three points are, nonetheless, worth being emphasized in this context.
First, strategic interaction gives rise to the same tax rate, compared to the case of no strategic
interaction, provided that θ = θ∗ = α−q+β(1−α)
α+β−q(1+β) (see footnote 12). In this case, strategic
interaction cannot exert an impact on Δτ . Moreover, notice that strategic interaction leads
to a higher (lower) decentralized tax rate whenever θ < θ∗ (θ > θ∗).
Second, consider the case r¯ = 0 such that τfb = β/q.
19 Assuming that θ 	= θ∗, strategic
interaction always magniﬁes the ineﬃciency provided that q = α+ β. This condition implies
19The basic argument also holds true in the more general case r¯ > 0.
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that the ﬁrst-best tax rate τfb = β/q equals the decentralized tax rate for θ = θ
∗; remember
that for θ = θ∗ the decentralized tax rate with and without strategic interaction coincide. This
constellation represents an important benchmark case. Since strategic interaction always leads
to a higher (lower) decentralized tax rate whenever θ < θ∗ (θ > θ∗), it follows that the gap
Δτ is always larger, in absolute terms, under strategic interaction.
Third, the reverse result, strategic interaction moderates the ineﬃciency, is more likely to
occur when either (i) the ﬁrst-best tax rate is close to the tax rate preferred by laborers and
when laborers are strong in the sense θ < θ∗ or (ii) the ﬁrst-best tax rate is close to the
tax rate preferred by capitalists and when capitalists are strong in the sense θ > θ∗. In this
respect, it is interesting to notice that the ﬁrst-best tax rate, assuming that r¯ = 0, can be
represented as an average of the tax rates preferred by the two groups according to:
τfb = aτ
∗
DL + (1− a)τ ∗DC ,
where a = q−α
q
> 0. Hence, if (i) α is either close to q and θ > θ∗ or (ii) α is close to zero
and θ < θ∗, then strategic interaction is more likely to moderate the ineﬃciency. The fact
that strategic interaction can indeed moderate the ineﬃciency is, of course, a second best
implication. Given an ineﬃciency τfb 	= τ ∗, the presence of an additional imperfection in the
political sphere can moderate the ineﬃciency provided that τfb is ”close” to either τ
∗
DL or τ
∗
DC
simply because strategic interaction pushes the decentralized tax rate more towards τ ∗DL or
τ ∗DC if one group is strong or even dominates the tax rate determination process.
Taken together, strategic interaction is likely to magnify the ineﬃciency provided that the
parameter restriction q = α + β approximately holds true. Considering empirically plausible
values of the relevant parameters, q ≈ 0.6, α ∈ [0.3, 0, 4] and β ∈ [0.2, 0.3], this restriction
is not unlikely to be roughly satisﬁed in reality. Moreover, the extent to which strategic
interaction magniﬁes the ineﬃciency depends on the fact whether one group is strong in the
sense θ 	= θ∗.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the issues discussed above. It shows the proportional welfare loss
y(τfb)−y(τ∗)
y(τfb)
with strategic interaction (solid curve) and without strategic interaction (dashed
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curve) as a function of θ.20 The three plots diﬀer with respect to the underlying value of β.
Consider at ﬁrst plot (b), which assumes β ∼= 0.243. In this case, strategic interaction always
magniﬁes the output loss due to distributional conﬂict (i.e. the solid curve lies always above
the dashed curve).21 However, plot (a), based on β = 0.15, and plot (c), assuming β = 0.3,
show that this need not be the case. For either low or high values of β, strategic interaction
can in fact moderate the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency (i.e. there is a range of θ such that
the solid curve lies below the dashed curve). This phenomenon occurs, however, only within
small ranges of θ. In summary, this little numerical exercise suggests once more that strategic
interaction is likely to magnify the welfare loss resulting from distributional conﬂict.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
θ θ
θ
prop. welfare loss (β = 0.15) prop. welfare loss (β = 0.243)
prop. welfare loss (β = 0.3)
Figure 5.5: Welfare loss as a function of θ. Solid curve: with strategic interaction; dashed
curve: without strategic interaction.
20The underlying set of parameters is described in Table 5.2 below.
21For this parameter constellation τfb equals the decentralized tax rate for θ
∗ = α−q+β(1−α)α+β−q(1+β) , which, by
construction, is the same under strategic interaction and absence of strategic interaction.
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5.6.3 Heterogeneity
Even if we remove time inconsistency and strategic interaction from the model, the decen-
tralized tax rates are likely to deviate from the ﬁrst-best tax rate. What is the reason for
this remaining ineﬃciency?22 This residual ineﬃciency must be due to a fundamental conﬂict
of interest. Since both groups are asymmetrically aﬀected by changes in the tax rate, every
group prefers a diﬀerent tax rate. However, heterogeneity is not suﬃcient for ineﬃciency
to occur. From the median voter model we know that political competition, based on the
median voter principle, delivers an eﬃcient solution provided that the income distribution is
symmetric. In this case, the ﬁrst-best tax rate coincides with the preferred tax rate of the
median voter (decisive voter).
Our model departs along two dimensions from this benchmark case. First, we do not apply the
median voter principle and, second, the income distribution is discrete with two realizations
(”income of workers” and ”income of capitalists”). In this case, there is simply no voter who
prefers the ﬁrst-best tax rate. Consequently, there is no decentralized decision mechanism,
relying on the principle of one voter being decisive, that can deliver the ﬁrst-best solution.
The remaining ineﬃciency can be labelled ”natural ineﬃciency” since it could only be avoided
by an omnipotent social planner who sets the tax rate to its ﬁrst-best level. Put diﬀerently,
the decentralized economy is intrinsically characterized by a conﬂict of interest between the
two classes. Since both groups are asymmetrically aﬀected by changes in the tax rate, the
political process is likely to give rise to a tax rate diﬀerent from the ﬁrst-best tax rate. Hence,
the conﬂict of interest produces an additional ineﬃciency.
22Notice that productive government expenditures G do not cause an ineﬃciency in this model. It is true
that G represents an external eﬀect from the perspective of the representative ﬁrm. However, when deciding
on the preferred tax rate individuals internalize the associated change in G.
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5.7 Numerical Considerations
5.7.1 The Overall Distributional-conﬂict Ineﬃciency
The quantitative importance of the overall distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency is assessed by
running a simple numerical exercise. To this end, we calibrate the general equilibrium model
under study, determine the diﬀerent tax rates, and calculate the implied welfare loss. In
addition, the relative importance of the diﬀerent mechanisms discussed above is investigated.
Table 5.2 shows the underlying baseline set of parameters.
Technology and endowment α = 0.3; β = 0.25 L = 5; u = 0.6;K = 20
Policy and capital outside option q = 0.6; r¯ = 0.1; ε = 0.1
Table 5.2: Baseline set of parameters
The empirical literature on productive government expenditures indicates that the elasticity
of productive government expenditures in the production of ﬁnal output should lie in the
interval β ∈ [0.16, 0.39] (Aschauer, 1989; Finn, 1993).23 The choice of q = 0.6 is compatible
with data on social security transfers in OECD countries. More precisely, expenditures on
social security transfers as a percentage of total tax receipts, 1− q in our notation, averaged
to 35% in 2000 (OECD, 2006). Since the deﬁnition of ”social security transfers” is somewhat
narrow in the context of the model, we set 1 − q = 0.4.24 The capital share of α = 0.3
is standard. The assumption u = 0.6 means that individuals supply 60% of their time
endowment (net of recreation) to the labor market. The outside option for capital r¯ = 0.1
might appear somewhat high at ﬁrst glance. However, the implied rate of return on capital
earned in the outside option net of investment costs (associated with foreign investments)
amounts to 0.066 (more precisely, r¯ − εK−KM(τ=0.4)
K
∼= 0.066).
23For a detailed discussion on the empirical estimation see Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).
24Public social expenditure as a percentage of total tax receipts among OECD countries averaged to 0.6 in
2000 (OECD, 2006). This deﬁntion would, however, be too broad.
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Employing the baseline set of parameters in Table 5.2 leads to the following tax rates:
τ ∗DC ∼= 0.25; τfb ∼= 0.37; τ optL ∼= 0.43; τ ∗DL ∼= 0.58
Notice that these tax rates are fairly plausible in empirical terms. We now turn to the overall
distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency, as measured by
y(τfb)−y(τ∗)
y(τfb)
. The decentralized tax rate τ ∗
depends on the presence or absence of strategic interaction and, additionally, on the value of
the political impact parameter θ. Assuming, ﬁrst, strategic interaction among capitalists and
workers in the political process, and, second, that the economy is in a dominance of workers
regime (θ ≤ q−α−β(1−α)
q−α ) we get:
y(τfb = 0.37)− y(τ ∗DL = 0.58)
y(τfb = 0.37)
∼= 0.073.
The proportional gap between aggregate income evaluated at the ﬁrst-best tax rate τfb ∼= 0.37
and aggregate income evaluated at the decentralized tax rate τ ∗DL ∼= 0.58 hence amounts to
7.3%. This number points to a substantial welfare loss and indicates that the ineﬃciency due
to distributional conﬂicts may be substantial.25
5.7.2 A Decomposition into Several Components
We ﬁnally turn to the relative importance of the diﬀerent mechanisms discussed in Section
5.6. Figure 5.6, upper plot, shows the overall distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency together with
the three components ”time inconsistency”, ”strategic interaction”, and ”heterogeneity” as a
function of θ. The curve labelled ”overall gap” gives the absolute gap Δy = y(τfb)−y(τ ∗(θ)).26
As explained above (Figure 5.5 ) this curve has three ranges, which correspond to the three
diﬀerent regimes (”dominance of workers”, ”no group dominates”, ”dominance of capitalists”).
The lower plot reproduces Figure 5.3 to ease the interpretation.
25Two remarks are at order: First, the 7% is much larger than the output gap during severe recessions,
which amounts to approximately 3%. Second, in a dynamic growth model the upward bias in the tax rate
would translate into a downward bias in the growth rate. Therefore, the welfare loss would be even larger in
a dynamic setup.
26We use the absolute gap here since the corresponding plot for the proportional gap is more diﬃcult to
interpret.
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The curve labelled ”strat. int.” displays the ineﬃciency due to strategic interaction among
major interest groups. To be precise, this curve shows the loss in output due to the fact that
there is strategic interaction in the political process when the time inconsistency problem is
still prevalent. For θ = 0 and θ = 1 this component must be zero since, in these cases, the
decentralized tax rate with strategic interaction and without strategic interaction coincide.
The diﬀerence Δτ =| τ ∗−τfb | and hence the gap Δy increases initially, starting at θ = 0, as θ
rises. This is due to the fact that the decentralized tax rate remains constant under strategic
interaction as long as the economy is in a dominance of workers regime, while the tax rate
decreases with θ from the beginning under absence of strategic interaction. However, when θ
passes a critical threshold, given by θ = 1−q
α−qβ, and hence the economy enters into a ”no group
dominates regime” the decentralized tax rate decreases stronger under strategic interaction
compared to the case of no strategic interaction and hence the curve ”strat. int.” peaks at
θ = 1−q
α−qβ. It then approaches zero at the unique θ which implies that the decentralized
tax rate with strategic interaction and without strategic interaction coincide (for the set of
parameters this is also the value of θ which establishes the ﬁrst best such that the overall gap
also vanishes at this point). Increasing θ further leads once more to an increase, a peak at
θ = 1− β, and eventually a reversal to zero as θ goes to unity.
The curve labelled ”time inconsist.” shows the time-inconsistency component. This curve
assumes that (i) there is no strategic interaction, i.e. all relevant tax rates lie on the straight
line given by τ˜ ∗ = θβ + (1 − θ) (α−1)β
α−q , and (ii) workers demand τ
∗
DL (i.e. do not take the
feedback eﬀect of capital ﬂights into account) instead of τ optL , which is optimal in the sense
of taking the feedback eﬀect of capital ﬂights into account. For θ = 0 this component is
positive since workers alone determine the decentralized tax rate, which is too high compared
to the ﬁrst best. When θ is increased (i.e. workers become less and less inﬂuential), the
time inconsistency component falls as the worker’s political impact gets smaller. It can be
recognized that the time-inconsistency component turns even negative. For a suﬃciently high
value of θ (i.e. a strong position of capitalists) the decentralized tax rate might be lower than
the ﬁrst best. Time inconsistency leads workers to opt for a higher tax rate which moves the
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Figure 5.6: Decomposition of overall distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency.
decentralized tax rate closer to the ﬁrst best. In this case, the isolated contribution of time
inconsistency is positive (2nd best implication). The time inconsistency component reverts to
zero as θ further increases. The reason is that the workers’ political impact becomes smaller
and eventually vanishes.
Finally, the curve labeled ”heterogeneity” gives the residual ineﬃciency, which, as explained
above, can be attributed to heterogeneity and the associated fundamental conﬂict of interests.
Figure 5.6 shows that the heterogeneity component is positive initially. Let’s once more start
with θ = 0. In this case, the decentralized tax rate is τ optL since (i) there is no strategic
interaction, hence the decentralized tax rate is formed according to (5.3.7), and (ii) τ ∗DL =
τ optL . Since τ
opt
L 	= τfb a residual ineﬃciency remains even after strategic interaction and
time inconsistency have been removed. Increasing θ moves τ ∗ closer to τfb and hence the
heterogeneity component falls. There is a critical value of θ, determined by θβ+(1−θ)τ optL =
τfb, at which the heterogeneity component vanishes. When θ is further increased the gap
Δτ =| θβ + (1 − θ)τ optL − τfb | is widened and the heterogeneity component rises. At θ = 1
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the overall distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency is made up exclusively of the ineﬃciency due
to heterogeneity since both the strategic-interaction and the time-inconsistency components
vanish at θ = 1.
5.8 Summary and Conclusion
The starting point for this paper is the recognition that distributional conﬂicts prevail in
every market economy. We believe that the way these conﬂicts are carried out has ﬁrst order
implications for economic eﬃciency and welfare. Employing a simple general equilibrium
model, which captures the major relevant features, we have investigated the sources and
consequences of distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciencies. The main contribution of the paper lies
in the decomposition of the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency into three components: (i) the
time-inconsistency component; (ii) strategic interaction in the political sphere; and (ii) an
unavoidable residual which results from heterogeneity. Furthermore, using data for OECD
economies we have used a calibrated version of the model to assess the magnitude of the
distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency. This exercise indicates that the ineﬃciency may be quite
substantial. For our baseline set of parameters we ﬁnd an output loss of about 7% (recall that
severe recessions are associated with an output gap of around 3%). Numerical considerations
have, in addition, been used to assess the relative importance of the diﬀerent components.
These results leave us with a natural follow-up question: What are the mechanisms that
have the potential to reduce the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency. Since a discussion of this
topic would clearly constitute a separate paper, we restrict ourselves here to the following
enumeration. There appear to be four such ”mechanisms”: (i) One obvious possibility lies
in the reduction of income heterogeneity, which could be induced by appropriate government
policies. (ii) At a theoretical level, one could think of a wage contract implying that workers
exchange a share of their wage income against a claim on the capital income net of taxes. As
a result, it becomes incentive-compatible for workers to opt for a comparably low tax rate at
the ex post investment stage. (iii) A mechanism which is at work in reality lies in repeated
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interaction in the political process. We did not model this aspect to keep the analysis as
simple as possible. It is important to notice, in this context, that the political-institutional
system then determines the relevant time horizon. (iv) It appears interesting to consider the
consequences of inequality aversion as a fundamental cultural factor (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) have shown that ”a small degree of inequality aversion” can
lead to large equilibrium redistribution. In an open economy, then, it seems that inequality
aversion indeed magniﬁes the output loss due to distributional conﬂicts.
Finally, the paper at hand contributes to the theoretical literature, which tries to understand
the diﬀerences in per capita income across countries. Recent macroeconomic studies have
decomposed the international variance of per capita income into three basic components
(Caselli, 2005): (i) physical inputs; (ii) technology; (iii) institutions and policy. Olson (1996)
has argued that the third component is substantial. We have shown that policy choices are
shaped by distributional conﬂicts and the way these conﬂicts are carried out. Our quantitative
ﬁnding suggests that the distributional-conﬂict ineﬃciency can indeed be substantial, which
is in line with Olson’s results.
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5.10 Appendix
Reduced-form Technology
Using G = qτYM together with YM = G
βKαM(uL)
1−α we ﬁrst solve for G:
G = qτGβKαM(uL)
1−α
G = (qτKαM(uL)
1−α)
1
1−β .
Plugging this expression for G back into YM = G
βKαM(uL)
1−α gives:
YM = (qτK
α
M(uL)
1−α)
β
1−βKαML
1−α
YM = q
β
1−β τ
β
1−βK
βα
1−β+α
M (uL)
β(1−α)
1−β +(1−α)
YM = q
β
1−β τ
β
1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−β .
This is equation (5.2.1) in the main text.
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Factor Prices
The competitive interest rate is given by:27
r =
∂YM
∂KM
= αGβKα−1M (uL)
1−α
r = α(qτKαM(uL)
1−α)
β
1−βKα−1M (uL)
1−α
r = α(qτ)
β
1−βK
α−1+β
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−β
This is equation (6.2.2) in the main text.
The competitive wage rate reads:
w =
∂YM
∂L
= (1− α)GβKαM(uL)−α
w = (1− α)(qτKαM(uL)1−α)
β
1−βKαM(uL)
−α
w = (1− α)(qτ) β1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
β−α
1−β
This is equation (6.2.3) in the main text.
Reaction Function of Capitalists
The maximization problem of capitalists can be expressed as follows:
max
τC
{
yK(τ) = (1− τ)α(qτ) β1−βK
α−1+β
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−βKM
}
s.t. τ = θτC + (1− θ)τL
and 0 ≤ τC ≤ 1,
27Notice that it is necessary to ﬁrst take the partial derivative w.r.t. K or L and then insert G =
(qτKαML
1−α)
1
1−β .
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given the worker’s vote and 0 ≤ τL ≤ 1 satisfying 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. Formulating the Lagrangian
yields
L = yK(τ) + λ0(−τC) + λ1(1− τC).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be stated as follows (Sydsaeter et al., 2000, pp. 97)
(A) τC
∂L
∂τC
= τC
(
∂yK
∂τC
− λ0 − λ1
)
= 0.
(B) λ0
∂L
∂λ0
= λ0τC = 0
(C) λ1
∂L
∂λ1
= λ1(1− τC) = 0.
1. λ1 = λ0 = 0 - no restriction is binding and there is an interior solution with
∂yK
∂τC
= 0:
−θα(qτ) β1−βK
α−1+β
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−βKM
+(1− τ)θα β
1− β (q)
β
1−β τ
2β−1
1−β K
α−1+β
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−βKM = 0
−τ β1−β + (1− τ) β
1 − β τ
2β−1
1−β = 0
−τ β1−β − β
1− β τ
β
1−β +
β
1− β τ
2β−1
1−β = 0
−1 + β
1− β τ
−1 − β
1− β = 0
− β
1− β +
β
1− β τ
−1 = 0
⇒ τ−1 = 1
β
such that
θτC + (1− τ)τL = β
and hence
τC =
β
θ
− 1− θ
θ
τL.
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2. λ1 = 0 and λ0 	= 0 - negative tax rates are excluded, such that in light of condition
(B) : τC = 0. If this is the case, we yield from (A) :
∂yK
∂τC
= λ0. Since, we have for
interior solutions ∂y
K
∂τC
= 0, we yield ∂y
K
∂τC
< 0 and therefore β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL < 0.
3. λ1 	= 0 and λ0 = 0 - tax rates greater then one are excluded. Hence, we get from
(C) : τC = 1 and from (A) :
∂yK
∂τC
= λ0, where
∂yK
∂τC
> 0 implying that β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL > 1.
Collecting all the feasible outcomes for τC together, yields
τC =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 for β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL > 1
β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL for 0 ≤ βθ − 1−θθ τL ≤ 1
0 for β
θ
− 1−θ
θ
τL < 0
Reaction Function of Workers
The workers’ maximization problem of is:
max
τL
{
yL(τ) = (1− τ)(1− α)(qτ) β1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
β−α
1−β L+ (1− q)τq β1−β τ β1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−β
}
s.t. τ = θτC + (1− θ)τL
and 0 ≤ τL ≤ 1,
given the capitalists’ vote and 0 ≤ τC ≤ 1 satisfying 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. Formulating the Lagrangian
yields
L = yL(τ) + λ0(−τL) + λ1(1− τL).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be stated as follows (Sydsaeter et al., 2000, pp. 97)
(A′) τL
∂L
∂τL
= τL
(
∂yL
∂τL
− λ0 − λ1
)
= 0.
(B′) λ0
∂L
∂λ0
= λ0τL = 0
(C ′) λ1
∂L
∂λ1
= λ1(1− τL) = 0.
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1. λ1 = λ0 = 0 - no restriction is binding and there is an interior solution with
∂yL
∂τL
= 0:
(1− θ)(1− α)(qτ) β1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
β−α
1−β L
+(1− τ) β
1− β (1− α)(1− θ)(q)
β
1−β τ
2β−1
1−β K
α
1−β
M (uL)
β−α
1−β uL
+(1− q) 1
1− β (1− θ)(q)
β
1−β τ
β
1−βK
α
1−β
M (uL)
1−α
1−β (uL) = 0
−(1− α)τ β1−β + (1− τ)(1− α) β
1− β τ
2β−1
1−β + (1− q) β
1− β τ
β
1−β = 0
−(1− α)τ β1−β + (1− α) β
1− β τ
2β−1
1−β − (1− α) β
1− β τ
β
1−β + (1− q) β
1− β τ
β
1−β = 0
−(1− α)τ β1−β ( 1
1− β ) + (1− α)
β
1− β τ
2β−1
1−β + (1− q) β
1− β τ
β
1−β = 0
τ
β
1−β (α− q) + (1− α)βτ 2β−11−β = 0
implying that
α− q + (1− α)βτ−1 = 0
⇒ α− q = (α− 1)βτ−1
and hence
α− 1
α− qβ = θτC + (1− θ)τL
τL =
(α− 1)β
(1− θ)(α− q) −
θ
1− θτC
2. λ1 = 0 and λ0 	= 0 - negative tax rates are excluded, such that in light of condition
(B′) : τL = 0. If this is the case, we yield from (A′) :
∂yL
∂τL
= λ0. Since, we have for
interior solutions ∂y
L
∂τL
= 0, we yield ∂y
K
∂τL
< 0 and therefore (α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC < 0.
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3. λ1 	= 0 and λ0 = 0 - tax rates greater then one are excluded. Hence, we get from (C ′) :
τL = 1 and from (A
′) : ∂y
L
∂τL
= λ0, where
∂yL
∂τL
> 0 implying that (α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC > 1.
Collecting all the feasible outcomes for τL together, yields
τL =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for (α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC > 1
(α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC for 0 ≤ (α−1)β(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC ≤ 1
0 for (α−1)β
(1−θ)(α−q) − θ1−θτC < 0
First-best Tax Rate - No Outside Option
Maximization of aggregate income
Forming the ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t τ in problem (19) yields after some manipulations
−ατ β1−β + (1− τ)αβ
1− β τ
2β−1
1−β + (1− q)τ β1−β + (1− q)τ β1−β = 0.
Hence,
−α(1− β)− (1− α)(1− β) + β(1
τ
− 1) + (1− q) = 0
which implies immediately that
τfb =
β
q
.
This is equation (5.4.2) in the main text.
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Abstract
What are the dynamic consequences of comprehensive integration shocks? The answer to this
question appears all but trivial. We set up a dynamic macroeconomic model of a small open
economy with capital mobility, migration, and increasing returns to scale. The model features
multiple equilibria as well as (local and global) indeterminacy. Despite its simplicity, the
model creates a rich set of plausible implications. We clarify the mechanics that may lead an
integrating economy to the good or to the bad equilibrium by showing how fundamentals and
expectations interact in the process of equilibrium selection. The model is applied to replicate
two striking empirical characteristics of macroeconomic development in East Germany since
1990.
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6.1 Introduction
There are numerous examples in economic history of economies that have experienced a
comprehensive integration into a larger economic entity or into the global economy. Examples
comprise the ﬁrst era of globalization (about 1820 until 1913) with nearly perfect capital
mobility and mass migration among Atlantic economies (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999), the
uniﬁcation of South and North Italy in 1862 (Boltho et al., 1997), the German Reuniﬁcation
in 1990 (Sinn, 2002) and the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 to include many of
the East European economies (Mora et al., 2004). What are the dynamic consequences with
regard to income and welfare of such comprehensive integration shocks for speciﬁc regions or
economies? The answer to this question appears all but trivial.
We argue that a careful analysis should account for capital mobility, migration, and increasing
returns to scale (IRS). The employed model features multiple equilibria (ME) as well as (local
and global) indeterminacy. We clarify the mechanics that may lead an integrating economy
to the good or to the bad equilibrium by showing how fundamentals and expectations interact
in the process of equilibrium selection. The model is then applied to replicate two striking
empirical characteristics of macroeconomic development in East Germany since 1991.
In search for an answer to our research question, international trade theory seems to be the
natural starting point. Provided that a set of neoclassical conditions (including constant
returns to scale) holds, trade liberalization induces, ﬁrst, (incomplete) specialization in goods
production according to the principle of comparative advantages and, second, international
equalization of factor rewards. Additional factor market integration (FMI) would add no
further implications. However, the consequences of goods trade and FMI diﬀer drastically if
one believes in IRS. Goods trade then induces complete specialization in goods production,
whereas factor price equalization does not apply anymore. FMI, on the other hand, may
lead to declining areas or set the stage for prospering regions by attracting capital and labor.
Interestingly, Paul Romer has recently proposed an innovative development strategy, labeled
’charter cities’, which rests on IRS, sound institutions, and complete factor mobility (Romer,
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2010).
There is indeed strong evidence, both direct and indirect, in favor of (aggregate) IRS. For
instance, Schmitt-Grohe´ (1997) reviews the empirical literature on IRS. She reports that
the degree of IRS (at the level of industries) ranges from 1.03 to 1.4 (Schmitt-Grohe´, 1997,
Table 4). Graham and Temple (2006) argue that models with IRS and ME can explain a
substantial part of the international income disparity. Depending on the strength of the
positive externality in the manufacturing sector, they attribute between 18 percent and 50
percent to the presence of ME.1 Consequently, a careful discussion of the question raised
above should take IRS and factor mobility into account.
IRS in endogenous input factors, as is well known, may give rise to ME. An important question,
then, is how the process of equilibrium selection works. Most theoretical models imply that
initial conditions are crucial (see, for instance, Galor, 1996; Deissenberg et al., 2001). There
are, however, also models showing that expectations may play an important role in the process
of equilibrium selection (Krugman, 1991; Galor, 1992; Graham and Temple, 2006). There
is indeed substantial, although at this stage inconclusive, evidence on the importance of
expectations as driving force for economic growth. Sengupta and Okamura (1995), Sauer et
al. (2003), Alesina et al. (1996) support the view that expectations matter, while Harris and
Ioannides (2000) remain more sceptical.
Theoretical papers dealing with the dynamic consequences of FMI under IRS comprise Dellas
and de Vries (1995), Faini (1996), Reichlin and Rustichini (1998). These papers are clearly
instructive and show that the consequences of FMI under IRS are all but trivial. None
of these contributions takes, however, the role of expectations in the process of equilibrium
selection into account. In addition, according to the best of our knowledge, the New Economic
Geography literature does not capture the elements (capital mobility, migration, and IRS)
which appear of crucial importance in the context of our research question (cf. Ottaviano
and Thisse, 2004; Baldwin and Martin, 2004).
1See also the literature discussed in Graham and Temple (2006, Section 2).
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We develop a simple one-sector model of a small open economy to study the dynamic con-
sequences of FMI under IRS. FMI means that both input factors get access to an outside
option, i.e. capital can be invested abroad and workers may start to emigrate. Agents (capi-
tal owners and workers) form rational expectations about future factor rewards. The model
features ME as well as (local and global) indeterminacy. There is a multiplicity of expec-
tations which give rise to self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Despite its simplicity, the model creates
a rich set of plausible implications: (i) The success of economic development in response to
FMI is determined by history and expectations. (ii) The relative importance of expectations
as determinant of economic success depends positively on TFP. (iii) There is a multiplicity of
admissible initial expectations. Initial expectations interact with fundamentals (initial con-
ditions and TFP) in a systematic fashion. This implies that, for instance, bad institutions
(e.g., red tape or corruption), which have a detrimental impact on TFP, may block favorable
economic development because suﬃciently optimistic expectations cannot be fundamentally
warranted under this side condition.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 the model is developed and its main
properties are described. Section 6.3 is devoted to the interaction between expectations and
fundamentals. In Section 6.4 the model is applied to replicate two stylized facts of macroe-
conomic development in East Germany since 1991. Section 6.5 summarizes and concludes.
6.2 The Model
Consider a dynamic one-sector model of a perfectly competitive, small open economy. To
enable a discussion of the dynamics of the regional income distribution, we view this economy
as being composed of a number of n ≥ 1 regions. If n = 1 there is just one single region
which comprises the entire, small open economy. The alternative case, i.e. n > 1, allows
for a regional disaggregation.2 For simplicity regions do not interact.3 FMI means that both
2This aspect will become relevant when applying the model to better understand the stylized facts of
macroeconomic development in East Germany (Section 6.4).
3This simplifying assumption is uncritical with regard to the major implications. For a, say, declining
region it does not matter whether capital and workers move to another region or move abroad.
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input factors get access to an outside option, i.e. capital can be invested abroad and workers
may emigrate. Moving input factors out of or into the domestic market sector is associated
with mobility costs. Agents form rational expectations about future factor rewards. Regions
are identical except for the initial amount of capital and labor allocated to the domestic
market sector and the degree of initial optimism or pessimism. The model features IRS at
the aggregate level due to external economies.
6.2.1 Production Technology and Factor Prices
The output technology of a typical ﬁrm j ∈ [0, 1] in region i ∈ {1, ..., n} reads
Yj,i = AK
α
j,iK¯
a
i L
β
j,iL¯
b
i , (6.2.1)
where A denotes a constant technology parameter (capturing TFP), Kj,i capital employed
by ﬁrm j in region i, K¯i the overall stock of capital in region i, Lj,i the amount of labor
employed by ﬁrm j in region i, L¯i the overall amount of labor employed in region i, and
0 < α, β, a, b < 1 constant parameters, which satisfy β+ b < 1, α+a < 1. There are constant
returns to scale at the level of the individual ﬁrm, i.e. α + β = 1. The aggregate output
technology of region i in symmetric equilibrium reads Yi = AK
α+a
i L
β+b
i . At the aggregate
level there are IRS, i.e. α+β+a+ b > 1. The major implications (multiple steady states and
indeterminacy) depend critically on the assumption of IRS in endogenous input factors (K
and L). They do not, however, depend on the speciﬁc mechanism which gives rise to aggregate
IRS. Marshallian externalities represent one widely used mechanism (e.g., Krugman, 1991;
Graham and Temple, 2006). Competitive factor prices are given by
ri = αAK
α+a−1
i L
β+b
i (6.2.2)
wi = βAK
α+a
i L
β+b−1
i , (6.2.3)
where denotes ri the rate of return to capital and wi the competitive wage rate in region i,
respectively.
Equation (6.2.2) implies ∂ri
∂Li
> 0 and ∂
2ri
∂Li∂A
> 0. The positive impact of additional workers
employed in the domestic market sector on the incentive for capital owners to engage in the
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domestic market economy, reﬂected by ri, increases with the TFP parameter A. Similarly,
equation (6.2.3) implies ∂wi
∂Ki
> 0 and ∂
2wi
∂Ki∂A
> 0. These observations are, of course, standard
mechanical implications which also apply to case of constant returns to scale. Within the un-
derlying model, as will become clear below, this implies that the interdependence of decisions
(across groups) to engage in the domestic market sector increases with TFP. As a consequence,
a higher level of TFP gives expectations a greater role in the process of equilibrium selection.
In addition, a high TFP level may facilitate suﬃciently optimistic expectations such that
an economy experiences a favorable economic development despite comparably unfavorable
initial conditions.
Under (aggregate) IRS, factor rewards and per capita income are crucially determined by the
amount of capital and labor allocated to the domestic market sector. We therefore turn to the
allocation decisions of capital owners and workers at next. Despite considering both outward
and inward capital ﬂows as well as outward and inward migration, the terminology is based
on the perspective of domestic expatriates. The domestic region / economy is often denoted
as ’the source’, whereas the rest of the world is denoted as ’the destination’.
6.2.2 Capital Owners
Every region is populated by a continuum of length one of identical capital owners.4 Every
capitalist is endowed with K¯Si units of capital. Capital can be employed in the region’s
domestic market sector (source) earning a rate of return ri. Alternatively, capital can be
invested abroad (destination) to earn the ﬁxed rate of return r¯ > 0. The representative
capital owner in the source maximizes the present value of an inﬁnite income stream, i.e.
solves the following problem
4To simplify, we assume that capital owners don’t move. The location of capital owners is not important
since we are interested in the determinants of GDP, not in the determinants of GNP.
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max
{vSKi}
∞∫
0
⎡
⎣riKSi + r¯(K¯Si −KSi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 at t=0
− 1
2γK
(
vSKi
)2⎤⎦ e−ρtdt (6.2.4)
s.t. K˙Si = v
S
Ki
KSi (0) = K¯
S
i , 0 ≤ KSi ≤ K¯Si ,
where ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate and K˙Si := dK
S
i /dt. Moving capital from
the region’s domestic market sector to the outside option, or vice versa, causes (symmetric
and convex) capital adjustment costs which reduce current income, as captured by the term
’− 1
2γK
(
vSKi
)2
’, where vSKi denotes a control variable. More precisely, moving one additional
unit of capital from, say, the source to the destination causes reallocation costs of
K˙Si
γK
, i.e.
marginal adjustment costs increase with the ﬂow of capital being transferred.5 The parameter
γK > 0 is an inverse measure for the importance of adjustment costs. We assume that the
typical capital owner has all his capital K¯Si allocated to the domestic market economy initially,
i.e. KSi (0) = K¯
S
i . Thus he can either keep all his capital inside the region’s domestic market
sector or start investing abroad. An increase in the region’s stock of capital requires capital
inﬂows from abroad. To simplify the analysis, we assume that foreign capital investments
are irreversible. This implies that capital once invested in, say, the source cannot be invested
again in the destination.
Let HS := HS(KSi , v
S
Ki
) denote the associated (current value) Hamiltonian function. The
ﬁrst-order conditions may then be expressed as follows
∂HS
∂vSKi
= − 1
γK
vSKi + λKi = 0 ⇒ vSKi = γKλKi (6.2.5)
λ˙Ki = ρλKi −
∂HS
∂KSi
= ρλKi − (ri − r¯) . (6.2.6)
5There are indeed convex capital reallocation costs at the individual level. This is consistent with the
following interpretation. If the individual capital owner transfers ﬁnancial funds, no costs are incurred. The
accumulation of physical capital is, however, associated with convex capital adjustment costs according to
Hayashi (1982).
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Equation (6.2.5) says that, in equilibrium, marginal moving costs
vSKi
γK
must equal the shadow
price λKi. Equation (6.2.6) indicates that λKi(0) =
∞∫
0
(ri − r¯) e−ρtdt, i.e. λKi(0) gives the
diﬀerence between earnings in the domestic market sector and in the outside option in present
value terms.6 Since the competitive rate of return ri depends on the amount of capital and
labor employed in the domestic market sector, λKi(0) captures expectations about future
economic development.
The problem of the typical capital owner in the destination (rest of the world) may be ex-
pressed as follows
max
{vDKi}
∞∫
0
⎡
⎣r¯
(
K¯D −
n∑
i=1
KDi
)
+
n∑
i=1
ri K
D
i︸︷︷︸
=0 at t=0
−
n∑
i=1
1
2γK
(
vDKi
)2⎤⎦ e−ρtdt (6.2.7)
s.t. K˙Di = v
D
Ki
∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n}
KDi (0) = 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n}, 0 ≤ KDi ≤ K¯D.
where K¯D > 0 denotes the capital endowment, KDi ≥ 0 the amount of capital invested in
region i, r¯ the rate of return to capital in the destination, ri the rate of return in region i,
and vDKi choice variables, respectively. We assume K
D
i (0) = 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n} implying that
the initial capital endowment is invested completely in the destination. Similarly to the case
considered above, the ﬁrst-order conditions λ˙Ki = ρλKi − (ri − r¯), together with appropriate
border conditions, imply that the shadow value placed on capital invested in region i is given
by λKi(0) =
∞∫
0
(ri − r¯) e−ρtdt.
Physical capital in region i, denoted as Ki, increases due to capital inﬂows K˙
D
i ≥ 0 and
decreases due to capital outﬂows K˙Si ≤ 0, i.e. K˙i = K˙Di + K˙Si . Physical capital in region i
therefore changes according to (for details see the appendix)
K˙i = γKλKi  0 for λKi  0. (6.2.8)
The modeling of the capitalist’s investment decisions, described above, employs two simplify-
ing assumptions: (i) capitalists do not save, i.e. consume their entire capital income (net of
6This solution for λKi(0) requires that the boundary condition λKi(T ) = 0 (the so-called ”soft landing
condition”) holds, where T denotes the point in time when the economy hits a boundary (see Section 6.3.1).
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capital reallocation costs) and (ii) the instantaneous utility function is linear in consumption.
The setup, viewed this way, is then perfectly compatible with standard utility maximizing
behavior. We could make the model more complicated by relaxing these assumptions. This
would not, however, change the basic implications of multiple equilibria and (global and local)
indeterminacy.
6.2.3 Workers
There are Li(0) = Li,0 identical workers initially in region i, who live forever. Every worker
supplies one unit of time per period, independent of the wage rate, to the labor market.
Domestic workers have the possibility to emigrate. Migration decisions are modelled according
to Braun (1993).7 The beneﬁt of emigration at t = 0 is reﬂected by
λDLi(0) =
∞∫
0
(w¯ − wi) e−ρtdt, (6.2.9)
where ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate, wi is the domestic competitive wage rate, and w¯
is the wage rate that can be earned in the destination. The beneﬁt of emigrating at t = 0 from
the source to the destination, denoted as λDLi(0), is given by the diﬀerence between earnings in
the outside option (destination) and in the domestic market sector (source) in present value
terms. Since the domestic competitive wage rate wi depends on the amount of capital and
labor employed in the domestic market sector, λDLi(0) captures expectations about the future
economic development.
The moving costs per migrant are given by
mci =
1
γL
L˙SDi , (6.2.10)
where L˙SDi ≥ 0 denotes the ﬂow of migrants from the source to the destination per period
of time. Equation (6.2.10) shows that (individual) migration costs increase with the number
7The Braun (1993) model of migration and growth represents a dynamic, representative-agent model (see
also Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Chapter 9.1.3).
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of migrants, which may be due to congestion externalities (cf. Braun, 1993, p. 24).8 The
parameter γL > 0 is an inverse measure, given L˙
SD
i , for the importance of the moving costs.
The individual moving decision is a binary decision. Workers leave the economy if the beneﬁt
of emigration, reﬂected by λDLi, exceeds the migration costs, as given by mci. In a competitive
equilibrium the beneﬁt of emigration must equal the costs of migration, i.e. λDLi =
1
γL
L˙SDi .
Moreover, if the beneﬁt of emigration is zero, λDLi = 0, no one will want to emigrate, i.e.
L˙SDi = 0. Similarly, provided that λ
D
Li
< 0, one gets L˙SDi = 0. Migration from the source to
the destination (outward migration) may hence be described as follows
L˙SDi =
{
γLλ
D
Li
for λD
Li
> 0
0 for λD
Li
≤ 0 . (6.2.11)
Consider at next the typical worker in the destination (i.e. the rest of the world). Let
λSLi(0) =
∞∫
0
(wi − w¯) e−ρtdt denote the value of being in the source (domestic region) rather
than being in the destination (rest of the world). Notice also that λDLi = −λSLi . The moving
costs per migrant are again given by mci =
1
γL
L˙DSi , where L˙
DS
i ≥ 0 denotes the ﬂow of
migrants from the rest of the world to the domestic region per period of time. Applying an
analogous reasoning as before yields
L˙DSi =
{
γLλ
S
Li
for λSLi > 0
0 for λSLi ≤ 0
. (6.2.12)
The rate of change of workers in the domestic region is the diﬀerence between inward migration
and outward migration, i.e. L˙i = L˙
DS
i − L˙SDi . The number of workers in region i therefore
changes according to (for details see the appendix)
L˙i = γLλ
S
Li
 0 for λSLi  0. (6.2.13)
A clariﬁcation may be warranted. Consider a set of domestic regions with λSLi > 0. Does the
model imply that the region with the highest λSLi attracts workers from the rest of the world
8The key property is that the cost of moving for the marginal mover rises with the number of movers.
This relation would also hold if there were heterogeneity with respect to moving costs. The persons with
lower costs would move sooner, and the cost of moving would therefore rise at the margin with the number
of movers (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 401).
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ﬁrst and then other regions develop at next? Assuming that there are enough workers outside
the economy for a simultaneous development of all regions with λSLi > 0, the answer is no.
As stated above, the focus is on the source. Therefore, we consider variables that relate to
the source only. Moreover, to simplify the notation we set λSLi = λLi. This notation then
implies that λLi < 0 captures pessimism in the sense that the diﬀerence between wi and w¯,
in present value terms, is negative.
6.2.4 Dynamic System and Steady States
Noting (6.2.6), (6.2.8), (6.2.13) and diﬀerentiating λL(0) =
∞∫
0
(w − w¯) e−ρtdt with respect to
t, the dynamic system which governs the evolution of the economy within the interior of the
state space may be expressed as follows9
K˙ = γKλK (6.2.14)
L˙ = γLλL (6.2.15)
λ˙K = ρλK − (r − r¯) (6.2.16)
λ˙L = ρλL − (w − w¯) (6.2.17)
K(0) = K0, L(0) = L0,
where r and w are given by (6.2.2) and (6.2.3). Provided that λK(0) and λL(0) are speci-
ﬁed, the above system describes a unique trajectory in four-dimensional (K,L, λK , λL)-space.
However, λK(0) and λL(0) are not uniquely determined. There is rather a multiplicity of
shadow price combinations [λK(0), λL(0)] which are admissible as self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
Moreover, any set of admissible expectations [λK(0), λL(0)] is restricted to be fundamentally
warranted, as will be explained below.
A steady state is determined by K˙ = L˙ = λ˙K = λ˙L = 0. We ﬁrst turn to the interior steady
state. From K˙ = γKλK and L˙ = γLλL one recognizes that K˙ = L˙ = 0 requires λK = λL = 0.
From (6.2.16), (6.2.17), λK = λL = 0 (implying λ˙K = λ˙L = 0) one gets r = r¯ and w = w¯.
9To simplify notation, the region index is suppressed whenever this does not lead to confusion.
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These two equations in K and L characterize the interior steady state in (K, L)-plane.10
Noting (6.2.2) and (6.2.3) and solving for L gives
L =
( r¯
αA
) 1
β+b
K
1−α−a
β+b
(6.2.18)
L =
(
w¯
βA
) 1
β+b−1
K
α+a
1−β−b
. (6.2.19)
Since β+b < 1, α+a < 1, and α+β+a+b > 1, it follows that, ﬁrst, the RHS of (6.2.18) is an
increasing and concave function of K due to 0 < 1−α−a
β+b
< 1 and, second, the RHS of (6.2.19)
is an increasing and convex function of K due to α+a
1−β−b > 1. Hence, there is a unique interior
solution (K∗, L∗), as illustrated by point A in Figure 6.1. There are also two boundary steady
states. The lower (inferior) steady state is (K = 0, L = 0), point C in Figure 6.1. The upper
(superior) steady state reads (K = K∗∗, L = L¯), point B in Figure 6.1.11
As regards the dynamics at the border of the state space, two aspects need to be clariﬁed.
First, the economy remains at the boundary once it touches the border of the state space (see
the appendix for details). Second, in a world of IRS we need to ensure that factor inﬂows
sooner or later come to a halt. It is assumed that the maximum number of workers that
can move into a speciﬁc region cannot exceed L¯. This may be interpreted as capturing the
importance of a third (ﬁxed) factor, land, in the background. The maximum amount of
capital, K∗∗, is then endogenously determined by r(K∗∗, L¯) = r¯. To illustrate, assume that
the economy hits, say, the upper L-boundary at t = T , i.e. L(T ) = L¯, with 0 < K(T ) < K∗∗.
The dynamics of the economy are then governed by (6.2.14), (6.2.16), and L = L¯. Capital
inﬂows take place until r = r¯. This movement is sluggish because of convex adjustment costs
(for details see the appendix).
Do the basic (qualitative) implications depend on the assumption that there is a ﬁxed upper
bound L¯? The answer is no. The upper bound for labor may very well increase over time.
10Notice, however, that r = r¯ and w = w¯ is necessary but not suﬃcient for K˙ = 0 and L˙ = 0; suﬃcient for
K˙ = 0 (L˙ = 0) is λK = 0 (λL = 0).
11If there is a set of workers who do not leave their homeland irrespective of the wage diﬀerential, then the
lower boundary is given by L> 0 and the lower steady state is (K = 0, L = L).
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Figure 6.1: Multiple equilibria
All that is required is an endpoint condition of the form λL(T ) = 0 at L(T ) = L¯ for some
ﬁnite L¯.12
6.3 Expectations and Fundamentals
6.3.1 Admissible Expectations and Equilibrium Dynamics
The dynamic system (6.2.14) to (6.2.17), evaluated at the interior steady state, exhibits three
eigenvalues with positive real part. The interior steady state (point A in Figure 6.1) is hence
locally unstable. Moreover, there is indeterminacy in the sense of a multiplicity of admissible
initial shadow prices [λK(0), λL(0)]. Admissible expectations and equilibrium trajectories
must fulﬁll the following criteria (see the appendix for details)
1. Equilibrium trajectories must approach the border of the state space tangential, i.e.
12To use a metaphor, consider an airplane which lands on a conventional (i.e. non-moving) airport. Alter-
natively, consider a ﬁghter jet that lands on a moving air craft carrier. ’Equilibrium’ in both cases requires
that the aircraft lands in a smooth fashion which requires that the landing runway does exist in ﬁnite space.
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must satisfy one of the ’soft-landing conditions’ K˙(T ) = λK(T ) = 0 or L˙(T ) = λL(T ) =
0. Once the economy hits the border it does not return into the interior of the state
space. Instead it moves along the boundary to one of the border equilibria (B or C in
Figure 6.1).
2. Given initial conditions K(0) = K0 and L(0) = L0, there is a multiplicity of initial
shadow prices [λK(0), λL(0)] which are admissible as self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Hence,
there is an inﬁnite number of equilibrium trajectories, indexed by initial shadow prices.
3. The set of admissible shadow prices must, ﬁrst, equal the present value of expected
earning diﬀerentials and, second, must give rise to a trajectory that satisﬁes the soft-
landing condition.
6.3.2 Interaction between Expectations and Fundamentals
Any region is characterized by a predetermined history in the sense of an initial amount of
K and L allocated to the domestic market sector. If the region under study starts inside a
speciﬁc (K,L)-set, expectations (initial shadow prices) determine whether the region moves
towards the superior or inferior steady state, i.e. the model exhibits global indeterminacy.
Within this area of global indeterminacy — or overlap, a term coined by Krugman (1991) —
knowledge about initial state variables is not suﬃcient to determine the ﬁnal outcome. In
contrast, if the economy starts with suﬃciently unfavorable initial conditions (i.e. southwest
of the overlap) it converges to the inferior steady state. Similarly, if it starts with suﬃciently
favorable initial conditions (i.e. northeast of the overlap) it converges to the superior steady
state.
To visualize the area of global indeterminacy, we have discretized the state space, i.e. we
have deﬁned a grid of points in (K,L)-space. Then we have checked whether, for a speciﬁc
(K,L)-combination, there is at least one admissible set of expectations [λK(0), λL(0)] which
gives rise to a trajectory leading to the superior steady state and, for the same (K,L)-
combination, there is at least one set of admissible expectations [λK(0), λL(0)] which gives
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rise to a trajectory leading to the inferior steady state. If this condition is satisﬁed, the
(K,L)-combination under consideration is an element of the overlap. If this is not the case,
the speciﬁc (K,L)-combination lies outside the overlap.13
Figure 6.2: Three exemplary regions (D, E, F) and a multiplicity of equilibrium trajectories
Figure 6.2 illustrates the basic logic of the model. For expositional convenience the size of
the factor box was chosen such that the interior steady state is centered in K-dimension
and L-dimension and, in addition, is normalized to one. The area of global indeterminacy is
represented by the set of grey rectangles. Consider a region starting with an initial endowment
given by the coordinates of point D. Provided that agents are suﬃciently optimistic, both
capital owners and workers increasingly engage in the region’s domestic market sector. The
region prospers and converges to the superior equilibrium at B. In contrast, if agents are
pessimistic both capital and labor leave the region’s domestic market sector. The region
13The underlying routines can be found in the Numerical Appendix 9.4
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declines and approaches the inferior equilibrium at C.14 The region with initial endowment
D, therefore, exhibits global indeterminacy.
Local indeterminacy means that there is a multiplicity of equilibrium trajectories leading
to, say, the superior equilibrium. Local indeterminacy may also be of substantial economic
interest. Consider again a region with an initial endowment given by D and assume that
expectations are such that the region prospers, i.e. approaches the superior equilibrium
at point B. The multiplicity of trajectories indicates that the model can explain both a
pattern of immigration and capital inﬂows (one of the upper trajectories) or a pattern of
emigration followed by immigration (i.e. migration reversals) and capital inﬂows (one of the
lower trajectories). The trajectory which describes a migration reversal is based on λL(0) < 0
and λK(0) > 0 such that labor emigrates initially, L˙ < 0, but capital is being attracted,
K˙ > 0. Both L˙ < 0 and K˙ > 0 push the wage rate up such that λL(t) turns positive at some
t = t∗ implying that labor starts immigrating, i.e. L˙ > 0, for t > t∗.
Next, consider a region with initial endowment given by E (i.e. northeast of the overlap). It
will unambiguously prosper and converge to the superior equilibrium at B. Similarly, a region
with initial endowment given by F (i.e. southwest of the area of global indeterminacy) must
converge towards the inferior equilibrium at C.
Figure 6.3 displays the frequency distribution of admissible initial expectations of workers
λL(0).
15 The upper graph shows the admissible λL(0) for region E. Notice that endowment E
(together with the underlying TFP parameter) guarantees optimism in the sense of λL(0) > 0.
Moreover, there is obviously a multiplicity of equilibrium expectations, illustrating local inde-
terminacy. The middle graph shows the frequency distribution of admissible λL(0) for region
D. This distribution comprises two separate parts, which corresponds to the global indeter-
minacy implication. For λL(0) taken from the left part of the distribution (i.e. comparably
unfavorable expectations), the economy declines and converges to the inferior equilibrium at
C, while for λL(0) taken from the right part (i.e. comparably favorable expectations), the
14Equilibrium trajectories could, of course, also hit the (lower or upper) K-boundary for interior L-values.
This pattern is, however, rarely observed for plausible calibrations.
15A similar graph can be shown for the admissible initial expectations of capital owners λK(0).
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Figure 6.3: Frequency distribution (unit area histograms) of admissible initial expectations
of workers, λL(0), corresponding to the three exemplary regions (D, E, F) shown in Figure
6.2
economy prospers and moves towards the superior equilibrium at B. Finally, the lower graph
shows the admissible initial shadow prices for region F. Notice that λL(0) < 0 throughout,
i.e. endowment F (together with the underlying TFP parameter) dooms region F to be
pessimistic.
Figure 6.4 shows that the size of the overlap increases with the TFP parameter A. The small
overlap applies for A = 0.05, whereas the large overlap applies for A = 0.1. This makes
good economic sense since an increase in TFP (due to ∂ri
∂Li
> 0, ∂
2ri
∂Li∂A
> 0 and ∂wi
∂Ki
> 0,
∂2wi
∂Ki∂A
> 0) strengthens the interdependence among the agents’ decisions to engage in the
domestic market sector across groups. As will be explained below, this mechanism implies
that sound institutions, industrial traditions, and a strict supply-side policy give expectations
a greater role in the process of equilibrium selection.
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Figure 6.4: Overlap in response to an increase in TFP (small overlap applies for A = 0.05;
large overlap applies for A = 0.1)
Is a large overlap good or bad? The answer is that it is neither good nor bad. A large
overlap may imply that, even under unfavorable initial conditions, the economy is capable,
due to strong optimism, of moving towards the superior steady state. In contrast, even
under favorable initial conditions there is the risk that, due to a high degree of pessimism,
the inferior steady state is ultimately realized. In this sense, the economy becomes more
vulnerable against bad moods. Hence, an adequate, although fairly general, proposition
states that the relative importance of expectations vis-a`-vis history increases with the size of
the overlap.
Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of admissible initial expectations λL(0) across all regions in
the factor endowment box for alternative TFP-levels. Due to the multiplicity of admissible
expectations a speciﬁc region contributes to distinct classes of initial expectations. The graph
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illustrates that an increase in TFP, holding initial endowments constant, shifts probability
mass to the right. This observation demonstrates that a higher level of TFP enables a
higher degree of optimism to be fundamentally warranted. Moreover, one recognizes that
expectations are not completely exogenous. Initial expectations can be seen as being drawn
from a distribution which is determined by fundamentals, i.e. initial endowments and the
level of TFP.
Figure 6.5: Frequency distribution (unit area histograms) of λL(0) across all regions for
A = 0.05 (upper diagram) and for A = 0.1 (lower diagram)
In summary, an increase in TFP is ambiguous since it gives expectations a greater role in
the process of equilibrium selection, as demonstrated by Figure 6.4. This may imply that,
due to suﬃciently unfavorable expectations, a region converges to the inferior equilibrium
despite comparably favorable fundamentals. On the other hand, an increase in TFP is a good
thing in that it increases, on average, the admissible (i.e. fundamentally warranted) initial
expectations, as demonstrated by Figure 6.5. A more optimistic view becomes possible,
implying that the chance for a prosperous economic development increases.
6. Journey into the Unknown? 205
6.3.3 Deep Determinants of TFP
Since the interaction between expectations and TFP is of outstanding importance in the
process of equilibrium selection, as explained above, we sketch three prominent approaches
which point to the deep determinants of TFP.
Assume that ﬁnal output is produced according to Y = L1−α
∑N
i=1 x
α
i , where xi denotes the
amount of intermediate good i ∈ {1, ..., N} and 0 < α < 1, N > 0 (Ethier, 1982; Romer,
1990). Employing the symmetry property (xi = x for all i) and using x =
K
N
, where K
denotes aggregate capital, one gets Y = N1−αL1−αKα. Assume that it costs F > 0 units of
ﬁnal output to set up a new x-ﬁrm and that there is free entry into the x-sector. The number
of x-ﬁrms in equilibrium may then be stated as N = N(F ) with N ′(F ) < 0. TFP, given by
N1−α, is inversely related to F , which may reﬂect the consequence of bad institutions, e.g. red
tape or corruption. Our model therefore implies that bad institutions may block favorable
economic development because suﬃciently optimistic expectations cannot be fundamentally
warranted under this side condition.
Suppose next that the Y -technology is given by Y = Kα(BL)1−α with labor eﬃciency (or
average human capital) B depending on cumulated output per capita according to B˙ =
κy−δBB, where y = kαB1−α is output per capita and 0 < κ < 1 (Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986).
The steady state level of B (determined by B˙ = 0) then reads B∗ =
(
κ
δB
) 1
α
k. Accordingly,
industrial traditions in the sense of a high level of cumulated output, i.e. a high level of
B, increases TFP and strengthens the relative importance of expectations in the process of
equilibrium selection. In addition, it enables a high degree of optimism to be fundamentally
warranted.
Finally, assume that Y = GβKαL1−α, where G denotes productive government expenditures
(Barro, 1990), ﬁnanced according to G = qτY , where 0 < q < 1 denotes the share of
tax receipts devoted to productive government expenditures and 0 < τ < 1 the tax rate,
respectively. The reduced form technology then is Y = (qτ)
β
1−βK
α
1−βL
1−α
1−β . TFP, as given by
(qτ)
β
1−β , now depends positively on q and τ . Competitive factor rewards net of taxes are given
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by r = (1 − τ)α(qτ) β1−βK
α−1+β
1−β
L
1−α
1−β and w = (1 − τ)(1 − α)(qτ) β1−βK α1−βLβ−α1−β . An increase
in q enhances TFP with the implications sketched above. An increase in τ unfolds, however,
a non-monotonic impact on w and r and, hence, on the relative importance of expectations.
6.4 The Case of East Germany
The German reuniﬁcation provides a drastic example of an economy that was subject to a
comprehensive integration shock. In 1991 a whole economy with hitherto highly restricted
capital and labor mobility, namely East Germany, became integrated into a nearly frictionless
world capital market and the European labor market. We ask now whether the model at hand
is instructive when trying to better understand macroeconomic development in East Germany
in response to a comprehensive integration shock.16
6.4.1 Three Striking Empirical Observations
Economic development in East Germany since the German reuniﬁcation in 1991 exhibits three
striking empirical characteristics.
Massive factor movements. There has been substantial labor outﬂow and massive capital
inﬂow. Between 1991 and 2009 about 60,000 people (0.4 percent of the population) emigrated
from East Germany per annum (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005, 2009). There are important
regional diﬀerences. Some regions shrank substantially and, at the same time, there are
regions which attracted people to a substantial extent.17 At the same time, there has been a
substantial inﬂow of (private) capital. For instance, Burda (2006, p. 368) reports that capital
inﬂows between 1991 to 2004 amounted to 80 to 90 billion EUR, or about 20 percent of GDP,
each year.
16Theoretical papers on macroeconomic development in East Germany comprise Funke and Strulik (2000)
and Burda (2006) who investigate the pattern of East-West convergence as well as Snower and Merkl (2006)
and Uhlig (2006) who focus on unemployment.
17East-West migration is much more important compared to movements within East Germany. The ratio
of East-West migration and movements within East Germany ﬂuctuates between 70 percent and 85 percent
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993-2011).
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Limited East-West convergence. Real GDP per capita (per employee) in East Germany rela-
tive to GDP per capita (per employee) in West Germany stood at 39 percent (41 percent) in
1991. It then increased at an impressive pace up to 63 percent (69 percent) in 1996. Subse-
quently, the process of East-West convergence slowed down substantially. Relative GDP per
capita (per employee) reached 69 percent (77 percent) in 2010. This leveling points to limited
convergence of GDP per capita (cf. also Uhlig, 2006, p. 383).
Regional divergence and emergence of twin peaks. Vollmer et al. (2011) decompose the
(entire) German distribution of annual GDP per employee into two components using a two-
component normal mixture model for the years 1992 until 2006. This allows them to identify
those counties (’Kreise’) that moved from the ﬁrst to the second component. Subsequently,
a standard cross-sectional growth regression is extended to include a mover dummy, which
is highly signiﬁcant. Vollmer et al. (2011, p. 11) conclude that ”...there are two distinct
convergence clubs for GDP per employee in the East of Germany.”. There is also impressive
descriptive evidence for regional divergence and the emergence of a twin-peak structure in
the regional distribution of real GDP per capita (available from the authors). The kernel
density for the regional (at the level of counties) distribution of real GDP per capita shows
an unimodal income distribution in 1996 and a bimodal distribution in 2006.
Both limited East-West convergence and regional divergence are in stark contrast to the
neoclassical model. This is reinforced by noting, ﬁrst, that real GDP per capita in East
Germany relative to West Germany stood at about 120 percent before WWII (Boltho et al.,
1997, p. 257) and, second, the degree of factor mobility appears to be quite high. East
Germany has unrestricted access to the international capital market and major migration
costs associated with cultural and lingual diﬀerences do not apply (Hunt, 2006). Moreover,
there are substantial productive government expenditures, funded by the central government,
which aim at a ’harmonization of living conditions’ (as prescribed by the German constitution)
by uniformly distributed public infrastructure investment.
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6.4.2 Sketch of the Underlying Procedure
The model is evaluated in the following manner. First, we consider an arbitrarily large
number of regions, more precisely n = 1000. Every region starts with a speciﬁc combination
[Ki(0), Li(0)] which is restricted to fall inside the upper left of the state plane (i.e. above the
r = r¯-isocline and to the left of the w = w¯-isocline). This assumption implies ri > r¯ and
wi < w¯. This choice is part of the calibration strategy since we choose [Ki(0), Li(0)] such
that the model generates (aggregate) capital inﬂows and (aggregate) labor outﬂows. Second,
we assume that, in every region, there are 0 <L< L¯ inhabitants who do not condition their
migration decision on the wage diﬀerential, i.e. they stay in the source irrespective of λLi .
18
Third, we focus on interior dynamics throughout. This implies that we hold the coordinates
[Ki(t), Li(t)] ﬁx once a region has hit the boundary of the state space. Accounting additionally
for dynamics at the border would not change the qualitative implications. Fourth, initial
shadow prices λLi(0) for every i ∈ {1, ..., n} are drawn from a (non-parametric) probability
distribution, which is region speciﬁc, as shown in Figure 6.3. The values of λKi(0) are then
determined by the soft-landing condition, i.e. λLi(T ) = 0 or λKi(T ) = 0, where T denotes
the point in time when the economy hits a boundary. Once, Ki(0), Li(0), λKi(0) and λLi(0)
are speciﬁed, one can trace out Ki(t), Li(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Finally, we
calculate the time path of average per capita income y(t) :=
∑
Yi(t)∑
Li(t)
.
6.4.3 Calibration
Initial conditions [Ki(0), Li(0)] are selected, as mentioned above, such that ri > r¯ and wi <
w¯. This is in line with the observation of (aggregate) capital inﬂows and (aggregate) labor
outﬂows. The technology parameters are chosen as follows: α = 0.3, β = 0.7, a = 0.075,
b = 0.075. The implied degree of IRS of 1.15 lies inside the empirically plausible range
(Schmitt-Grohe´, 1997; Graham and Temple, 2006). The rate of return to capital is set to
r¯ = 0.04 and the wage rate in the outside option is normalized to one, i.e. w¯ = 1. The time
18The calibration below assumes a value for L and initial conditions Li(0) such that, on average, about 4
percent of the domestic population are assumed not to move.
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preference rate is set to ρ = 0.01 and the TFP parameter reads A = 1.1.19 Moreover, we
have set L¯ = 1.5L∗, where L∗ is the interior steady state value. K∗∗ is then endogenously
determined. This implies that a successful region, in the steady state, exhibits a GDP per
employee which is 5 percent higher than (average) GDP per employee in West Germany.
The mobility cost parameter γL = 0.025 is determined as follows. Equation (6.2.15) says
that γL =
L˙
λL
. To determine L˙ we notice that about 2.4 percent of the East German labor
force left East Germany in 1991 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005). Hence, the appropriately
scaled L˙ reads L˙ = −0.024∑ni Li(0). Given L˙, the initial conditions [Ki(0), Li(0)], the above
mentioned parameters, and an initial guess for γL and γK, we can calculate a frequency
distribution across all regions; in analogy to the frequency distributions shown in Figure 6.5.
This frequency distribution gives us E[λLi(0)]. Now we adjust γL, and repeat the simulation
iteratively, until the implied E[λLi(0)] matches γL =
L˙
E(λL)
. Capital mobility costs are set
equal to labor mobility costs, i.e. γK = γL.
20 Table 6.1 summarizes the underlying set of
parameters.
Technological elasticities α = 0.3; β = 0.7; a = 0.075; b = 0.075
Preference and outside option ρ = 0.01; r¯ = 0.04; w¯ = 1
Expectations and mobility costs (implied) E[λLi(0)]  −10; γL= γK= 0.025
Table 6.1: Set of parameters
19The value A = 1.1 does not mean that the overlap comprises nearly the entire state plane, as one could
conjecture with regard to the A-values employed in Section 6.3. The reason is twofold. First, the overlap
seems to converge to a limiting set (a subset of the state plane) as A increases and, second, other parameters,
like γL and γK , also have an impact.
20One might object that capital is more mobile than labor, i.e. γK > γL. However, this is not clear if we
think of real capital instead of ﬁnancial capital. Also, we have experimented with other constellations, i.e.
γK > γL and γK < γL. The qualitative results do not change.
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6.4.4 Limited East-West Convergence and Twin Peaks
We now demonstrate that the model can replicate limited East-West convergence as well as
the emergence of a twin-peak structure in the regional income distribution. Notice at ﬁrst
that, within our model, Y
L
may be interpreted either as GDP per capita or as GDP per
employee, since the model abstracts from unemployment. When it comes to a comparison
between model implications and empirical data, it is clearly appropriate to interpret Y
L
as
GDP per employee. With regard to limited East-West convergence of GDP per employee we
focus on the following metric. The competitive wage rate in West Germany, which constitutes
the outside option for East German workers, is given by w¯ = β Y
W
LW
. This implies that GDP
per employee in West Germany may be written as Y
W
LW
= w¯
β
. East German GDP per employee,
averaged across diﬀerent regions, reads Y
E
LE
=
∑
i Y
E
i∑
i L
E
i
. Hence, limited East-West convergence
requires that
lim
t→∞
Y E/LE
Y W/LW
= lim
t→∞
∑
i Y
E
i /
∑
i L
E
i
w¯/β
< 1.
Figure 6.6 shows the time path Y
E/LE
YW /LW
resulting from model simulation by applying the
procedure and calibration described above (solid line). The empirical series for Y
E/LE
YW /LW
is
represented by the dashed line. One can recognize that relative GDP per employee starts at
Y E/LE
YW /LW
 0.41 and converges to Y E/LE
Y W /LW
 0.83. This illustrates that the model can replicate
limited convergence. About 5 percent of regions converge to the superior, while 95 percent of
regions converge to the inferior steady state. The hump-shaped pattern of Y
E/LE
YW /LW
between
t = 0 and t = 5, displayed in Figure 6.6 (solid line), results from the fact that those regions
which converge to the inferior steady state may temporarily experience an increase in GDP
per employee since labor may leave individual regions more rapidly than capital ﬂows out of
this same region, implying that
Y Ei
LEi
increases temporarily.
We ﬁnally turn to regional divergence and the emergence of twin peaks in the regional income
distribution. Figure 6.7 (left panel) demonstrates that the model, given the initial set of
(KEi , L
E
i )-coordinates according to the calibration strategy outlined above, does indeed imply
an unimodal regional income distribution, which is in line with empirical observations. Figure
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Figure 6.6: Limited East-West convergence of real GDP per employee (dashed line: empirical
series; solid line: theoretical series)
6.7 (right panel) shows that the regional income distribution after 20 years is clearly bimodal.
Thus, the model can replicate regional divergence (the maximum deviation has increased)
and the emergence of a twin-peak structure in East Germany.
In summary, the model under study can replicate limited East-West convergence as well as
the emergence of twin peaks in the regional income distribution. The model is also in line
with regional heterogeneity in labor movements as well as migration reversals (cf. also Figure
6.2), which can indeed be observed for a number of East German counties (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 1993-2011). Hence, we believe that the model points to an underlying economic
structure and associated mechanisms that appear helpful when trying to better understand
East German macroeconomic development since 1991.
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Figure 6.7: Regional income distribution (kernel densities) at t = 0 (left graph) and at t = 20
(right graph)
6.5 Summary and Conclusion
Does a comprehensive integration shock set the stage for ongoing prosperity or does it doom
to gradual economic decline? This question has been discussed by employing a model of
a small open economy under increasing returns to scale. Due to multiple steady states as
well as local and global indeterminacy, the underlying model creates a rich set of (plausible)
implications. It has been shown that the outcome depends on a number of side conditions, like
initial state variables, total factor productivity, and expectations about the future domestic
factor rewards.
Our analysis contributes also to a better understanding of the interaction between expecta-
tions and fundamentals in models with indeterminacy. It has been shown that (i) the relative
importance of expectations as determinant of economic success depends on total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) and (ii) expectations depend on fundamentals (initial conditions and TFP)
in a systematic fashion. This insight has far reaching economic implications. For instance,
bad institutions may block favorable economic development because suﬃciently optimistic
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expectations cannot be fundamentally warranted under this side condition.
We believe that our analysis is not only important with regard to factor market integration.
The main implications should also apply to cases where the factors of production become
endogenous. This may be due to institutional or technological changes. For instance, instead
of using the metaphor ’agents get the opportunity to move across borders’ one may think of
an economy that starts developing a capital market or an educational system.
Finally, the model has been applied to replicate two striking empirical characteristics of
macroeconomic development in East Germany since 1991. It has been demonstrated that it
can replicate limited East-West convergence and the emergence of a twin-peak structure in the
regional income distribution, which represents a puzzle for the standard neoclassical model.
In addition, the model is in line with regional heterogeneity in labor movements as well as
migration reversals. We believe that the model points to an underlying economic structure
and associated mechanisms that are helpful when trying to better understand macroeconomic
development in East Germany since 1991.
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6.7 Appendix
Equations (6.2.8) and (6.2.13)
Capital - equ. (6.2.8). The (current-value) Hamiltonian function associated with problem
(6.2.7) and the ﬁrst-order conditions read
HD := r¯
(
K¯D −
n∑
i=1
KDi
)
+
n∑
i=1
ri K
D
i︸︷︷︸
=0 at t=0
−
n∑
i=1
1
2γK
(
vDKi
)2
+
n∑
i=1
λKiv
D
Ki
∂HD
∂vDKi
= − 1
γK
vDKi + λKi = 0 ⇒ vDKi = γKλKi ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n} (6.7.1)
λ˙Ki = ρλKi −
∂HD
∂KDi
= ρλKi − (ri − r¯) ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Physical capital in region i, denoted as Ki, increases due to capital inﬂows K˙
D
i ≥ 0 and
decreases due to capital outﬂows K˙Si ≤ 0, i.e.
K˙i = K˙
D
i︸︷︷︸
≥0 (capital inﬂows)
+ K˙Si︸︷︷︸
≤0 (capital outﬂows)
. (6.7.2)
From the ﬁrst-order condition ∂H
S
∂vSKi
= 0 associated with problem (6.2.4) and the ﬁrst-order
conditions K˙Di = γKλKi ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n}, implied by (6.7.1), it follows that21
K˙Si =
{
γKλKi for λKi < 0
0 for λKi ≥ 0 (6.7.3)
K˙Di =
{
γKλKi for λKi > 0
0 for λKi ≤ 0 . (6.7.4)
We now draw the following case distinction
21We also assume that there is enough capital outside the economy for a simultaneous development of all
regions heading towards the superior equilibrium.
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1. Assume λKi < 0. Noting (6.7.2), (6.7.3) and (6.7.4) this yields K˙i = K˙
D
i︸︷︷︸
=0
+ K˙Si =
γKλKi < 0.
2. Assume λKi = 0. Noting (6.7.2), (6.7.3) and (6.7.4) this yields K˙ = K˙
D
i︸︷︷︸
=0
+ K˙Si︸︷︷︸
=0
= 0.
3. Assume λKi > 0. Noting (6.7.2), (6.7.3) and (6.7.4) this yields K˙i = K˙
D
i + K˙
S
i︸︷︷︸
=0
=
γKλKi > 0.
In summary, the equation of motion for Ki reads
K˙i = γKλKi  0 for λKi  0. (6.7.5)
This is equ. (6.2.8) in the main text.
Workers - equ. (6.2.13). The number of workers in the domestic region, denoted as Li,
changes according to
L˙i = L˙
DS
i︸︷︷︸
inward migration
− L˙SDi︸︷︷︸
outward migration
. (6.7.6)
We now draw the following case distinction
1. Assume λSLi < 0 (i.e. λ
D
Li
> 0). Noting (6.2.11), (6.2.12), (6.2.13), this gives L˙i =
L˙DSi︸︷︷︸
=0
− L˙SDi = γLλSLi < 0.
2. Assume λSLi = 0 (i.e. λ
D
Li
= 0). Noting (6.2.11), (6.2.12), (6.2.13), this gives L˙i =
L˙DSi︸︷︷︸
=0
− L˙SDi︸︷︷︸
=0
= 0.
3. Assume λSLi > 0 (i.e. λ
D
Li
< 0). Noting (6.2.11), (6.2.12), (6.2.13), this gives L˙i =
L˙DSi − L˙SDi︸︷︷︸
=0
= γLλ
S
Li
> 0.
In summary, the equation of motion for Li may be expressed as follows
L˙i = γLλ
S
Li
 0 for λSLi  0. (6.7.7)
This is equ. (6.2.13) in the main text.
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Notes on stability
We proceed in two steps. First, we assume that α = β = a = b = 0.5. The dynamic system
then becomes linear such that eigenvalues can be determined analytically. Second, we set
α = 0.3 and β = 0.7, as in the baseline set of parameters in the main text, and determine the
eigenvalues for alternative values of a and b numerically. Assuming α = β = a = b = 0.5 the
Jacobian matrix of system (6.2.15) to (6.2.16) is
J =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 0 γL 0
0 0 0 γK
0 −0.5A ρ 0
−0.5A 0 0 ρ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
It can be readily shown that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are given by
r1,2 =
1
2
[
ρ±
√
ρ2 − 2A√γLγK
]
r3,4 =
1
2
[
ρ±
√
ρ2 + 2A
√
γLγK
]
.
Several remarks are at order:
1. Eigenvalues r3,4 are real. Moreover, r3 > 0 and r4 < 0. This requires ρ <
√
ρ2 + 2A
√
γLγK , which
boils down to 2A
√
γLγK > 0 being always true.
2. As regards r1,2, we need a case distinction: Provided that ρ
2 < 2A
√
γLγK eigenvalues
r1,2 are conjugate complex with positive real parts
1
2
ρ > 0.
3. If, on the other hand, ρ2 > 2A
√
γLγK eigenvalues r1,2 are real. Eigenvalue r1 > 0.
Eigenvalue r2 > 0 iﬀ ρ >
√
ρ2 − 2A√γLγK . This condition boils down to 2A√γLγK > 0,
which is always true.
Figure 7.3.1 demonstrates that the eigenvalue conﬁguration, given α = 0.3 and β = 0.7, is
robust with respect to changes in a and b.
To summarize, there are always three eigenvalues with positive real part and one eigenvalue
with negative real part. Since there are two jump variables and three unstable roots, the
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Figure 6.8: Eigenvalues (real parts) in response to changes in a and b. Notice that the hori-
zontal line represents the two (identical) real parts of a pair of conjugate complex eigenvalues
interior steady state is unstable. There is a three-dimensional unstable manifold leading
away from the interior steady state. Since there are two (predetermined) state variables and
two jump variables, there is indeterminacy in the sense of a multiplicity of admissible initial
shadow prices [λL(0), λK(0)].
Notes on Equilibrium Dynamics
Reasoning of Fukao and Be´nabou (1993). Fukao and Benabou (1993, Proposition 2)
have shown that, within the one-factor Krugman (1991) model, equilibrium trajectories must
satisfy two conditions: (i) the shadow price of the factor reaching the boundary must approach
zero and (ii) once the boundary has been touched, equilibrium implies that the economy
remains at the boundary forever. The reasoning relies on an arbitrage condition, which must
hold in equilibrium, and largely applies to the model under study. Assume that there is a
set of workers who do not leave their homeland irrespective of the wage diﬀerential. Then
the lower boundary is given by L= ε > 0 with ε arbitrarily small. Assume further that the
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economy hits the lower L-boundary at t = T (i.e. L(T ) = 0 with K > 0) with λL(T ) < 0.
In this case, each individual worker has an incentive to deviate from the trajectory under
consideration since he can realize the gain, reﬂected by λL(T ) < 0, an instant in time later
and thereby avoid all relocation costs (as the individual is of measure zero) by moving one
instant in time later. Hence, any equilibrium trajectory must hit the L-boundary such that
λL(T ) = 0. Alternatively, one could assume that L= 0. Equilibrium trajectories must then
approach the origin asymptotically. The endpoint condition (still a soft landing condition)
then reads lim
t→∞
λL(t) = 0 and lim
t→∞
L(t) = 0. The fact that λL(t) approaches zero as t goes
to inﬁnity is compatible with L(t) approaching zero if the trajectory convergences along the
w = w¯ isocline towards the origin. Notice that the w = w¯ locus (equ. (6.2.19)) has zero slope
at the origin (see also Figure 6.2).
A similar reasoning applies to the case when the economy is located at the boundary and
remains there forever. Assume the economy is located at the lower L-boundary (i.e. L =L
and K > 0). In this case w > w¯ applies. It would indeed be optimal for workers to return into
the domestic market sector. This will, however, never happen. Each individual worker has
an incentive to realize the gain, reﬂected by w > w¯, an instant in time later by moving alone
and thereby avoid relocation costs. Hence, the fact that the economy does not return into the
interior of the state region is essentially due to a coordination failure in market equilibrium.
The arbitrage argument used here relies on one crucial assumption, namely that the individual
agent is of measure zero. This guarantees that the deviation of any individual from a given
trajectory does not change competitive factor rewards and hence leaves λK and λL unchanged.
Moreover, this assumption guarantees that relocation costs are zero if one agent moves in
isolation.22 Therefore, this reasoning extends to the two-factor case under consideration with
atomistic agents implying that equilibrium trajectories must approach the border of the state
region tangential, i.e. satisfying either L˙(T ) = λL(T ) = 0 or K˙(T ) = λK(T ) = 0 and, in
addition, remains at the border of the state space once the economy hits the boundary.
22Notice that ”reallocation costs” are essentially congestion costs, i.e. marginal moving costs are zero at
the origin.
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Boundary dynamics. Assume that the economy hits, say, the L-boundary at t = T , i.e.
L(T ) =L or L(T ) = L¯, with 0 < K(T ) < K¯. The dynamics are then governed by (6.2.14)
and (6.2.16) (noting that L(T ) =L or L(T ) = L¯). Next assume that the economy hits the
K-boundary at t = T , i.e. K(T ) = 0 or K(T ) = K¯, with L< L(T ) < L¯. The dynamics are
then governed by (6.2.15) and (6.2.17) (noting that K(T ) = 0 or K(T ) = K¯).
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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of interregional labor market integration in a two-sector, overlapping-
generations model with land-intensive production in the non-tradable goods sector (housing).
To capture the response to migration on housing supply, capital formation is endogenous,
assuming that ﬁrms face capital adjustment costs. Our analysis highlights heterogeneous wel-
fare eﬀects of labor market integration. Whereas individuals without residential property lose
from immigration due to increased housing costs, landowners may win. Moreover, we show
how the relationship between migration and capital formation depends on initial conditions
at the time of labor market integration. Our model is also capable to explain the reversal
of migration during the transition to the steady state, like observed in East Germany after
uniﬁcation in 1990. It is also consistent with a gradually rising migration stock and house
prices in high-productivity countries like Switzerland.
Key words: Capital formation; House prices; Land distribution; Migration; Welfare.
JEL classiﬁcation: D90, F20, O10
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7.1 Introduction
Immigration leads to both higher prices for non-tradable goods like housing and higher rental
rates of land. Increased housing costs may reduce welfare of natives and trigger supply
responses like residential investment. This paper investigates the eﬀects of interregional labor
market integration in a neoclassical two-sector, overlapping-generations model with land-
intensive production in the non-tradable goods sector. To capture the response to migration
on housing supply, capital formation is endogenous, assuming that ﬁrms face capital stock
adjustment costs.
The goal of the paper is twofold. First, we investigate welfare eﬀects of changes in the
population density in response to labor market integration by emphasizing changes in the
price of housing and the price of land. Welfare eﬀects of interregional labor market integration
are heterogeneous and depend on the ownership distribution of land. Whereas individuals
without residential property lose from immigration due to increased housing costs, landowners
may win. In other words, the eﬀects of an unequal distribution of land property are aggravated
by immigration. Such distributional concerns have typically been neglected in the previous
literature on labor market integration. They potentially help to understand and address
reservations to immigration of certain groups in the host economy’s population.
Second, we examine whether, and under which circumstances, the relationship between inter-
regional ﬂows of migration and regional changes in the stock of physical capital is positive or
negative. Historically, there are examples for both possibilities. For instance, the ﬁrst era of
globalization in the 19th century was characterized by simultaneous capital and labor ﬂows
from Europe to the US (e.g., O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Solimano and Watts, 2005).
Moreover, at least in an early phase of the enlargement process of the European Union (EU),
labor was migrating from Southern and Eastern EU members to Western EU countries like
Germany or the UK. However, temporarily, capital was ﬂowing in the other direction or was
accumulated faster in some emigration countries. Our analysis shows how initial conditions
and the time passed after labor market integrated determines whether we observe that emi-
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gration goes along with accumulation or decumulation of capital. If the initial capital stock is
close to the pre-integration steady state level, we observe emigration (immigration) and cap-
ital decumulation (accumulation) at the same time, consistent with factor ﬂows in the ﬁrst
era of globalization, for instance. The exact pattern also depends on productivity diﬀerences
and the initial population density. However, if the capital stock is initially low, an emigration
outﬂow may occur at the same time as the capital stock accumulates. For instance, this is
consistent with an investment boom observed in East Germany and labor migration at a large
scale from East to West shortly after the German reuniﬁcation in 1990 (e.g., Burda, 1996).
In the case where the initial level of capital is low, our analysis also suggests that house
prices fall, associated with declining population density shortly after labor market integration.
Consequently, the migration pattern is reversed in later phases. Thus, our model also provides
a candidate explanation for the phenomenon of ”reverse migration”, i.e., aggregate (net)
outward migration followed by aggregate (net) inward migration later on. For instance, reverse
migration is observed in some regions in East Germany after 1990 (e.g., Scha¨fer and Steger,
2012) and in Poland after becoming an EU member in 2004.1 Typically, scholars employ
models with increasing returns to scale to explain non-monotonic time paths of a region’s
population size (e.g., Scha¨fer and Steger, 2012), whereas standard neoclassical models do not
explain reverse migration (e.g., Braun, 1993; Burda 2006). Our model is capable to generate
non-monotonic transitions despite resting on constant returns to scale.
The key novelty of the paper is to simultaneously examine the implications of migration
on the dynamics of housing costs and land prices as well as their consequences on capital
formation and welfare. In addition to analyzing welfare eﬀects and explaining stylized facts,
this enables us to suggest novel implications for structural estimations of the determinants
1Poland experienced signiﬁcant migration outﬂows most of the time in the post-WWII period which con-
tinued in the process of the EU enlargement. However, recently, the trend has been reversed. According to
United Nations (2010), there has been a positive net migration inﬂow of about 56,000 between 2007 and 2011.
Another example of reverse migration is Ireland. According to United Nations (2010), Ireland experienced a
net migration outﬂow of about 177,000 between 1980 and 1995, with a subsequent net migration inﬂow until
2010 of 383,000. However, we do not associate an integration shock with non-monotonic adjustment over time
with this phenomenon. It may rather be due to productivity advances and inward FDI in response to changes
in the tax law. Thus, we will not discuss the Irish case further.
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and eﬀects of migration. Whereas a large literature on the dynamic eﬀects of migration has
emphasized the impact on the level and distribution of wages, we deliberately abstain from
modeling productivity or wage eﬀects of migration in most parts of our analysis.2 Rather,
we shift the focus to the (relative) price for land-intensive, non-tradable goods and the rental
rate of land. For instance, Saiz (2003, 2007) and Nygaard (2011) ﬁnd substantial eﬀects of
immigration on rental rates and house prices in the US and UK, respectively. Our theory is
consistent with such price eﬀects of migration.
There is a sizable literature on the relationship between capital formation and interregional
labor mobility.3 One emphasis is on increasing returns, which are absent from our model.4
Closer to our paper, Rappaport (2005) and Burda (2006) study neoclassical one-sector mod-
els with capital adjustment costs, exogenous interest rates and interregional labor mobility.
However, their focus is on wage convergence rather than on the eﬀects of migration on housing
costs and land prices as in our two-sector model. Rappaport (2005) argues that higher labor
mobility, which triggers increased outﬂows of workers, does not necessarily increase the speed
of income convergence. For a given capital stock, emigration leads to increased wages in the
source country. However, emigration also drives down the shadow value of capital and there-
fore slows down capital investment. The latter eﬀect results in delayed income convergence.
Burda (2006) studies the dynamics of labor migration and capital accumulation under factor
adjustment costs. In his model, per capita income of the East German economy converges
2This is motivated by the mixed empirical evidence on wage eﬀects of migration, indicating small eﬀects.
For instance, Friedberg (2001) and Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (2005) show that immigration to Israel and
the UK, respectively, only slightly reduces wages of low-skilled workers. It may even moderately raise wages
of high-skilled workers. For the US, Borjas (2003) reports signiﬁcant negative wage eﬀects of immigration
for low-skilled workers. By contrast, Ottaviano and Peri (2012), by taking into account the substitutability
between migrants and natives of similar education and experience levels, do not ﬁnd any negative eﬀect.
Grossmann and Stadelmann (2012) employ international data and ﬁnd a negligible impact of bilateral skilled
migration on bilateral (log) diﬀerences of GDP per capita, total factor productivity, and wages of skilled
workers.
3For an extensive literature survey, see Felbermayr, Grossmann and Kohler (2012).
4Faini (1995) contrasts models of exogenous and endogenous growth, arguing that income convergence
is not necessarily less likely in the case of learning-by-doing eﬀects. Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) employ
an endogenous growth model with learning-by-doing eﬀects to show that immigration enhances interregional
wage diﬀerences due to a scale eﬀect, beneﬁtting the receiving destination. On the other hand, migration may
change the skill composition of the workforce in a way which may also beneﬁt the source economy. Scha¨fer
and Steger (2012) emphasize how equilibrium selection and dynamics depend on both expectations and initial
conditions in a multi-region model where increasing returns give rise to multiple equilibria.
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to the West German level as labor moves towards West Germany and capital accumulates in
the East.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents the basic model in which individuals
earn labor income only. Section 7.3 derives the dynamic system for the basic model, solves
for the steady state, provides analytical results, and discusses implications for empirical esti-
mations of the determinants and eﬀects of migration. In Section 7.4, we numerically simulate
the transition path to the steady state in response to labor market integration conditional on
productivity diﬀerences and . Section 7.5 extends the basic model to examine distributional
eﬀects of labor market integration when individuals diﬀer in their ownership of land. Section
7.6 discusses how our model can replicate the recent experience of Switzerland after its major
integration shocks in the last decade and may help to understand the ongoing public debate
on immigration. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes.
7.2 The Basic Model
Consider a simple overlapping generations model with two-period lives of a perfectly compet-
itive, small open (”domestic”) economy. There are two sectors, a tradeable goods sector and
a non-tradable goods sector. Labor can be employed in both sectors and reallocated without
any frictions. There is international capital mobility at an (exogenous) interest rate r > 0.
Moreover, there is a large (”foreign”) economy from or to which migration may take place.
We distinguish the cases of interregionally immobile and mobile labor and thereby investigate
the eﬀects of labor market integration. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ...
7.2.1 Firms
In the non-tradable goods sector, denoted by superscript N , there is a mass one of ﬁrms. For
instance, this sector could be interpreted as housing sector. It produces with labor, physical
capital and a ﬁxed factor which we refer to as land in the following. Output Y N in period t
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is given by
Y Nt = b
(
LNt
)α
(Kt)
β Z1−α−β, (7.2.1)
b > 0, α, β ∈ (0, 1), α + β < 1, where K is the amount of physical (residential) capital, LN
the amount of labor employed in the non-tradable goods sector, and Z is land input (which
equals land supply).5 The capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt, (7.2.2)
where I is gross (housing) investment in terms of the tradable good, δ > 0 is the depreciation
rate and K0 > 0 is given. There are (convex) capital-adjustment costs in the non-tradable
goods sector (see Abel, 1982; Hayashi, 1982). The typical ﬁrm, taking goods and factor prices
as given, solves the following dynamic problem:
max
{LNt ,It,Z}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
pNt Y
N
t − wtLNt − pZt Z − It
[
1 + θ
(
It
Kt
)η]
(1 + r)t
s.t. (7.2.1), (7.2.2), (7.2.3)
θ, η > 0, where pN denotes the price of the non-tradable good, w is the wage rate, and pZ is
the price of land, respectively.
There is also a mass one of ﬁrms in the tradable goods sector, denoted by superscript T ,
which we choose as numeraire (i.e., output price pT ≡ 1). For simplicity, ﬁrms produce with
labor as the only input.6 Output Y T is given by
Y Tt = aL
T
t , (7.2.4)
a > 0, where LT denotes the amount of labor employed in the tradable goods sector. Since
the labor market is perfect, the wage rate equals the (constant) labor productivity in the
tradable goods sector, w = a. Moreover, as labor is homogenous, also the distribution of
wages within the economy is unaﬀected by migration.
5The time index t is sometimes omitted, provided that this may not lead to confusion.
6In Section 7.6, we modify the production technology such that output of the tradable good is produced
with both labor and capital unter constant returns. First, however, in the basic model, we want to shut down
any channel through wage eﬀects.
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For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms in the non-tradable goods sector are owned by foreigners.
In the basic model, the same applies to the ﬁxed factor, land. In an extension of the model
in Section 7.5, we examine the consequences of migration for welfare of natives when land is
owned by natives.
7.2.2 Households
Each individual lives for two periods (”working-age” and ”retirement”) and has one child when
old, i.e., the size of the native population remains constant over time. Let cT1,t and c
N
1,t denote
the amount of tradable and non-tradeable goods consumed by a working-age individual born
in t, respectively. Analogously, cT2,t+1 and c
N
2,t+1 are consumption levels during retirement.
Life-time utility of an individual born in period t is given by
Ut = u(c
T
1,t, c
N
1,t) + ρ · u(cT2,t+1, cN2,t+1), (7.2.5)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1). The instantaneous utility function reads u(cT , cN) = γ log (cT ) + (1 −
γ) log
(
cN
)
with γ ∈ (0, 1). In the ﬁrst period, each individual supplies one unit of labor
when young to the sector with the highest wage and chooses how much to save (or borrow).
Moreover, individuals decide at the beginning of the ﬁrst period whether to stay or to migrate
to the large economy, seeking to maximize utility.
For simplicity, in the case of integrated labor markets, we abstain from imposing limits to
labor ﬂows exogenously via assuming psychological migration costs, institutional migration
barriers, monetary moving costs or labor adjustment costs of ﬁrms. We rather want to focus
on endogenously changing house prices in response to migration to limit migration ﬂows
despite persistent wage diﬀerentials. Thereby, migration ﬂows are endogenously smoothed
along with adjustments in the capital stock. In any period, equilibrium utility of (similarly
endowed) individuals is equalized across regions.
Recalling that pT = 1, each individual solves
max
cT1,t,c
N
1,t,c
T
2,t+1,c
N
2,t+1
Ut s.t. c
T
1,t + p
N
t c
N
1,t +
cT2,t+1 + p
N
t+1c
N
2,t+1
1 + r
≤ Wt, (7.2.6)
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where W is the present discounted value of income from the perspective of a young individual.
Since in the basic model individuals receive labor income only, we have W = w = a.
The number of workers (i.e., the number of young individuals) in period t is denoted by Lt.
Thus, total population size in period t is given by St := Lt + Lt−1. The number of initially
old natives, L−1 > 0, is given. In the case where labor is not interregionally mobile, Lt = L−1
and St = 2L−1 for all t ≥ 0, since each period the same number of individuals is born. Denote
the population density by DS := S
Z
, where DS−1 > 0 is given.
7.2.3 Foreign Economy
The foreign economy is assumed to be in steady state and is large in the sense that migration
from or towards the domestic economy has no eﬀect on the population density in the (large)
foreign economy, denoted by DS∗. It is therefore time-invariant. Similarly, domestic saving
decisions do not change the international interest rate, r. Productivity levels in the tradable
and non-tradable goods sector of the foreign economy, a∗ and b∗, may diﬀer from the domestic
levels, a and b. In all other respects than productivity levels and the population density, the
domestic and the foreign economy are identical initially.
7.3 Equilibrium Analysis
For simplicity, we assume that the following standard relationship between the interest rate
and the discount rate holds:
ρ(1 + r) = 1. (7.3.1)
Lemma 1. The goods demand structure of an individual born in t is given by
cT1,t = c
T
2,t+1 =
γ
1 + ρ
Wt, (7.3.2)
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cN1,t =
1− γ
1 + ρ
Wt
pNt
, cN2,t+1 =
1− γ
1 + ρ
Wt
pNt+1
. (7.3.3)
Individual welfare reads
Ut = (1+ρ) log
(
γγ(1− γ)1−γ
1 + ρ
Wt
)
−(1−γ) [log pNt + ρ log pNt+1] ≡ V (Wt, pNt , pNt+1). (7.3.4)
All proofs are relegated to the appendix. Lemma 1 shows that life-time utility V is decreasing
in the price of non-tradables (pN) in both periods of life. Thus, if wages are the only source
of income (not being aﬀected by immigration) and if immigration raises house prices, then
immigration has an unambiguously negative eﬀect on welfare. Obviously, this could change
if immigration had positive wage eﬀects, a channel from which we deliberately abstract in
the basic model (see, however, Section 7.6, where we allow for wage eﬀects by assuming that
capital is an input also in the tradable goods sector).
Denote by V ∗ the (steady state) life-time utility of an individual who lives in the foreign
economy. Moreover, denote by q the shadow price of capital, i.e., the multiplier to capital
accumulation constraint (7.2.2) in the proﬁt maximization problem (7.2.3) of the non-tradable
goods sector.
An equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium consists of time paths for quantities {Lt, LTt , LNt , Kt+1, It, Y Nt ,
Y Tt , c
N
t , c
T
t }∞t=0 and prices {pNt , qt, wt, pZt }∞t=0 such that the capital stock evolves according to
(7.2.2) and it holds in any period that
1. ﬁrms maximize the present discounted value of cash ﬂow;
2. households maximize life-time utility;
3. if and only if labor is interregionally mobile, life-time utility of domestic residents equals
life-time utility in the foreign economy, V (wt, p
N
t , p
N
t+1) = V
∗;
4. the wage rate is equal across sectors;
7. Migration and Capital Formation 233
5. the labor market clears, LNt + L
T
t = Lt;
6. the market for non-tradables clears, Y Nt = c
N
1,tLt + c
N
2,tLt−1.
Conditions 1, 2 and 5 are straightforward. Equilibrium condition 3 holds since individuals can
costlessly migrate if labor is interregionally mobile.7 Condition 4 holds since individuals are
perfectly mobile across sectors and seek the sector with the highest wage. Thus, in equilibrium,
the wage rate in the tradable goods sector coincides with that in the non-tradable goods sector.
To understand condition 6, recall that the non-tradable good cannot be used for investment
purposes. Also note that, in period t, cN1,tLt is the total goods demand for non-tradables of
young agents and cN2,tLt−1 is the total goods demand for non-tradables of old agents.
7.3.1 Exogenous Increase in Population Density
We now solve for the equilibrium. We start with the simple case where the population
density, DS := S
Z
, is exogenous before we turn to endogenous migration. Deﬁne DK := K
Z
and DI := I
Z
, as the (residential) capital stock per unit of land (”capital density”) and gross
investment per unit of land (”investment density”), respectively. Note that DK0 =
K0
Z
> 0.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the sequence of population density {DSt }∞t=0 is given.
(i) The capital density (DKt ), the investment density (D
I
t ), and the shadow value of capital
( qt) jointly evolve over time according to a saddle-point stable system which is given by
DKt+1 = D
I
t + (1− δ)DKt , (7.3.5)
DIt
DKt
=
(
qt − 1
(η + 1) θ
) 1
η
, (7.3.6)
7Also recall that life-time income equals the wage rate in the basic model, W = w. Taking into account
ﬁxed migration costs in terms of utility loss, ζ, would not change the conclusions of our paper. In this case,
the no-arbitrage condition would read V (wt, p
N
t , p
N
t+1)− V ∗ = ζ.
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qt+1 =
1 + r
1− δ qt−
1
1− δ
[
pNt+1βb
(
α (1− γ)
1 + ρ
)α (
DSt+1
)α (
DKt+1
)β−1 − θη(DIt+1
DKt+1
)η+1]
. (7.3.7)
The price of non-tradables ( pNt ) and the price of land ( p
Z
t ) are given by
pNt =
a
b
α−α
(
1− γ
1 + ρ
)1−α (
DKt
)−β (
DSt
)1−α
, (7.3.8)
pZt = φaD
S
t ≡ p˜Z(DSt , a), (7.3.9)
respectively, where φ ≡ (1−α−β)(1−γ)
1+ρ
.
(ii) If DS is time-invariant, then, in the long run, the capital density and the price of the
non-tradable good are given by
DK = χaDS ≡ D˜K(DS, a), (7.3.10)
pN = ν
a1−β
b
(
DS
)1−α−β ≡ p˜N(DS, a, b), (7.3.11)
respectively, where χ ≡ β(1−γ)
(1+ρ)[r(1+(1+η)θδη )+δ+θδη+1]
and ν ≡
(
1−γ
1+ρ
)1−α
α−αχ−β.
According to Proposition 1, for a given population density, DS, adjustment of the capital
density, DK , to the steady state is gradual. Moreover, both for a given capital stock and
in the long run, the price of the non-tradable good, pN , rises with DS, according to (7.3.8)
and (7.3.11), respectively. This is because immigration leads to a dilution eﬀect with respect
to the ﬁxed factor (land) when producing non-tradable goods. The eﬀect of an exogenous
increase in population density on pN is mitigated if there is a supply response in the form of
capital formation (increase in DK), according to (7.3.8).
According to (7.3.9), in any period, the price of land, pZ , is independent of the capital
density, DK , and proportional to the population density, DS. An increase in DK has two
counteracting eﬀects on pZ , which cancel out. First, an increase in DK raises the value of
the marginal product of land for a given price of non-tradables, pN . Secondly, however, as
we have just argued, pN falls with DK , which lowers the value of the marginal product of
land. An increase in DS raises the value of the marginal product of land for a given price of
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non-tradables, pN , and through an increase in pN (as argued above), thereby raising the price
of land.
Finally, the long run capital stock per unit of land, D˜K , is proportional to the population
density, DS. An increase in DS triggers higher employment in both sectors. It therefore
stimulates capital investments.
We are now ready to derive comparative-static results for the case where the population
density is exogenous.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the population density, DS, is exogenous.
(i) An increase in DS, and/or an increase in total factor productivity (TFP) in the tradable
goods sector ( a) leads to both a gradual increase in the capital density, DK, and an upward
jump of the land price, pZ, which is constant thereafter. The price of non-tradables, pN , jumps
upwards and then gradually declines to a level which exceeds the pre-shock level.
(ii) An increase in the TFP-level of the non-tradable goods sector, b, has neither an impact
on capital formation nor on the price of land, but leads to a downward jump of pN .
Figure 7.1 illustrates the impact of an increase in population density DS (exogenous immigra-
tion) on the dynamic two-equation system (7.3.5) and (7.3.7), starting from an initial steady
state. As is easy to see, the locus implied by (7.3.5) in DK − q−space which refers to a
time-invariant capital density (ΔDK = 0) is unaﬀected. By contrast, the locus implied by
(7.3.7), which refers to a time-invariant shadow price of capital (Δq = 0), shifts to the right.
Consequently, for a given initial steady state capital density (D˜K0 ), the shadow price of capital
jumps upwards, triggering gradual adjustment on the saddle path to the new steady state
(with capital density D˜K1 > D˜
K
0 ). The reason is that an increase in D
S immediately raises the
(relative) price of non-tradables. This gives rise to capital formation which in turn mitigates
the initial jump in pN . The land price increases due to a higher value of the marginal product
of land.
Qualitatively, the impact of an increase in productivity of the tradable goods sector a (increase
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Figure 7.1: Phase diagram in DK − q− space and the impact of an increase in population
density,DS .
in the wage rate) is similar. By contrast, an increase in the TFP-level of the non-tradable
sector (b), by raising supply of non-tradable goods for given inputs, has a negative eﬀect on
pN . However, for given pN , it also raises the marginal productivity of inputs. With respect
to capital formation and the price of land, both eﬀects cancel out.
7.3.2 The Eﬀects of Labor Market Integration
We now turn to the case where labor is interregionally mobile (endogenous migration).
Proposition 3. Suppose that labor is interregionally mobile.
(i) The sequence {qt, DKt , pNt , DSt }∞t=0 is jointly determined by (7.3.5)-(7.3.8) and
(1 + ρ) log
( a
a∗
)
= (1− γ)
[
log
(
pNt
pN∗
)
+ ρ log
(
pNt+1
pN∗
)]
, (7.3.12)
where pN∗ = p˜N(DS
∗
, a∗, b∗).
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(ii) In steady state, the population density D˜S is given by
D˜S =
[( a
a∗
) 1−(1−β)(1−γ)
1−γ
(
b
b∗
)] 11−α−β
DS∗. (7.3.13)
With respect to the steady state, the following comparative-static results hold.
Corollary 1. Suppose that labor is interregionally mobile.
(i) D˜S is increasing in the relative productivity level across regions of both sectors, a
a∗ and
b
b∗ .
(ii) D˜S is proportional to the foreign population density, DS∗.
An increase in relative productivity across regions of the tradable goods sector, a
a∗ , has two
counteracting eﬀects on the steady state labor force of the domestic economy when labor is
interregionally mobile. First, since a
a∗ is the relative wage rate (and thus relative income)
of individuals across regions, the domestic economy becomes more attractive for potential
migrants. Second, as implied by part (i) of Proposition 2, for a given population density, it
also raises the price of non-tradables in the domestic region relative to the one in the foreign
region; in turn, this lowers the attractiveness of the domestic economy for migrants. The ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates the second one.
An increase in the relative productivity of the non-tradable goods sector, b
b∗ , has no income
eﬀect. However, for given labor inputs, it lowers the relative price of non-tradables across
regions, which makes the domestic economy more attractive for immigrants.
Finally, an increase in the foreign population density, DS∗, raises the price of non-tradables
in the foreign economy, pN∗, and therefore enhances attractiveness of the domestic economy
for migrants.
We next examine the dynamic eﬀects of labor market integration on the key variables. We
emphasize the role of initial conditions for factor ﬂows, the price of non-tradables, and the
rental rate of land.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that, initially, the labor market is closed interregionally. Opening
up the labor market leads to the following eﬀects:
(i) If the economy is initially in steady state (i.e., DK0 = D˜
K(DS−1, a)) and D
S
−1 < (>)D˜
S, the
long run levels of the capital density (DK), the price for non-tradables ( pN) and the price of
land ( pZ) are higher (lower) than their initial levels.
(ii) If the initial capital density is below its post-integration steady state value (i.e., DK0 <
D˜K(D˜S, a)), then emigration may go along with capital formation during the transition to the
steady state equilibrium.
(iii) The price for non-tradables ( pN) instantaneously jumps to its new steady state level.
Suppose ﬁrst that the population density under a closed labor market is initially lower than
its steady state value after labor market integration (DS−1 < D˜
S). According to part (i) of
Proposition 4, this means that the long run capital density will be higher than its initial level
in response to labor market integration. Formally, D˜K(DS−1, a) < D˜
K(D˜S, a). The same is
true for the prices of non-tradables (pN) and land (pZ). The reason is that the long run values
of these variables are increasing in population density (Proposition 1). The opposite holds if
DS−1 > D˜
S.
Next, suppose DK0 < D˜
K(D˜S, a), as presumed in part (ii) of Proposition 4. If, in addition, the
initial population density is not below the post-integration steady state value (i.e., DS−1 ≥ D˜S),
in the long run, we end up with an increased capital density. To prove the result that there
may be emigration and capital formation in the same period, we need to examine transitional
dynamics. As we will see in the numerical analysis of Section 7.4, a low initial capital density
triggers outward migration as an immediate response to labor market integration while at the
same time the standard neoclassical convergence mechanism induces capital formation. As
emigration reduces the shadow price of capital, labor market integration retards investments,
however. In the aftermath, as capital further accumulates, there will be reverse migration.
Finally, as also illustrated in Section 7.4, the intuition for part (iii) of Proposition 4 lies
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in two counteracting and oﬀ-setting eﬀects of labor market integration on the price of non-
tradables, pN . An integration shock leads to an instantaneous jump in pN . One period after
the integration shock, the labor force and the capital stock evolve in the same direction during
the remaining transition. Whereas a rising population density (DS) raises pN , an increasing
capital density (DK) lowers pN . That both eﬀects exactly cancel is an implication of the
fact that the wage rate is time-invariant in the basic model. In Section 7.6, we modify the
production technology in the tradable goods sector to relax this property. Note that the eﬀect
on pN in the case of endogenous migration is diﬀerent than in the case of exogenous migration,
where a labor inﬂow ﬁrst led to a jump in pN with gradual decreases due to capital formation
thereafter (part (i) of Proposition 2). As will be seen in Section 7.6, this prediction does not
apply to the Swiss case, suggesting that an analysis with endogenous migration could be more
useful to understand stylized facts.
7.3.3 Implications for Structural Estimations
Our analysis has emphasized the interaction between migration ﬂows (determining population
density) and house prices, taking into account capital formation in the housing sector. The
two-way interaction suggests that any empirical analysis of this relationship may run into
severe endogeneity problems. We now discuss how our theory could help to address these
problems. We start with the determinants of migration ﬂows. The empirical literature on the
determinants of migration has emphasized the role of wage diﬀerences across regions (e.g.,
Grogger and Hanson, 2011).8 In our basic model, these are rooted in productivity diﬀerences
in the tradable goods sector. According to our theory, diﬀerences in house prices determine
migration ﬂows as well, but the causality also runs in the opposite direction. According to
the expression for the steady state price of non-tradable goods, p˜N , in (7.3.11), diﬀerences in
sectoral productivity across regions as well as diﬀerences in population density aﬀect long-run
8Other important determinants of bilateral migration ﬂows are similiar as in gravity-type estimations
of trade ﬂows, like distance between countries, whether source and destination share a common language,
institutional mobility barriers, and other factors which aﬀect mobility costs (for an overview on this literature,
see Felbermayr et al., 2012). Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) also stress network eﬀects from past migration
as an important trigger of further immigration.
7. Migration and Capital Formation 240
diﬀerences in house prices. The exogenous determinants of both wage rates and house prices
are reﬂected in (7.3.13) which gives us the long run population density in a region and can
be rewritten as
log
(
D˜S
DS−1
)
= λ1 log
( a
a∗
)
+ λ2 log
(
b
b∗
)
+ λ3 log
(
DS∗
DS−1
)
, (7.3.14)
where λ1 ≡ 1−(1−β)(1−γ)(1−γ)(1−α−β) , λ2 ≡ 11−α−β , λ3 = 1. Thus, Proposition 3 predicts that the migration-
induced long run growth rate in population density (or the growth rate of the stock of immi-
grants) of a region depends on the initial diﬀerence of (the log of) population density to other
regions and on sectoral total factor productivity levels relative to other regions. We are not
aware of any empirical study on the determinants of migration which takes into account house
price diﬀerences across regions through diﬀerences in population size. Moreover, Proposition
4 suggests that, during the transition, migration patterns which evolve from labor market
integration critically depend on the initial capital density as well.
We now turn to the eﬀects of migration. Our theory suggests a structural equation system
which, for instance, could be estimated by two-stage least squares. Measures of change of im-
migration policy provide exogenous variation to instrument migration ﬂows at the ﬁrst stage
whereas the determinants of migration we just discussed should be used as additional controls.
At the second stage, for instance, capital ﬂows could be regressed on the instrumented migra-
tion ﬂows. Our model implies that the causal relationship of immigration (emigration) ﬂows
to capital inﬂows (outﬂows) is unambiguously positive, although capital formation and emi-
gration could occur at the same time, according to part (ii) of Proposition 4. This is because
emigration slows down capital formation which takes place due to convergence forces, when
the capital density is low initially. Similarly, the causal eﬀect of immigration (emigration) on
the price of land, pZ , and the price of housing, pN , is positive (negative).
7.4 Numerical Analysis
We now turn to numerical analysis in order to illustrate the role of initial conditions for the
relationship between capital formation and migration in response to labor market integration,
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already indicated in the discussion of Proposition 4. Moreover, we investigate the evolution of
the price for non-tradables, the price of land, the shadow price of capital, and gross investment
over time.9
7.4.1 Calibration
We employ the following baseline calibration. Assuming an annual real interest rate of 2
percent and a length of a generation of about 35 years suggests that r = 1; thus ρ = 0.5,
according to (7.3.1). Empirical evidence points to a budget share on housing of about one
third (e.g., Johnson, Rogers and Tan, 2001), which suggests γ = 2
3
. Moreover, we set δ = 0.5,
which reﬂects an annual depreciation rate of about 2 percent in a period of 35 years. We also
employ the standard quadratic speciﬁcation of capital stock adjustment costs, which means
that we set η = 1. In addition, we assume θ = 0.5 which implies that, in a steady state with
I
K
= δ = 0.5, one unit of gross investment requires 1 + θ
(
I
K
)η
= 1.25 units of the tradable
good. For output elasticities in the non-tradable goods sector, we set α = 0.5 and β = 0.3.
Finally, we normalize the foreign (exogenous) population density to DS∗ = 1.10
7.4.2 Labor Market Integration
We now visualize the eﬀects of labor market integration on the evolution of the population
density, DS = S
Z
, the capital density, DK = K
Z
, the investment density, DI = I
Z
, the shadow
price of capital, q, the price of land, pZ , and the price of non-tradables, pN .
In Figure 7.2, the economy is initially in its pre-labor-market-integration steady state, which
corresponds to the case in part (i) of Proposition 4. Moreover, we assume that, initially, the
population density coincides with that of the foreign economy, DS−1 = D
S∗ = 1. Productivity
levels are, however, 10 percent higher compared to the foreign economy, i.e. a
a∗ =
b
b∗ = 1.1.
That is, the initial population density is below its post-integration long run level, DS−1 < D˜
S,
9The routines can be found in the Numerical Appendix 9.5.
10We do not have to calibrate the land size, Z. All endogenous variables can be expressed relative to Z.
This can be seen from the dynamic system in Proposition 1 and 3.
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Figure 7.2: The impact of labor market integration in period t = 0 on a high-productivity
economy which initially has the same population density as abroad and is in steady state.
Note: a = b = 5.5, a∗ = b∗ = 5, DK0 = D˜
K(DS−1, a), and D
S
−1 = D
S∗ = 1 < D˜S .
and the initial capital density reads DK0 = D˜
K(DS−1, a). This constellation may be interpreted
as the case of an advanced country which opens up the labor market. As we will argue in
Section 7.6, an appropriate example which can be discussed in the light of our model is the
case of Switzerland which opened the labor market to the EU in the 2000s.
Now, when the labor market is opened up in period t = 0, the population density, DS, jumps
upwards and then gradually increases along with the capital density. The migration inﬂow,
induced by a comparably high domestic wage rate, raises the demand for non-tradables and
triggers an increase in the price of non-tradables, pN , as well as an increase in the price of
land, pZ . The upward jump in pN represents a drag on further migration inﬂows. In line
with part (iii) of Proposition 4, pN instantaneously jumps to its new steady state level, as
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displayed in the last panel of Figure 7.2. Also the shadow value of installed capital, q, goes up,
fostering higher investment. Consequently, the capital stock rises. In Figure 7.3, as before,
Figure 7.3: The impact of labor market integration in period t = 0 on a high-productivity
economy which initially has the same population density as abroad and is in steady state.
Note: a = b = 5, a∗ = b∗ = 5.5, DK0 = D˜
K(DS−1, a), and D
S
−1 = D
S∗ = 1 > D˜S .
the economy is initially in its pre-labor-market-integration steady state and DS−1 = D
S∗ = 1.
Productivity levels are now about 10 percent lower compared to the foreign economy, i.e.
a
a∗ =
b
b∗
∼= 0.9. That is, the initial population density is below its post-integration long run
level, DS−1 > D˜
S, and the initial capital density reads DK0 = D˜
K(DS−1, a). When the labor
market is opened up in period t = 0, the population density, DS, jumps downwards and
then gradually declines along with the capital density. The migration outﬂow, induced by
a comparably low domestic wage rate, reduces the demand for non-tradables and triggers a
decrease in the price of non-tradables, pN , as well as a decrease in the price of land, pZ . The
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downward jump in pN represents a drag on further migration outﬂows. Also the shadow value
of installed capital, q, goes down, fostering lower gross investment such that net investment
turns negative. Consequently, the capital stock declines. In sum, if the initial capital stock is
at the pre-labor-market-integration steady state level, we observe emigration (immigration),
lower (higher) house and land prices, and capital decumulation (accumulation) at the same
time.
Figure 7.4: Solid lines show dynamic responses assuming labor market integration at t = 0
for an initially capital-poor economy with the same population density as abroad. Dotted
lines show dynamic responses assuming that labor markets remain closed. Note: a = a∗ =
b = b∗ = 5, DK0 < D˜
K(D˜S, a), DS−1 = D˜
S.
We now assume that domestic productivity levels are equal to the foreign economy, i.e.,
a = a∗ and b = b∗. Eq. (7.3.13) then implies that the post-integration long run population
density coincides with that of the foreign economy, D˜S = DS∗ = 1. The initial population
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density is also equal to this value (DS−1 = D
S∗), while the capital density is lower than
the post-integration value, DK0 < D˜
K(D˜S, a). The solid time paths of Figure 7.4 illustrate
economic development provided that the labor market is opened up at t = 0. The dotted
lines show, in contrast, economic development under the alternative assumption of closed
labor markets. Figure 7.4 (solid lines) illustrates part (ii) of Proposition 4, i.e., the possibility
that emigration may go along with capital accumulation after labor markets integrate. We
see that the population density considerably falls below DS∗ = D˜S immediately after the
integration shock. Therefore, also the shadow value of capital drops, leading to a lower
investment density, DI . Nevertheless, as q is still above its steady state level, which reﬂects
the standard neoclassical convergence force, there is still capital accumulation. Over time,
and after the immediate response of DS to integration, population density rises along with
capital accumulation. This explains why the land price, pZ , rises after its initial drop. The
price of the non-tradable good, pN , again jumps immediately to the new steady state level.
As argued in the discussion of part (iii) of Proposition 4, the eﬀect of the gradually increasing
DS and DK on pN cancel out such that pN remains unchanged below its pre-integration level
during the transition. This case provides a candidate explanation for reverse migration, which
coincides, for instance, with the recent experience in Poland and East Germany. Turning
to the alternative scenario of closed labor markets (dotted lines), we see that DS remains
constant, DI is much higher, compared to the case of labor market integration and resulting
emigration, such that capital gets accumulated more quickly. The land price, pZ , does not
drop and the price for non-tradables, pN , declines gradually, which reﬂects the absence of
emigration.11
It is worth noting that reverse migration cannot be explained by standard neoclassical models
(Rappaport, 1995; Burda, 2006). Technically, the diﬀerence between our model and standard
neoclassical models of migration and capital mobility based on some form of convex adjust-
ment costs for both capital and labor is that, in our model, labor is a jump variable determined
by the no-arbitrage condition V (wt, p
N
t , p
N
t+1) = V
∗ (see Deﬁnition 1) and not a sluggish state
11Notice that this does not contradict Proposition 4 (iii), which assumes that the labor market is opened
up such that (7.3.12) holds. This is not the case for the scenario represented by the dotted lines in Figure 7.4.
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variable (e.g., Braun, 1993; Rapapport, 2005).
7.5 Distribution of Land and Welfare
For simplicity, we have so far assumed that land is not owned by individuals in the domestic
economy. Moreover, the previous analysis suggests that the price of the non-tradable good
is higher than its initial level at all times after a shock which induces labor inﬂows. Thus, if
individuals earn labor income only, the native population necessarily loses from immigration,
according to (7.3.4).
In this section, by contrast, we assume that initially land is fully owned by the L−1 old natives.
Landowners bequeath their landholding to their child when leaving the scene, such that the
number of landowners and the land distribution among natives is time-invariant. Let z(i)
denote the landholding of individual i. For the sake of realism, suppose that a non-negligible
fraction of natives is landless (for such an individual i, z(i) = 0).
In period t, a young individual i who stays in the domestic economy has a present discounted
value of life-time income, Wt(i), which is given by
Wt(i) = a+
pZt+1
1 + r
z(i) (7.5.1)
(recall that the wage rate is wt = a and land is owned by old individuals). Life-time utility
of individual i born in t is V (Wt(i), p
N
t , p
N
t+1), where function V is given by (7.3.4).
7.5.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We again start with the case where population density is exogenous. The dynamic system
modiﬁes as follows.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the sequence of population density {DSt }∞t=0 is given.
(i) The capital density (DKt ), the investment density (D
I
t ), the shadow value of capital ( qt),
the price of the non-tradable good ( pNt ), and the price of land ( p
Z
t ) jointly evolve over time
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according to (7.3.5), (7.3.6) and
(1− δ)qt+1 = (1 + r) qt − θη
(
DIt+1
DKt+1
)η+1
−
pNt+1βb
(
DKt+1
)β−1 [α (1− γ)
a (1 + ρ)
(
aDSt+1 + ρ
(
pZt+2 + p
Z
t+1
))]α
, (7.5.2)
pNt =
1
b
( a
α
)α(1− γ
1 + ρ
)1−α [
ρ(pZt+1 + p
Z
t ) + aD
S
t
]1−α (
DKt
)−β
, (7.5.3)
pZt+1 =
1
ρ
(
1 + ρ
(1− α− β) (1− γ) − ρ
)
pZt −
a
ρ
DSt . (7.5.4)
(ii) If DS is time-invariant, then, in the long run, the price of land, the capital density, and
the price of the non-tradable good are respectively given by12
pZ =
p˜Z(DS, a)
1− 2ρφ ≡ pˆ
Z(DS, a), (7.5.5)
DK =
D˜K(DS, a)
1− 2ρφ ≡ Dˆ
K(DS, a), (7.5.6)
pN =
(
1
1− 2ρφ
)1−α−β
p˜N(DS, a, b) ≡ pˆN (DS, a, b). (7.5.7)
Comparing Proposition 5 with Proposition 1, the dynamics appear more complicated than in
the case where natives do not own land. The reason is that individuals who own land have
to anticipate the future price of land.
Comparison with Proposition 1 also reveals that, in the long run, the price of land (pZ), the
capital density (DK) and the price of non-tradables (pN) are higher than in the case where
nobody owns land: pˆZ > p˜Z , DˆK > D˜K , pˆN > p˜N . The key ingredient of the model which
gives rise to this result is the declining marginal productivity of land: if natives receive land
rents in addition to wage income, this raises the demand for all goods. However, since land is
12Recall from part (i) of Proposition 1 the parameter deﬁnition φ = (1−α−β)(1−γ)1+ρ . Note that ρ, α, β, γ ∈
(0, 1) and α+ β < 1 implies 1 > 2ρφ.
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a ﬁxed factor, it becomes more scarce. This raises the price of land along with house prices.
As a consequence of the latter, incentives to accumulate capital are higher as well.
Note that the distribution of land does not aﬀect the dynamic system. The reason lies in
the assumption of homothetic preferences, which implies that aggregate goods demand is
independent of the income distribution.
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis for the case of interregionally mobile labor.
Lemma 2. When landless individuals are indiﬀerent whether or not to migrate, no landowner
wants to migrate.
Lemma 2 suggests that the incentive to migrate is higher for landless individuals. The reason
is simple. Land rents are received from the home region irrespective of the location deci-
sion, whereas wage income depends on the chosen location. Thus, income-related migration
beneﬁts come from wage diﬀerentials only. Diﬀerences in the log of income across regions
are therefore higher for landless individuals. We focus on an equilibrium where only (some)
landless individuals migrate. For such an equilibrium to exist, the share of landless indi-
viduals has to be suﬃciently large. In this case, the no-arbitrage condition (7.3.12) for the
migration decision (equilibrium condition 3 of Deﬁnition 1) still holds, where now the price of
non-tradables abroad is given by pN∗ = pˆN(DS
∗
, a∗, b∗). Consequently, the steady state pop-
ulation density is still given by (7.3.13) such that Corollary 1 applies. Thus, the implications
on structural estimations, discussed in Subsection 7.3.3, still apply. Moreover, if we conduct
the same experiments as for Figure 7.2,7.3 and 7.4, the dynamics triggered by an integration
shock are qualitatively the same as in the case where no individual owns land (available on
request). That is, if labor markets are opened when the economy is in steady state initially,
population density (DS), capital density (DK), and prices for both non-tradables (pN) and
land (pZ) move into the same direction (Figure 7.2 and 7.3). When the economy is not in
steady state at the time labor markets integrate, population density and capital density may
move in diﬀerent directions instantaneously in response to integration (Figure 7.4).
7. Migration and Capital Formation 249
7.5.2 Welfare
We now analyze the eﬀects of labor market integration on individual welfare, conditional on
land endowment. For the long run, we ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 6. If labor market integration leads to an increase in the long run population
density, landowners of the steady state generations win if and only if they own a suﬃcient
amount of land; landless individuals lose.
Proposition 6 suggests an important distributional impact of immigration which is diﬀerent
from eﬀects on the distribution of labor income often discussed in the literature. If housing
demand increases in response to immigration, both land rents of landowners and the price
of housing increase.13 If and only if the land estate of an individual is suﬃciently high, the
positive eﬀect of immigration on land income dominates. Thus, there is a threshold amount
of landholding, z¯ > 0, such that all individuals with z(i) > (<)z¯ win (lose) from labor market
integration.
We now discuss welfare eﬀects of integration over time for non-steady state generations. To
do so, we need to compare the time paths of house prices and land prices with and without
integrated labor markets. Recall that house prices immediately jump to the new steady state
level after labor market integration. In the scenario where the pre-integration capital stock
was initially at the steady state level and population density was low to begin with, the land
price rises over time (Fiugre 7.2 and 7.3). Thus, the threshold land endowment z¯ above
which an individual gains from immigration falls over time. As consumers, individuals lose
from integration in any period. But as the stock of immigrants rises, later generations of
landowners earn higher income than earlier ones.
When the economy is initially capital-poor, labor market integration leads to emigration and
13As discussed after Proposition 1, there are also two counteracting supply eﬀects of immigration on the
price of land, which cancel each other. First, when more houses are built, land becomes scarcer. This raises
land prices for given house prices. Second, however, house prices decline. This has a depressing eﬀect on the
value of the marginal product of land.
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retarded capital accumulation (Figure 7.4). Also recall that the land price drops initially
in response to integration but, in contrast to house prices, rises afterwards as the migration
ﬂow reverses. Without migration, the land price would have been constant over time whereas
the house price would have fallen gradually without integration due to capital accumulation.
Thus, in the scenario of Figure 7.4, where the steady states with and without migration
coincide, we can conclude that non-steady state generations of landless individuals are better
oﬀ with integration. Non-steady state generations of rich landowners, however, may lose
during the transition.
7.6 The Case of Switzerland
Without exaggeration, immigration is one of the most debated issues in the Swiss public in
the last 10 years and beyond. Switzerland is an interesting case because it is a high-wage
country which has experienced a substantial labor market integration shock. In the year
2002, it signed a bilateral agreement with the European Union on the free movement of labor.
With respect to the EU15 plus Malta and Cyprus, referred to as EU17 in the following, it
came into full eﬀect in 2007.14 This exogenous event in a small high-wage country serves
as a kind of ”natural experiment” to ”test” the predictions of our model as visualized in
Figure 7.2. (Recall that, in Figure 7.2, we study the impact of labor market integration on
an economy with high productivity and an initial capital density which coincides with the
pre-labor-market-integration steady state level).
Figure 7.5 shows the annual net migration inﬂow into Switzerland from the year 2002 to 2010
by the region of origin. The integration process provoked net immigration from the EU17 at
ﬁrst to slightly increase after 2002, jumping upwards after 2007. In the ”control group” of
non-EU17 countries, net immigration shows only a slight upward trend. Consistent with the
14Between 2002-2006, immigration to Switzerland was only slightly facilitated. Like before, residents were
still preferred in the labor market, meaning that a potential employer had to prove that the ﬁrm does not
ﬁnd an adequate resident for the job. Moreover, immigration quotas were held in place. For most Eastern
European countries free movement of labor has come into eﬀect in May 2011. Burgaria and Romania even
have to wait until mid 2016. See http://www.bfm.admin.ch/content/bfm/en/home/themen/fza schweiz-eu-
efta.html
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ﬁrst panel in, Figure 7.2, which displays the population density as a strictly concave function
during the transition to the new steady state after labor markets integrate, net migration
inﬂows decreased after the initial jumps in 2007 and 2008. Moreover, rental prices for houses
Figure 7.5: Net immigration ﬂow to Switzerland (annual number of immigrants minus number
of emigrants) between 2002-2010 from EU17 and non-EU17 countries. (Source: bfs.admin.ch;
own calculations)
and apartments in Switzerland started to increase in 2004 and rose by 20 percent between 2002
and 2010, as displayed by Figure 7.6.15 This sluggish price increase is not readily compatible
with the transitional dynamics for the price of housing, pN , derived from our basic model.
Figure 7.2 suggests that pN jumps immediately to a higher steady state level in response to
integration. However, the absence of transitional dynamics in pN hinges on the simplifying
15Similarly, sales prices for houses rose slightly between 2002-2006 and surged thereafter. There is no oﬃcial
house price index in Switzerland. However, the Zu¨rcher Kantonalbank, a local bank based in Zurich, publishes
estimates based on own sales transactions data and data from an internet platform for buying and renting
houses and appartments (www.zkb.ch).
7. Migration and Capital Formation 252
Figure 7.6: Rental price index for Switzerland, monthly data, oﬀer-based. (Source: ZKB,
Zu¨rcher Kantonal Bank; www.zkb.ch)
assumption that only labor enters the production function of the tradable good (Y Tt = aL
T
t ).
Allowing for capital as a second input in the tradable goods sector modiﬁes the transition
path of pN . Let KTt denote the stock of capital employed in the tradable goods sector. We
maintain a constant-returns to scale technology and modify the production function to
Y Tt = a
(
LTt
)κ (
KTt
)1−κ
, (7.6.1)
κ ∈ (0, 1). Conducting the same experiment as in Figure 7.2, Figure 7.7 shows that pN
(left panel) increases smoothly during the transition to the new steady state. The price of
non-tradable goods, pN , drops initially because the wage rate, w, falls at t = 0 in response
to migration inﬂows, as displayed in the right panel. This reduces the demand for the non-
tradeable good, as can be seen from (7.3.3) and Wt = wt. The reduction in the wage rate is,
however, not persistent since the wage converges back to its initial steady state value, despite
further massive immigration. This behavior of the wage rate is consistent with empirical
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evidence which, if anything, suggests a short-run drop in the wage rate and negligible long-
run eﬀects (e.g. Friedberg, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Dustmann et al., 2005). The underlying reason
for the increase in w along the smooth transition is that ﬁrms, in both sectors, build up their
capital stock because a larger labor force makes installed capital goods more valuable. All
other properties of the transition paths are qualitatively similar to Figure 7.2. From Figure
Figure 7.7: The impact of labor market integration in period t = 0 under the same presump-
tions as in Figure 7.2, except that the production technology for the tradable good is modiﬁed
to (7.6.1) with κ = 0.5.
7.5 and 7.6 one also recognizes that rental prices started to increase (in 2004) before net
immigration started to increase (in 2006). This observation is in line with our theory by
noting that the Swiss labor market integration represents an expected integration shock. We
kept the analysis deliberately as simple as possible by assuming an unexpected integration
shock. Hence, the timing of events in the data (i.e., the price increase ﬁrst, then the increase
in net immigration rates) can easily be reconciled with our theory.
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A sceptic may ask whether the observed magnitude of migration inﬂows can plausibly be held
responsible for the rental price increase. Two aspects are noteworthy in this regard. An annual
(net) migration inﬂow of 100 thousand people, like in the year 2008 where Switzerland had 7.7
million inhabitants, amounted to a 1.4 percent increase of the domestic population. Although
this increase does not sound dramatic at the ﬁrst glance, these migration inﬂows were highly
concentrated in urban areas. For instance, the residential population in the canton of Zurich
increased by about 9.1 percent between 2006 and 2011. The sales price index for residential
property during this period rose by about 30 percent (data source: http://www.zkb.ch).
The considerably rising prices for housing services have provoked an intensive debate on the
gains from migration in Switzerland. At the ﬁrst glance, this seems remarkable as wage eﬀects
are barely visible and a large fraction of immigrants from EU countries is tertiary educated.
The debate seems reasonable, however, in view of our model. In particular, and consistent
with the welfare eﬀects suggested by Proposition 6, the association of tenants but not those
of house owners have recently opposed further immigration. This indicates that immigration
to Switzerland has triggered a new distributional conﬂict, which dominates recent policy
and media debates. Previous debates on migration have centered on wage eﬀects and the
implications of low-skilled migration on the social policy system. Recently, by contrast, not
only populist right-wing parties but also left-wing parties and interest groups argue in favor
of slowing down or even reversing migration ﬂows. All important opponents to immigration
started focussing on rental rates of housing.16 The parties in the middle do not express strong
views. In the light of our model, this could be rationalized by the fact that their constituency
is particularly heterogenous in terms of their land- and houseownership.
16According to our analysis, redistribution of land or wealth, or more indirect redistribution measures from
rich landowners to poorer individuals, would be a way to spread the gains of landowners from immigration
to a wider population. This points to the possibility that, from a normative point of view, redistribution
measures may be preferable to reversing labor market integration.
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7.7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of labor market integration on migration, capital for-
mation, house prices, and land prices in an intertemporal model in which ﬁrms face capital
adjustment costs. Our theory is compatible with no or weak wage eﬀects. The mechanism
which acts as a drag on migration ﬂows and prevents that everyone moves to high-productivity
regions, once this is legally made feasible, works through changes in the price of housing. The
predictions of our model are, for instance, in line with the recent experience of Switzerland
after integration of its labor market to the European labor market.
We have examined how initial conditions (i.e., initial levels of population density, productiv-
ity, and the capital stock) aﬀect the direction and evolution of migration and capital ﬂows
over time. In particular, our theory provides a candidate explanation for reverse migration.
According to the best of our knowledge, previous studies based on neoclassical models which
rest on constant returns to scale did not explain that labor market integration may lead to la-
bor outﬂows in early phases of the transition to the new long run equilibrium and immigration
in later phases. In our model, the number of people in the domestic economy is determined
by the condition that life-time utility in the source and the destination are equalized. As
a result, technically, population density is a jump variable which allows for non-monotonic
transitions in a natural and intuitive way.
At a normative level, the paper has shown how heterogeneity of landownership determines
the distributional consequences in response to labor market integration, caused by changes in
the rental rate of land. This may help to understand political debates on and resistance to
immigration even if immigration has negligible eﬀects on the wage distribution.
As regards future research, we suggest to introduce externalities, implying that the aggregate
output technologies exhibit increasing returns to scale, such that multiple equilibria may
emerge. This modiﬁcation could then be employed to examine how initial conditions and
expectations interact for the dynamic evolution of migration, capital formation, house prices,
and land prices.
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7.9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The household’s problem is solved in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the
intertemporal consumption problem is solved. Omitting subscripts, deﬁne a Cobb-Douglas
consumption index, C :=
(
cT
)γ (
cN
)1−γ
such that instantaneous utility is given by logC.
Consumption expenditure in a given period can be expressed as
PC = cT + pNcN , (7.9.1)
where P denotes an appropriately deﬁned price index (see below). Life-time utility of an
individual born in t reads as Ut = logC1,t + ρ logC2,t+1.
For later use, we also allow for second-period income. Denote income of an individual born
in t in the ﬁrst and second period of life by y1,t and y2,t+1, respectively. First-period income
is equal to the wage rate, y1 = w. (Moreover, in the basic model, y2 ≡ 0.) Let Savt denote
individual savings in working age at time t, i.e., Savt := wt − P1,tC1,t. We have
C1,t =
wt − Savt
P1,t
, (7.9.2)
C2,t+1 =
(1 + r)Savt + y2,t+1
P2,t+1
. (7.9.3)
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The intertemporal problem may be expressed as follows:
max
Savt
{log (wt − Savt)− log (P1,t) + ρ log [(1 + r)Savt + y2,t+1]− ρ log (P2,t+1)} . (7.9.4)
Deﬁning Wt ≡ wt + y2,t+11+r , the ﬁrst-order condition implies
PtC1,t =
1
1 + ρ
Wt, (7.9.5)
P2,t+1C2,t+1
1 + r
=
ρ
1 + ρ
Wt. (7.9.6)
In the second step, we analyze the static problems. Given the amount of ﬁrst period con-
sumption expenditure when young in t, PtC1,t =
1
1+ρ
Wt, the household solves
max
cT1,t,c
N
1,t
log
[(
cT1,t
)γ (
cN1,t
)1−γ]
s.t.
1
1 + ρ
Wt = c
T
1,t + p
N
t c
N
1,t. (7.9.7)
Hence,
cT1,t =
γ
1− γ p
N
t c
N
1,t, (7.9.8)
which combined with 1
1+ρ
Wt = c
T
1,t + p
N
t c
N
1,t implies
cT1,t =
γ
1 + ρ
Wt, c
N
1,t =
1− γ
1 + ρ
Wt
pNt
. (7.9.9)
Similarly, given the amount of second period consumption expenditures when old in t + 1,
P2,t+1C2,t+1 =
ρ(1+r)
1+ρ
Wt, the household solves
max
cT2,t+1,c
N
2,t+1
log
[(
cT2,t+1
)γ (
cN2,t+1
)1−γ]
s.t.
ρ (1 + r)
1 + ρ
Wt = c
T
2,t+1 + p
N
t+1c
N
2,t+1. (7.9.10)
Hence, we get
cT2,t+1 =
γ
1− γ p
N
t+1c
N
2,t+1 (7.9.11)
which combined with (1+r)ρ
1+ρ
Wt = c
T
2,t+1 + p
N
t+1c
N
2,t+1 leads to
cT2,t+1 =
γ (1 + r) ρ
1 + ρ
Wt, c
N
2,t+1 =
(1− γ) (1 + r) ρ
1 + ρ
Wt
pNt+1
. (7.9.12)
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Substituting (1 + r) ρ = 1 and inserting the goods demand functions into the intertemporal
utility function conﬁrms (7.3.2)-(7.3.4). It remains to be shown that there exists a price index
as used above. Using C =
(
cT
)γ (
cN
)1−γ
, the price index P may be expressed as
P =
cT + pNcN
C
=
(
cT
cN
)1−γ
+ pN
(
cN
cT
)γ
. (7.9.13)
Noting that c
T
cN
= γ
1−γp
N one gets
P =
(
pN
)1−γ [( γ
1− γ
)1−γ
+
(
1− γ
γ
)γ]
. (7.9.14)
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The Lagrangian function to the optimization problem (7.2.3) of
ﬁrms in sector N , implied by equilibrium condition 1 in Deﬁnition 1, is given by
L =
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1 + r
)t(
pNt b
(
LNt
)α
(Kt)
β Z1−α−β − wtLNt − pZt Z − It
[
1 + θ
(
It
Kt
)η]
+
qt [It + (1− δ)Kt −Kt+1]) . (7.9.15)
Using wt = a, the associated ﬁrst-order conditions
∂L
∂LNt
= ∂L
∂Z
= ∂L
∂It
= ∂L
∂Kt+1
= 0 imply
pNt =
a
(
LNt
)1−α
αb (Kt)
β Z1−α−β
, (7.9.16)
pZt = p
N
t (1− α− β) b
(
LNt
)α
(Kt)
β Z−α−β , (7.9.17)
It =
(
qt − 1
(η + 1) θ
) 1
η
Kt, (7.9.18)
(1− δ)qt+1 + pNt+1βb
(
LNt+1
)α
(Kt+1)
β−1 Z1−α−β + θη
(
INt+1
KNt+1
)η+1
= (1 + r)qt. (7.9.19)
Recall DK = K
Z
and DI = I
Z
. Then, ﬁrst, (7.9.18) gives us (7.3.6). Substituting (7.9.18) into
(7.2.2) conﬁrms (7.3.5). Substituting (7.2.1) as well as cN1,t and c
N
2,t as given by (7.3.3) into
equilibrium condition 6 in Deﬁnition 1, Y Nt = c
N
1,tLt + c
N
2,tLt−1, and using Wt = a implies
b
(
LNt
)α
(Kt)
β Z1−α−β =
1− γ
1 + ρ
a
pNt
(Lt + Lt−1). (7.9.20)
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Substituting (7.9.16) into (7.9.20) and solving for LNt we obtain
LNt =
α(1− γ)
1 + ρ
(Lt + Lt−1). (7.9.21)
Advancing (7.9.21) by one period and using it in (7.9.19), as well as recalling DK = K
Z
,
DI = I
Z
, DS = S
Z
, and St = Lt + Lt−1 conﬁrms (7.3.7). Moreover, substituting (7.9.21)
into (7.9.16) conﬁrms (7.3.8). Substituting (7.9.16) into (7.9.17) and using (7.9.21) conﬁrms
(7.3.9).
We next show that, for a given population density (DS), the system (7.3.5)-(7.3.7) is saddle-
point stable. To see this, use (7.3.6) in (7.3.5) to ﬁnd
ΔDKt+1 := D
K
t+1 −DKt =
[(
qt − 1
(η + 1) θ
) 1
η
− δ
]
DKt . (7.9.22)
Thus, ΔDKt+1 is increasing in qt. Moreover, the locus which is given by ΔD
K
t+1 = 0 in D
K
t −
qt−space is a horizontal line which is given by
qt = 1 + (1 + η)θδ
η ≡ q˜. (7.9.23)
Next, using (7.3.6) in (7.3.7) deﬁnes qt+1 implicitly as a function of D
K
t and qt. We see that
Δqt+1 := qt+1− qt is increasing in DKt . However, substituting qt+1 = Δqt+1+ qt in (7.3.7) and
setting Δqt+1 = 0 could give us a positive or negative relationship between D
K
t and qt. Thus,
it is possible that the locus which is given by Δqt+1 = 0 in D
K
t − qt−space is positively sloped
or negatively sloped. Fortunately, in either case, the phase diagram based on the derived
properties of the dynamic system reveals saddle-point stability. In either case, like in Figure
7.1, the saddle-path is negatively sloped. This conﬁrms part (i).
To derive steady state expressions in part (ii), set qt+1 = qt = q˜ as given by (7.9.23) in (7.3.7)
to conﬁrm (7.3.10). Substituting DKt = χaD
S into (7.3.8) gives us (7.3.11). This concludes
the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that the saddle-path
of the phase diagram in DK − q−space is downward-sloping. Moreover, note that an increase
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in DS or in a shifts the Δq−locus to the right and leaves the ΔDK−locus unaﬀected. This
explains the eﬀects on DK in part (i). The impact on pZ follows from (7.3.9). The impact
on pN follows from (7.3.8) and (7.3.11). With respect to part (ii), note by inspection of
(7.3.5)-(7.3.7) that parameter b does not enter the dynamic system. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Steady state utility of a foreign individual with wage income
only is given by V ∗ ≡ V (a∗, pN∗, pN∗). Using this and (7.3.4) in equilibrium condition 3 in
Deﬁnition 1 then conﬁrms (7.3.12). Setting pNt = p
N
t+1 = p˜
N(DS, a, b) and, as the foreign
economy is in steady state by assumption, pN∗ = p˜N(DS
∗
, a∗, b∗) in (7.3.12), using (7.3.11)
and solving for DS conﬁrms (7.3.13). This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Directly follows from (7.3.13). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i) directly follows from (7.3.9)-(7.3.11), as discussed in the
main text. For part (ii), an example suﬃces. It is given in Figure7.4. To prove part (iii),
rewrite (7.3.12) as
log pNt+1 +
1
ρ
log pNt =
1 + ρ
ρ
[
log
(
a
a∗
)
1− γ + log p
N∗
]
≡ Ω. (7.9.24)
Deﬁning xt := log p
N
t , we can write (7.9.24) as xt+1 = −1ρxt + Ω, which represents a linear,
inhomogenous, ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation. The solution is given by
xt =
(
x0 − Ω
1 + 1
ρ
)(
−1
ρ
)t
+
Ω
1 + 1
ρ
. (7.9.25)
Diﬀerence equation xt+1 = −1ρxt + Ω also implies that, in a steady state where xt+1 = xt as
t → ∞, we must have limt→∞ xt = Ω1+ 1
ρ
. Since 0 < ρ < 1, this requires x0 =
Ω
1+ 1
ρ
. In this case
the solution for pNt as given by (7.9.24) is constant over time. 
Proof of Proposition 5. First, note that (7.9.16)-(7.9.19) still hold. Thus, (7.3.5) and
(7.3.6) still hold.
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We now have to reconsider equilibrium condition 6 in Deﬁnition 1 (clearing of the non-tradable
goods market). According to (7.3.3) and (7.5.1), demand for the non-tradable good of a young
and an old individual i in period t, with landholding z(i) in the second period of life, is
cN1,t(i) =
1− γ
1 + ρ
a+ ρpZt+1z(i)
pNt
, cN2,t(i) =
1− γ
1 + ρ
a+ ρpZt z(i)
pNt
, (7.9.26)
respectively, where we used (7.3.1). Thus, total demand for the non-tradable good, denoted
by CNt , reads as
CNt =
1
pNt
1− γ
1 + ρ
[
(Lt + Lt−1)a+ ρ(pZt+1 + p
Z
t )Z
]
. (7.9.27)
Substituting (7.9.16) into (7.9.27) and using (7.2.1), goods market clearing condition Y Nt =
CNt implies
LNt
Z
=
α
a
1− γ
1 + ρ
[
aDSt + ρ
(
pZt+1 + p
Z
t
)]
, (7.9.28)
where we used the deﬁnition of DS. Combining (7.9.16) and (7.9.17) yields
pZt =
a
α
(1− α− β)L
N
t
Z
. (7.9.29)
Combining (7.9.28) and (7.9.29) conﬁrms (7.5.4). Advancing (7.9.28) by one period and using
it in (7.9.19) conﬁrms (7.5.2). Inserting (7.9.28) into (7.9.16) leads to (7.5.3). This conﬁrms
part (i).
To derive steady state expressions in part (ii), recall the deﬁnitions of parameters in part (ii)
of Proposition 1. First, set pZt+1 = p
Z
t = p
Z in (7.5.4) to conﬁrm (7.5.5). Using qt+1 = qt = q˜
as given by (7.9.23) in (7.5.2) and substituting the steady state value for the price of land
as given in (7.5.5) for pZt+2 conﬁrms (7.5.6). Substituting the steady state values for p
Z from
(7.5.5) and for DK from (7.5.6) into (7.5.3) gives us (7.5.7). This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Individual i born in t does not want to migrate from the domestic
to the foreign economy if V (Wt(i), p
N
t , p
N
t+1) > V (Wt(i), pˆ
N∗, pˆN∗). According to (7.3.4) and
(7.5.1), this is equivalent to
(1 + ρ) log
(
a +
y2,t+1(i)
1+r
a∗ + y2,t+1(i)
1+r
)
> (1− γ)
[
log
(
pNt
pN∗
)
+ ρ log
(
pNt+1
pN∗
)]
, (7.9.30)
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where y2,t+1(i) = p
Z
t+1z(i) denotes the land income received in the second period of life of an
individual i born in t. Note that for y2 > 0, we have
a+
y2
1+r
a∗+ y2
1+r
> (<) a
a∗ if a < (>)a
∗. Thus,
if a < a∗ and (7.3.12) holds, a landowning individual does not want to migrate from the
domestic to the foreign economy, as (7.9.30) is fulﬁlled. Similarly, if a > a∗ and (7.3.12)
holds, a landowning individual does not want to migrate from the foreign to the domestic
economy. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that wt = a and that the dynamic system in Proposition
5 is independent of the distribution of land among individuals. The result then follows from
using (7.5.1), (7.5.5) and (7.5.7) in (7.3.4). 
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Abstract
After most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation as a con-
sequence of signing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-protection has shifted towards IPR-
enforcement. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies
satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) the regions’ incentives to enforce
IPR in a decentralized game, (b) the desired IPR-enforcement of the two regions in negotia-
tion rounds on global harmonization and (c) the constrained-eﬃcient enforcement level. We
show how the diﬀerent solutions relate to each other and how the results depend on the re-
search productivity in the North and the regions’ relative market sizes. While growth rates
substantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North’s desired level, our
numerical simulation suggests that the South may also beneﬁt in terms of long-run welfare.
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8.1 Introduction
As trade of knowledge intensive goods accelerated during the last decades, patent and copy-
right infringements have become a problem of highest concern. Although the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) speciﬁes a minimum set of
protection standards that members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have to assent
to, the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is still a source of great international
heterogeneity and further fuels the debate about the optimal protection level of IPRs in the
world.
For example, the European Commission’s IPR Enforcement Report 2009 gives account of
serious problems with IPR-enforcement in a large number of mostly developing countries.
Complaints include that injunctions or criminal sanctions are often diﬃcult to obtain and
civil procedures are lengthy and burdensome with high uncertainty of outcomes. Involved
staﬀ is insuﬃciently trained, lacks resources to eﬀectively prosecute and convict violators,
and cooperation between authorities is insuﬃcient. For some countries the report even as-
sesses a lack of political will indicated by their opposing in-depth enforcement discussions
in international fora such as the WTO or the WIPO.1 Studying the distributional eﬀects
of TRIPs, McCalman (2001) argues that the agreement involves transfers from developing
countries to developed countries due to stronger IPR protection. These transfers are primar-
ily determined by enforcement eﬀorts rather than the extension of the coverage of patent
protection. Thus, he reasons that the developing countries “will be more willing to extend
the coverage of patent protection as required by TRIPs, but may be less willing to devote
adequate resources to enforcement”. Further he predicted that “future North-South tensions
over intellectual property rights are likely to be centered around enforcement issues rather
than the sectoral coverage of protection oﬀered” [p. 181], McCalman (2001).2
1See EU Commission (2009). A similar picture is drawn in the annual Special 301 Reports by the U.S.
Trade Representative, see Oﬃce of U.S. Trade Representative(2010).
2Other authors hold that even though the TRIPs-Agreement provides for mechanisms of law enforcement,
these are not always implemented by the member countries (see e.g. Cychosz, 2003).
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The recent debate on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) also indicates that
questions on IPR-enforcement are among the most ﬁercely discussed living causes. ACTA
was worked out in secret negotiations with the aim to harmonize international standards of
IPR-enforcement.3 An agreement has been reached in April 2011 between several countries
among them the U.S. and the E.U.4 An ultimate objective of ACTA is that large emerging
economies, “where IPR could be improved will sign up to the global pact” EU Commission
(2008), Reuters (2010).5 However, the European Parliament has voted against ACTA on July
4, 2012, thereby opposing the European Commission, which will now seek the legal opinion of
the European Court of Justice and approach the European Parliament to ﬁnd an agreement
in the future.6
Inspired by these recent developments, this paper develops an endogenous growth framework
to study IPR-enforcement within the context of a classical North-South trade model. Our
analysis is characterized by the following features that distinguish our paper from the previous
literature. First, we assume equal strength of enforcement of all active patents in a region at
any point in time. Second, a government cannot commit to IPR-enforcement for the indeﬁnite
future but after each legislative term the (new) government may adjust its enforcement eﬀorts
as it sees ﬁt. Third, when setting its policies, the government’s planning horizon is limited.
By the ﬁrst two assumptions, we intend to capture important aspects of IPR-enforcement.
With regard to the ﬁrst item, we argue that in reality IPR-enforcement depends on whether
or not a patent is active, ruling out the possibility that IPR-enforcement distinguishes active
patents by, e.g., the year of invention.7 Second, while formal law may be ﬁxed for substantial
time horizons, the enforcement of laws can be changed more easily, for example, by reallocating
3A comparison between ACTA and TRIPs can be found at e.g.
https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/ .
4The countries are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.S.
5In 2006, the European Union adopted the “IPR Enforcement Directive” to harmonize IPR-enforcement
levels among its members and eschew civil procedures that are “unnecessarily complicated and costly or
involve unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays” (European Parliament, 2004).
6See EU Commission (2012).
7In principle, it would be possible that enforcement distinguishes between a domestic product and an
invention of a foreign country. In this paper, we do not address this case and focus on national treatment
only.
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resources used for IPR-enforcement to other purposes. Our third assumption reﬂects an
important aspect of policy making in that governments are not or not only motivated by
fostering long-term welfare but are concerned with their political ends.8
Incorporating these assumptions into a dynamic model with endogenous innovation arguably
makes the analysis of IPR-enforcement more realistic. However, it is also particularly in-
teresting as it adds another area of tension resulting from the diﬀerent planning horizons
of the governments and the innovators. At the heart of our analysis is the governments’
classical trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency and dynamic gains extended by international ex-
ternalities of IPR-protection with regard to R&D incentives and proﬁt ﬂows.9 By choosing
IPR-enforcement, the government has to trade oﬀ welfare today - by incurring deadweight
losses and R&D costs - against future welfare resulting from a higher technological level.
Without internalizing the full future beneﬁts of innovations, an oﬃce-term motivated gov-
ernment may be more reluctant to bear the costs of great innovative activity implying a
substantial burden on current welfare.
As a consequence, we ﬁnd that in the decentralized equilibrium of the IPR-enforcement
game between the North and the South, the relation between the North’s equilibrium IPR-
enforcement level and its own research productivity exhibits an inverted U-shape. When the
research capacity is low, the dynamic gains of IPR-enforcement dominate and the enforcement
level increases with a higher productivity of research. However, if the research capacity is very
high, the farsighted ﬁrms’ R&D investments and the deadweight losses are very large reducing
current consumption and welfare levels. This can lead a short-sighted Northern government
to reduce IPR-enforcement in response to an even higher research productivity. As the South
does not engage in R&D, it neglects research expenditures but considers its inﬂuence on the
8For example, both, politicians’ monetary and non-monetary rewards may depend on the welfare level
during their term in oﬃce. According to a large literature on the political business cycle, the welfare during
the term in oﬃce also aﬀects the incumbent politicians’ reelection probabilities (Oudiz and Sachs,1985; Drazen,
2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). There is also a literature on oﬃce motivated politicians, so called populists,
who pander to the public by pursuing short-term policies to maximize reelection chances. The concern of this
literature is how to give incentives to implement projects that are beneﬁcial in the long-term but come at
costs in the short-run. See e.g., Mu¨ller, (2007); Gersbach, (2004).
9The trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency and dynamic gains was ﬁrst discussed by Nordhaus (1969).
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R&D activity in the North. Accordingly, the South’s equilibrium IPR-enforcement increases
monotonically with the North’s innovative capacity. Hence, the oﬃce-motivated government
in the North possesses higher incentives to enforce IPR than the one in the South when the
North’s R&D productivity is low, while the opposite may be the case for very high levels of
R&D productivity. Further we ﬁnd that a country’s relative market size positively aﬀects its
equilibrium IPR-enforcement level. The intuition is that a larger country’s impact on R&D
incentives is relatively higher and therefore its incentive to free-ride on the other region’s
IPR-eﬀorts are lower.
By analyzing the regions’ preferred harmonized IPR-enforcement levels at the global scale,
we seek to shed light on potential clashes of interest in international negotiation rounds. We
compare the preferred harmonized enforcement levels with those chosen in the decentralized
equilibrium and relate both to the constrained-eﬃcient solution reﬂecting the maximum wel-
fare the two governments can achieve given they are not able to escape their political-economy
constraints.
Both, the North’s and the South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement levels are higher than
their respective equilibrium choices. While the South’s preferred harmonized enforcement
level is independent of relative market sizes, the one of the North typically exhibits a declining
relationship with its relative market size. The reason is that a larger relative market size
of the North involves relatively lower proﬁt inﬂows from the South and higher deadweight
losses in the North. This contrasts with the decentralized equilibrium where the North’s
equilibrium IPR-enforcement level is positively associated with its relative market size. This
result suggests that small innovative countries show large diﬀerences between their desired
harmonized levels supported in negotiation rounds concerning global IPR-enforcement and
their own equilibrium choices.
Further, we ﬁnd that relative to the constrained-eﬃcient solution the regions’ IPR-enforce-
ment levels in the decentralized equilibrium are too low. By contrast, the North’s desired
harmonized enforcement level is typically higher than the constrained eﬃcient one while
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that of the South is lower. As a consequence, the regions’ growth rate is highest when the
harmonized IPR-enforcement level of the North is implemented. Would this rate of growth
come at the expense of welfare in the South? A numerical illustration suggests that the
South may well gain in terms of aggregate long-run welfare by adopting the North’s desired
harmonized IPR-enforcement level given a suﬃciently productive R&D sector in the North.
However, the opposite holds for low research capacities in the North.
The literature has approached questions regarding the international protection of IPR from
two perspectives. On the one hand, from a macroeconomic, endogenous growth perspective
which treats the regions’ IPR-enforcement as exogenous and examines its eﬀects on the result-
ing growth rate and on welfare (Helpman, 1993; Lai, 1998; Kwan and Lai, 2003; Iwaisako et
al. 2011). On the other hand, from a rather microeconomic, industrial organization perspec-
tive that explicitly takes IPR-enforcement as endogenous, but precludes long-run dynamics
(Chin and Grossman, 1990, Deardorﬀ, 1992, Maskus, 1990, Diwan and Rodrik, 1991, Lai and
Qiu, 2003). This paper establishes a dynamic general equilibrium framework and allows to
consider endogenous choices of IPRs and their welfare implications.
In the next section, we relate our paper to the literature in more detail and introduce the
model in Section 8.3. We examine the non-cooperative game in which both regions choose
their national IPR-enforcement decentrally in Section 8.4. In Section 8.5, we analyze the
preferred harmonized enforcement levels of the North and the South. Section 8.6 compares the
desired harmonized enforcement levels and the decentralized equilibrium with the constrained-
eﬃcient solution. We present implications for welfare in Section 8.7 and provide a summary
and conclusions in Section 8.8.
8.2 Relation to the Literature
A seminal work in the literature on international intellectual property rights protection is
Grossman and Lai (2004), which also employs a framework of variety expanding innovations,
but considers a one-shot game with respect to IPR-protection and does not allow for en-
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dogenous long-run economic growth. The equilibrium in Grossman and Lai (2004) can be
interpreted as a subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium, where governments are able (1) to decide
on the IPR-protection level of each vintage of inventions separately and (2) to fully commit to
it in the future.10 Such a set-up implies the theoretical possibility that at a particular point
in time, all diﬀerent vintages of active patents enjoy diﬀerent levels of IPR-enforcement. This
is precluded in our model.11 Grossman and Lai (2004) ﬁnd that higher research capacity and
larger market size are associated with higher IPR-protection in the non-cooperative game.
Due to limited commitment possibilities of the governments, our model predicts a positive
relation between research capacity and IPR-enforcement for moderate research productivity
levels. However, this relation may become negative for high levels of research capacity. More-
over, our model allows to draw inferences of IPR-enforcement on economic growth showing
that even though IPR-enforcement exhibits an inverted U-shape in the North’s research ca-
pabilities, the rate of economic growth will strictly increase with research productivity. In
contrast to Grossman and Lai (2004), we also shed light on distributional eﬀects associated
with harmonized IPR-protection by deriving the countries’ desired globally harmonized en-
forcement level. We ﬁnd that a positive eﬀect of the North’s relative market size on its
preferred harmonized IPR-enforcement, but a negative eﬀect of its relative market size on
the North’s equilibrium enforcement level. This may explain tough international negotiation
rounds as particularly small innovative countries advocate drastic IPR-enforcement far-oﬀ
their equilibrium enforcement levels.
Scotchmer (2004), Ch. 11 and Scotchmer (2004b) provide an elegant reduced form model
where governments decide on the length of IPR-protection. She does not derive the value
of an innovation and the deadweight losses from an equilibrium analysis but takes them as
exogenously given to focus entirely on the one-shot game of the governments when setting the
10See [p. 1642], Grossman and Lai (2004).
11The major diﬀerence is that in Grossman and Lai (2004), the policy maker determines in each period
of time the level of IPR-protection only for the products invented in the same period but for the duration of
their entire lifetime (i.e. until the products become obsolete). In our model, the policy maker decides in each
period on the level of IPR-enforcement of all products under de-jure IPR-protection but cannot commit to
enforcement levels in future periods.
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patent length. Next to the Nash-equilibrium, she also discusses the countries’ desired harmo-
nized IPR-protection and ﬁnds that, given equal market sizes, the country with the higher
research capacity desires higher globally harmonized IPR-protection. Given equal productiv-
ity of R&D, the smaller country prefers a longer globally harmonized patent length than the
larger country. By contrast, our paper develops a full-ﬂedged general equilibrium endogenous
growth model and characterizes the entire comparative statics with respect to market size and
the North’s innovative capability. Taking a dynamic perspective and accounting for political
economy constraints shows that results may reverse if the research capabilities of the North
are very strong.
Grinols and Lin (2006) is one of the few dynamic models with endogenous IPRs. Particular
to their setting is that they consider goods that are only demanded in the South but invented
in the North. In a numerical equilibrium analysis, they ﬁnd that the South may well choose a
higher level of IPR-protection for this special set of products than the level of IPR-protection
chosen by the North for the remaining products which are demanded in both regions. The
driving force of this result is that the South cannot free-ride on IPR-protection in the North
to provide incentives for innovation in this particular product category. In the decentralized
equilibrium in our model, it can also occur that the South enforces IPR more than the North
if the innovative capacity of the North is suﬃciently high. However, this result originates
from politico-economic reasons rather than diﬀerent demand structures in the North and the
South.
An intriguing paper by Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa (2008) takes a complementary approach
to endogenizing the strength of IPR-enforcement in an endogenous growth model of a closed
economy. Rather than being a policy instrument of the government, IPR-enforcement is the
result of private investments by ﬁrms. This leads to multiple equilibria (one with high (low)
IPR-enforcement and high (low) R&D investments) as investments in IPR-protection and
investments in R&D are complements.
Important precursors of our work within the family of endogenous growth frameworks with
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exogenous IPRs are Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Iwaisako et al. (2011). Helpman (1993) also
considers a North-South set-up where only the North innovates. IPRs are varied exogenously
by changing the exogenously given imitation rate. Considering both trade and FDI, the
extend of the latter plays a major role in determining the consequences of stricter IPR-
protection.12 Related to Helpman (1993), Lai (1998) considers multinational Northern ﬁrms
that transfer the production of new products via FDI to the South and shows that the eﬀects
of IPR-protection in the South depend crucially on whether imitation or FDI by multinational
ﬁrms is the channel of international production transfer from the North to the South.13 A
recent contribution by Iwaisako et al. (2011) conducts a welfare analysis in a North-South
endogenous growth framework with FDI. They incorporate quality improving innovations and
ﬁnd that the dynamic gains of enhanced innovations are suﬃciently strong that the South
would beneﬁt by adopting the IPR-standards of the North. As noted in the introduction, in
contrast to these papers, our model considers endogenous choices by governments allowing
us to derive results on the equilibrium behavior of countries concerning IPR-enforcement
and compare it to the constraint eﬃcient and desired harmonized solutions of the diﬀerent
regions.14
Other, seminal contributions to the literature approached questions regarding the interna-
tional protection of IPRs from an industrial organization perspective. In contrast to our
paper, they typically take a partial equilibrium perspective and abstract from long-run dy-
namics. 15 In this branch of the literature, Lai and Qiu (2003) is most closely related to our
paper. They propose a static multi-sectoral North-South trade model, where both regions
12Helpman ﬁnds that stronger IPRs adversely aﬀect the South’s welfare and could be detrimental to the
North as well, if only trade is considered.
13Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) study technology transfer driven by imitation and Dinopoulus and
Segerstrom (2010) consider technology transfer within multinational ﬁrms via FDI. These papers conﬁrm Lai
(1998)’s results in a semi-endogenous growth model.
14More remotely related to our work are several interesting papers that expand this branch of the literature
by including skill accumulation (Parello, 2008), analyzing catch-up dynamics of the South in product quality
levels (Borota, 2012), and examining eﬀects of patent policy on a country’s income distribution in a closed
economy (Kiedaisch, 2009).
15Among these papers are Chin and Grossman (1990) and Deardorﬀ (1992), who examine welfare eﬀects in
a North-South model with exogenous variations in IPRs, as well as Diwan and Rodrik (1991) who analyzes
IPRs endogenously chosen by the regional governments.
8. Intellectual Property, North-South Trade, and Growth 274
innovate and national governments set patent length. In their partial equilibrium analysis,
they ﬁnd that the countries’ equilibrium patent length increases with relative market size. We
argue that this is not always the case in a dynamic model incorporating political economy con-
straints and that the eﬀect of relative market size on the desired harmonized IPR-enforcement
of regions is typically opposite to its eﬀect on equilibrium IPR-enforcement.
8.3 The Model
We consider two regions, n and s, that diﬀer with respect to their innovative capacity. Region
n, which we also refer to as the North, produces blueprints, that are licensed out to Region s,
the South. For simplicity, we assume that there is no innovation activity in Region s.16 Our
analysis builds on a variety-expanding-growth framework where at time t a patent is enforced
with probability ωj,t in Region j = s, n.
17 For simplicity, we assume that imitation is costless.
Thus, an imitated intermediate is supplied under full competition and operating proﬁts are
zero. Both economies are populated by a measure Lj of households each inelastically supplying
one unit of labor in each period. There is no population growth and time moves in discrete
steps t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. In the following, we ﬁrst introduce the model for given levels of IPR-
enforcement in both regions and then discuss the governments’ problems concerning their
IPR-enforcement choice.
16We do not neglect that the South conducts R&D, however, in a model where both regions innovate but
Region s possesses lower innovative capacity and without perfect knowledge spillovers between the regions,
it can be shown that the ratio between the number of innovations in Region s and Region n tends to zero.
A proof is available upon request. Moreover, in the context of our model R&D is assumed to push out the
world technological frontier, i.e. we abstract from reverse engineering and duplicative research in developing
countries.
17As our explicit focus is on IPR-enforcement, we assume that each innovation obtains a patent of inﬁnite
length and neglect the issue of patent breadth. Without changing our qualitative results, it would be possible
to assume a ﬁnite patent length and a certain patent breadth, e.g., given exogenously via TRIPs. The regional
governments then possess some leverage on determining the strength of enforcement reﬂected by ωjt.
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8.3.1 Production
In Region j, the ﬁnal good Yj is produced according to
Yj = AjL1−αj
∫ N
0
[xj(i)]
αdi, (8.3.1)
where Aj represents a productivity measure, Lj is labor input, N is the measure of diﬀerent
intermediates invented in the North, and xj(i) stands for the amount of intermediate i used in
ﬁnal-good production in Region j = n, s. The elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent
intermediates is denoted by α ∈ (0, 1).
Each intermediate good i is produced by a monopolist or an imitator. The production of
one unit of intermediate i requires one unit of the ﬁnal output. We choose ﬁnal output as
the numeraire. Hence marginal production costs of intermediates are equal to unity. The
symmetric equilibrium on the market for intermediates induces equal prices and demand for
all types of intermediates, such that pm,j(i) = pm,j = 1/α, xm,j(i) = xm,j for all protected
intermediates and pc,j(i) = pc,j = 1, xc,j(i) = xc,j for all imitated intermediates. Demand
in Region j for protected intermediates is xm,j = λjα
2
1−α , with λj = LjA
1
1−α
j reﬂecting the
”eﬀective” market size of Region j. Hence, a small economy in terms of its population may
constitute a large eﬀective market when its productivity level in ﬁnal-good production is
suﬃciently large and vice versa. Patent holders located in the North can attain operating
proﬁts per period π = P (λs + λn) with P =
(
1−α
α
)
α
2
1−α > 0. If an intermediate is copied
and, hence, sold at the competitive price pc,j = 1, demand increases to xc,j = λjα
1
1−α , and
operating proﬁts in j at time t are zero.
Given the enforcement level 0 ≤ ωj,t ≤ 1, the number of protected intermediates at time t is
ωj,t ∗Nt, while [1 − ωj,t] ∗Nt of the intermediates are imitated. Aggregate output in Region
j writes therefore as
Yj,t = λ1−αj
[∫ ωj,tNt
0
[xm,j(i)]
αdi+
∫ [1−ωj,t]Nt
0
[xc,j(i)]
αdi
]
. (8.3.2)
Additionally considering that xm,j = α
1
1−αxc,j, we obtain Yj,t = λjNt[1 + ωj,t(α α1−α − 1)]xαc,j,
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where ωj,t(α
α
1−α − 1) < 0 represents the deadweight loss due to monopolistic competition.18
8.3.2 Research and development
The North performs R&D in search for new designs (blueprints) of intermediate goods. Here,
we use a lab equipment speciﬁcation assuming that ﬁnal output (which incorporates both
labor and intermediate goods) enters as the main factor of production into the R&D process.
A measure Len << Ln of the population in the North has the entrepreneural skills to operate
a research lab. Each research-lab operates under the cost function
ζ(ηt) =
δη2t
Nt
Len
, (8.3.3)
where ηt denotes the number of new inventions at time t and δ reﬂects the research produc-
tivity or the quality of the research infrastructure. Alternatively, δ can be interpreted as a
measure of the entrepreneurs’ human capital. That is, the higher the level of human capital,
the lower δ implying that lab-equipment can be used more productively. In addition, R&D is
positively aﬀected by the entrepreneurs’ average level of technological knowledge Nt
Len
.19. On
the macro level, the probably most important source of decreasing returns in R&D can be seen
in an increased probability of duplicative research through an increasing number of both rivals
and expenditures, even though the R&D process as such may be driven by large spillovers
(Amir, 2000; Kortum, 1993; Klette and Kortum,2004). In a related line of argument, it is
possible to think of plausible limits in transforming an ever increasing stock of new ideas into
usable knowledge for production Weitzman (1998).From an aggregate perspective, decreasing
returns may also reﬂect heterogeneity in the cost of research projects. A similar argument
18Notice that for ωj,t = 1, i.e., full patent protection, we obtain the standard Romer-(1990) production
function: Yj,t = AjL1−αj Nt(α
1
1−α xc,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
xm,j
)α. The case without patent protection, ωj,t = 0, yields the highest
possible output from a static perspective: Yj,t = AjL1−αj Ntxαc,j . Of course this undermines incentives to
invest in R&D.
19The assumption that both, research productivity (or human capital) as well as the current technology
stock play a positive role for innovative output and are complementary to a certain extent is standard in
the literature. For example, in Romer (1990), p. 86, the aggregate stock of designs evolves according to
A˙ = δaHAA, where A is the stock of designs, HA is human capital and δa is a productivity parameter. The
assumption of decreasing returns on the ﬁrm and industry level with respect to R&D expenditures has been
supported empirically, e.g., by Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Hall et al. (1988).
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can be found in Scotchmer (2004), Ch. 11. Convex costs of R&D are also widely used in the
industrial organization type literature on IPR-protection (see e.g., Chin and Grossman, 1990;
McCalman (2002), Lai and Qiu, 2003).
A new blueprint invented in period t can be employed in ﬁnal-good production from t+1 on
and it receives a patent of inﬁnite length. Accordingly, the expected value of an invention i
at time t reads as
Et[V (i)] =
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tP
(
λnωn,τ + λsωs,τ
)
. (8.3.4)
As Et[V (i)] is the same for all i, we will use the abbreviation Et in the following. Optimal-
ity requires that marginal costs for an additional invention must equal its expected value.
Consequently, inventions per research lab are given by
ηt = Et
Nt
2δLen
, (8.3.5)
and the aggregate stock of technological knowledge evolves according to
Nt+1 −Nt = ηtLen = Et
Nt
2δ
. (8.3.6)
Obviously, an increase in eﬀective market size increases expected proﬁts and encourages there-
fore innovations.20. In this way, our R&D speciﬁcation is subject to a scale eﬀect in the sense
that the size of the population aﬀects the size of markets but not directly R&D-inputs such as
research personnel or, in our particular case, lab-equipment. If we assumed instead decreasing
returns in research output with respect to the existing stock of knowledge following e.g. Jones
(1995), IPR-enforcement would likely aﬀect transitory growth and the steady-state level of
output.
20Schmookler (1966) emphasized that ”the amount of invention is governed by the extend of the market.”;
see also the discussion in Acemoglu (2009), Ch. 12 and 15.5
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8.3.3 The household’s and the government’s problem
Concentrating on the governments’ IPR-enforcement decisions, we keep the individual house-
hold’s problem deliberately simple. The households in Region j maximize
Uj,t =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tcj,τ , (8.3.7)
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor.21 For the entrepreneurs in the North, the maximization
problem reduces to the decision of how much of their income (labor income plus the proﬁt
ﬂows from their active patents) to invest in R&D and how much to consume in each period.
This problem is solved by (8.3.5). The households in the North without entrepreneurial skills
as well as the households in the South consume their labor income in each period.
As motivated in the introduction, we intend to examine the eﬀects of politically motivated
short-sighted governments that do not fully take into account the long-run consequences of
their actions. The simplest way to incorporate this aspect into our model is to assume that
at any time t the governments in both regions choose an optimal enforcement level of IPR so
as to maximize22
Wj,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tCj,τ , (8.3.8)
subject to (8.3.6). Cj,t stands for aggregate consumption in country j at time t. As mentioned
in the introduction, we make two additional assumptions concerning the governments’ IPR-
enforcement choices. First, governments can only commit to a level of IPR-enforcement for
21Note that this implies that 1−ββ is the rate of time preference which, in equilibrium, must be equal to the
interest rate.
22Oudiz and Sachs (1985) argue that restricting the planning horizon of the government as we do it here
is a natural way to incorporate short-sightedness of governments into dynamic macroeconomic models. Our
particular modelling choice regarding the planning horizon of the government could be motivated via short-
lived households (with two-period lifes). A minority of the households is altruistic and entertain research labs.
At the cost of further complexity, we could interpret output Y as sophistcated machinery that can be used
either in research or to produce the consumption good via technology F (Lu,Y), where Lu denotes unskilled
labor. Under the assumption that unskilled workers constitute the non-altruistic (short-sighted) majority
and Lu and Y are complements, there exists a conﬂict between R&D expenditures and machinery for the
production of the consumption good. Concerning IPR-policy, a re-election motivated government would then
adopt a the short-sighted view of the majority of unskilled workers.
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the subsequent period, i.e. ωj,t+1, but not for the indeﬁnite future. For example, while in oﬃce
at time t, the government can increase training eﬀorts of staﬀ responsible for the prosecution
and conviction of imitators of protected intermediates. A larger number of trained oﬃcials
will then be available in t + 1 to enforce the laws on IPR. Similar arguments apply with
respect to other resources or capacity building necessary for eﬀective enforcement.23 Second,
we assume that the enforcement level chosen by the government in Region j applies to all
active patents in the same way.
In a typical period t, the sequence of events can be summarized as follows. First, intermediate-
good production and ﬁnal-good production take place given the technology stock Nt and IPR-
enforcement level ωj,t. Then the government announces the level of IPR-enforcement ωj,t+1
and thereafter the entrepreneurs decide how much to invest in R&D. Finally, the households
consume.
At any time t aggregate consumption in the North as well as the dynamics of the technology
stock (8.3.6) depend on the R&D expenditures in t which reﬂect the entrepreneurs’ expec-
tations about future IPR-enforcement beyond t + 1. Let us denote these expections at time
t by Ω′t+2 ≡ {ω′n,τ , ω′s,τ}∞τ=t+2 and the vector of IPR-enforcement that will ﬁnally realize by
Ωt+2. When deciding on IPR-enforcement, ωj,t+1, the governments have expectations about
the entrepreurs’ expectations Ω′t+2, which we refer to by Ω
g
t+2, and on how the entrepreneurs
adapt their expectations in response to the governments’ enforcement choices for period t+1,
ωj,t+1. Even under the assumption of rational expectations, this structure allows for a pleni-
tude of subgame-perfect equilibria. Here, we intend to minimize complexity by focussing on
equilibria that satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1
(i) At any time t, the entrepreneurs’ expectations about future IPR-enforcement Ω′t+2 do
not depend on ωj,t+1.
23The costs of IPR-protection in our model consist of the associated deadweight loss in the consumption-
good market. Additionally including resource-using IPR-protection would increase these costs without chang-
ing the qualitative results. To keep the complexity of the model at a minimum, we abstracted from costs of
IPR-protection beyond deadweight-losses.
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(ii) Each government j takes Nt, ωn,t, ωs,t, (ωk,t+1, k 	= j) and item (i) as given and maxi-
mizes (8.3.8) subject to (8.3.6) according to its expectations Ωgt+2. Governments do not
condition their choices on the history of play before time t.
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), expectations are rational, i.e. Ωgt+2 = Ω
′
t+2 = Ωt+2.
Two remarks are in order. First, in Item (ii) we have used parenthesis for the other region’s
IPR-enforcement choice at time t, because this is taken as given by each government in
the game where IPR-enforcement is chosen decentrally. Later we consider regimes where a
government is able to determine both regions’ enforcement levels in which, of course, the
other region’s IPR-enforcement is not taken as given. Second, given Item (i) of Assumption
1, the entrepreneurs’ expectations can only be rational if the future governments’ optimal
enforcement choices do not depend on the technology stock. This is the case as we will see
below.
8.4 Decentralized Enforcement of IPRs
In this section, we examine the strategic interaction between governments with respect to their
national levels of IPR-enforcement. We focus on unique subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in
steady state satisfying Assumption 1. In the next two subsections, we study the South’s and
the North’s maximization problems and describe the SPE in steady state thereafter.
8.4.1 The problem of the South
The objective function of the government in the South at time t can be written as
Ws,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτλs [Y + ωs,τ(D − P )] , (8.4.1)
where Y ≡ α α1−α − α 11−α > 0 reﬂects the contribution of an intermediate to ﬁnal output net
of production costs for intermediates and D ≡ α 2α1−α −α α1−α +α 11−α −α 21−α < 0 represents the
deadweight-loss factor net of production costs for intermediates. The expression ωs,τNtλsP
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indicates the proﬁts accruing to the technology owners in the North. The South’s objective
(8.4.1) and the constraint (8.3.6) reveal the government’s trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency
and dynamic gains: Stronger IPR-enforcement involves higher deadweight losses and proﬁt
ﬂows to the North while it increases the incentives to innovate in the North (via Et) and
thereby leads to higher productivity of domestic ﬁnal-good production in the South. Solving
the South’s optimization problem, the reaction function along the balanced growth path with
ωj,t+1 = ωj,t = ωj, writes as
24
ωrs(ωn) = −
(
1− β
2− β
)[
Y
D − P +
2Δ
βP
(
1 +
λn
λs
)]
− 1
2− β
λn
λs
ωn, (8.4.2)
where λ ≡ λn + λs denotes the eﬀective size of the world market and Δ ≡ δλ represents the
North’s research capacity relative to the aggregate eﬀective market size. This notation turns
out to be very convenient for separating the eﬀects of the aggregate world market size, λ, from
those of the relative eﬀective market sizes, λn
λs
. In light of (8.4.2), we establish the following
proposition:
Proposition 15 (IPR-enforcement in South)
(i) The steady-state level of IPR-enforcement in the South is a strategic substitute to IPR-
enforcement in the North.
(ii) For ωn given, the South’s IPR-enforcement increases with the eﬀective market size of
the South, λs, and with the research productivity of the North – i.e., it is decreasing in
Δ.
The result in Item (i) originates from the fact that IPR-enforcement constitutes a global
public good as far as R&D incentives are concerned. With respect to Item (ii), the South’s
impact on the value of a patent becomes larger when it exhibits a larger eﬀective market size,
thereby reducing its incentive to free-ride on the North’s protection levels.25
24We suppress time indices for steady-state variables. The ﬁrst-order condition reads as: Rs(ωn, ωs) =(
1 + Et2δ
)
(D − P ) + βλsP2δ [Y + ωs,t+1(D − P )] = 0.
25Note that the South’s level of IPR-enforcement may be perfect, that is ωs = 1. This can be the case if
either Δ is suﬃciently low, i.e., the research productivity in the North relative to the eﬀective world market
is large or the relative size of the eﬀective market in the South is very large implying a small value of λnλs .
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8.4.2 The problem of the North
In contrast to the government’s objective in the South, the government in the North ad-
ditionally accounts for R&D expenditures, E2t /4δ, and proﬁt ﬂows from the South to the
North, ωs,tNtλsP , which are subject to IPR-enforcement in the South. Hence, the North’s
government maximizes
Wn,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτ
[
λn(Y + ωn,τD) + λsωs,τP − E
2
τ
4δ
]
, (8.4.3)
subject to (8.3.6). We obtain the ﬁrst-order condition
−NtEt
2δ
λnP +Nt+1λnD +Nt
βλnP
2δ
[
λn(Y + ωn,t+1D) + λsωs,t+1P − E
2
t+1
4δ
]
= 0 . (8.4.4)
A marginal increase in ωn,t+1 involves higher R&D costs in period t lowering current con-
sumption. This is reﬂected by the ﬁrst term in (8.4.4). The second term represents the
marginal increase in the deadweight loss in period t+ 1.26 Finally, the marginal beneﬁts are
captured by the last summand of (8.4.4) which multiplies the additional number of innova-
tions, Nt+1 − Nt = Nt βλnP2δ , induced by the marginal increase in IPR-enforcement, with the
future welfare gains per innovation as expressed by the term in brackets.
From (8.4.4), we obtain in steady state
Rn(ωn, ωs) ≡ E˜
2Δ
(D − P ) +D + βP
2Δ
[
λn
λ
(Y + ωnD) +
λs
λ
Pωs − E˜
2
4Δ
]
= 0, (8.4.5)
where E˜ = E/λ. Note that E˜ only depends on the relative eﬀective market sizes, λn/λs, but
not on λ. Equation (8.4.5) implicitly deﬁnes the reaction function of the North, ωrn(ωs). In the
ﬁrst term of (8.4.5), we combined the R&D costs and the deadweight losses of the innovations
created in period t, while the second term represents the deadweight losses resulting from
enforcing the patents created before time t. The government’s future welfare gains induced
Further notice that positive consumption levels at any feasible level of IPR-enforcement require Y > P −D.
Consequently, the ﬁrst term in brackets of (8.4.2) is greater than 1 (i.e. YD−P < −1).
26Note that, by assumption, the marginally higher IPR-enforcement applies to all active patents in t + 1,
Nt+1. This includes all innovations created before time t, Nt, as well as those invented in period t, Nt
Et
2δ .
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by a marginal increase in the North’s level of IPR-enforcement are still captured in the third
term. In the appendix, we show:
Lemma 5
(i) There exists a unique economically sensible solution ωrn(ωs) to Rn(ωn, ωs) = 0.
(ii) The North’s reaction function ωrn(ωs) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave on the
relevant interval [0, 1].
Lemma 5’s implication of strategic substitutability between ωn and ωs from the perspective
of the North is not obvious. A higher ωs implies higher proﬁt inﬂows from the South to
the North for all active patents and for those intermediates that are developed in t. On
the one hand, this increases the North’s incentives to tighten its level of IPR-enforcement.
On the other hand, the global public good problem with respect to R&D-incentives acts to
reduce IPR-enforcement in the North when the South increases its enforcement level. As
veriﬁed in the proof of Lemma 5 the public good aspect dominates. Hence, national levels of
IPR-enforcement are strategic substitutes to foreign enforcement levels.
8.4.3 Equilibrium
The reaction functions of the North, ωrn(ωs), and the South, ω
r
s(ωn), possess only one po-
tentially economically meaningful intersection which we denote by (ωxn, ω
x
s ).
27 However, the
intersection may lie outside of the feasible set [0, 1]2. To account for corner solutions, let
us introduce the notation zˆ ≡ max{min{z, 1}, 0} and zˆ(x) ≡ max{min{z(x), 1}, 0} for a
constant z and a function z(x), respectively. Now we are able to characterize the levels of
IPR-enforcement in a steady-state SPE, (ωen, ω
e
s).
Proposition 16 (Steady-State SPE)
In steady state, there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the IPR-enforcement
game satisfying Assumption 1. The unique enforcement levels in equilibrium are characterized
27A formal proof can be found in Appendix 8.10.
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by
ωen =
⎧⎨
⎩
ωˆrn(0), if ω
x
s ≤ 0,
ωˆxn, if ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1),
ωˆrn(1), if ω
x
s ≥ 1,
ωes =
⎧⎨
⎩
ωˆrs(0), if ω
x
n ≤ 0,
ωˆxs , if ω
x
n ∈ (0, 1),
ωˆrs(1), if ω
x
n ≥ 1.
The proof can be found in Appendix 8.10. Note that in the case of zero IPR-enforcement
in the South, i.e., ωes = 0 both countries’ equilibrium enforcement levels are identical to
the ones they would implement in a closed economy. Given ωes > 0, trade opening between
North and South lowers the enforcement level in the North and enhances the level of IPR-
enforcement in the South compared to autarky. The reason for the former is that the regions’
IPR-enforcement levels are strategic substitutes, while the latter originates from the South’s
internalizing the eﬀect of its IPR-enforcement level on R&D-incentives in the North.
8.4.4 The roles of research capacity and market sizes
In our model, the enforcement levels in the steady-state SPE are entirely determined by the
‘primitives’ α, β,Δ, and λn/λs. Our interest centers on how the decentralized steady-state
equilibrium is aﬀected (1) by the research capacity of the North and the global eﬀective market
size captured by the parameter Δ and (2) by the relative eﬀective market size of the North
and the South, λn
λs
, for a given aggregate market size, i.e. for a given Δ.28
We begin with Δ. Perceiving ωen and ω
e
s as functions in Δ, we obtain
Lemma 6
In an interior equilibrium where (ωen, ω
e
s) ∈ (0, 1)2,
(i) ωen is strictly concave in Δ.
28For example, an increase in the North’s market size leaving that of the South unaﬀected would increase
both, the world market size and the relative market size of North. Consequently, the eﬀect on the IPR-
enforcement level would be a combination of the two eﬀects. For this reason, it seems natural to isolate the
resulting eﬀects from each other.
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(ii) ωes is strictly convex in Δ.
In the proof given in the appendix, we ﬁrst show that ωen is strictly concave in Δ in an interior
equilibrium. As far as IPR-enforcement levels in the South are concerned, ωes is a declining
line in Δ if there is no IPR-enforcement in the North. For positive protection levels in the
North, the South’s enforcement level must be strictly below this line as the protection level
of the North acts as a strategic substitute. Consequently, the protection level of the South
becomes convex since IPR-enforcement in the North is concave.
To fully characterize the comparative-statics, we have to account for corner solutions. There
exists a critical level Δ0j , for both regions individually, such that for any Δ > Δ
0
j country j
is not willing to enforce IPRs.29 This implies for the situation Δ0s < Δ
0
n – i.e., the South’s
critical threshold level is smaller than the one of the North – that for all Δ0n > Δ > Δ
0
s
the South does not oﬀer protection in equilibrium while the North acts as in autarky. The
opposite holds true in the situation where Δ0n < Δ
0
s. In the following, we focus on the case
Δ0s < Δ
0
n and deﬁne Δ
0 ≡ Δ0s as the smallest threshold corresponding to the South. This
condition seems to match reality more closely compared to the opposite case, as it implies a
minimum eﬀective market size of the North relative to the South
λn
λs
>
D
D − P . (8.4.6)
Note that the right-hand side of (8.4.6) is smaller than one. Hence the inequality is always
satisﬁed if λn > λs, but it also holds if λn is not too much smaller than λs. In the next
proposition, we characterize the comparative statics of equilibrium IPR-enforcement levels
with respect to changes in Δ given that condition (8.4.6) holds.
Proposition 17 (Eﬀect of Δ on IPR-enforcement)
If λn
λs
> D
D−P , then
(i) ωes is positive and strictly decreasing with Δ for all Δ < Δ
0, and ωes = 0 for all Δ ≥ Δ0.
29This claim is veriﬁed analytically in the proof of Proposition 17.
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ωen
ωes
Δ
Δ0Δx
Figure 8.1: Steady state equilibrium pairs (ωen, ω
e
s) dependent on Δ, with α = 0.3; β = 0.3;λ =
1;λn = 0.445.
(ii) For interior values, ωen exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with Δ. ω
e
n is identical
to its value in autarky for Δ > Δ0.
(iii) There exists a unique value Δx < Δ0 where ωen = ω
e
s. For all interior equilibria, ω
e
n < ω
e
s
if Δ < Δx, and ωen > ω
e
s > 0 if Δ > Δ
x.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Proposition 17 is illustrated in Figure 8.1. Intuitively,
ωes declines with Δ because a larger value of Δ =
δ
λ
(i.e. declining research capacity (δ ↑)
or declining eﬀective world market size (λ ↓)) implies a lower lever exercised by the South’s
IPR-enforcement on innovation incentives in the North. The convex shape for interior values
of ωes arises, as discussed earlier, from the public-good aspect of IPR-enforcement on R&D-
incentives. In contrast to the literature, our model predicts an inverted U-shaped relation
between the North’s level of IPR-enforcement and Δ. An intuition for this result can be gained
from scrutiny of the North’s reaction function (8.4.5) for a given ωs.
30 Using the implicit-
function theorem, the partial derivative of ωrn(ωs) with respect to Δ can be written as
∂ωrn
∂Δ
=
−∂R(ωn,ωs)
∂Δ
/∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂ωn
. As we show in the appendix the denominator is negative, implying that
30The eﬀect of Δ via ωs changes ω
e
n quantitatively but does not aﬀect the inverted-U shape of ω
e
n in Δ.
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the sign of ∂ω
r
n
∂Δ
is identical to the one of ∂R(ωn,ωs)
∂Δ
, which may be positive or negative. On the
one hand, a decline in Δ involves an increase in the number of innovations, (βP/2Δ). On the
other hand, it increases current R&D expenditures and future deadweight losses (ﬁrst term
in (8.4.5)). Additionally, welfare per innovation (term in brackets in (8.4.5)) declines when
Δ becomes smaller because next period’s R&D expenditures increase, as well. The beneﬁts
of a marginal increase in ω (the higher number of innovations) are not increasing as strongly
when Δ becomes smaller as the marginal costs (additional R&D-costs and deadweight losses),
implying an inverted U-shaped relation between ωen and Δ.
It is important to emphasize that this result is not an implication of convex R&D-costs at the
research lab level. The central assumptions behind this result are that the government does
not take full account of the future beneﬁts of R&D and enforces all active patents at the same
strength. It is straightforward to show that in the case of a far-sighted government which
could commit to a particular enforcement level for each vintage over the entire lifetime of its
patent (such as in Grossman and Lai (2004)), a monotonically declining relationship between
ωn and Δ would result.
31 Similarly, in a one shot game where the government determines the
level of IPR-enforcement once and for all. The governments’ limited time horizons and the
necessity to enforce all active patents at the same strength result in diﬀerent weights between
the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs of IPR-enforcement in the government’s ﬁrst-
order condition. While the government can only inﬂuence the proﬁt ﬂows and deadweight
losses in the next period, the induced additional costs for R&D that accrue in the current
period account for the entire net present value of future proﬁts. The latter cost term takes
the dominant role for small values of Δ leading to an increasing relationship between IPR-
enforcement and Δ in the North. To the contrary, the South’s decision problem is independent
from R&D-expenditures, such that the dynamic gains from the perspective of the South are
monotonically increasing with the research productivity of the North. As a consequence of
this result, we may ﬁnd lower IPR-enforcement levels in the North than in the South for
suﬃciently small Δ, and vice versa if Δ is suﬃciently large.
31A proof is provided upon request.
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Before turning our attention to the comparative statics with respect to relative market sizes,
λn
λs
, we verify that in interior equilibria, the global rate of growth on the balanced growth
path increases when the research capacity becomes larger, even though the North’s level of
IPR-enforcement may be declining at low values of Δ.
Proposition 18 (Eﬀect of Δ on steady-state growth)
In interior equilibria (ωen, ω
e
s) ∈ (0, 1)2, the global steady-state growth rate strictly decreases
with Δ.
The proof can be found in Appendix 8.10. Finally we turn to the role of relative market sizes
for IPR-enforcement and economic growth. We focus again on interior equilibria.
Proposition 19 (Eﬀect of relative eﬀective market size)
In interior equilibria (ωen, ω
e
s) ∈ (0, 1)2, both countries’ IPR-enforcement levels increase with
their relative eﬀective market sizes. The steady-state growth rate is unaﬀected by the relative
eﬀective market sizes.
The proof is provided in Appendix 8.10. Governments tighten IPR-enforcement in response
to an increase in their relative market share, since their relative levers in inducing innova-
tions increase. The region becoming relatively smaller by a marginal change in the relative
eﬀective market sizes reduces its IPR-enforcement level in a symmetric way such that the
global discounted proﬁts to be earned in expectation by an entrepreneur in the North remain
unchanged. As a consequence, the steady-state growth rate remains unaﬀected. In sum, a
change in a country’s eﬀective market size will aﬀect the growth rate only through its eﬀect
on the total world market size but not via a change in the its relative market size.
8.5 Harmonization of IPR-enforcement
As discussed in the introduction, some countries make an eﬀort to harmonize IPR-enforcement
globally, e.g., via ACTA. In this respect, it is interesting to explore which harmonized IPR-
enforcement level the governments of Regions n and s would like to implement given it had
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the power to do so. These enforcement levels may shed light on the diﬀerences that need to
be bridged in international negotiation rounds.32
In our context harmonization means that both regions are subject to the same level of IPR-
enforcement. Hence, expected discounted proﬁts per invention are speciﬁed as
Eht =
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tωhj,τPλ, (8.5.1)
where ωhj,τ represents the harmonized IPR-enforcement level preferred by Region j. The
evolution of the technology stock is again captured by (8.3.6), where discounted proﬁts are
now determined by (8.5.1), such that
Nn,t+1 = Nt
(
1 +
Eht
2Δ
)
. (8.5.2)
With respect to the governments’ decision problems, we keep with the two major assumptions
that there is only commitment on IPR-enforcement for one period and all active patents have
to be enforced at the same strength. One may argue that an agreement in the international
arena could serve as a commitment device, partially at least. However, particularly where
IPR-enforcement is concerned rather than formal laws, there is also the possibility of renego-
tiations after each period. Here, we stress the latter point.33 This also allows us to directly
compare the results to the ones in the decentralized setting.
8.5.1 Desired harmonized enforcement level of the South
We begin with the optimization problem of the government located in the South which chooses
a single level of IPR-enforcement that applies to both regions. The South maximizes
W hs,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτλs
[
Y + ωhs,τ (D − P )
]
, (8.5.3)
32In the formal bargaining problem, the governments’ most preferred IPR-enforcement levels are the points
on the boundary of the feasible set which will realize if the respective regional government possesses all the
bargaining power. The threat point of the problem is the decentralized equilibrium as described in the previous
section. How close to governments’ ideal enforcement levels the bargaining outcome will be depends on the
relative bargaing power, of course.
33Allowing for commitment over a longer ﬁnite time horizon would increase the desired levels of IPR-
protection but would not change the characteristics of the problem qualitatively.
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subject to (8.5.2). Along the balanced growth path, we obtain as the preferred harmonized
enforcement level of the South34
ωhs = −
1− β
2− β
(
Y
D − P +
2Δ
βP
)
. (8.5.4)
Compared to the decentralized protection game (see Equation (8.4.2)), the desired harmonized
enforcement level of the South is larger, since the marginal beneﬁts in terms of R&D incentives
increase due to the larger market size in the optimization problem (λ versus λs) for which
enforcement is determined. At the same time, the marginal costs in terms of deadweight
losses in the South and proﬁt outﬂows to the North remain as in the decentralized setting.
In addition, ωhs is independent from relative market sizes. Equation (8.5.4) reveals that ω
h
s
increases with the North’s research capacity but is independent of the relative eﬀective market
sizes. We summarize these observations in the next proposition.
Proposition 20 (Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the South)
The preferred harmonized level of IPR-enforcement of the South increases with the North’s
research productivity and the global eﬀective market size but is independent of the relative
market sizes.
8.5.2 Desired harmonized enforcement level of the North
The objective of the government in the North includes proﬁt inﬂows from the South which
are – contrary to the decentralized IPR-enforcement game – subject to the harmonized en-
forcement level of the North
W hn,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτ
[
λn(Y + ω
h
n,τD) + λsPω
h
n,τ −
(
Ehτ
)2
4δ
]
. (8.5.5)
34Note that we still assume that the government is able to adjust IPR-enforcement after each period.
Consequently, in period t the South determines the optimal harmonized enforcement level ωhs,t+1 taking as
given the rational beliefs of the entrepreneurs about future governments’ optimal decisions (see Assumption
1). The ﬁrst-order condition reads as
(
1 +
Eht
2Δ
)
(D − P ) = −β P2Δ
[
Y + ωhs,t+1(D − P )
]
.
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In steady state, the North’s optimal level of global IPR-enforcement, ωhn, satisﬁes
35
Rhn(ω
h
n) ≡
E˜h
2
(D − P ) + Δ(D + λs
λn
P )
+
βP
2
[
Y + ωhn
(
D + P
λs
λn
)
−
(
E˜h
)2
4Δ
(
1 +
λs
λn
)]
= 0. (8.5.6)
where E˜h = β
1−βPω
h
n. The next proposition veriﬁes that (8.5.6) possess a unique economically
sensible solution and describes the eﬀects of changes in Δ and the relative market sizes, λn
λs
,
on the preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North.
Proposition 21 (Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the North)
There exists a unique economically sensible solution to the North’s optimization problem.
The North’s desired harmonized level of global IPR-enforcement depends on its research
productivity and its relative eﬀective market size as follows:
(i) If λn
λs
< −P
D
, then the North’s desired level of global IPR-enforcement, ωhn, increases
with Δ.
(ii) If λn
λs
> −P
D
, then there exists a unique value Δm > 0 where for all Δ > (<)Δm, the
North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement, ωhn, decreases (increases) with Δ.
(iii) There exists a unique value Δ¯ > 0, where for all Δ > (<)Δ¯, the North’s desired level
of IPR-enforcement, ωhn, decreases (increases) with
λn
λs
.
The proof can be found in Appendix 8.10. Concerning the eﬀects of research capacity and
global eﬀective market size (Δ), Proposition 21 distinguishes two cases. In the ﬁrst, (i), an
increase of global IPR-enforcement involves less additional deadweight losses in the North
(−λnD) than additional proﬁt inﬂows from the South (λsP ). Thus, the only costs associated
35The North’s ﬁrst-order condition reads Rhn(ω
h
n,t+1) =
Eht
2λ (D − P ) + Δ(D + λsλnP ) +
βP
2
[
Y + ωhn,t+1
(
D + P λsλn
)
− (E
h
t+1)
2
4Δλλn
]
= 0. As the North controls proﬁt inﬂows from the South, the second-
order condition for the problem described above may be violated, if λsλn is large enough, such that the marginal
gains from proﬁt inﬂows to the North always overcompensate the marginal R&D costs and deadweight losses
in the North. Then the North opts for complete protection ωhn,t = 1, ∀t. In the following, we consider the
more interesting case where the second-order condition for a maximum is satisﬁed, such that λnλs >
P−2D
P > 1,
since D < 0.
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Δ
ωhn
ωhn
ωhs
λn
λs
↑
Δ¯
Figure 8.2: Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the North (solid lines) in response to an
increase in λn
λs
(gray versus black solid line). Dashed line: desired harmonized IPR-enforcement
level of the South. Parameters: α = 0.3; β = 0.35;λ = 1;λn = 0.78.
with IPR-enforcement are the research costs, and the North’s main objective in enforcing
global IPRs is to reap proﬁts from the South. The latter is cheaper when Δ increases as this
implies lower aggregate R&D expenditures. As a consequence, there is a positive relation
between ωhn and Δ. In the second case, (ii), the proﬁt inﬂows from the South are lower than
the deadweight losses in the North incurred by an increase in global IPR-enforcement. In
this scenario, the North’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to its most preferred harmonized
enforcement level shows a similar structure as the one in the decentralized game with the
diﬀerence that a part of the North’s deadweight losses are compensated for by higher proﬁt
inﬂows from the South. As a consequence, we also obtain an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between ωhn and Δ for which the same intuition as provided in the discussion of the
decentralized setting can be applied.
Contrary to the decentralized enforcement game, the relative eﬀective market size exhibits a
non-monotonic eﬀect on the North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement as indicated by Item
(iii) of Proposition 21. The reason is that changes in the relative eﬀective market sizes change
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the weights attached to the diﬀerent components in the North’s objective function. As an
illustration consider the eﬀect of an increase of λn/λs given λ on the government’s welfare
objective in period t. The latter writes as
Nt
[
λnY + ω
h
n,t
(
λnD + λsP
)
− (E
h
t )
2
4Δ
]
. (8.5.7)
Substituting λs by λ− λn and taking the derivative with respect to λn given λ yields
Ntλn
[
Y + ωhn,t
(
D − P
)]
. (8.5.8)
Apparently, the marginal change of the North’s periodic welfare with respect to changes in
its own relative market size (8.5.8) is structurally equivalent to the periodic welfare of the
South and is independent of research expenditures since Eht depends only on the eﬀective
world market size λ, which remains unchanged. Intuitively, a larger eﬀective market size of
the North gives higher weight to ﬁnal-good production and deadweight losses in the North
and lower weight to the proﬁt inﬂow from the South. That is, an increase in the eﬀective
market size of the North gives higher weight to those components of the North’s periodic
welfare that are also present in the South’s. Hence, the desired IPR-enforcement level of the
Northern government approaches the one of the South when λn/λs increases. However, it will
never coincide with ωhs , since ω
h
n represents the solution under autarky for λs = 0 with R&D
expenditures still being positive. A graphical illustration is presented in Figure 8.2, where
the solid gray line reﬂects the desired harmonized enforcement level of the North for a lower
relative market size λn/λs compared to the dark solid line. The dark solid curve is closer to
the dashed line which represents the desired harmonized enforcement level of the South.36
36Formally this can be seen as follows. As a direct consequence of the arguments above, it follows that the
derivative of Rhn(ω
h
n) with respect to λn/λs is equivalent to the South’s ﬁrst-order condition in steady state
(cf. footnote 23)
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ λnλs
= Rhs (ω
h
s ) ≡
(
1 +
E˜h
2Δ
)
(D − P ) + β P
2Δ
(Y + ωhj (D − P )),
with j = n, s. The optimal level of IPR-enforcement of the South is given by
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ λnλs
= Rhs (ω
h
s ) = 0. As
(8.5.9) is decreasing with ωhj , and given that Δ is such that the desired value of IPR-enforcement of the North
is higher than that of the South – i.e., ωhn > ω
h
s – an increase of the North’s relative market size would imply
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ λnλs
< 0 and thus
dωhn
d λnλs
< 0. This argument follows directly from the implicit-function theorem. The
opposite holds true if ωhn < ω
h
s (see Figure 8.2).
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According to this intuition and Proposition 21 (iii), we infer:
Proposition 22 (North’s and South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement)
For interior values of ωhn and ω
h
s , ω
h
n < ω
h
s if Δ < Δ¯, and ω
h
n > ω
h
s if Δ > Δ¯.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 8.2 and a proof is provided in the appendix.37 Propo-
sition 22 implies that when the research productivity in the North is very large (Δ suﬃciently
small), the South may even desire a higher harmonized enforcement level than the North.
Likely, reality is described by Δ > Δ¯ and Δ > Δx implying that ωhn > ω
h
s and ω
e
n > ω
e
s.
Then the North’s desired harmonized enforcement level increases with the relative market
size of the South while its equilibrium enforcement level in the decentralized game declines.38
Consequently, a relatively larger Southern market widens the gap between ωhn and ω
e
n. The
opposite is true for the South: Its desired harmonized level is independent from the relative
market sizes, while the equilibrium level ωes increases with the South’s relative market size.
This implies that the diﬀerence between ωes and ω
h
s becomes smaller, since ω
e
s < ω
h
s as argued
in Section 8.5.1.
In particular, with regard to the ACTA-negotiations our results suggest that small countries
located in the North strongly favor tighter IPR-enforcement as they beneﬁt most from higher
proﬁt inﬂows from the South, with the latter incurring the correspondingly large amount of
deadweight losses.
8.6 Constrained Eﬃciency and Comparison of Regimes
What would be the maximum welfare that governments could achieve by coordinating their
respective levels of IPR-enforcement, but given their inability to escape their political-economy
constraints? We have in mind a global government choosing pairs of (ωn,t+1, ωs,t+1) so as to
37Recall that ωˆhn ≡ max{min{ωhn, 1}, 0}. Moreover, we changed the set of parameters for illustrative pur-
poses of interior solutions without altering the qualitative results. The set of parameters employed in the
previous section violates the second order condition of the North, such that the North would choose full
protection, i.e. ωhn = 1. The parameters used in this section imply a corner solution in the decentralized en-
forcement game, such that the South opts very fast for zero protection and the North behaves as in autarky.
38Scotchmer (2004, p. 336 and 346) notes that during the TRIPS negotiations countries with smaller
markets were in favor of stronger protection.
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maximize the sum of the regional governments’ welfare. Since expected proﬁts depend only
on the path of Φt = λnωn,t+λsωs,t and not on particular values of ωn,t and ωs,t, we can rewrite
the maximization problem of a global government in terms of Φt.
39 Hence the constrained
eﬃcient pairs of IPR-enforcement, (ωn,t+1, ωs,t+1), are obtained by solving
max
Ωpt+1
W =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNt
⎡
⎣Y λ+D (λnωn,t + λsωs,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φt
−E
2
t
4Δ
⎤
⎦ , (8.6.1)
subject to (8.3.6). The necessary condition for a constrained welfare maximum in steady state
reads as
D +
E˜
2Δ
(D − P ) + βP
2Δ
(
Y +DΦ/λ− E˜
2
4Δ
)
= 0. (8.6.2)
Sidestepping the multiplicity of optimal solutions to the global government’s problem, we focus
on the (unique) constrained eﬃcient harmonized solution where the optimal enforcement level
ωp is implemented in both regions and solves (8.6.2). In this case, we obtain Φ = λωp and
(8.6.2) coincides with the ﬁrst-order condition of a closed economy with eﬀective market size
λ.
The constrained-eﬃcient solution serves as a theoretical point of reference to which we re-
late the enforcement levels obtained from the previous sections. The diﬀerent levels of
IPR-enforcement are depicted in Figure 8.3. The regions’ preferred harmonized and the
constrained-eﬃcient enforcement levels intersect at Δ¯ such that ωhn > ω
p > ωhs , if Δ > Δ¯,
while ωhn < ω
p < ωhs , if Δ < Δ¯.
The intuition behind this result can be described as follows: for λs → 0 and λn → λ the
preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North must equal the constrained-eﬃcient
solution (ωhn = ω
p) since the world economy consists of the North only. According to Item (iii)
of Proposition 21, ωhn increases with λs/λn if Δ > Δ¯, but declines if Δ < Δ¯.
40 Hence, starting
from the situation where λs = 0 and λn = λ, an increase in λs/λn turns ω
h
n counterclockwise
39An equivalent result is obtained by Grossman and Lai (2004).
40Intuitively, in the former case the motive of gaining proﬁt ﬂows from the South dominates while in the
latter Δ is so small that increased R&D expenditures are of greater concern.
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Δ
ωhn
ωp
ωhs
Δ¯
Figure 8.3: Comparison between the regimes: non-cooperative enforcement, eﬃcient solution
and preferred harmonized enforcement levels. Parameters: α = 0.3; β = 0.4;λ = 1;λn = 0.78.
around Δ¯ implying ωhn > (<) ω
p if Δ > (<) Δ¯. As discussed in the previous section, for a
declining ratio λs/λn, ω
h
n approaches ω
h
s but will not coincide with it in the limit λs/λn → 0.
Accordingly, Proposition 22 implies ωhs < (>) ω
p for Δ > (<) Δ¯. As a consequence, the
constrained-eﬃcient IPR-enforcement level is in between the desired harmonized enforcement
levels of the North and the South for all Δ 	= Δ¯.
Concerning the decentralized enforcement level in the North, we know from Proposition 5 that
∂ωen
∂ λn
λs
> 0. Moreover, in the situation where λn = λ, ω
e
n coincides with the constrained-eﬃcient
enforcement level ωp.41 An increase in λs/λn thus implies ω
e
n < ω
p. According to our previous
discussion, it further involves ωen < ω
h
n for Δ ≥ Δ¯. However, this relation may not be satisﬁed
for all Δ < Δ¯.42 We summarize our observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 23 (Comparison of IPR-enforcement regimes)
(i) At Δ = Δ¯ the regions’ preferred harmonized enforcement levels correspond to the
constrained eﬃcient harmonized IPR-enforcement, i.e., ωhs = ω
h
n = ω
p.
41The reason is that if λn = λ, the decision problem of the North is entirely described by the constrained
eﬃcient problem.
42In this case both, ωen and ω
h
n decline with λs/λn. Conditions under which ω
e
n < ω
h
n for all Δ ≥ Δ¯ will be
provided upon request.
8. Intellectual Property, North-South Trade, and Growth 297
(ii) For Δ < Δ¯, ωhs is above and ω
h
n below the constrained-eﬃcient level of IPR-enforcement.
For all Δ > Δ¯, ωhs is below and ω
h
n above the constrained-eﬃcient level of IPR-
enforcement.
(iii) The decentralized equilibrium level of IPR-enforcement in the North, ωen, is always
below the constrained-eﬃcient level and lower than the North’s desired harmonized
enforcement level if Δ ≥ Δ¯.
The world economy is arguably best described by Δ > Δ¯. As stated in Proposition 23 and
depicted in Figure 8.3, the preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North exceeds the
constrained-eﬃcient level which in turn is higher than the preferred harmonized enforcement
level of the South. Since the steady-state growth rate is a linear function of IPR-enforcement,
the implementation of ωhn would be most conducive for economic growth.
43 On the other hand,
for small values of Δ, the decentralized game yields the lowest aggregate incentives for R&D
and consequently the lowest steady-state growth rate. Interestingly, the latter may even fall
below the resulting growth rate if the South’s desired harmonized level of IPR-enforcement
were adopted globally.44
8.7 Welfare
Whether the South should adopt the IPR-standards of the North is one of the most debated
questions in the political arena.45 However, it is not clear to which IPR-standards of the
North the discussion refers to: the equilibrium choice of the North or its desired harmonized
enforcement level. Figure 8.3 in the previous section suggests that even though the diﬀerence
between the North’s and the South’s equilibrium choices can be substantial, the South’s
desired harmonized IPR-enforcement level can be quite close to the North’s equilibrium choice.
43As can be inferred directly from (8.3.6), the steady-state growth rate can be written as g(ωhj ) =
E˜
2Δ .
44This can be the case when λs/λn is large (however still satisfying (8.4.6)). Using the set of parameters
employed in this section, we obtain ωes = 0 (even for Δ < Δ¯). The North behaves as in autarky where
ωen < ω
p < ωhn for Δ > Δ¯ = 0.005. The resulting growth rate per year for Δ = 0.009 implying ω
e
n ≈ 0.85 and
ωhs ≈ 0.75 equals ge ≈ 3.6% and g(ωhs ) ≈ 3.8%.
45See e.g., Lai and Qiu (2003).
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Δ
Δ0f → ωfs = 0
Δ0h → ωhs = 0
W¯nhs W¯
sh
s W¯
sf
s
Figure 8.4: Welfare eﬀects in the South due to the implementation of ωhs , ω
h
n and ω
f
s as a
function of Δ, respectively (W¯ shs corresponds to ω
h
s ; W¯
nh
s corresponds to ω
h
n; W¯
sf
s corresponds
to ωfs ).
Hence, a binding adoption of the North’s equilibrium enforcement level might not be such a
contentious issue as opposed to the implementation of the North’s most preferred harmonized
protection level of IPRs. We therefore explore the welfare eﬀects in the South resulting from
the implementation of ωhn along the balanced growth path as compared to the implementation
of ωhs .
46 Aggregate welfare in the South can be written as
W¯s(ω
h
j ) =
1
1− β(1 + g(ωhj ))
λs
[
Y + ωhj (D − P )
]
, (8.7.1)
with g(ωhj ) =
Pωhj
2Δ
β
1−β and j = n, s.
47 The results are depicted in Figure 8.4.
The gray solid line reﬂects the South’s overall welfare, W¯s(ω
h
s ), obtained from its government’s
preferred harmonized enforcement level, while the dashed line represents the long-term welfare
level, W¯s(ω
h
n), realized by accepting the Northern government’s desired harmonized enforce-
46We do not consider welfare eﬀects in the North, which are very intuitive: The implementation of ωhs in
the North causes welfare losses there relative to the implementation of ωhn, since the South neglects the impact
of ωhs on R&D expenditures and proﬁt inﬂows to the North.
47We use the same set of parameters as before: α = 0.3;β = 0.4;λ = 1;λn = 0.78. Details on the
calculations can be obtained upon request.
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ment level. Figure 8.4 indicates that for a relatively high research capacity in the North
(Δ < Δ0f ), the implementation of ω
h
n would induce welfare gains in the South compared to
the implementation of its own preferred harmonized enforcement level, ωhs . For large values
of Δ, however, the South suﬀers welfare losses by implementing ωhn rather than ω
h
s .
The result that the South gains in welfare from implementing the desired harmonized IPR-
enforcement level of the North can be explained by the Southern government’s limited time
horizon. To illustrate this, we calculate the simple one-shot solution to maximizing welfare
in the South given by (8.7.1). That is, the government in the South selects the global level of
IPR-enforcement at t = 0 which is then ﬁxed for all times. The welfare level realized from the
implementation of this enforcement level, which we denote by ωfs , is indicated by the dashed
dark line in Figure 8.4.48 Here we directly observe that the South’s welfare level obtained from
the implementation of the North’s desired harmonized enforcement level approximates the one
realized in the full commitment case for Δ < Δ0f . To the contrary, the implementation of ω
h
n
causes welfare losses for Δ > Δ0f , since the South would set even ω
f
s equal to zero. Clearly
the intuition is that the government in the South would enforce IPR stronger if its planning
horizon accounted for the entire future welfare associated with innovations.49 Hence, if the
research capacity of the North is large, accepting the North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement
in international negotiation rounds such as ACTA, would foster long-term welfare in the South.
However, the opposite is true when the research capacity is low, such that Δ > Δ0f .
48Note that ωfs must satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition
2δ
P
(1 +
E˜
2Δ
)(D − P ) +
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t(1 + g)τ−t−1λs
[
Y + ωfs (D − P )
]
= 0.
The ﬁrst-order condition concerning the (one-shot) full-commitment problem diﬀers from the one with limited
commitment (8.5.4) with respect to the second summand which represents the discounted beneﬁt of a change in
IPR-enforcement for all future periods. It follows that the South would prefer a higher harmonized enforcement
level when full commitment were available – i.e., W¯s(ω
f
s ) > W¯s(ω
h
s ).
49Note that ωhs = 0 for Δ > Δ
0
h.
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8.8 Summary and Conclusions
Even though most countries have agreed to harmonize intellectual property rights by signing
TRIPs, there is much dispute about the enforcement of IPR in the world. This paper ex-
amines IPR-enforcement in an endogenous growth framework with two open economies. We
incorporate three assumptions that distinguish our paper from the previous literature and
add realistic features to the model. These are that in each economy all active patents are
enforced at the same (endogenously chosen) strength, the governments cannot fully commit
to IPR-enforcement for the indeﬁnite future and have limited planning horizons, e.g. due to
re-election concerns.
While the governments in the decentralized game provide too little IPR-enforcement relative
to the constrained-eﬃcient solution that maximizes the governments’ aggregate welfare under
the previous assumptions, both regions, the North and the South, desire higher IPR-protection
relative to the equilibrium enforcement levels if they were able to select a harmonized world
enforcement level. Typically, the North’s desired harmonized enforcement level is larger than
the constrained eﬃcient one while that of the South is lower. The diﬀerence between the
North’s and the South’s desired harmonized enforcement levels increases with the relative
market size of the South, thus amplifying the clash of interests in international negotiations.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the smaller a region’s relative market size, the larger is the diﬀer-
ence between its equilibrium choice and the ideal harmonized enforcement desired on the
international level.
Concerning the discussion whether the South suﬀers welfare losses from adopting the desired
IPR-enforcement levels of the North, our numerical welfare example suggests that as long as
the North’s research capacity is not too low, the South may well beneﬁt in terms of overall
long-term welfare. However, when the research capacity is low, the dynamic gains realized
would not justify the large proﬁt outﬂows even from a long-term welfare perspective.
It is frequently assumed in the political economy literature as well as in parts of the dynamic
macroeconomic literature that governments act in a short-sighted way. Our paper highlights
8. Intellectual Property, North-South Trade, and Growth 301
that such an assumption can change the above results in counterintuitive ways for very high
levels of the North’s research capabilities. In particular the North’s short-sighted goverment’s
IPR-enforcement level in equilibrium and also the desired harmonized level may decline with
its research productivity. As a consequence, the short-sighted government in the South may
choose a higher equilibrium and desired harmonized enforcement level than the North.
With regard to ACTA, the countries working out the agreement correspond to what we
have referred to as the innovative Northern countries in our analysis. Assuming that ACTA
reﬂects their desired globally harmonized level of IPR-enforcement, our results suggest that,
under realistic research capabilities, the ACTA-enforcement levels are higher than the globally
eﬃcient harmonized level of IPR-enforcement and also higher than the desired harmonized
enforcement levels in the South. This would increase the growth rates of both, the North and
the South. However, our numerical example suggests that the South will likely loose in terms
of welfare. Consequently, even if the Northern countries will ratify the treaty, their hopes
that ACTA will become a global pact by the less innovative Southern countries also signing
the agreement will likely be disappointed.
Our paper opens up several avenues for future research. It would be interesting to extend the
enforcement game to one where both regions are active in research and to consider more than
two countries. Further, the framework developed can be used to study several important
aspects of IPR-protection such as blocking patents, diﬀerences in preferences between the
countries or principal-agent problems in R&D joint ventures and their consequences for long-
run development.
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8.10 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
(i) Solving Rn(ωn, ωs) = 0 for ωn yields
ωn1(ωs) =
1
β2P 2λn
[
G(ωs) + 2
√
ΔλH(ωs)
]
(8.10.1)
ωn2(ωs) =
1
β2P 2λn
[
G(ωs)− 2
√
ΔλH(ωs)
]
where
G(ωs) = −β2λsP 2ωs − 2(1− β)Δλ(−(2− β)D + P ) < 0,
H(ωs) = Δλ[(2− 3β + β2)2D2 + (1− β)2(P 2 − 4(1− β)DP ))]
+(1− β)2β2P 2(λnY − λs(D − P )ωs) > 0.
The signs of G(ωs) and H(ωs) imply that ω
n
n2(ωs) is negative for all values ωs ≥ 0. In contrast,
ωnn1(ωs) can be positive. Hence the latter is the only economically sensible solution and we
deﬁne ωrn(ωs) ≡ ωn1(ωs).
(ii) Taking the second derivative of ωrn(ωs) with respect to ωs gives
d2ωrn(ωs)
dω2s
= −(1− β)
4β2Δ2λ2λ2s(D − P )2P 2
2λn[H(ωs)]
3
2
< 0, ∀ωs ≥ 0.
Note that H(ωs) > 0 for all ωs ≥ 0. Thus ωrn(ωs) is strictly concave.
To show that ωrn(ωs) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1], we use the implicit-function theorem. The
partial derivative of Rn(ωn, ωs) with respect to ωn reads
∂Rn(ωn, ωs)
∂ωn
=
1
2
∂E˜
∂ωn
(D − P ) + βP
2
(
D − E˜
2Δ
∂E˜
∂ωn
)
< 0.
As the monopoly distortion D is negative, the derivative is smaller than zero for all (ωn, ωs) ∈
R
2
+. The derivative of Rn(ωn, ωs) with respect to ωs can be written as
∂Rn(ωn, ωs)
∂ωs
= − β
2
1− β
P 2λs
2λ
+
1
2
∂E˜
∂ωs
(
D − βP
2
E˜
Δ
)
< 0.
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The implicit-function theorem then implies
dωn
dωs
= −
∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂ωn
∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂ωs
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 16
The intuition of the proof can be summarized as follows. First, we show that there is a unique
economically sensible intersection of the reaction functions of the North and the South. Then
we verify that the reaction function of the North intersects the one of the South from below.
This implies that there exists a stable “Cobb-web” mechanism towards the intersection of the
reaction functions. This mechanism leads to a unique equilibrium which is the intersection of
the reaction function itself if the intersection is in the feasible set. Otherwise it determines a
unique equilibrium on the boundary of the feasible set. The detailed formal proof is provided
in the working paper version Schaefer and Schneider (2011).
Proof of Lemma 6
From the proof of Proposition 16, we know that
ωxn =
1
β2P 2λn
[
Q1(Δ) + 2
√
(2− β)2Δλ2Q2(Δ)
]
,
where
Q1(Δ) =
β2λsY P
2
D − P + 2Δλ((3− β)(2− β)D − (4− 3β)P ) < 0,
Q2(Δ) = (3− β)2ΔD2 − 4(3− 2β)ΔDP + P 2(2(2− β)Δ + β2Y ) > 0.
The second derivative of ωxn with respect to Δ reads
d2ωxn
dΔ2
= −(2− β)β
2P 2λY
2λnQ2(Δ)
3
2
< 0.
Concerning the convexity of the South’s IPR-level in Δ, we use equation (8.4.2) and take the
second derivative with respect to Δ to obtain
d2ωxs
dΔ2
= − 1
2− β
λn
λs
d2ωxn
dΔ2
< 0. (8.10.2)
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Since d
2ωxn
dΔ2
< 0, d
2ωxs
dΔ2
must be positive and hence, ωxs is strictly convex in Δ. 
Proof of Proposition 17
To verify the three items of Proposition 17, it is necessary to show that ωxs is strictly convex
and declining with Δ, while ωxn is strictly concave and exhibits an inverted U-shaped relation
with Δ. Then determining the roots of ωxs and ω
x
n in Δ identiﬁes Δ
0
s and Δ
0
n. Comparing Δ
0
s
and Δ0n yields condition (8.4.6).
Item (i) of Proposition 17 follows from the properties of ωxs mentioned above. For Item (ii)
it is necessary to additionally show that ωrn(0) (i.e., the North’s IPR-enforcement level in
autarky) is strictly concave in Δ and intersects with ωxn from above at Δ
0(≡ Δ0s). Since ωen
is identical to ωxn for all Δ < Δ
0 and identical to ωrn(0) for all Δ ≥ Δ0, this implies that ωen
is strictly concave and shows an inverted U-shape over the entire relevant interval, but is –
of course – not diﬀerentiable at Δ0. Item (iii) follows from the properties of ωxn and ω
x
s given
that condition (8.4.6) is satisﬁed.
The detailed formal proof becomes involved because ωxn and ω
x
s do not possess closed forms
that meaningfully reveal their properties in Δ. This requires to operate via the ﬁrst-order
conditions using the implicit-function theorem and making several estimates. The detailed
formal proof is provided in the working paper version Schaefer and Schneider (2011).
Proof of Proposition 18
The equilibrium growth rate of both economies writes
g =
βP (λn
λ
ωxn +
λs
λ
ωxs )
2(1− β)Δ .
Inserting50
ωxn =
1
β2P 2λn
[
Q1(Δ) + 2
√
(2− β)2Δλ2Q2(Δ)
]
(8.10.3)
50Details on how ωxn is derived can be found in the extended appendix of the Schaefer and Schneider (2011).
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and ωxs as given by (8.4.2) and diﬀerentiating with respect to Δ yields
dg
dΔ
=
−βY
2Δ
√
Δ(β2Y P 2 +Δ((3− β)2D2 − 4(3− 2β)DP + 2(2− β)P 2 < 0.

Proof of Proposition 19
First we show that ωxn increases with
λn
λs
and, thereafter, that ωxs decreases with
λn
λs
. Finally,
we verify that the growth rate is invariant with λn
λs
given Δ.
1. Let us consider Ren(ωn), which is derived by inserting ω
r
s(ωn) as given by (8.4.2) into
the ﬁrst-order condition of the North (8.4.5). As shown in the ﬁrst part of the proof
of Proposition 16, Ren(ωn) possesses two real roots, of which only the larger one is
economically sensible and is denoted by ωxn. Using the implicit-function theorem, we
obtain
dωxn
dλn
λs
∣∣∣∣∣
λ
=
dωxn
dλn
∣∣∣∣
λ
= −
∂Ren(ωn)
∂λn
∣∣∣
λ
∂Ren(ωn)
∂ωn
.
Concerning the sign of the denominator, we can show that ∂R
e
n(ωn)
∂ωn
|ωn=ωxn < 0 by verifying
that Ren(ωn) is strictly concave.
51 Ren(ωn) can be written as
Ren(ωn) =
D − P
2
β
2− βP
(
λn
λ
ωn − A1
)
+ΔD +
βP
2
[
λn
λ
(Y + ωnD)− P 1− β
2− βA1 − P
λn
λ
ωn
2− β −
(
β
2− β
)2
P 2
4Δ
(
λn
λ
ωn −A1
)2]
.
where A1 =
Y
D−P
λs
λ
+ 2Δ
βP
. Taking the second derivative with respect to ωn, we obtain
∂2Ren(ωn)
∂ω2n
= −
(
β
2− β
)2
P 2
2Δ
(
λn
λ
)2
< 0.
51This follows from the facts mentioned above: that Ren(ωn) possesses two real roots and ω
x
n is the larger
one of the two.
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As a consequence of the denominator being negative, the sign of dω
x
n
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
is identical to
that of dR
e
n(ωn)
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
. For the derivative of Ren(ωn) with respect to λn given the total market
size λ, we can write
∂Ren(ωn)
∂λn
∣∣∣∣
λ
=
βP (Y + ωn(D − P ))
4Δ(2− β)2λ2(D − P )2 [2Δλ(D − P )((3− β)(2− β)D
−(4 − 3β)P ) + β2P 2(λsY − λnωn(D − P ))
]
. (8.10.4)
Since Y + D − P > 0, it can be readily observed from (8.10.4) that dRen(ωn)
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
> 0.
Hence, if we have an interior solution where ωen ∈ (0, 1), the North’s IPR-enforcement
level strictly increases with its relative eﬀective market size.
2. We insert λs = λ− λn into (8.4.2) and take the derivative with respect to λn given the
total market size λ. We obtain
dωxs
dλn
∣∣∣∣
λ
= −1− β
2− β
2Δλ
λ2s
− ωn
2− β
λ
λ2s
− λn
λs
1
2− β
dωxn
dλn
∣∣∣∣
λ
< 0 (8.10.5)
As we know from the ﬁrst part of the proof that dω
x
n
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
> 0, it follows that dω
x
s
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
< 0.
This veriﬁes that the South (at an interior solution) also increases IPR-enforcement if
its relative market size increases.
3. Consider now the steady-state growth rate in equilibrium:
g =
βP (λnω
x
n + λsω
x
s )
2(1− β)λΔ .
Inserting ωxn as given by (8.10.3), ω
x
s and substituting λs by λ − λn, we obtain for the
derivative with respect to λn given λ:
dg
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
= 0.

Proof of Proposition 21
The proof ﬁrst shows that there is a unique solution to the North’s optimization problem.
Then we show that the desired harmonized enforcement level ωhn is strictly concave in Δ by
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verifying that the second derivative is negative. The derivative of ωhn with respect to Δ is
always positive if the condition given in Item (i) of Proposition 21 is satisﬁed. Otherwise the
derivative will change its sign for larger values of Δ implying an inverted U-shaped relation
between ωhn and Δ. This veriﬁes Item (ii) of Proposition 21. With respect to Item (iii), we
ﬁrst show that ωhn increases (decreases) with its relative eﬀective market size if ω
h
n < (>)ω
h
s .
Using the properties of ωhn and ω
h
s on the relevant interval of Δ, we show that there exists a
unique Δ¯ such that ωhn > (<)ω
h
s if and only if Δ > (<)Δ¯. This proves item (iii) of Proposition
21. The detailed formal proof is provided in the working paper version Schaefer and Schneider
(2011).
Proof of Proposition 22
The proof of Proposition 22 follows directly from the last part of the proof of Proposition 21,
where we have shown that ωhn and ω
h
s possess a unique intersection where both ω
h
n and ω
h
s are
greater than zero. Δ¯ is the level of Δ at this intersection. It follows further from the proof of
Proposition 21 that ωhn < ω
h
s if Δ < Δ¯ and ω
h
n > ω
h
s if Δ > Δ¯. 
9 Numerical Appendix
9.1 Maple-Code: Habit Formation, Dynastic Altruism,
and Population Dynamics
Below we present the Maple-code that detects the transition path of the neoclassical version
of the model. The routine calculates ﬁrst the steady state solution. In the second step, the
linearized solution is evaluated which serves as a good guess for the backward solution (reverse
shot) of non linearized system.
restart:
alpha:=0.36; sigma:=.5; gam:=.12; delta:=.93; beta:=0.935; epsilon:=0.015;
A:=10; z:=0;
###########################steady state
wss := (1-alpha)*A*kss^alpha;
rss := alpha*A*kss^(alpha-1);
yss := A*kss^alpha;
eq5 := kss = 1/nss *(A*kss^alpha - z*w*nss - rss/((rss+epsilon)*lambda_ss)*
(1+(epsilon+beta*(epsilon+rss))/(delta*rss) * (epsilon+rss)/(epsilon+rss)));
eq6 := lambda_ss = lambda_ss*nss/(delta*(alpha)*A*kss^(alpha-1));
eq7 := nss = (nss^sigma/delta + 1/(sigma*gam)*(lambda_ss*((1-alpha)
*A*kss^(alpha)-z*w) - (1+beta)))^(1/sigma);
sol := solve({eq5,eq6,eq7});
nss := subs(sol[1],nss); kss := subs(sol[1],kss);
lambda_ss := subs(sol[1],lambda_ss);
eq1 := nss*kss = yss - css -z*wss*nss - css*(beta*rss+epsilon*(1+beta))/nss;
eq3 := nss = ((delta)/(delta-1)*(1/(sigma*gam))*(lambda_ss*wss*(1-z)
-(1+beta)))^(1/sigma);
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eq4 := lambda_ss * css = rss/(rss+epsilon);
css := solve(eq1,css);
ess := (epsilon*(1+beta)+beta*rss)*css;
eq4 := gss = rss/nss*(wss*(1-z*nss)+gss - css - ess/rss);
gss:=fsolve(eq4);
ess;
sss := 1/rss*(ess + gss*nss);
css:=(1-alpha)*yss + gss -sss;
sav_rate:=sss/((1-alpha)*yss+gss);
cons_rate:=css/((1-alpha)*yss+gss);
(ess+css)/yss;
################################################Stability########################
rneu := (alpha)*A*kneu^(alpha-1);
r := (alpha)*A*k^(alpha-1);
w := (1-alpha)*A*k^(alpha);
eq5 := kneu = 1/n *(A*k^alpha - z*w*n - rneu/((rneu+epsilon)*lambda)
*(1+(epsilon+beta*(epsilon+r))/(delta*rneu) * (epsilon+rneu)/(epsilon+r)));
k_neu:=solve(eq5,kneu);
lambda_neu := lambda*n/(delta*(alpha)*A*k_neu^(alpha-1));
nneu := (n^sigma/delta + 1/(sigma*gam)*(lambda_neu*((1-alpha)
*A*k_neu^(alpha)-z*w) - (1+beta)))^(1/sigma);
with (LinearAlgebra):
J11 := implicitdiff(eq5,kneu,k); J21:=implicitdiff(eq5,kneu,lambda);
J31 := implicitdiff(eq5,kneu,n);
J12 := diff(lambda_neu,k); J22:=diff(lambda_neu,lambda);
J32 := diff(lambda_neu,n);
J13 := diff(nneu,k); J23:=diff(nneu,lambda); J33:=diff(nneu,n);
kneu:=kss; k:=kss; lambda:=lambda_ss; n:=nss;
J_11:=simplify (J11); J11 := select (type, J_11, realcons);
J_21:=simplify (J21); J21 := select (type, J_21, realcons);
J_31:=simplify (J31); J31 := select (type, J_31, realcons);
J_12:=simplify (J12); J12 := select (type, J_12, realcons);
J_22:=simplify (J22); J22 := select (type, J_22, realcons);
J_32:=simplify (J32); J32 := select (type, J_32, realcons);
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J_13:=simplify (J13); J13 := select (type, J_13, realcons);
J_23:=simplify (J23); J23 := select (type, J_23, realcons);
J_33:=simplify (J33); J33 := select (type, J_33, realcons);
R := <<J11,J12,J13>|<J21,J22,J23>|<J31,J32,J33>>;
(v,ee) := Eigenvectors(R);
Char := CharacteristicPolynomial(R,x);
plot(Char,x=-1..3);
#################################Solving the linearized system######
tmax:=30;
EigR := Eigenvalues (R);
k0:=.00000000100;
A3 := (k0-kss)/ee[1,3];
for t from 0 to tmax do
ktrans[t] := A3*ee[1,3]*EigR[3]^t + kss;
lambda_trans[t] := A3*ee[2,3]*EigR[3]^t + lambda_ss;
ntrans[t] := A3*ee[3,3]*EigR[3]^t + nss;
end do;
for t from 1 to tmax do
if (t<tmax) then
rneu:=alpha*A*ktrans[t+1]^(alpha-1);
end if;
if (t=tmax) then
rneu:=alpha*A*ktrans[t]^(alpha-1);
end if;
c[t] := rneu/((rneu+epsilon)*lambda_trans[t]);
r := alpha*A*ktrans[t]^(alpha-1);
e[t] := c[t] * (beta*rneu+epsilon*(1+beta));
end do:
h:=1; g:=’g’;
rneu := alpha*A*ktrans[tmax]^(alpha-1);
g[tmax]:=gss;
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eq10 := g[tmax] = rneu/ntrans[tmax-h]*((1-alpha)*A
*ktrans[tmax-h]^alpha
*(1-z*ntrans[tmax-h]) + g - (c[tmax-h]+e[tmax-h]/rneu));
sol := fsolve(eq10,g); g[tmax-h]:=sol;
for t from 2 to (tmax-1) do
h:=h+1;
rneu := alpha*A*ktrans[tmax-(h-1)]^(alpha-1);
eq10 := g[tmax-(h-1)] = rneu/ntrans[tmax-h]*((1-alpha)*A*ktrans[tmax-h]^alpha
*(1-z*ntrans[tmax-h]) + g - (c[tmax-h]+e[tmax-h]/rneu));
sol := fsolve(eq10,g); g[tmax-h]:=sol;
s[tmax-h] := (e[tmax-(h)]+g[tmax-(h-1)]*ntrans[tmax-h])/rneu;
end do;
for t from 1 to tmax do
wage[t]:=(1-alpha)*A*ktrans[t]^alpha;
y[t]:=A*ktrans[t]^alpha;
g[t];
s_share[t] := s[t]/((1-alpha)*A*ktrans[t]^alpha + g[t]);
c_share[t] := c[t]/((1-alpha)*A*ktrans[t]^alpha + g[t]);
b_share[t] := g[t+1]/(rneu*((1-alpha)*A*ktrans[t]^alpha + g[t]));
s_y_share[t] := s[t]/y[t];
c_y_share[t] := c[t]/y[t];
b_y_share[t] := g[t+1]/(rneu*y[t]);
end do;
##################Evaluating the solution of the non-linearized system
(method: reverse shot while the above generated solutions of the linearized system
serve as a good first guess in each step of the iteration)
dk:=-10^(-5);
tmax:=30;
k0 := Re(kss + dk*Re(ee[1,3])); lambda_0 := Re(lambda_ss + dk*Re(ee[2,3]));
g0:=gss-dk; n0 := (nss + dk*Re(ee[3,3]));
kneu := ’kneu’; k:=’k’; lambda := ’lambda’; lambdaneu:=’lambdaneu’;
e:=’e’; nneu := ’nneu’; n:=’n’;
rneu:=alpha*A*kneu^(alpha-1);
r:=alpha*A*k^(alpha-1);
h:=0;
eqa := kneu=k_neu;
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eqb := lambdaneu = lambda*n/(delta*(alpha)*A*kneu^(alpha-1));
eqc := nneu = (n^sigma/delta + 1/(sigma*gam)*(lambdaneu*(1-alpha)*A*kneu^(alpha)
- (1+beta)))^(1/sigma);
kneu:=k0; lambdaneu:=lambda_0; nneu:=n0;
kappr:=kss; nappr:=nss; lambdaappr:=lambda_ss;
for t from 1 to tmax do
eqa; eqb; eqc;
soln := fsolve ({eqa,eqb,eqc},{k=Re(ktrans[30-h]),n=Re(ntrans[30-h]),
lambda=Re(lambda_trans[30-h])});
h:=h+1;
capital[t]:=subs(soln,k); shadow[t]:=subs(soln,lambda); fertility[t]:=subs(soln,n);
kappr:=capital[t]; nappr:=fertility[t]; lambdaappr:=shadow[t];
kneu:=capital[t]; lambdaneu:=shadow[t]; nneu:=fertility[t];
n:=’n’; k:=’k’; lambda:=’lambda’;
end do;
############################# the solution vector upside down #######
h:=0;
tmax:=19;
for t from 1 to (tmax) do
k[t] := capital[tmax-h];
lambda[t] := shadow[tmax-h];
n[t] := fertility[tmax-h];
h:=h+1;
end do;
for t from 1 to tmax do
r:=’r’; rneu:=’rneu’;
if (t<tmax) then
rneu:=alpha*A*k[t+1]^(alpha-1);
end if;
if (t=tmax) then
rneu:=alpha*A*k[t]^(alpha-1);
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end if;
c[t] := rneu/((rneu+epsilon)*lambda[t]);
r := alpha*A*k[t]^(alpha-1);
e[t] := c[t] * (beta*rneu+epsilon*(1+beta));
y[t] := A*k[t]^(alpha);
w[t] := (1-alpha)*A*k[t]^alpha;
lamb_y[t] := lambda[t]*y[t];
end do:
h:=1; g:=’g’;
rneu := alpha*A*k[tmax]^(alpha-1);
g[tmax]:=gss;
eq10 := g[tmax] = rneu/n[tmax-h]*((1-alpha)*A*k[tmax-h]^alpha + g
- (c[tmax-h]+e[tmax-h]/rneu));
sol := fsolve(eq10,g); g[tmax-h]:=sol;
for t from 2 to (tmax-1) do
h:=h+1;
rneu := alpha*A*k[tmax-(h-1)]^(alpha-1);
eq10 := g[tmax-(h-1)] = rneu/n[tmax-h]*((1-alpha)*A*k[tmax-h]^alpha + g
- (c[tmax-h]+e[tmax-h]/rneu));
sol := fsolve(eq10,g); g[tmax-h]:=sol;
s[tmax-h] := (e[tmax-(h)]+g[tmax-(h-1)]*n[tmax-h])/rneu;
end do;
for t from (tmax+1) to (tmax+4) do
k[t]:=kss; c[t]:=css; e[t]:=ess; g[t]:=gss; n[t]:=nss; s[t]:=(ess+gss*nss)/rss;
end do;
for t from 1 to tmax-1 do
rneu := alpha*A*k[t+1]^(alpha-1);
r := alpha*A*k[t]^(alpha-1);
cq[t] := c[t]/y[t];
cqi[t] := c[t]/(w[t]+g[t]);
ceq[t] := delta*(r+epsilon)*rneu/((rneu+epsilon)*(beta*r+epsilon*(1+beta)));
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c_et2q[t] := c[t]/e[t]; # =c(t)/e(t+1)
sqi[t] := s[t]/(w[t]+g[t]);
sq[t] := s[t]/y[t];
bqi[t] := g[t+1]*n[t]/(rneu*(w[t]+g[t]));
bq[t] := g[t+1]*n[t]/(rneu*y[t]);
bc[t] := g[t]/c[t];
end do;
sq[tmax] := (ess+gss*nss)/(rss*yss);
sqi[tmax] := (ess+gss*nss)/(rss*((1-alpha)*A*kss^alpha+gss));
cq[tmax] := css/yss;
cqi[tmax] := css/((1-alpha)*A*kss^alpha+gss);
9.2 Maple-Code: Technological Change, Population Dy-
namics, and Natural Resource Depletion
Below we present the Maple-routine for the solution of the linearized system of diﬀerence equations.
restart:
Lneu_g := (ns*L_g+theta_g*nus_g)/((1-theta_g)*nuu);
LsyLuyneu_g:=(Lneu_g*(1-phi*ns)-phi*thetaneu_g*nusneu_g);
Nneu_g := (eta * Nt_g^(-d))^(psi_2/(beta-alpha*(1-beta)*(sigma-1)))
*( ((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta)*(LsyLuyneu_g)^((sigma-1)*(beta+(1-alpha)
*(1-beta)))*(A_B)^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)))^(1/(beta-alpha*(sigma-1)*(1-beta)));
omeganeu_g := (((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta)*(Nneu_g)^(sigma-1)
*(LsyLuyneu_g)^(-beta)*(A_B)^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)))^(1/psi_2);
eq3 := nusneu_g = psi/(z+omeganeu_g*phi);
nusneu_g := solve (eq3,nusneu_g);
LsyLuy_g := (L_g*(1-phi*ns)-phi*theta_g*nus_g);
omega_g := (((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta)*(Nt_g)^(sigma-1)
*(LsyLuy_g)^(-beta)*(A_B)^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)))^(1/psi_2);
eq2 := nus_g = psi/(z+omega_g*phi);
nus_g := solve (eq2,nus_g);
####################Paramters;
phi:=1/20*(1.01); epsilon:=2.4; z:=0.15; rho:=2.3; nu:=0.26;
eta:=2.2*(1);
beta:=0.65; g:=.655; d:=-.045;
pro:=1;
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#A_B:=4.05;
A_B:=8; alpha := 0.08;
phio:=1/20; epsilono:=epsilon; zo:=z; rhoo:=rho; nuo:=nu;
etao:=2.2;
betao:=beta; go:=g; d_o:=d;
proo:=1;
A_Bo:=A_B; alphao := alpha;
nusBGP:=’nusBGP’; thetaBGP:=’thetaBGP’;
LBGP:=’LBGP’; tauBGP:=’tauBGP’;
L_g:=’L_g’; theta_g:=’theta_g’;
thetaneu_g:=’thetaneu_g’; Nt_g:=’Nt_g’;
tau_g:=’tau_g’; tauneu_g:=’tauneu_g’;
##################Expenditure share children;
disc:=1/(1+rho);
psi := (nu )/(1+nu+disc);
nuu := psi*1/z;
ns := psi*(1/(z+phi));
##################labor productivity;
sigma := epsilon -(epsilon-1)*(1-beta);
psi_2 := sigma*beta + (1-alpha)*(1-beta)*(sigma-1);
psi_3 := beta*( (1+d*sigma)* psi_2 - (sigma-1)*(1-beta)
*(1+alpha*(sigma-1)));
psi_5 := (1+d*sigma)*beta + (1-beta)*(sigma-1)
*(d*(alpha-1)-alpha);
psi_6 := beta-alpha*(1-beta)*(sigma-1)+d*(beta+(sigma-1)
*(beta+(1-alpha)*(1-beta)));
Z := (eta^(sigma-1) * ((1-g)/g)^(beta*epsilon*(1+d))
* (A_B)^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)*(1+d)))^(sigma*beta/psi_3);
LBGP := thetaBGP*nusBGP/((1-thetaBGP)*nuu-ns);
nusBGP := psi/(z+z/(z-phi)*phi);
LsyLuyBGP := (LBGP*(1-phi*ns)-phi*thetaBGP*nusBGP);
omegaBGP := (eta^(sigma-1)*((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta*(1+d))
*(LsyLuyBGP)^(sigma-1-beta*(1+d))*(A_B)^((sigma-1)
*(1-beta)*(1+d)) )^(1/psi_6);
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eq1 := Z*(LsyLuyBGP)^((sigma-1-beta*(1+d))*sigma*beta/psi_3)
= z/(z-phi);
thetaBGP := fsolve (eq1,thetaBGP=0..1);
z/(z-phi);
omegaBGP;
LBGP;
NBGP := (eta^(beta+(sigma-1)*(beta+(1-alpha)*(1-beta)))
*((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta) * A_B^((sigma-1)*(1-beta))
* LsyLuyBGP^((sigma-1)*(beta+(1-alpha)*(1-beta))))^(1/psi_6);
eq1;
cucsBGP := (A_B)*NBGP*(omegaBGP)^(alpha-1);
LBGP := thetaBGP*nusBGP/((1-thetaBGP)*nuu-ns);
DBGP := NBGP^(1+d)*eta^(-1);
omicronRxuBGP := 1/(1 + ((1-g)/g)^(epsilon/sigma)
*(NBGP)^((sigma-1)/sigma) *(LsyLuyBGP)^((sigma-1)/sigma)
*cucsBGP^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)/(sigma*beta)));
PhiBGP := eta^(-1)*NBGP^(1+d);
Z_2:=beta*(1-beta)*(1+PhiBGP);
ZZ:=omicronRxuBGP*Z_2;
LambdaBGP := disc*(beta+(1-alpha)*(1-beta))/(1 + nu + disc)
* (1+omegaBGP*LBGP) - (1-beta)*alpha/omicronRxuBGP
* (1-tauBGP)/(tauBGP);
BGPg := (((1-thetaBGP)*nuu)
* (1-tauBGP)^((alpha*(1-beta))/(beta+(1-alpha)
*(1-beta))))^((1-alpha*(1-beta))/d);
(sigma-2-d)/(1+d*sigma);
(1+0.02)^30;
g_per_yer := BGPg^(1/30)-1;
savrate := disc/(1+nu+disc);
plot (g_per_yer,tauBGP=0..0.98);
eq1a := 1-tauBGP = LambdaBGP/((1+PhiBGP)*beta*(1-beta));
tauBGP := fsolve (eq1a,tauBGP=0..1);
g_per_yer;
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BGP_gpr := (BGPg*((1-thetaBGP)*nuu)^((1-alpha)*(1-beta)
+beta)*(1-tauBGP)^(alpha*(1-beta)-1));
BGP_gpr_per_year := (BGPg*((1-thetaBGP)*nuu)^((1-alpha)
*(1-beta)+beta)*(1-tauBGP)^(alpha*(1-beta)-1))^(1/30)-1;
BGP_gw := (BGPg/(BGP_gpr)^(alpha*(1-beta)))
^(1/(beta+(1-beta)*(1-alpha)));
BGP_gw_per_year := BGP_gw^(1/30)-1;
sigma-2-d;
omegaBGP;
‘sig‘;
sigma;
‘nBGP‘;
(1-thetaBGP)*nuu;
period_length:=evalf((ln(disc)/ln(0.99))/4); # 0.99 per quarter
‘elast. of subst.‘;
sigma-1-beta*(1+d);
‘sigm‘;
sigma;
‘resource income share‘;
alpha*(1-beta);
beta-alpha*(1-beta)*(sigma-1);
‘psi‘;
beta-alpha*(1-beta)*(sigma-1)+d*(beta+(sigma-1)*(beta+(1-alpha)
*(1-beta)));
(1-tauBGP)^(1/period_length);
omegaBGP := (((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta)*NBGP^(sigma-1)*(LsyLuyBGP)
^(-beta)*(A_B)^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)))^(1/psi_2);
cucsBGP := A_B*NBGP*omegaBGP^(alpha-1);
pBGP := evalf(((1-g)/g)^(beta*epsilon/sigma)*(NBGP*LsyLuyBGP)
^(-beta/sigma)*cucsBGP^(-(1-beta)/sigma));
puBGP := evalf((g^(epsilon)+(1-g)^(epsilon)*pBGP^(1-epsilon))^(1/(epsilon-1)));
psBGP := pBGP*puBGP;
YuYBGP := 1/((g+(1-g)*(NBGP*pBGP^((1-beta)/beta)*(cucsBGP)^((1-beta)/beta)
*LsyLuyBGP)^((epsilon-1)/epsilon))^(epsilon/(epsilon-1)));
YuYBIP := 1/((g+(1-g)*(NBGP*pBGP^((1-beta)/beta)*(cucsBGP)^((1-beta)/beta)
*LsyLuyBGP)^((epsilon-1)/epsilon))^(epsilon/(epsilon-1))
+psBGP*NBGP*(pBGP*cucsBGP)^((1-beta)/beta)*(beta+(1-alpha)*(1-beta))/beta
*LBGP*phi*(ns+thetaBGP*LBGP^(-1)*nusBGP));
chiRBGP := 1/(1 + ((1-g)/g)^(epsilon/sigma)
*(NBGP)^((sigma-1)/sigma) *(LsyLuyBGP)^((sigma-1)/sigma)*cucsBGP^((sigma-1)
*(1-beta)/(sigma*beta)));
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SY_BIP := puBGP*YuYBGP*(disc*(beta+(1-alpha)*(1-beta))/(1 + nu + disc)
* (1+omegaBGP*LBGP) - (1-beta)*alpha/chiRBGP * (1-tauBGP)/(tauBGP));
g_per_yer;
‘nBgp‘:
((1-thetaBGP)*nuu)^(1/30);
psi_0 := beta-alpha*(1-beta)*(sigma-1);
barn_g := ((1-theta_g)*nuu + theta_g*nus_g + ns*L_g)/(1+L_g);
cucs_g := (A_B)*Nt_g*(omega_g)^(alpha-1);
omicronRxu_g := 1/(1 + ((1-g)/g)^(epsilon/sigma)
*(Nt_g)^((sigma-1)/sigma) *(LsyLuy_g)^(sigma-1/sigma)
*cucs_g^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)/(sigma*beta)));
cucsneu_g := (A_B)*Nneu_g*(omeganeu_g)^(alpha-1);
omicronRxuneu_g := 1/(1 + ((1-g)/g)^(epsilon/sigma)
*(Nneu_g)^((sigma-1)/sigma) *(LsyLuyneu_g)^((sigma-1)/sigma)
*cucsneu_g^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)/(sigma*beta)));
Phi_g := eta^(-1)*Nneu_g*Nt_g^(d);
Lambda_g := disc*(beta+(1-alpha)*(1-beta))/(1 + nu + disc)
*(1+omega_g*L_g) - (1-beta)*alpha/omicronRxu_g * (1-tau_g)/(tau_g);
tauneu_g := Lambda_g/((1+Phi_g)*beta*(1-beta))*tau_g/(1-tau_g)
*(omicronRxu_g/omicronRxuneu_g):
sigma := epsilon -(epsilon-1)*(1-beta);
#####################Preparing the Jacobian
J1:=’J1’; J2:=’J2’; J3:=’J3’; J4:=’J4’; J5:=’J5’;
J6:=’J6’; J7:=’J7’; J8:=’J8’; J9:=’J9’; J10:=’J10’;
J11:=’J11’; J12:=’J12’; J13:=’J13’; J14:=’J14’;
J15:=’J15’; J16:=’J16’;
eq4 := omeganeu_g = (z+ omega_g*phi)/z;
disc:=1/(1+rho);
psi := (nu )/(1+nu+disc);
nuu := psi*1/z;
ns := psi*(1/(z+phi));
sigma := epsilon -(epsilon-1)*(1-beta);
B := sigma-2;
J1;
J1 := diff (Lneu_g,theta_g):
J2;
J2 := diff (Lneu_g,L_g):
J3;
J3 := diff (Lneu_g,Nt_g):
J4;
J4 := diff (Lneu_g,tau_g):
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J5;
J5 := -(diff(omeganeu_g,theta_g) - phi/z
* diff(omega_g,theta_g))*(diff(omeganeu_g,thetaneu_g))^(-1):
J6;
J6 := -(diff(omeganeu_g,L_g)
-phi/z * diff(omega_g,L_g))*(diff(omeganeu_g,thetaneu_g))^(-1):
J7;
J7 := -(diff(omeganeu_g,Nt_g) - phi/z * diff(omega_g,Nt_g))
*(diff(omeganeu_g,thetaneu_g))^(-1):
J8;
J8 := -(diff(omeganeu_g,tau_g) - phi/z
* diff(omega_g,tau_g))*(diff(omeganeu_g,thetaneu_g))^(-1):
J9;
J9 := diff (Nneu_g,theta_g):
J10;
J10 := diff (Nneu_g,L_g):
J11;
J11 := diff (Nneu_g,Nt_g):
J12;
J12 := diff (Nneu_g,tau_g):
J13;
J13 := diff (tauneu_g,theta_g):
J14;
J14 := diff (tauneu_g,L_g):
J15;
J15 := diff (tauneu_g,Nt_g):
J16;
J16 := diff (tauneu_g,tau_g):
L_g:=LBGP; theta_g:=thetaBGP; thetaneu_g:=thetaBGP;
Nt_g:=NBGP; tau_g:=tauBGP;
J1_1 := evalf (J1): J2_1 := evalf (J2): J3_1 := evalf (J3):
J4_1 := evalf (J4):
J1_2 := evalf (J5): J2_2 := evalf (J6): J3_2 := evalf (J7):
J4_2 := evalf (J8):
J1_3 := evalf (J9): J2_3 := evalf (J10): J3_3 := evalf (J11):
J4_3 := evalf (J12):
J1_4 := evalf (J13): J2_4 := evalf (J14): J3_4 := evalf (J15):
J4_4 := evalf (J16):
J1_1 := evalf (J1_1); J2_1 := evalf (J2_1); J3_1 := evalf (J3_1);
J4_1 := evalf (J4_1);
J1_2 := evalf (J1_2); J2_2 := evalf (J2_2); J3_2 := evalf (J3_2);
J4_2 := evalf (J4_2);
J1_3 := evalf (J1_3); J2_3 := evalf (J2_3); J3_3 := evalf (J3_3);
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J4_3 := evalf (J4_3);
J1_4 := evalf (J1_4); J2_4 := evalf (J2_4); J3_4 := evalf (J3_4);
J4_4 := evalf (J4_4);
##############Eigenvalues & initial values
with (LinearAlgebra):
thetat := array (1..15);
Lt := array (1..15);
nust := array (1..15);
R := <<J1_1, J1_2, J1_3, J1_4>|<J2_1, J2_2, J2_3, J2_4>|
<J3_1, J3_2, J3_3, J3_4>|<J4_1, J4_2, J4_3, J4_4>>;
CharR := CharacteristicPolynomial(R,lambda);
EigR := Eigenvalues (R);
(v,e) := Eigenvectors (R);
L0:=LBGP_o;
N0:=NBGP_o;
A3:=’A3’; A4:=’A4’;
eq4 := L0 - LBGP = A3*Re(e[1,2])+A4*Re(e[1,3]);
eq5 := N0-NBGP = A3*Re(e[3,2])+A4*Re(e[3,3]);
soln := fsolve ({eq4,eq5},{A3,A4});
A3 := subs (soln,A3); A4 := subs(soln,A4);
plot (CharR,lambda=-4..4);
LBGP;
thetaBGP;
NBGP;
theta0 := A3*Re(e[2,2]) + A4*Re(e[2,3]) + thetaBGP;
tau0 := A3*Re(e[4,2]) + A4*Re(e[4,3]) + tauBGP;
####################before shock
t_shock:=4;
os:=30;
###############old parameters#########
for t from 0 to os do;
nus:=’nus’;
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disco:=1/(1+rhoo);
psio := (nuo )/(1+nuo+disco);
nuuo := psio*1/zo;
nso := psio*(1/(zo+phio));
Ltrans_o[t] :=LBGP_o;
thetatrans_o[t] := thetaBGP_o;
Ntrans_o[t] := NBGP_o;
tautrans_o[t] := tauBGP_o;
LsyLuy := (LBGP_o*(1-phi*ns)-phi*thetaBGP_o*nus);
omegao := zo/(zo-phio);
eq2 := nus = psio/(zo+omegao*phio);
nustrans_o[t] := fsolve (eq2);
LsyLuytrans_o[t] := (LBGP_o*(1-phio*nso)-phi*thetaBGP_o
*nustrans_o[t]);
LsxLuxtrans_o[t] := (LBGP_o*(1-phio*nso)-phi*thetaBGP_o
*nustrans_o[t]);
LseLuLstrans_o[t] := phio*(nso*LBGP_o+thetaBGP_o
*nustrans_o[t])/(1+LBGP_o);
omegatrans_o[t] := zo/(zo-phio);
barntrans_o[t] := ((1-thetatrans_o[t])*nuuo
+ thetatrans_o[t]*nustrans_o[t] + nso*Ltrans_o[t])/(1+Ltrans_o[t]);
barnutrans_o[t] := (1-thetatrans_o[t])*nuuo;
barnstrans_o[t] := nso+thetatrans_o[t]*nustrans_o[t]/Ltrans_o[t];
end do;
tmax:=t_shock;
with (plots):
theta:=’theta’; omega:=’omega’;
pointplot({seq([t,Re(Ltrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,popratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(LsyLuytrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,LSYLUYpopratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(LsxLuxtrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,LSXLUXpopratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(LseLuLstrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,LSELULSpopratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(thetatrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,theta]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(Ntrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,Blueprintratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(nustrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,usfert]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(omegatrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,omega]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(tautrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
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labels=[time,depl]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(barntrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,avfert]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(barnutrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,Lugrowth]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(barnstrans_o[t])],t=0..tmax)},
labels=[time,Lsgrowth]);
for t from 0 to os do
L_t[t]:=Ltrans_o[t]; theta_t[t]:=thetatrans_o[t];
N_t[t]:=Ntrans_o[t];
tau_t[t]:=tautrans_o[t]; LsyLuy_t[t]:=LsyLuytrans_o[t];
LsxLux_t[t]:=LsxLuxtrans_o[t]; LseLuLs_t[t]:=LseLuLstrans_o[t];
nus_t[t]:=nustrans_o[t]; omega_t[t]:=omegatrans_o[t];
barn_t[t]:=barntrans_o[t]; barnu_t[t]:=barnutrans_o[t];
barns_t[t]:=barnstrans_o[t]; gN_t[t+1]:=barntrans_o[t]-1;
end do;
#############transition###############################
tmax := 30;
t_shock:=os-26;
for t from 0 to tmax do
nus:=’nus’;
Ltrans[t] := A3*Re(e[1,2])*Re(EigR[2])^t + A4*Re(e[1,3])
*Re(EigR[3])^t + LBGP;
thetatrans[t] := A3*Re(e[2,2])*Re(EigR[2])^t + A4*Re(e[2,3])
*Re(EigR[3])^t + thetaBGP;
if (thetatrans[t]<0) then thetatrans[t]:=0 end if;
if (thetatrans[t]>1) then thetatrans[t]:=1 end if;
Ntrans[t] := A3*Re(e[3,2])*Re(EigR[2])^t + A4*Re(e[3,3])
*Re(EigR[3])^t + NBGP;
tautrans[t] := A3*Re(e[4,2])*Re(EigR[2])^t + A4*Re(e[4,3])
*Re(EigR[3])^t + tauBGP;
end do:
for t from 0 to tmax do
nus:=’nus’; LsyLuy:=’LsyLuy’; omega:=’omega’;
LsyLuy := (Ltrans[t]*(1-phi*ns)-phi*thetatrans[t]*nus);
omega := (((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta)*Ntrans[t]^((sigma-1))
*(LsyLuy)^(-beta)
*(A_B)^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)))^(1/psi_2);
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if (thetatrans[t]>0) then
eq2 := nus = psi/(z+omega*phi);
nustrans[t] := fsolve (eq2);
else
nustrans[t] :=0;
end if;
LsyLuytrans[t] := (Ltrans[t]*(1-phi*ns)-phi*thetatrans[t]
*nustrans[t]);
LsxLuxtrans[t] := (Ltrans[t]*(1-phi*ns)-phi*thetatrans[t]
*nustrans[t]);
LseLuLstrans[t] := phi*(ns*Ltrans[t]+thetatrans[t]*nustrans[t])
/(1+Ltrans[t]);
omegatrans[t] := (((1-g)/g)^(epsilon*beta)*Ntrans[t]^(sigma-1)
*(LsyLuytrans[t])
^(-beta)*(A_B)^((sigma-1)*(1-beta)))^(1/psi_2);
barntrans[t] := ((1-thetatrans[t])*nuu + thetatrans[t]
*nustrans[t]
+ ns*Ltrans[t])/(1+Ltrans[t]);
barnutrans[t] := (1-thetatrans[t])*nuu;
barnstrans[t] := ns+thetatrans[t]*nustrans[t]/Ltrans[t];
end do:
with (plots):
theta:=’theta’; omega:=’omega’;
pointplot({seq([t,Re(Ltrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels=[time,popratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(LsyLuytrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,LSYLUYpopratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(LsxLuxtrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,LSXLUXpopratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(LseLuLstrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,LSELULSpopratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(thetatrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,theta]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(Ntrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,Blueprintratio]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(nustrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,usfert]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(omegatrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,omega]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(tautrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,depl]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(barntrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,avfert]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(barnutrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,Lugrowth]);
pointplot({seq([t,Re(barnstrans[t])],t=0..tmax)},labels
=[time,Lsgrowth]);
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Maple-Code: Figure 4.3
The routine generates ﬁrst an artiﬁcial sample of households, estimates aggregate labor supply and
iterates over solutions, until a stationary solution is achieved.
restart;
with(stats);
with(Statistics);
with(plots);
with(RealDomain);
alpha := .3; A := .25; B := 3.3; g := .905; beta := .45;
z := 0.72e-1; eta := .25; delta := .315; theta := 0.1e-1;
tau := .5; mu := 1.95; bb1 := .85; bb2 := 1.42; bb3 := 1.365;
bb4 := 0.35e-1; phi := .1; psi_0 := .45; psi_1 := .15;
lamb := 1000; lambd_pr := .25; a := 0; u0 := .2;
s0 := 0.1e-1;
epsilon := .75;
s := s0+epsilon;
u := u0+.5*(s0^2-s^2);
imax := 1000; tmax := 25;
et := array(1 .. imax, 1 .. tmax);
dt := array(1 .. imax, 1 .. tmax);
surv := array(1 .. imax, 1 .. tmax);
nt := array(1 .. imax, 1 .. tmax);
Nt := array(1 .. imax, 0 .. tmax);
bt := array(1 .. imax, 1 .. tmax);
ht := array(1 .. imax, 1 .. tmax);
xt := array(1 .. imax, 1 .. tmax+1);
h := array(1 .. imax);
k := array(0 .. tmax);
gr := array(1 .. tmax);
avh := array(0 .. tmax);
N := array(0 .. tmax);
P1 := random[lognormal[u, s]](’generator’);
h := [‘$‘(’P1()’, imax)];
P := DensityPlot(LogNormal(u, s));
Q := Histogram(h); plots[display](Q, P);
9.3 Maple-Codes: The Growth Drag of Pollution 330
avh[0] := describe[mean](h); x := h/avh[0];
M := g*(1-beta*eta);
eq1 := xss = (((z*xss-theta)*(M-delta)+delta*(z-theta/xss))/((M-delta)
*(z-theta)+delta*(z-theta)))^eta*xss^tau; plot({xss, (((z*xss-theta)
*(M-delta)+delta*(z-theta/xss))/((M-delta)*(z-theta)+delta*(z-theta)))^eta*xss^tau}
, xss = 0 .. 1.5);
xmax := 10.1; xmin := .14;
for i to imax do
xt[i, 1] := x[i];
if xt[i, 1] < xmin then xt[i, 1] := xmin end if;
if xt[i, 1] > xmax then xt[i, 1] := xmax end if;
ht[i, 1] := h[i]; Nt[i, 1] := 1 end do;
for i to imax do bt[i, 1] := 0.1e-1 end do;
t := 1; i := 1;
K[t] := sum(bt[ii, 1], ii = 1 .. imax);
P[t] := 0.2e-1;
Pop[t] := sum(Nt[ii, 1], ii = 1 .. imax);
for t to tmax do
S[t] := psi_0*avh[t-1]/(1+avh[t-1])-psi_1*P[t]/(1+P[t]);
tax[t] := (P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]-P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]*bb1
+A*bb2*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]+delta*P[t]*avh[t-1]
*Pop[t]-delta*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]*bb1+delta*A*bb2
*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]+g*S[t]*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]-S[t]*P[t]
*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]*bb1+g*S[t]*A*bb2*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]
-mu*bb3*A*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]+(bb4+bb4*delta+bb4*g*S[t])
*Pop[t])/(A*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]*bb3*(1+delta+g*S[t]-mu));
w1 := (1-alpha)*A*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha;
r1 := alpha*A*(K[t]/L[t])^(alpha-1);
b1 := delta*(z-theta/x1)*w1/(M-delta-g*S[t]);
d1 := g*S[t]*(z-theta/x1)*w1/(M-delta-g*S[t]);
e1 := (beta*eta*g*z*x1-(g-delta-g*S[t])*theta)/(M-delta-g*S[t]);
bx := delta*(z-theta)*w1/(M-delta-g*S[t]);
dx := g*S[t]*(z-theta)*w1/(M-delta-g*S[t]);
ex := (beta*eta*g*z-(g-delta-g*S[t])*theta)/(M-delta-g*S[t]);
nx := g*(1+r1*bt[1, 1]/(w1*avh[t-1]))/((1+g)*(z+e1+(b1+d1)/w1));
if t = 1 then
n1 := g*(1+r1*bt[1, 1]/(w1*x1*avh[t-1]))/((1+g)*(z+e1/x1+(b1+d1)/w1));
Ex := 1-(z+ex)*nx; avx1 := (sum(xt[ii, t], ii = 1 .. imax))/imax;
var_x[t] := (sum((xt[ii, t]-avx1)^2, ii = 1 .. imax))/imax;
l1 := (1-z*n1)*x1-e1*n1;
EL[t] := Ex+(1/2)*var_x[t]*(diff(l1, [‘$‘(x1, 2)]));
x1 := avx1;
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eq1 := L[t] = EL[t]*avh[t-1]*(sum(Nt[ii, t], ii = 1 .. imax));
sol := fsolve(eq1); L[t] := sol; k[t] := K[t]/L[t]
end if;
if t > 1 then
n1 := g*(1+r1*delta*(z-theta/x0)*(1-tax[t-1])*w[t-1]*x0*avh[t-2]/
((M-delta-g*S[t-1])*w1*x1*avh[t-1]))/((1+g)*(z+e1/x1
+(delta*(z-theta/x1)*(1-tax[t])*w1/(M-delta-g*S[t])+g*S[t]*
(z-theta/x1)*(1-tax[t])*w1/(M-delta-g*S[t]))/((1-tax[t])*w1)));
avx1 := (sum(xt[ii, t], ii = 1 .. imax))/imax;
avx0 := (sum(xt[ii, t-1], ii = 1 .. imax))/imax; Ex := 1-(z+ex)*nx;
var_x[t] := (sum((xt[ii, t]-avx1)^2, ii = 1 .. imax))/imax;
covar_x[t] := (sum((xt[ii, t]-avx1)*(xt[ii, t-1]-avx0), ii = 1 .. imax))/imax;
l1 := (1-(z+e1)*n1)*x1;
EL[t] := Ex+(1/2)*var_x[t]*(diff(l1, [‘$‘(x1, 2)]))+(diff(l1, x0, x1))*covar_x[t]
+(1/2)*var_x[t-1]*(diff(l1, [‘$‘(x0, 2)]));
x1 := avx1;
x0 := avx0;
eq1 := L[t] = EL[t]*avh[t-1]*(sum(Nt[ii, t], ii = 1 .. imax));
sol := fsolve(eq1, L[t]);
L[t] := sol;
k[t] := K[t]/L[t] end if;
tax[t] := tax[t];
S[t] := S[t];
if tax[t] < 0 then tax[t] := 0
end if;
w[t] := (1-alpha)*A*k[t]^alpha;
r[t] := alpha*A*k[t]^(alpha-1);
for i from 1 to imax do
bt[i,t+1] := delta/(M-delta-g*S[t])*(z-theta/(xt[i,t]))
*(1-tax[t])*w[t]*ht[i,t];
dt[i,t]:=g*S[t]/(M-delta-g*S[t])*(z-theta/(xt[i,t]))
*(1-tax[t])*w[t]*ht[i,t];
et[i,t]:=(beta*eta)/((1-beta*eta))
*(z*xt[i,t]+g*S[t]/(M-delta-g*S[t])
*(z-theta/(xt[i,t]))*xt[i,t]+ delta/(M-delta-g*S[t])
*(z-theta/(xt[i,t]))*xt[i,t])-theta/((1-beta*eta));
if (et[i,t]<0) then
et[i,t]:=0;
bt[i,t+1] := delta/((g-delta)*(1-S[t])-delta*S[t])
*z*(1-tax[t])*w[t]*ht[i,t];
dt[i,t]:=(S[t])/((1-S[t]))*((1-tax[t])*w[t]ht[i,t]*z
+bt[i,t+1]);
end if;
surv[i,t]:=lambd_pr*(lamb*dt[i,t])^S[t];
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if surv[i,t]>1 then surv[i,t]:=1; end if;
nt[i,t] :=g/(1+g)*((1+r[t]*bt[i,t]/(w[t]*ht[i,t]))
/(z+(et[i,t])/(xt[i,t])+(bt[i,t+1]+dt[i,t])/((1-tax[t])* w[t]*ht[i,t])));
Nt[i,t+1]:=surv[i,t]*nt[i,t]*Nt[i,t];
ht[i,t+1]:=B*(theta+et[i,t])^(eta)*xt[i,t]^(tau)*avh[t-1];
xt[i,t+1]:=((theta+et[i,t])/( theta+(beta*eta*g*z
-(g-delta-g*S[t])*theta)/((M-delta-g*S[t]))))^eta*xt[i,t]^tau;
if (xt[i,t+1]<xmin) then xt[i,t+1]:=xmin end if;
bt[i,t+1]:=(bt[i,t+1])/(surv[i,t]);
end do: i:=’i’;
avh[t]:=sum(Nt[i,t+1]*ht[i,t+1],i=1..imax)/((sum(Nt[i,t+1],i=1..imax)));
gr[t]:=(avh[t]/avh[t-1]);
avn[t]:=sum(Nt[i,t+1],i=1..imax)/sum(Nt[i,t],i=1..imax);
avnb[t]:=sum(Nt[i,t]*nt[i,t],i=1..imax)/sum(Nt[i,t],i=1..imax);
ave[t]:=sum(Nt[i,t]*nt[i,t]*et[i,t],i=1..imax)/sum(Nt[i,t]*nt[i,t],i=1..imax);
if ave[t]<0 then ave[t]:=0 end if;
gr[t]:=gr[t]^(1/30)-1;
y[t]:=A/(Pop[t])*K[t]^(alpha)*L[t]^((1-alpha));
if t>1 then gy[t]:=((y[t])/(y[t-1]))^((1/(30)))-1; end if;
K[t+1]:=sum(Nt[ii,t+1]*bt[ii,t+1],ii=1..imax);
Pop[t+1]:=sum(Nt[ii,t+1],ii=1.. imax);
P[t+1]:=(1-bb1)*P[t]+(bb2*A*k[t]^alpha*L[t]-bb3*tax[t]*A*k[t]^alpha
*L[t]+bb4*Pop[t])/(sum(Nt[i,t+1]*ht[i,t+1],i=1..imax));
x1:=’x1’; x0:=’x0’;
avsurv[t]:=1/(sum(nt[i,t]*Nt[i,t],i=1..imax))*sum(nt[i,t]
*Nt[i,t]*surv[i,t],i=1..imax);
end do: #t
Maple-Code: Figure 4.4
The routine is basically identical to the previous one, but takes account for regional diﬀerentials in
survival probabilities. Depending on the regime, the simulation is either based on individuals’ tax
preferences living in Region A or of those who live in B.
for t from 1 to tmax do
SA[t]:=psi_0*(avh[t-1])/(1+avh[t-1])-psi_1A*P[t]/(1+P[t]);
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SB[t]:=psi_0*(avh[t-1])/(1+avh[t-1])-psi_1B*P[t]/(1+P[t]); #
###################################Regime A
‘####tax A‘
tax[t]:=(P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]-P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]* bb1
+A* bb2*((K[t])/(L[t]))^(alpha)* L[t]+delta*P[t]*avh[t-1]
*Pop[t]-delta*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]* bb1+delta* A*
bb2*((K[t])/(L[t]))^(alpha)*L[t]+g *SA[t]*P[t]*
avh[t-1]*Pop[t]-SA[t]*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]*
bb1+g* SA[t] *A* bb2*((K[t])/(L[t]))^(alpha)(*)^L[t]
-mu* bb3* A*((K[t])/(L[t]))^(alpha)*L[t]
+bb4*(1+delta+g*SA[t])*Pop[t])/(A *((K[t])/(L[t]))^
(alpha)* L[t]* bb3* (1+delta+g* SA[t]-mu));
##################################Regime B
#####tax B
tax[t] := (P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]-P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]*
bb1+A*bb2*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]+delta*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]
-delta*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]*bb1+delta*A*bb2*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha
*L[t]+g*SB[t]*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]
-SB[t]*P[t]*avh[t-1]*Pop[t]*bb1+g*SB[t]*A*bb2*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha
*L[t]-mu*bb3*A*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]+bb4*(1+delta+g*SB[t])
*Pop[t])/(A*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha*L[t]*bb3*(1+delta+g*SB[t]-mu));
w1 := (1-alpha)*A*(K[t]/L[t])^alpha; r1 := alpha*A*(K[t]/L[t])^(alpha-1)
b1A:=delta/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta/x1A)*w1;
d1A:=g*SA[t]/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta/x1A)*w1;
e1A:=(beta*eta*g*z*x1A-(g-delta-g*SA[t])*theta)
/((M-delta-g*SA[t]));
b1Ax:=delta/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta)*w1;
d1Ax:=g*SA[t]/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta)*w1;
e1Ax:=(beta*eta*g*z-(g-delta-g*SA[t])*theta)/((M-delta-g*SA[t]));
n1Ax := g/(1+g)*((1+r1*(bt[1,1])/(w1*avh[t-1]))/(z+e1A+(b1A+d1A)/(w1)));
b1B:=delta/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/x1B)*w1;
d1B:=g*SB[t]/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/x1B)*w1;
e1B:=(beta*eta*g*z*x1B-(g-delta-g*SB[t])*theta)/((M-delta-g*SB[t]));
b1Bx:=delta/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta)*w1;
d1Bx:=g*SB[t]/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta)*w1;
e1Bx:=(beta*eta*g*z-(g-delta-g*SB[t])*theta)/((M-delta-g*SB[t]));
n1Bx := g/(1+g)*((1+r1*(bt[1,1])/(w1*avh[t-1]))/(z+e1B+(b1B+d1B)/(w1)));
if t=1 then
n1A := g/(1+g)*((1+r1*(bt[1,1])/(w1*x1A*avh[t-1]))/(z+e1A/x1A+(b1A+d1A)/(w1)));
ExA:=(1-(z+e1Ax)*n1Ax);
avxA:=1/iA*sum(xtA[ii,t],ii=1..iA);
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var_xA[t]:=1/iA*sum((xtA[ii,t]-avxA)^(2),ii=1..iA);
l1A:=(1-z*n1A)*x1A -e1A*n1A;
ELA[t] := ExA +1/2*var_xA[t]*diff(l1A,[x1A$2]);
x1A:=1/(iA)*sum(xtA[ii,t],ii=1..iA);
n1B := g/(1+g)*((1+r1*(bt[1,1])/(w1*x1B*avh[t-1]))/(z+e1B/x1B+(b1A+d1B)/(w1)));
ExB:=(1-(z+e1Bx)*n1Bx);
avxB:=1/iB*sum(xtB[ii,t],ii=1..iB);
var_xB[t]:=1/iB*sum((xtB[ii,t]-avxB)^(2),ii=1..iB);
l1B:=(1-z*n1B)*x1B -e1B*n1B;
ELB[t] := ExB +1/2*var_xB[t]*diff(l1B,[x1B$2]);
x1B:=1/iB*sum(xtB[ii,t],ii=1..iB);
eq1:=L[t]=(ELA[t]+ELB[t])*avh[t-1]*sum(Nt[ii,t],ii=1..imax);
sol:=fsolve(eq1);
L[t]:=sol;
k[t]:=K[t]/L[t];
end if;
if t>1 then
n1A := g/(1+g)*((1+r1*delta/(M-delta-g*SA[t-1])*(z-theta/x0A)
*(1-tax[t-1])* w[t-1]/w1*x0A/x1A*avh[t-2]/avh[t-1])/
(z+e1A/x1A+(delta/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta/x1A)
*(1-tax[t])*w1+g*SA[t]/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta/x1A)
*(1-tax[t])*w1)/((1-tax[t])*w1)));
ExA:=(1-(z+e1Ax)*n1Ax);
avXa1:=1/iA*sum(xtA[ii,t],ii=1..iA);
avXa0:=1/iA*sum(xtA[ii,t-1],ii=1..iA);
var_xA[t]:=1/iA*sum((xtA[ii,t]-avXa1)^(2),ii=1..iA);
covar_xA[t]:=1/iA*sum((xtA[ii,t]-avXa1)*(xtA[ii,t-1]-avXa0),ii=1..iA);
l1A:=(1-z*n1A)*x1A -e1A*n1A;
ELA[t] := ExA + 1/2*var_xA[t]*diff(l1A,[x1A$2]) + diff(l1,x0A,x1A)*covar_xA[t]
+ 1/2*var_xA[t-1]*diff(l1A,[x0A$2]);
x1A:=avXa1; x0A:=avXa0;
n1B := g/(1+g)*((1+ r1*delta/(M-delta-g*SB[t-1])*(z-theta/x0B)*(1-tax[t-1])
* w[t-1]/w1*x0B/x1B*avh[t-2]/avh[t-1])
/(z+e1B/x1B+(delta/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/x1B)*(1-tax[t])
*w1+g*SB[t]/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/x1B)
*(1-tax[t])*w1)/((1-tax[t])*w1)));
ExB:=(1-(z+e1Bx)*n1Bx);avXb1:=1/iB*sum(xtB[ii,t],ii=1..iB);
avXb0:=1/iB*sum(xtB[ii,t-1],ii=1..iB);
var_xB[t]:=1/iB*sum((xtB[ii,t]-avXb1)^(2),ii=1..iB);
covar_xB[t]:=1/iB*sum((xtB[ii,t]-avXb1)*(xtB[ii,t-1]-avXb0),ii=1..iB);
l1B:=(1-z*n1B)*x1B -e1B*n1B ;
ELB[t] := ExB + 1/2*var_xB[t]*diff(l1B,[x1B$2]) + diff(l1,x0B,x1B)*covar_xB[t]
+ 1/2*var_xB[t-1]*diff(l1B,[x0B$2]);
x1B:=avXb1; x0B:=avXb0;
sol:=fsolve(eq1,L[t]=L[t-1]);
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L[t]:=sol;
k[t]:=K[t]/L[t];
end if;
tax[t]:=tax[t];
SA[t]:=SA[t];
SB[t]:=SB[t];
if tax[t]<0 then tax[t]:=0 end if;
w[t] := (1-alpha)*A*k[t]^(alpha);
r[t] := (alpha)*A*k[t]^(alpha-1);
for i from 1 to iA do
btA[i,t+1] := delta/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta/(xtA[i,t]))
*(1-tax[t])*w[t]*htA[i,t];
dtA[i,t]:=g*SA[t]/(M-delta-g*SA[t])*(z-theta/(xtA[i,t]))*(1-tax[t])
*w[t]*htA[i,t];
etA[i,t]:=(beta*eta)/((1-beta*eta))*(z*xtA[i,t]+g*SA[t]
/(M-delta-g*SA[t])
*(z-theta/(xtA[i,t]))*xtA[i,t]+ delta/(M-delta-g*SA[t])
*(z-theta/(xtA[i,t]))*xtA[i,t])-theta/((1-beta*eta));
if (Re(etA[i,t])<0) then
etA[i,t]:=0;
btA[i,t+1] := delta/((g-delta)*(1-SA[t])-delta*SA[t])*z*(1-tax[t])*w[t]*htA[i,t];
dtA[i,t]:=(SA[t])/((1-SA[t]))*((1-tax[t])*w[t]*htA[i,t]*z+btA[i,t+1]);
end if;
survA[i,t]:=lambd_pr*(lamb*dtA[i,t])^SA[t];
if survA[i,t]>1 then survA[i,t]:=1; end if;
ntA[i,t] :=g/(1+g)*((1+r[t]*btA[i,t]/(w[t]*htA[i,t]))/(z+(etA[i,t])/(xtA[i,t])
+(btA[i,t+1]+dtA[i,t])/((1-tax[t])*w[t]*htA[i,t])));
NtA[i,t+1]:=survA[i,t]*ntA[i,t]*NtA[i,t];
htA[i,t+1]:=B*(theta+etA[i,t])^(eta)*xtA[i,t]^(tau)*avh[t-1];
xtA[i,t+1]:=((z*xtA[i,t]-theta)/((z-theta)))^eta*xtA[i,t]^tau;
if (xtA[i,t+1]<xmin) then xtA[i,t+1]:=xmin end if;
btA[i,t+1]:=(btA[i,t+1])/(survA[i,t]);
end do:
for i from 1 to iB do
btB[i,t+1] := delta/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/(xtB[i,t]))
*(1-tax[t])*w[t]*htB[i,t];
dtB[i,t]:=g*SB[t]/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/(xtB[i,t]))
*(1-tax[t])*w[t]*htB[i,t];
etB[i,t]:=(beta*eta)/((1-beta*eta))*(z*xtB[i,t]+g*SB[t]
/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/(xtB[i,t]))
*xtB[i,t]+ delta/(M-delta-g*SB[t])*(z-theta/(xtB[i,t]))*xtB[i,t])
-theta/((1-beta*eta));
if (Re(etB[i,t])<0) then etB[i,t]:=0;
btB[i,t+1] := delta/((g-delta)*(1-SB[t])-delta*SB[t])*z*(1-tax[t])
*w[t]*htB[i,t];
dtB[i,t]:=(SB[t])/((1-SB[t]))*((1-tax[t])*w[t]*htB[i,t]*z+btB[i,t+1]);
end if;
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survB[i,t]:=lambd_pr*(lamb*dtB[i,t])^SB[t];
if survB[i,t]>1 then survB[i,t]:=1; end if;
ntB[i,t] :=g/(1+g)*((1+r[t]*btB[i,t]/(w[t]*htB[i,t]))/(z+(etB[i,t])/(xtB[i,t])
+(btB[i,t+1]+dtB[i,t])/((1-tax[t])*w[t]*htB[i,t])));
NtB[i,t+1]:=survB[i,t]*ntB[i,t]*NtB[i,t];
htB[i,t+1]:=B*(theta+etB[i,t])^(eta)*xtB[i,t]^(tau)*avh[t-1];
xtB[i,t+1]:=((z*xtB[i,t]-theta)/((z-theta)))^eta*((M-delta-g*SA[t])
/((M-delta-g*SB[t])))^(eta)*xtB[i,t]^tau;
if (xtB[i,t+1]<xmin) then xtB[i,t+1]:=xmin end if;
btB[i,t+1]:=(btB[i,t+1])/(survB[i,t]);
end do:
i:=’i’;
avh[t]:=(sum(NtA[i,t+1]*htA[i,t+1],i=1..iA)
+sum(NtB[i,t+1]*htB[i,t+1],i=1..iB))/((sum(NtA[i,t+1],i=1..iA))
+(sum(NtB[i,t+1],i=1..iB)));
gr[t]:=(avh[t]/avh[t-1]);
avn[t]:=((sum(NtA[i,t+1],i=1..iA)
+sum(NtB[i,t+1],i=1..iB)))/((sum(NtA[i,t],i=1..iA)+sum(NtB[i,t],i=1..iB)));
ave[t]:=(sum(NtA[i,t]*etA[i,t]*ntA[i,t],i=1..iA)
+sum(NtB[i,t]*etB[i,t]*ntB[i,t],i=1..iB))/(sum(NtA[i,t]*ntA[i,t],i=1..iA)
+sum(NtB[i,t]*ntB[i,t],i=1..iB));
if ave[t]<0 then ave[t]:=0 end if;
gr[t]:=gr[t]^(1/30)-1;
y[t]:=A/(Pop[t])*K[t]^(alpha)*L[t]^((1-alpha));
if t>1 then gy[t]:=((y[t])/(y[t-1]))^((1/(30)))-1; end if;
K[t+1]:=sum(NtA[ii,t+1]*btA[ii,t+1],ii=1..iA)+sum(NtB[ii,t+1]*btB[ii,t+1],ii=1..iB);
Pop[t+1]:=sum(NtA[ii,t+1],ii=1.. iA)+sum(NtB[ii,t+1],ii=1.. iB);
P[t+1]:=(1-bb1)*P[t]+(bb2*A*k[t]^alpha*L[t]-bb3*tax[t]*A*k[t]^alpha
*L[t]+bb4*Pop[t])/(sum(NtA[i,t+1]*htA[i,t+1],i=1..iA)
+sum(NtB[i,t+1]*htB[i,t+1],i=1..iB));
x1A:=’x1A’; x0A:=’x0A’; x1B:=’x1B’; x0B:=’x0B’;
avsurvA[t]:=1/(sum(ntA[i,t]*NtA[i,t],i=1..iA))*sum(ntA[i,t]
*NtA[i,t]*survA[i,t],i=1..iA);
avsurvB[t]:=1/(sum(ntB[i,t]*NtB[i,t],i=1..iB))*sum(ntB[i,t]*NtB[i,t]
*survB[i,t],i=1..iB);
end do: #t
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9.4 Maple-Codes: Journey into the Unknown?
9.4.1 The Grid
##################grid in KM0 and LM0 space##############################
eq0:=y=(wbar/(beta*A)*(x)^(-(alpha+a)))^(1/(beta+b-1));
soln:=solve(eq0,x);
x:=soln[1];
eq0:=y2 = (rbar/(alpha*A)*x2^(-(alpha+a-1)))^(1/(beta+b));
x2:=solve(eq0,x2);
KM_T_up:=maxK;
KM_T_down:=0.01*maxK;
KM_grid:=32;
KM_step := (maxK-KM_T_down)/KM_grid;
LM_T:=maxL;
LM_grid := 32;
LM_step := (maxL-0.1)/LM_grid;
KM_0 := array(1..KM_grid);
s:=0;
for j from 1 to KM_grid do
s:=s+KM_step;
KM_0[j]:=s
end do;
LM_0 := array(1..LM_grid);
s:=0;
for z from 1 to LM_grid do
s:=s+LM_step;
LM_0[z]:=LM_T-s;
end do;
k:=1;
k:=1;
Lower_L_bound := 0.1;
Z:=array(1..LM_grid*KM_grid);
jj:=1;
for j from 1 to LM_grid do
for i from 1 to KM_grid do
Z[jj]:=[KM_0[i],LM_0[j]];
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jj:=jj+1;
end do;
end do;
maxpnts:=jj-1;
9.4.2 Detection of the Overlap
This section provides the core of the routine which detects the overlap. Due to memory restrictions,
the grid is partitioned into an appropriate number of segments. The routine checks then for every
point in the grid whether there exists a feasible transition to the lower boundary or the upper
boundary. The solution is saved in respective ﬁles on the hard disk. The routine presented below
searches in the ﬁrst segment of the box for feasible transition paths to the lower boundary of the
box.
Create("/Users/A.Scha¨fer/Trekstore/Leipzig/Thomas/Reciprocal
Market Partizipation/Libs/WB_dn_A02_SG_Sec1.lib");
Traj_dn_Sec1:=array(1..maxpnts);
Time_dn_Sec1:=array(1..maxpnts);
LM0_dn_Sec1:=array(1..maxpnts);
KM0_dn_Sec1:=array(1..maxpnts);
mm:=0;
for mL from 1 to LM_grid/2 do
mL;
fl:=0;
er3:=0;
for mK from 1 to KM_grid/2 do
march(’open’, "/Users/A.Scha¨fer/Trekstore/Leipzig/Thomas/Reciprocal
Market Partizipation/Libs/WB_dn_A02_SG_Sec1.lib"):
mm:=mm+1;
if er3=0 then
ii_start:=300;
ii:=1;
max_nn:=300/ii+ii;
end if;
if er3=1 then
ii_start:=300;
ii:=10;
max_nn:=300/ii+1;
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er3:=0;
end if;
for nn from 1 to max_nn do
er:=0;
T[1]:=ii_start-nn*ii;
n2:=0;
er2k:=0;
for n from 1 to m do
ics := L(T[1])=LM_0[mL],K(T[1])=KM_0[mK],lambdaL(0)=0, L(0)=0.001; #L(0)=0.01;
#ics := L(T[n])=0.04,K(T[n])=0.7,lambdaK(0)=0, K(0)=maxK; #L(0)=0.00005;
try
Traj_dn_Sec1[mm] := dsolve({diff(K(t),t)=-gK*lambdaK(t),
diff(L(t),t)=-gL*lambdaL(t), diff(lambdaK(t),t)=-(rho*lambdaK(t)-(r-rbar)),
diff(lambdaL(t),t)=-(rho*lambdaL(t)-(w-wbar)),ics}, type=numeric,range=0..T[1],
maxmesh=5000,output=listprocedure)
catch "unable to store %1 when datatype=%2","initial Newton iteration
is not converging", "Newton iteration is not converging","precision
is insufficient for required absolute error,
suggest increasing Digits to approximately %1 for this problem":
n:=m+1;
er:=1;
end try;
if (er=0) then
ds:=eval(Traj_dn_Sec1[mm]); ds(0); K0[n]:=subs(ds(0),K(t)(0));
ds(0.1); L0[n]:=subs(ds(0.1),L(t)(0.1));
ds(0.1); K0e[n]:=subs(ds(0.1),K(t)(0.1));
if (K0e[n]<K0[n]) then
er2k:=1;
end if;
sol:=rhs(Traj_dn_Sec1[mm][3]);
sol1:=fsolve(sol(t)=maxL+0.001,t=0..300);
if type(sol1,realcons)=true then
er2k:=1;
end if;
if (er2k=1) then
n2:=n-1;
n:=m+1;
end if;
end if;
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end do:
if (er=0) and (er2k=0) then
nn:=max_nn+1;
KM0_dn_Sec1[mm]:=KM_0[mK];
LM0_dn_Sec1[mm]:=LM_0[mL];
end if;
if nn=max_nn-2 then
er3:=1;
mm:=mm-1;
nn:=max_nn+1;
fl:=1;
end if;
end do:
if (er=0) then
if (n2>0) then m:=n2 end if;
end if;
if er3=0 then Time_dn_Sec1[mm]:=T[1] end if;
Save (’Traj_dn_Sec1’, ’Time_dn_Sec1’, ’mm’, "/Users/A.Scha¨fer/
Trekstore/Leipzig/Thomas/Reciprocal Market Partizipation/
Libs/WB_dn_A02_SG_Sec1.lib"):
Traj_dn_Sec1:=’Traj_dn_Sec1’;
end do:
end do;
ics:=’ics’;
march(’open’, "/Users/A.Scha¨fer/Trekstore/Leipzig/Thomas/
Reciprocal Market Partizipation/Libs/WB_dn_A02_SG_Sec1.lib"):
dn_Sec1:=mm;
for n from 1 to dn_Sec1 do
Adn_norm_Sec1[n]:=display(odeplot(Traj_dn_Sec1[n],
[K(t)/maxK,L(t)/maxL],color="red"));
Adn_Sec1[n]:=display(odeplot(Traj_dn_Sec1[n],
[K(t),L(t)],color="red"));
Bdn_Sec1[n]:=display(odeplot(Traj_dn_Sec1[n],[Time_dn_Sec1[n]-t,
lambdaL(t)],color="red"));
Cdn_Sec1[n]:=display(odeplot(Traj_dn_Sec1[n],[Time_dn_Sec1[n]-t,
lambdaK(t)],color="red"));
Edn_Sec1[n]:=display(odeplot(Traj_dn_Sec1[n],[Time_dn_Sec1[n]-t,L(t)],
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color="red"));
Gdn_Sec1[n]:=display(odeplot(Traj_dn_Sec1[n],[Time_dn_Sec1[n]-t,K(t)],
color="red"));
end do:
n:=1;
F_norm:=display(plot({LssL0/maxK,LssK0/maxK},Kss=0..4));
with(plots):
P1_norm:=seq([Kss/maxK,LssK0/maxL],Kss=0..maxK,0.1):
P2_norm:=seq([Kss/maxK,LssL0/maxL],Kss=0..maxK,0.1):
A1dn_norm:=pointplot([P1_norm],view=[0..1,0..1],labels=[capital,labor],
style=line,thickness=4,labelfont=[COURIER,25],axesfont=[COURIER,15],
color=black):
A2dn_norm:=pointplot([P2_norm],view=[0..1,0..1],labels=[capital,labor],
style=line,thickness=4,labelfont=[COURIER,25],axesfont=[COURIER,15],
color=black):
LssK0;
display(A1dn_norm,A2dn_norm);
P1:=seq([Kss,LssK0],Kss=0..maxK,0.1):
P2:=seq([Kss,LssL0],Kss=0..maxK,0.1):
A1d:=pointplot([P1],view=[0..maxK,0..maxL],labels=[capital,labor],
style=line,thickness=4,labelfont=[COURIER,25],axesfont=[COURIER,15],
color=black):
A2dn:=pointplot([P2],view=[0..maxK,0..maxL],labels=[capital,labor],
style=line,thickness=4,labelfont=[COURIER,25],axesfont=[COURIER,15],
color=black):
LssK0;
display(A1dn,A2dn);
display({seq(Adn_norm_Sec1[i],i=1..mm),A1dn_norm,A2dn_norm},
labels=[capital,labor]);
display(seq(Bdn_Sec1[i],i=1..dn_Sec1));
display(seq(Cdn_Sec1[i],i=1..dn_Sec1));
display(seq(Edn_Sec1[i],i=1..dn_Sec1),plot(maxL,t=0..T[1]));
display(seq(Gdn_Sec1[i],i=1..dn_Sec1));
display(seq(Adn_Sec1[i],i=1..dn_Sec1));
grid:=pointplot({seq(Z[jj],jj=1..maxpnts)});
display(grid,A1up,A2up,seq(Adn_Sec1[i],i=1..dn_Sec1));
Save (’Traj_dn_Sec1’,’dn_Sec1’,’maxL’,’T’,’Time_dn_Sec1’,’KM0_dn_Sec1’,
’LM0_dn_Sec1’,’A1dn’,’A2dn’,’Grid’,’Adn_Sec1’,’Bdn_Sec1’,’Cdn_Sec1’,
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’Edn_Sec1’,’Gdn_Sec1’, "/Users/A.Scha¨fer/Trekstore/Leipzig/Thomas/
Reciprocal Market Partizipation/Libs/WB_dn_A02_SG_Sec1.lib"):
The following routine projects the results into the normalized grid and its output corresponds to
Figure 6.2.
9.4.3 Detection of Feasible Moods
The routines presented in the last section detected only one feasible transition from each grid point.
The following routine explores the set of feasible transition paths from each point in the grid. In
order to economize on memory, the grid is again partitioned and the routine starts in each segment
of the grid by making use of the data ﬁles generated by the routine in the last section. The results
are illustrated in Figure 9.5.
Figure 9.5: An illustrative example of the numerical detection of the overlap
march(’open’, "/Users/A.Scha¨fer/Trekstore/Leipzig/Thomas
/Reciprocal Market Partizipation/Libs/WB_dn_A02_SG_Sec1.lib"):
w:=beta*A*K(t)^(alpha+a)*L(t)^(beta+b-1);
r:=alpha*A*K(t)^(alpha+a-1)*L(t)^(beta+b);
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maxii:=dn_Sec1;
m:=600;
T:=array(1..m): i:=0.5;
pdn_Sec1:=array(1..maxii,1..m);
AAdn_Sec1:=array(1..maxii,1..m);
BBdn_Sec1:=array(1..maxii,1..m);
CCdn_Sec1:=array(1..maxii,1..m);
EEdn_Sec1:=array(1..maxii,1..m);
lambdaL0dn__Sec1:=Array(1..maxii,1..m);
for ii from 1 to maxii do
nn:=’nn’; kk:=’kk’;
er:=0;
m:=600;
ii-maxii;
w:=beta*A*K(t)^(alpha+a)*L(t)^(beta+b-1);
r:=alpha*A*K(t)^(alpha+a-1)*L(t)^(beta+b);
T:=’T’;
T[1]:=Time_dn_Sec1[ii];
i:=5;
for nn from 2 to m do
T[nn]:=T[nn-1]-i;
kk:=nn;
if T[nn]<=0 then
nn:=m;
end if;
end do:
if T[kk]<=0 then
m:=kk-1;
end if;
n2:=0;
er2k:=0;
for n from 1 to m do
ics := L(T[n])=LM0_dn_Sec1[ii],K(T[n])=KM0_dn_Sec1[ii],lambdaL(0)=0, L(0)=0.001;
try
pdn_Sec1[ii,n] := dsolve({diff(K(t),t)=-gK*lambdaK(t), diff(L(t),t)=-gL*lambdaL(t),
diff(lambdaK(t),t)=-(rho*lambdaK(t)-(r-rbar)), diff(lambdaL(t),t)=-(rho*lambdaL(t)
-(w-wbar)),ics}, type=numeric,range=0..T[n],maxmesh=5000,output=listprocedure)
catch "unable to store %1 when datatype=%2","initial Newton iteration is
not converging","Newton iteration is not converging","precision is
insufficient for required absolute error,
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suggest increasing Digits to approximately %1 for this problem":
maxn_dn_Sec1[ii]:=n-1;
n:=m;
er:=1;
end try;
if (er=0) then
ds:=eval(pdn_Sec1[ii,n]); ds(0); K0[n]:=subs(ds(0),K(t)(0));
ds(0.1); L0[n]:=subs(ds(0.1),L(t)(0.1));
ds(0.1); K0e[n]:=subs(ds(0.1),K(t)(0.1));
if (K0e[n]<K0[n]) then
er2k:=1;
end if;
sol:=rhs(pdn_Sec1[ii,n][3]);
sol1:=fsolve(sol(t)=maxL+0.001,t=0..300);
if type(sol1,realcons)=true then
er2k:=1;
end if;
if (er2k=1) then
maxn_dn_Sec1[ii]:=n-1;
n2:=n-1;
n:=m;
end if;
if er2k=0 then max_dn_Sec1[ii]:=n end if;
end if;#er=0
end do:#n
maxn_dn_Sec1[ii];
for n from 1 to maxn_dn_Sec1[ii] do
AAdn_Sec1[ii,n]:=display(odeplot(pdn_Sec1[ii,n],
[K(t),L(t)],color="red"));
BBdn_Sec1[ii,n]:=display(odeplot(pdn_Sec1[ii,n],[T[n]-t,lambdaL(t)]
,color="red"));
CCdn_Sec1[ii,n]:=display(odeplot(pdn_Sec1[ii,n],[T[n]-t,lambdaK(t)],
color="red"));
EEdn_Sec1[ii,n]:=display(odeplot(pdn_Sec1[ii,n],[T[n]-t,L(t)],
color="red"));
ds:=eval(pdn_Sec1[ii,n]); ds(T[n]); lambdaL0dn_Sec1[ii,n]:=subs(ds(T[n]),
lambdaL(t)(T[n]));
end do:
end do; #ii
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9.5 Mathematica-Codes: Migration and Capital For-
mation
The following routines provide the transition paths shown in Figures 7.2, 7.4, 7.7. As a solution
method we use relaxtion.
Mathematica-Code: Figure 7.2
Below we show the routine underlying Figure 7.2. The routine related to Figure 7.3 is omitted since
it underlies compared to the routine below just diﬀerent initial values.
paramInitial = {r -> 1, rho -> 0.5, gamma -> 2/3, delta -> 0.5,
eta -> 1, theta -> 0.5, alpha -> 0.5, beta -> 0.3, a -> 5.5,
b -> 5.5, af -> 5, bf -> 5, DS0 -> 1}
paramFinal = {r -> 1, rho -> 0.5, gamma -> 2/3, delta -> 0.5,
eta -> 1, theta -> 0.5, alpha -> 0.5, beta -> 0.3, a -> 5.5,
b -> 5.5, af -> 5, bf -> 5, DS0 -> 1}
XX = (beta (1 - gamma)/(1 +
rho))/(r (1 + (1 + eta) theta delta^(eta)) + delta +
theta delta^(eta + 1)) /. paramInitial
v = ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 - alpha) alpha^(-alpha) XX^(-beta) /.
paramInitial
(*Initial steady state without labor market integration*)
EquSSIni = {DI + (1 - delta) DK - DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
alpha DS0^(alpha) DK^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI/DK)^(eta + 1)) - q,
DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS0,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS0^(1 - alpha)} /. paramInitial
solIni = FindRoot[
EquSSIni, {{q, 1.5}, {DK, 0.1}, {DI, 0.1}, {pS, 0.1}, {pN, 2}}]
{qssIni, DKssIni, DIssIni, pSssIni, pNssIni} = {q /. solIni,
DK /. solIni, DI /. solIni, pS /. solIni, pN /. solIni}
DSssIni = DS0 /. paramInitial
(*Final steady state WITH labor market integration*)
EquSSFinal = {DI + (1 - delta) DK - DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
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alpha DS^(alpha) DK^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI/DK)^(eta + 1)) - q,
DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS^(1 - alpha), -(1 + rho) Log[
a/af] + (1 - gamma) (Log[pN/(v (af)^(1 - beta)/bf)] +
rho Log[pN/(v (af)^(1 - beta)/bf)])} /. paramFinal
solFin = FindRoot[
EquSSFinal, {{q, 1.5}, {DK, 1}, {DI, 1}, {DS, 1}, {pS, 1}, {pN, 1}}]
{qssFin, DKssFin, DIssFin, DSssFin, pSssFin, pNssFin} = {q /. solFin,
DK /. solFin, DI /. solFin, DS /. solFin, pS /. solFin, pN /. solFin}
dynEqu = {DI + (1 - delta) DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN1 beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
alpha DS1^(alpha) DK1^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI1/DK1)^(eta + 1)), (b/
a alpha^(alpha) ((1 + rho)/(1 - gamma))^(1 -
alpha) (DK1)^(beta) v (af)^(1 - beta)/
bf Exp[(1 + rho) Log[a/af]/((1 - gamma) rho) -
Log[pN/(v (af)^(1 - beta)/bf)] 1/rho] )^(1/(1 - alpha))}
statEqu = {DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS^(1 - alpha)}
subsVar = {DK -> X[1, j], DK1 -> X[1, j + 1], q -> W[1, j],
q1 -> W[1, j + 1], DS -> W[2, j], DS1 -> W[2, j + 1], DI -> Y[1, j],
DI1 -> Y[1, j + 1], pS -> Y[2, j], pN -> Y[3, j],
pN1 -> Y[3, j + 1]}
dynEquGN = dynEqu /. subsVar
statEquGN = statEqu /. subsVar
nX = 1;
nW = 2;
nY = 3;
n = 20;
(*subsList1=Join[Table[X[i,j]-> ((X[i,j-1]+X[i,j])/2),{i,1,nX}], \
Table[W[i,j]->((W[i,j-1]+W[i,j])/2),{i,1,nW}]];*)
equMain =
Table[Join[Table[X[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nX}],
Table[W[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nW}] ] - (dynEquGN), {j, 0, n - 1}];
equStat = Table[statEquGN, {j, 0, n - 1}];
equBorder =
Join[{X[1, 0] - DKssIni, W[1, n] - qssFin, W[2, n] - DSssFin,
Y[1, n] - DIssFin, Y[2, n] - pSssFin, Y[3, n] - pNssFin}];
equations =
Join[Flatten[equMain], Flatten[equBorder], Flatten[equStat]];
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(*start1=Join[Table[{X[i,j],KssIni},{i,1,nX}],Table[{W[i,j],qssIni},{\
i,1,1},Table[{W[i,j],qssIni},{i,1,2}]]*)
start1 = {{X[1, j], DKssIni}, {W[1, j], qssIni}, {W[2, j],
DSssIni}, {Y[1, j], DIssIni}, {Y[2, j], pSssFin}, {Y[3, j],
pNssFin}}
startValues1 = Flatten[Table[start1, {j, 0, n}], 1];
(*start2={{Y[3,n+1],pNssFin}}
startValues=Join[startValues1,start2]*)
Timing[sol2 = FindRoot[equations /. paramFinal, startValues1];]
Max[(equations /. paramFinal) /. sol2]
(*p1=ListPlot[Join[Table[DKssIni,{i,1,1}],Table[sol2[[z,2]],{z,1,(nX+\
nW+nY) n,nX+nW+nY}]], AxesLabel -> {t,DK},PlotRange-> All];*)
DKtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
qtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 2, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DStrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DItrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 4, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
pStrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 5, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
pNtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 6, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DK0 = Table[DKssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
q0 = Table[qssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DS0 = Table[DSssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DI0 = Table[DIssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
pS0 = Table[pSssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
pN0 = Table[pNssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
pntsx = Table[t - 6, {t, 1, n + 5}];
p1 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DK0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DKtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, D^K}, AxesOrigin -> {-5, 0}, PlotRange -> All];
p2 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], q0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], qtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, q}, AxesOrigin -> {-5, 1.4}, PlotRange -> All];
p3 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DS0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DStrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, D^S}, AxesOrigin -> {-5, 0}, PlotRange -> All];
p4 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DI0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DItrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, D^I}, AxesOrigin -> {-5, 0}, PlotRange -> All];
p5 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], pS0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], pStrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, p^Z}, AxesOrigin -> {-5, 0}, PlotRange -> All];
p6 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], pN0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], pNtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
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AxesLabel -> {t, p^N}, AxesOrigin -> {-5, 1}, PlotRange -> All];
GraphicsGrid[{{p3, p1, p4}}]
GraphicsGrid[{{p2, p5, p6}}]
KK = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}]
LL = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}]
ppN = (a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) KK^(-beta) LL^(1 - alpha)) /. {paramFinal}
Mathematica-Code: Figure 7.4
paramInitial = {r -> 1, rho -> 0.5, gamma -> 2/3, delta -> 0.5,
eta -> 1, theta -> 0.5, alpha -> 0.5, beta -> 0.3, a -> 1, b -> 1,
af -> 1, bf -> 1, DS0 -> 1}
paramFinal = {r -> 1, rho -> 0.5, gamma -> 2/3, delta -> 0.5,
eta -> 1, theta -> 0.5, alpha -> 0.5, beta -> 0.3, a -> 1, b -> 1,
af -> 1, bf -> 1, DS0 -> 1}
XX = (beta (1 - gamma)/(1 +
rho))/(r (1 + (1 + eta) theta delta^(eta)) + delta +
theta delta^(eta + 1)) /. paramInitial
v = ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 - alpha) alpha^(-alpha) XX^(-beta) /.
paramInitial
(*Transition to the steady state without labor market integration \
DK0=1*)
EquSSIni1 = {DI + (1 - delta) DK - DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
alpha DS0^(alpha) DK^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI/DK)^(eta + 1)) - q,
DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS0,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS0^(1 - alpha)} /. paramInitial
solIni1 =
FindRoot[EquSSIni1, {{q, 1.5}, {DK, 0.1}, {DI, 0.1}, {pS, 0.1}, {pN,
2}}]
{qssIni1, DKssIni1, DIssIni1, pSssIni1, pNssIni1} = {q /. solIni1,
DK /. solIni1, DI /. solIni1, pS /. solIni1, pN /. solIni1}
EquSSFinal1 = {DI + (1 - delta) DK - DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
alpha DS0^(alpha) DK^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI/DK)^(eta + 1)) - q,
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DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS0,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS0^(1 - alpha)} /. paramFinal
solFin1 =
FindRoot[EquSSFinal1, {{q, 1.5}, {DK, 0.1}, {DI, 0.1}, {pS,
0.1}, {pN, 2}}]
{qssFin1, DKssFin1, DIssFin1, pSssFin1, pNssFin1} = {q /. solFin1,
DK /. solFin1, DI /. solFin1, pS /. solFin1, pN /. solFin1}
dynEqu1 = {DI + (1 - delta) DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN1 beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
alpha DS0^(alpha) DK1^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI1/DK1)^(eta + 1))}
statEqu1 = {DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS0,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS0^(1 - alpha)}
subsVar = {DK -> X[1, j], DK1 -> X[1, j + 1], q -> W[1, j],
q1 -> W[1, j + 1], DI -> Y[1, j], DI1 -> Y[1, j + 1], pS -> Y[2, j],
pN -> Y[3, j], pN1 -> Y[3, j + 1]}
dynEquGN = dynEqu1 /. subsVar
statEquGN = statEqu1 /. subsVar
nX = 1;
nW = 1;
nY = 3;
n = 20;
Tshock = 2;
equMain =
Table[Join[Table[X[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nX}],
Table[W[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nW}] ] - (dynEquGN), {j, 0, n - 1}];
equStat = Table[statEquGN, {j, 0, n - 1}];
equBorder =
Join[{X[1, 0] - 0.01, W[1, n] - qssFin1, Y[1, n] - DIssFin1,
Y[2, n] - pSssFin1, Y[3, n] - pNssFin1}];
equations =
Join[Flatten[equMain], Flatten[equBorder], Flatten[equStat]];
start1 = {{X[1, j], DKssIni1}, {W[1, j], qssIni1}, {Y[1, j],
DIssIni1}, {Y[2, j], pSssFin1}, {Y[3, j], pNssFin1}}
startValues1 = Flatten[Table[start1, {j, 0, n}], 1];
Timing[sol2 = FindRoot[equations /. paramFinal, startValues1];]
Max[(equations /. paramFinal) /. sol2]
p1 = ListPlot[
Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}],
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AxesLabel -> {t, DK}, PlotRange -> All];
p2 = ListPlot[
Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 2, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}],
AxesLabel -> {t, q}, PlotRange -> All];
p3 = ListPlot[
Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}],
AxesLabel -> {t, DI}, PlotRange -> All];
p4 = ListPlot[
Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 4, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}],
AxesLabel -> {t, pS}, PlotRange -> All];
p5 = ListPlot[
Table[ sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 5, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}],
AxesLabel -> {t, pN}, PlotRange -> All];
GraphicsArray[{{p1, p2, p3}}]
GraphicsArray[{{p4, p5}}]
(*solution vectors*)
DKtrans0 = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
qtrans0 = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 2, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DItrans0 = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
pStrans0 = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 4, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
pNtrans0 = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 5, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DStrans0 = Table[1, {n}];
(*Initial values after labor market integration in t=2*)
q0 = qtrans0[[Tshock]]
DK0 = DKtrans0[[Tshock + 1]]
DI0 = DItrans0[[Tshock]]
pS0 = pStrans0[[Tshock]]
pN0 = pNtrans0[[Tshock]]
DS0 = 1
(*Final steady state after labor market integration*)
EquSSFinal2 = {DI + (1 - delta) DK - DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
alpha DS^(alpha) DK^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI/DK)^(eta + 1)) - q,
DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS^(1 - alpha), -(1 + rho) Log[
a/af] + (1 - gamma) (Log[pN/(v (af)^(1 - beta)/bf)] +
rho Log[pN/(v (af)^(1 - beta)/bf)])} /. paramFinal
solFin2 =
FindRoot[EquSSFinal2, {{q, 1.5}, {DK, 1}, {DI, 1}, {DS, 1}, {pS,
1}, {pN, 1}}]
{qssFin2, DKssFin2, DIssFin2, DSssFin2, pSssFin2,
pNssFin2} = {q /. solFin2, DK /. solFin2, DI /. solFin2,
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DS /. solFin2, pS /. solFin2, pN /. solFin2}
(*Transition to the steady state after labor market integration*)
dynEqu2 = {DI + (1 - delta) DK,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) q -
pN1 beta b (alpha (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^
alpha DS1^(alpha) DK1^(beta - 1) -
theta eta (DI1/DK1)^(eta + 1)), (b/
a alpha^(alpha) ((1 + rho)/(1 - gamma))^(1 -
alpha) (DK1)^(beta) v (af)^(1 - beta)/
bf Exp[(1 + rho) Log[a/af]/((1 - gamma) rho) -
Log[pN/(v (af)^(1 - beta)/bf)] 1/rho] )^(1/(1 - alpha))};
statEqu2 = {DI - ((q - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DK,
pS - (1 - alpha - beta) (1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) a DS,
pN - a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) DK^(-beta) DS^(1 - alpha)};
subsVar = {DK -> X[1, j], DK1 -> X[1, j + 1], q -> W[1, j],
q1 -> W[1, j + 1], DS -> W[2, j], DS1 -> W[2, j + 1],
DI -> Y[1, j], DI1 -> Y[1, j + 1], pS -> Y[2, j], pN -> Y[3, j],
pN1 -> Y[3, j + 1]};
dynEquGN = dynEqu2 /. subsVar;
statEquGN = statEqu2 /. subsVar;
nX = 1;
nW = 2;
nY = 3;
n = 20;
equMain =
Table[Join[Table[X[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nX}],
Table[W[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nW}] ] - (dynEquGN), {j, 0, n - 1}];
equStat = Table[statEquGN, {j, 0, n - 1}];
equBorder =
Join[{X[1, 0] - DK0, W[1, n] - qssFin2, W[2, n] - DSssFin2,
Y[1, n] - DIssFin2, Y[2, n] - pSssFin2, Y[3, n] - pNssFin2}];
equations =
Join[Flatten[equMain], Flatten[equBorder], Flatten[equStat]];
start1 = {{X[1, j], DKssFin2}, {W[1, j], qssFin2}, {W[2, j],
DSssFin2}, {Y[1, j], DIssFin2}, {Y[2, j], pSssFin2}, {Y[3, j],
pNssFin2}};
startValues1 = Flatten[Table[start1, {j, 0, n}], 1];
Timing[sol2 = FindRoot[equations /. paramFinal, startValues1];]
Max[(equations /. paramFinal) /. sol2]
DKtrans1 = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
qtrans1 = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 2, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DStrans1 = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DItrans1 = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 4, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
pStrans1 = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 5, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
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pNtrans1 = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 6, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
pntsx = Table[t - Tshock - 1, {t, 1, n + Tshock}];
pDK0 = Table[{pntsx[[i]], DKtrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}];
pDK1 = Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DKtrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, Tshock}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + Tshock]], DKtrans1[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]];
pq0 = Table[{pntsx[[i]], qtrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}];
pq1 = Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], qtrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, Tshock}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + Tshock]], qtrans1[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]];
pDS0 = Table[{pntsx[[i]], DStrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}];
pDS1 = Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DStrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, Tshock}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + Tshock]], DStrans1[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]];
pDI0 = Table[{pntsx[[i]], DItrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}];
pDI1 = Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DItrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, Tshock}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + Tshock]], DItrans1[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]];
pS0 = Table[{pntsx[[i]], pStrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}];
pS1 = Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], pStrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, Tshock}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + Tshock]], pStrans1[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]];
pN0 = Table[{pntsx[[i]], pNtrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}];
pN1 = Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], pNtrans0[[i]]}, {i, 1, Tshock}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + Tshock]], pNtrans1[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]];
p1 = ListPlot[{pDK0, pDK1}, Joined -> {False, True},
AxesOrigin -> {-Tshock, 0}, AxesLabel -> {t, D^K},
PlotRange -> All];
p2 = ListPlot[{pq0, pq1}, Joined -> {False, True},
AxesOrigin -> {-Tshock, 1.2}, AxesLabel -> {t, q},
PlotRange -> All];
p3 = ListPlot[{pDS0, pDS1}, Joined -> {False, True},
AxesOrigin -> {-Tshock, 0.9}, AxesLabel -> {t, D^S},
PlotRange -> All];
p4 = ListPlot[{pDI0, pDI1}, Joined -> {False, True},
AxesOrigin -> {-Tshock, 0.013}, AxesLabel -> {t, D^I},
PlotRange -> All];
p5 = ListPlot[{pS0, pS1}, Joined -> {False, True},
AxesOrigin -> {-Tshock, 0.032}, AxesLabel -> {t, p^Z},
PlotRange -> All];
p6 = ListPlot[{pN0, pN1}, Joined -> {False, True},
AxesOrigin -> {-Tshock, 1.7}, AxesLabel -> {t, p^N},
PlotRange -> All];
GraphicsGrid[{{p3, p1, p4}}]
GraphicsGrid[{{p2, p5, p6}}]
KK = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}]
LL = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}]
ppN = (a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) KK^(-beta) LL^(1 - alpha)) /. {paramFinal}
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Mathematica-Code: Figure 7.7
paramInitial = {r -> 1, rho -> 0.5, gamma -> 2/3, delta -> 0.5,
eta -> 1, theta -> 0.5, alpha -> 0.5, beta -> 0.3, kappa -> 0.5,
a -> 5.15, b -> 5.15, af -> 5, bf -> 5, DS0 -> 1}
paramFinal = {r -> 1, rho -> 0.5, gamma -> 2/3, delta -> 0.5,
eta -> 1, theta -> 0.5, alpha -> 0.5, beta -> 0.3, kappa -> 0.5,
a -> 5.15, b -> 5.15, af -> 5, bf -> 5, DS0 -> 1}
paramFor = {r -> 1, rho -> 0.5, gamma -> 2/3, delta -> 0.5, eta -> 1,
theta -> 0.5, alpha -> 0.5, beta -> 0.3, kappa -> 0.5, a -> 5,
b -> 5, DS0 -> 1}
EquSSFor = {DIT + (1 - delta) DKT - DKT, DIN + (1 - delta) DKN - DKN,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) qT -
a alpha (DKT)^(alpha - 1) (DST)^(1 - alpha) -
theta eta (DIT/DKT)^(eta + 1)) - qT,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) qN -
pN beta b (DKN)^(beta - 1) (DSN)^kappa -
theta eta (DIN/DKN)^(eta + 1)) - qN,
DIT - ((qT - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKT,
DIN - ((qN - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKN,
pN - a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)/(kappa b (DKN)^(beta) \
(DSN)^(kappa - 1)), ((1 - gamma)/(1 +
rho) + ((1 + r) (1 - gamma) rho)/(1 + rho)) a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)/pN DS0 -
b (DKN)^beta (DSN)^kappa, DS0 - DST - DSN,
w - a (1 - alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)} /. paramFor ;
solFor = FindRoot[
EquSSFor, {{qT, 1.5}, {DKT, 0.1}, {DIT, 0.1}, {qN, 1.5}, {DKN,
0.1}, {DIN, .1}, {DST, .5}, {DSN, .5}, {pN, 0.8}, {w, 0.8}}]
{qssTFor, qssNFor, DKTssFor, DKNssFor, DITssFor, DINssFor, DSTssFor,
DSNssFor, pNssFor, wssFor} = {qT /. solFor, qN /. solFor,
DKT /. solFor, DKN /. solFor, DIT /. solFor, DIN /. solFor,
DST /. solFor, DSN /. solFor, pN /. solFor, w /. solFor}
DSssFor = DS0 /. paramFor
UtOutpap = (1 +
rho) Log[(gamma^gamma (1 - gamma)^(1 - gamma))/(1 +
rho) w] - (1 - gamma) (1 + rho) Log[pN] /. paramFor /.
w -> wssFor /. pN -> pNssFor
UtOutpapNew = (1 +
rho) Log[(gamma^gamma (1 - gamma)^(1 - gamma))/(1 + rho) w] -
(1 - gamma) (1 + rho) Log[pN] + rho Log[(1 + r) rho] /.
paramFor /. w -> wssFor /. pN -> pNssFor
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UtOut = gamma Log[
gamma/(1 + rho) w] + (1 -
gamma) Log[(1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) w/pN] +
rho (gamma Log[
gamma (1 + r) rho/(1 + rho) w] + (1 -
gamma) Log[(1 - gamma) (1 + r) rho/(1 + rho) w/pN]) /.
paramFor /. w -> wssFor /. pN -> pNssFor
(*Initial steady state without labor market integration*)
EquSSIni = {DIT + (1 - delta) DKT - DKT, DIN + (1 - delta) DKN - DKN,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) qT -
a alpha (DKT)^(alpha - 1) (DST)^(1 - alpha) -
theta eta (DIT/DKT)^(eta + 1)) - qT,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) qN -
pN beta b (DKN)^(beta - 1) (DSN)^kappa -
theta eta (DIN/DKN)^(eta + 1)) - qN,
DIT - ((qT - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKT,
DIN - ((qN - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKN,
pN - a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)/(kappa b (DKN)^(beta) \
(DSN)^(kappa - 1)), ((1 - gamma)/(1 +
rho) + ((1 + r) (1 - gamma) rho)/(1 + rho)) a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)/pN DS0 -
b (DKN)^beta (DSN)^kappa, DS0 - DST - DSN,
w - a (1 - alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)} /. paramInitial ;
(*w-a (1-alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)*)
solIni = FindRoot[
EquSSIni, {{qT, 1.5}, {DKT, 0.1}, {DIT, 0.1}, {qN, 1.5}, {DKN,
0.1}, {DIN, .1}, {DST, .5}, {DSN, .5}, {pN, 0.8}, {w, 0.8}}]
{qssTIni, qssNIni, DKTssIni, DKNssIni, DITssIni, DINssIni, DSTssIni,
DSNssIni, pNssIni, wssIni} = {qT /. solIni, qN /. solIni,
DKT /. solIni, DKN /. solIni, DIT /. solIni, DIN /. solIni,
DST /. solIni, DSN /. solIni, pN /. solIni, w /. solIni}
DSssIni = DS0 /. paramInitial
(*Final steady state WITH labor market integration*)
EquSSFinal = {DIT + (1 - delta) DKT - DKT,
DIN + (1 - delta) DKN - DKN,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) qT -
a alpha (DKT)^(alpha - 1) (DST)^(1 - alpha) -
theta eta (DIT/DKT)^(eta + 1)) - qT,
1/(1 - delta) ((1 + r) qN -
pN beta b (DKN)^(beta - 1) (DSN)^kappa -
theta eta (DIN/DKN)^(eta + 1)) - qN,
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DIT - ((qT - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKT,
DIN - ((qN - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKN,
pN - a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha)/(kappa b (DKN)^(beta) \
(DSN)^(kappa - 1)),
w - a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha), ((1 - gamma)/(1 +
rho) + ((1 + r) (1 - gamma) rho)/(1 + rho)) w/pN DS -
b (DKN)^beta (DSN)^kappa, DS - DST - DSN,
gamma Log[
gamma/(1 + rho) w] + (1 -
gamma) Log[(1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) w/pN] +
rho (gamma Log[
gamma (1 + r) rho/(1 + rho) w] + (1 -
gamma) Log[(1 - gamma) (1 + r) rho/(1 + rho) w/pN]) -
UtOut} /. paramFinal
solFin = FindRoot[
EquSSFinal, {{qT, 1.5}, {DKT, 1}, {DIT, 1}, {qN, 1.5}, {DKN,
1}, {DIN, .1}, {DST, 2}, {DSN, 2}, {pN, 2}, {w, 2}, {DS, 10}}];
{qssTFin, qssNFin, DKTssFin, DKNssFin, DITssFin, DINssFin, DSTssFin,
DSNssFin, pNssFin, wssFin, DSssFin} = {qT /. solFin, qN /. solFin,
DKT /. solFin, DKN /. solFin, DIT /. solFin, DIN /. solFin,
DST /. solFin, DSN /. solFin, pN /. solFin, w /. solFin,
DS /. solFin}
dynEqu = {DIT + (1 - delta) DKT,
DIN + (1 - delta) DKN, (1 + r)/(1 - delta) qT -
1/(1 - delta) (a alpha (DKT1)^(alpha - 1) (DST1)^(1 - alpha) +
theta eta (DIT1/DKT1)^(eta + 1)), (1 + r)/(1 - delta) qN -
1/(1 - delta) (pN1 b beta (DKN1)^(beta - 1) (DSN1)^kappa +
theta eta (DIN1/DKN1)^(eta + 1))};
statEqu = {DIT - ((qT - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKT,
DIN - ((qN - 1)/((eta + 1) theta))^(1/eta) DKN,
pN - (a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha))/(kappa b (DKN)^(beta) \
(DSN)^(kappa - 1)),
w - a (1 -
alpha) (DKT)^(alpha) (DST)^(-alpha), ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho)) w/
pN DS + (((1 + r) (1 - gamma) rho)/(1 + rho)) w0/pN DS00 -
b (DKN)^beta (DSN)^kappa, DST + DSN - DS,
gamma Log[
gamma/(1 + rho) w] + (1 -
gamma) Log[(1 - gamma)/(1 + rho) w/pN] +
rho (gamma Log[
gamma (1 + r) rho/(1 + rho) w] + (1 -
gamma) Log[(1 - gamma) (1 + r) rho/(1 + rho) w/pN1]) -
UtOut};
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({DKTssFin, DKNssFin, qssTFin, qssNFin} - dynEqu) /. {qT -> qssTFin,
qN -> qssNFin, DKT -> DKTssFin, DKT1 -> DKTssFin, DKN -> DKNssFin,
DKN1 -> DKNssFin, DIT -> DITssFin, DIT1 -> DITssFin,
DIN -> DINssFin, DIN1 -> DINssFin, DST -> DSTssFin,
DST1 -> DSTssFin, DSN -> DSNssFin, DSN1 -> DSNssFin, pN -> pNssFin,
pN1 -> pNssFin, pN0 -> pNssFin, w -> wssFin, w0 -> wssFin,
DS -> DSssFin, DS00 -> DSssFin } /. paramFinal
statEqu /. {qT -> qssTFin, qN -> qssNFin, DKT -> DKTssFin,
DKT1 -> DKTssFin, DKN -> DKNssFin, DKN1 -> DKNssFin,
DIT -> DITssFin, DIT1 -> DITssFin, DIN -> DINssFin,
DIN1 -> DINssFin, DST -> DSTssFin, DST1 -> DSTssFin,
DSN -> DSNssFin, DSN1 -> DSNssFin, pN -> pNssFin, pN1 -> pNssFin,
pN0 -> pNssFin, w -> wssFin, w0 -> wssFin, DS -> DSssFin,
DS00 -> DSssFin } /. paramFinal
subsVar = {DKT -> X[1, j], DKT1 -> X[1, j + 1], DKN -> X[2, j],
DKN1 -> X[2, j + 1], qT -> W[1, j], qT1 -> W[1, j + 1],
qN -> W[2, j], qN1 -> W[2, j + 1], DIT -> Y[1, j],
DIT1 -> Y[1, j + 1], DIN -> Y[2, j], DIN1 -> Y[2, j + 1],
DST -> Y[3, j], DST1 -> Y[3, j + 1], DSN -> Y[4, j],
DSN1 -> Y[4, j + 1], pN -> Y[5, j], pN1 -> Y[5, j + 1],
pN0 -> Y[5, j - 1], w -> Y[6, j], w0 -> Y[6, j - 1], DS -> Y[7, j],
DS00 -> Y[7, j - 1]}
dynEquGN = dynEqu /. subsVar;
statEquGN = statEqu /. subsVar;
nX = 2;
nW = 2;
nY = 7;
n = 150;
equMain =
Table[Join[Table[X[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nX}],
Table[W[i, j + 1], {i, 1, nW}] ] - (dynEquGN), {j, 0, n - 1}];
equStat = Table[statEquGN, {j, 0, n}];
(*equBorder=Join[{X[1,0]-DKTssIni, X[2,0]-DKNssIni, W[1,n]-qssTFin, \
W[2,n]-qssNFin,Y[1,n]-DITssFin,Y[2,n]-DINssFin,Y[3,n]-DSTssFin,Y[4,n]-\
DSNssFin,Y[5,n]-pNssFin,Y[6,n]-wssFin,Y[7,n]-DSssFin}];*)
equBorder =
Join[{X[1, -1] - DKTssIni, X[1, 0] - DKTssIni, X[2, 0] - DKNssIni,
W[1, n] - qssTFin, W[2, n] - qssNFin, Y[4, -1] - DSNssIni,
Y[5, n + 1] - pNssFin, Y[6, -1] - wssIni, Y[7, -1] - DSssIni}];
equations =
Join[Flatten[equMain], Flatten[equBorder], Flatten[equStat]];
start1 = {{X[1, j], DKTssIni}, {X[2, j], DKNssIni}, {W[1, j],
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qssTIni}, {W[2, j], qssNIni}, {Y[1, j], DITssFin}, {Y[2, j],
DINssFin}, {Y[3, j], DSTssFin}, {Y[4, j], DSNssFin}, {Y[5, j],
pNssFin}, {Y[6, j], wssFin}, {Y[7, j], DSssFin}};
startValues1 = Flatten[Table[start1, {j, 0, n}], 1];
start2 = {{X[1, -1], DKTssIni}, {Y[4, -1], DSNssIni}, {Y[6, -1],
wssIni}, {Y[7, -1], DSssIni}, {Y[5, n + 1], pNssIni}};
startValues = Join[startValues1, start2];
Timing[sol2 = FindRoot[equations /. paramFinal, startValues];]
Max[(equations /. paramFinal) /. sol2]
DKTtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DKNtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 2, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
qTtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
qNtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 4, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DITtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 5, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DINtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 6, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DSTtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 7, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DSNtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 8, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
pNtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 9, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
wtrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 10, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DStrans = Table[sol2[[z, 2]], {z, 11, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}];
DKT0 = Table[DKTssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DKN0 = Table[DKNssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
qT0 = Table[qssTIni, {i, 1, 5}];
qN0 = Table[qssNIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DIT0 = Table[DITssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DIN0 = Table[DINssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DST0 = Table[DSTssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DSN0 = Table[DSNssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
pN0 = Table[pNssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
w0 = Table[wssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
DS0 = Table[DSssIni, {i, 1, 5}];
pntsx = Table[t - 6, {t, 1, n + 5}];
p1 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DKT0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DKTtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, D^KT}, PlotRange -> All];
p2 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DKN0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DKNtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, D^KN}, PlotRange -> All];
p3 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], qT0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], qTtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
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AxesLabel -> {t, q^T}, PlotRange -> All];
p4 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], qN0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], qNtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, q^N}, PlotRange -> All];
p5 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DIT0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DITtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, DI^T}, PlotRange -> All];
p6 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DIN0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DINtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, DI^N}, PlotRange -> All];
p7 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DST0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DSTtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, DS^T}, PlotRange -> All];
p8 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DSN0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DSNtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, DS^N}, PlotRange -> All];
p9 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], pN0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], pNtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, p^N}, PlotRange -> All];
p10 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], w0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], wtrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, w}, PlotRange -> All];
p11 = ListPlot[
Join[Table[{pntsx[[i]], DS0[[i]]}, {i, 1, 5}],
Table[{pntsx[[i + 5]], DStrans[[i]]}, {i, 1, n}]],
AxesLabel -> {t, DS}, PlotRange -> All];
GraphicsGrid[{{p1, p2, p3}, {p4, p5, p6}, {p7, p8, p11}}]
GraphicsGrid[{{p9, p10}}]
KK = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 1, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}]
LL = Table[sol2[[i, 2]], {i, 3, (nX + nW + nY) n, nX + nW + nY}]
ppN = (a/b alpha^(-alpha) ((1 - gamma)/(1 + rho))^(1 -
alpha) KK^(-beta) LL^(1 - alpha)) /. {paramFinal}
